

CONCEPTUAL INTERACTION BETWEEN METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS

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Abstract. There is no clear distinction between metonymy and metaphor. Specifying metaphor-metonymy interaction is a difficult task, particularly differentiating the two cognitive mechanisms from each other. There are a wide variety of opinion. In this paper we look mainly at two important issue, (i) what causes this interaction between metaphor and metonymy and (ii) how these two distinctly different processes blend. In Cognitive Linguistics metaphor and metonymy have both been explicitly recognized as central to a theory of knowledge organization. Metaphor and metonymy have both been described by Lakoff and his co-workers as mappings between conceptual domains. By means of metaphor we understand and reason about one conceptual domain in terms of another. Metonymy is a multilevel cognitive mechanism that can operate at the grammatical, lexical, syntactic, phonological, and discursive levels. According to cognitive linguists, metonymy is not merely a figure of speech; it is also a way of thinking and conceptualizing. Cognitive linguists, distinguish between metaphor and metonymy in terms of the number of domains involved. If the source and target belong to the same superordinate domain, we have a metonymy. If the source and target belong to two different superordinate domains, then we have a metaphor.

Keywords and expressions: metonymy, metaphor, conceptual interaction, metaphor-metonymy interaction, domain expansion, domain reduction, idealised cognitive models.

Аннотация. Метонимия ва метафора ўртасида аниқ фарқ йўқ. Метафора ва метонимиянинг ўзаро таъсирини аниқлаш қийин вазифадир, айниқса, агар иккита когнитив механизмни бир -биридан ажратса. Жуда хилма -хил фикрлар мавжуд. Ушбу мақолада биз асосан иккита муҳим масалани кўриб чиқамиз: (и) метафора ва метонимия ўртасидаги ўзаро таъсирга нима сабаб бўлади ва бу икки хил жараён қандай бирлаштирилади. Когнитив тилшуносликда метафора ва метонимия билимларни ташкил этиш назариясининг марказий қисми сифатида аниқ тан олинган. Метафора ҳам, метонимия ҳам Лакофф ва унинг ҳамкорлари томонидан контсептуал соҳаларни таққослаш сифатида тасвирланган. Метафора ёрдамида биз бир контсептуал соҳани тушунамиз ва бошқа нуқтаи назардан гаплашамиз. Метонимия-кўп даражали билиш механизми бўлиб, у грамматик, лексик, синтактик, фонологик ва дискурсив даражада ишлай олади. Когнитив тилшуносларнинг фикрига кўра, метонимия шунчаки нутқ фигураси эмас; бу ҳам фикрлаш ва фикрлаш усулидир. Когнитив тилшунослар метафора ва метонимияни иштирок этадиган соҳалар сонига қараб фарқлайдилар. Агар манба ва мақсад бир хил юқори доменга тегишли бўлса, бизда метафора бор.

Таянч сўз ва иборалар: метонимия, метафора, контсептуал ўзаро таъсир, метафора-метонимиянинг ўзаро таъсири, майдоннинг кенгайиши, майдоннинг камайиши, идеаллаштирилган когнитив моделлар.

Аннотация. Нет четкого различия между метонимией и метафорой. Определение взаимодействия метафоры и метонимии - сложная задача, особенно если дифференцировать два когнитивных механизма друг от друга. Есть самые разные мнения. В этой статье мы рассматриваем в основном два важных вопроса: (i) что вызывает это взаимодействие между метафорой и метонимией и (ii) как сочетаются эти два совершенно разных процесса. В когнитивной лингвистике метафора и метонимия были явно признаны центральными в теории организации знания. И метафора, и метонимия были описаны Лакоффом и его сотрудниками как сопоставления между концептуальными областями. С помощью метафоры мы понимаем одну концептуальную область и рассуждаем о ней с точки зрения другой. Метонимия - это многоуровневый когнитивный механизм, который может действовать на грамматическом, лексическом, синтаксическом, фонологическом и дискурсивном уровнях. Согласно когнитивным лингвистам, метонимия - это не просто фигура речи; это также способ мышления и осмысления. Когнитивные лингвисты различают метафору и метонимию с точки зрения количества вовлеченных областей. Если источник и цель принадлежат одному и





тому же вышестоящему домену, у нас есть метонимия. Если источник и цель принадлежат двум разным вышестоящим доменам, то у нас есть метафора.

Опорные слова и выражения: метонимия, метафора, концептуальное взаимодействие, взаимодействие метафора-метонимия, расширение области, сокращение области, идеализированные когнитивные модели.

In Cognitive Linguistics metonymy is also seen, like metaphor, as a conceptual mapping. In making the difference between metaphor and metonymy, Lakoff & Turner¹ have pointed out several distinguishing features:

(i) In metaphor there are two conceptual domains, while metonymy involves only one conceptual domain.

(ii) Metonymies, but not metaphors, involve a 'stand-for' relationship between the source and target domains. For example, if I say Chrysler has laid off a hundred workers, the name of the company stands for the person or persons in charge of the

company's employment policy. A well-known case of metonymy is ORDER FOR CUSTOMER as in The ham sandwich is waiting for his check², where "the ham sandwich" may be conventionally used by a waitress to refer to the 'customer who has ordered a ham sandwich.'

(iii) In metaphor a whole schematic structure, called the source domain, is mapped, together with its accompanying logic, onto another whole schematic structure, called the target, and its logic; the function of the mapping is to allow us to understand and reason about the target in terms of the source. In contrast, a metonymy is primarily used for reference: we refer to an entity by means of another entity.

According to Barcelona³, the interaction of both phenomena (metaphor and metonymy - H.G.) can be done explicitly through texts or can occur at a purely conceptual level. He emphasizes two types of interaction at the conceptual level: a) the metonymic conceptual motivation of metaphor and b) the metaphorical conceptual motivation of metonymy. For example: **Prick up one's ears** - qulaqlarını şəkləmək, diqqətlə qulaq asmaq. There are also linguists who have different approaches to domains. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibanez and Diez Velasco⁴ discuss two types of metonymy operations: domain expansion (source-in-target metonymy) and domain reduction (target-in-source metonymy). Source metonyms in the target include domain expansion, that is, they provide a complete transition to the matrix domain through one of their subdomains. Target metonyms in the source include domain reduction, which results in highlighting the relevant part of the domain. They do not accept part-to-part metonymies. Ruiz de Mendoza's theory is based on the criteria of distinguishing domains from subdomains. Croft's approach to distinguishing domains from subdomains is noteworthy. He describes the domain in his article "The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonyms" in this way: "We can now define a domain as a *semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one concept profile* (typically, many profiles)"⁵. Croft here from

⁵ Croft, W. 2003. The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. In R. Dirven and R. Porings (eds.), Metaphor and metonymy in comparison and contrast. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 166.



¹ Lakoff, G. and M. Turner (1989) More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor. University of Chicago Press, pp. 103.

² Lakoff, G., M. Johnson (1980) Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press, pp. 35.

³ Barcelona, A. 2003. Introduction. The cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy. In: A. Barcelona (ed.) Metaphor and Metonymy at the crossroads. A Cognitive Perspective. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

⁴ Ruiz de Mendoza Ibanez, Francisco J., and Olga J. Diez Velasco. 2002. Patterns of conceptual interaction. In Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, Rene Dirven, and Ralf Pörings (eds.), 489–532 (Cognitive Linguistics Research 20.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

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two terms put forward by R. Langaker; uses the *base* and *profile*, and perceives the relationship between them as presupposition: "...the base is usually taken to be just the domain immediately presupposed by the profiled concept". He calls the base of the profiled concept the *base domain*. This approach is consistent with Ruiz de Mendoza's concept of the matrix domain. It should be noted that Ruiz de Mendoza Ibanez's *matrix domain* and R. Longaker's *domain matrix* differ. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibanez and Diez Velasco present four models of interaction in their article "Patterns of conceptual interaction"²:

- 1. Interaction based on image schemas;
- 2. Interaction between propositional cognitive models in metaphoric settings;
- 3. Interaction involving metonymic models;
- 4. Interaction between metaphor and metonymy.

Metonymy is a multilevel cognitive mechanism that can operate at the grammatical, lexical, syntactic, phonological, and discursive levels.

Radden, G., & Kövecses, Z.³ explain metonymy based on G.Lakoff's idealized cognitive model. They note that metonymy is understood as a conceptual process that is mentally perceived by one conceptual entity, 'target', another conceptual entity 'mechanism' (vehicle) within the same ICM (idealized cognitive model - H.G.), one expressing the other, i.e. metonymy is a reversible process. For Radden & Kövecses, in classifying metonyms into 'sign', 'reference' and 'concept' metonyms, metonyms are used at each of the three points of the semiotic triangle, only 'concept metonyms' is reversible. Each ICM offers three 'ontological worlds', 'worlds of realities' (things and events), 'worlds of conceptualization' and 'worlds of language' (forms), representing the three points of the semiotic triangle, all of which can lead to metonymy. These worlds cover the three entities [. . .]: thought, characters, and referent; that create the famous semiotic triangle developed by Ogden and Richards. Radden & Kövecses⁴ distinguish two main types of ICM:

1. ICMs which interrelate entities of different ontological realms within the same semiotic unit:

a) The state of the connected ontological realms gives rise to two ICMs: a pair of concepts and forms generate a sign, and can be described as 'Sign ICMs' (italics H.G.). Sign ICMs combine form and one or more concepts, thus creating the metonym FORM FOR CONCEPT. The form expresses the concept that it defines metonymically. For example, the word or sign of the *dollar* is associated with \$ *money*;

b) the pairing, shape, and concept of a thing or event and sign creates a reference situation and can be described as '**Reference ICMs'** (italics H.G.). Reference ICMs promote the emergence of three types of metonymy:

- FORM - CONCEPT FOR THING/EVENT (where, e.g. the word/concept cow "stands for" a real cow);

- CONCEPT FOR THING / EVENT (here the concept of **cow** means any *cow*). This situation is called Reference-via-Meaning ICM by G. Lakoff;

⁴ Radden, G., & Kövecses, Z. (1999). Towards a theory of metonymy. In K. Panther & G. Radden (Eds.), Metonymy in language and thought (pp. 17–59). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.), pp. 23.



¹ Croft, W. 2003. The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies. In R. Dirven and R. Porings (eds.), Metaphor and metonymy in comparison and contrast. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 167.

² Ruiz de Mendoza Ibanez, Francisco J., and Olga J. Diez Velasco. 2002. Patterns of conceptual interaction. In Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, Rene Dirven, and Ralf Pörings (eds.), 489–532 (Cognitive Linguistics Research 20.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

³ Radden, G., & Kövecses, Z. (1999). Towards a theory of metonymy. In K. Panther & G. Radden (Eds.), Metonymy in language and thought (pp. 17–59). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.)

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- FORM FOR THING/EVENT (where, e.g. the word- form cow "stands for" a real cow or where a proper name (e.g. John Smith) is used for the person of that name. Radden and Kövecses call it the Direct- Reference ICM.

2. ICMs which interrelate entities of different semiotic units within the same ontological realm or realms and which give rise to Concept ICMs. Concept ICMs in turn lead to the following metonymic relationships:

a) FORMA - CONCEPTA FOR FORMB - CONCEPTB (e.g. bus -"bus" which "stands for" bus driver -"bus driver");

b) FORM - CONCEPTA FOR CONCEPTB (e.g. mother - "mother" which "stands for" "housewife mother");

c) FORMA - CONCEPTA FOR FORMA - CONCEPTB (e.g. White House "place" which "stands for" White House "institution");

d) FORMA - CONCEPTA FOR FORMB - CONCEPTA (e.g. UN which "stands for" United Nations). These examples are *linguistic metonyms*, as noted by Panther and Thornburg, because "when the source content is expressed by a linguistic sign (a lexeme or a syntagmatic combination of lexemes), one can speak of a *linguistic metonymy*"¹

Goossens explores the interaction between metonymy and metaphor and identifies four categories of 'metaphtonymy': 'metaphor from metonymy', 'metonymy within metaphor', 'metaphor within metonymy' and 'demetonization in a metaphorical context'².

Goossens used the term 'metaphor from metonymy' to describe the formation of many metonyms from metaphorical expressions, for example, *close-lipped, tongue in cheek* etc.. As an example of the phrase 'metonymy within metaphor', Goossens uses the phrase to shoot your mouth off. Here, the mouth expresses speech (metonymy) and expression means to reveal the mystery (metaphor). He tries to show the possibility of working together, despite the fact that both metaphor and metonymy are different within an expression.

Panther & Thornburg³ notes that metonymy has two other relationships besides the reference relationship, the reference phenomenon: (i) referential metonyms, (ii) predicational metonyms, and (iii) illocutionary metonyms. Examples of reference metonyms include $A\breve{g} Ev$ (*The White House*), which represents the US leadership, the President, or his spokesmen. Example of predicative metonyms: O *getmali oldu (He had to leave)*. In this sentence, the source (had to leave) is the same as the target. Scholars call the combination of reference metonyms and predicative metonyms *propositional metonymy*. They try to explain the illocutive categories through scenarios: "... speech acts are actions, and they share certain features with non-linguistic actions. Like other actions, they have "phases" or "stages" or "conditions" for successful performance. The scenario of a speech act represents the whole or its central element, in the words of Panther & Thornburg, the "core". Scholars describe the scenario for the request as follows:

(i) The BEFORE: H can do A, S wants H to do A

(ii) The CORE: S puts H under a (more or less strong) obligation to do A.

The RESULT: H is under an obligation to do A (H must/should/ought to do A).

³ Panther, Klaus-Uwe & Thornburg, Linda. 2007. "Metonymy," in: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 236-263.



¹ Panther, Klaus-Uwe & Thornburg, Linda. 2007. "Metonymy," in: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 240.

² Goossens, L. (1990). Metaphtonymy: The interaction of metaphor and metonymy in expressions for linguistic action. Cognitive Linguistics, 1 (3), 323–340.)



(iii) The AFTER: H will do A^1 .

They show that different parts of the scenario can represent a whole illocutive category.

In his book "Metonymy and Language"², Charles Denrosh proposes a new theory of language and communication in which metonymy and metonymic processing play a key role. This theory shows how cognitive ability is necessary at all levels of language use in understanding the relationship between signs and parts of signs. The scholar develops it within the framework of the General Theory of Metonymy. Let's take a look at his views: "By 'metonymy' I mean the recognition of part-whole relatedness between things, words and concepts.... metonymy plays a fundamental role in conceptualization and communication... Things, words and concepts are related if they have an element in common, if a part-whole relationship exists between them. The part may be a physical part or an attribute. It is the manipulation of these 'parts' which allows us to realize the full meaningmaking potential of the lexicon and the fullest expression of our conceptual system. It is argued in this study that morphology, syntax, lexis and phraseology, as they are conventionally represented, account only for basic meaning making in language, and that it is metonymy - or better, 'metonymic processing'- which gives us the flexibility and subtleties on and above those systems, on which we constantly rely in our social dealings with others"³. Charles Denroche tries to justify the transition from metaphor to metonymy and argues that metonymy is more fundamental than metaphor. He uses Frege's sense/reference to clarify his point. With these notions, he draws parallels between Saussure's 'langue' (language) and 'parole' (speech) and Chomsky's 'competence' and 'performance'. Sense is the meaning of the word 'complete', and reference is the meaning of 'part', and the connection between sense/reference is metonymic according to Denroche. Denroche argues that the General Theory of Metonymy has a wide range of relevance, plays an important role in conceptualization, language system and face-to-face interaction using language, is important in defining categories of metonymy, pragmatically, literary and metaphorical meaning, as well as metonymic meaning.

One of the main means of nominativeness is metonymy, which has a special role in expanding the meaning of the word. The difference with the metaphor is that it has no semantic similarity. Metonymy is a kind of metaphor realized on the principle of connection and substitution. Within this process, different objects, events, and signs replace each other within certain time and space. The language of metonyms adorns it with its conciseness, brevity, expressiveness and implicitness, making it more attractive.



¹ Thornburg, L. and Panther, K-U. 1997. "Speech act metonymies", in Liebert W. A. et al. (eds.), Discourse and Perspectives in Cognitive Linguistics. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, pp. 208.

² Denroche, Charles. (2015). Metonymy and language: a new theory of linguistic processing. Taylor & Francis.

³ Denroche, Charles. (2015). Metonymy and language: a new theory of linguistic processing. Taylor & Francis, pp. 1.