International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
32
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ijhps
VOLUME
Vol.05 Issue01 2025
PAGE NO.
32-36
10.37547/ijhps/Volume05Issue01-09
Evolution of Q
atar’s foreign policy in
Afghanistan
Aitov Marat Rakhmatullaevich
Independent researcher, Uzbekistan
Received:
26 October 2024;
Accepted:
28 December 2024;
Published:
30 January 2025
Abstract:
The author divided the evolution of Qatar's foreign policy in Afghanistan into four stages. The emirate
purposefully increased its efforts in the Afghan track, wisely using its existing capabilities. No less importantly,
Qatar took into account the shortcomings of its policy in a number of countries (Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and partly
Palestine). As a result, for some time the Emirate became the center of attraction for the international community
on almost all key issues related to Afghanistan.
The article also paid attention to the intricacies of diplomatic work on organizing a political office of the Taliban
Movement in Doha, which became a turning point for Qatar's policy in Afghanistan.
Keywords:
Qatar, Afghanistan, Taliban, conflict, negotiations, settlement.
Introduction:
Currently, the system of international
relations is undergoing a radical transformation.
Geopolitical confrontation between the main centers
of power is intensifying. Against the backdrop of a
gradual weakening of the role of the United States, the
process of transition from a unipolar to a multipolar
world is underway. Russia, China, Turkey and a number
of other countries are increasingly persistently
promoting their interests on the world stage.
In these conditions, the role of medium and small
countries, which previously were assigned an
insignificant, and sometimes absolutely no role in
global politics, is increasing. One of them is the state of
Qatar, located in the Persian Gulf. Occupying an area of
11 thousand square kilometers and having its own
population of 400 thousand people, the emirate is
pursuing an ambitious foreign policy, seemingly
disproportionate to its indicators.
The main priority of Qatar's foreign policy is the
peaceful settlement of disputes through mediation. In
this regard, Doha has recently sought to play an
important role in resolving a number of conflicts in the
Middle East and North Africa (Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen,
Palestine).
In this context, the emirate has made the most progress
in Afghanistan - since 2013, the Taliban Movement's
political office has been operating in Doha, in February
2020, a peace agreement was signed between the
United States and the Taliban in the Qatari capital, and
in September 2020, Qatar hosted historic peace talks
between the government of Afghanistan and the
Taliban.
Qatar's role in Afghanistan has especially increased
after the fall of Ghani’s government and the Taliban's
rise to power. Doha played a critical role in the
evacuation of thousands of Afghans and Western
citizens, and also took on the role of the main mediator
between Western countries and the new Afghan
government.
At the same time, Qatar has managed to become one
of the main players in the Afghan settlement in a
relatively short historical period. Given this, it is
appropriate to study the evolution of Qatar's Afghan
policy. In chronological order, it can be divided into
several successive stages.
The first stage - Qatar remains in the shadow of its
Arab allies
The first stage (1971-1996) of Qatar's policy in
Afghanistan covers a fairly significant period of time -
from the period when the emirate gained
independence (1971) until the first coming to power of
the Taliban (1996). At the same time, due to various
factors, the emirate was unable to take an active part
in the turbulent events unfolding in Afghanistan.
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
33
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ijhps
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences (ISSN
–
2771-2222)
In December 1979, the USSR sent troops to
Afghanistan, causing discontent and public outcry in
Muslim countries. Soon, a global jihad against the
largest atheistic state began in Afghanistan, in which a
number of Qatar's neighbors in the Persian Gulf were
involved in one way or another.
According to some reports, during the war in
Afghanistan (1979-1989), Saudi Arabia provided
military and financial assistance to the Afghan
opposition in the amount of $3 billion. In turn, Arab
private donors and NGOs also provided generous
financial assistance to the mujahideen, annually
allocating about $400 million [1].
According to various estimates, approximately 35
thousand foreign Muslims from 43 Islamic countries
took part in the war. Among them were about 25
thousand Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco, Sudan and a number of other countries [2].
At the same time, Qatar was unable to take an active
part in Afghan affairs. First of all, this is due to the
rather difficult economic situation in which the emirate
found itself due to the fall in oil prices in the 1980s. By
1986, prices for "black gold" reached below $10 per
barrel.
As a result, the emirate's budget became deficit in 1985
and, according to the Planning Council, in the 15 years
leading up to 2000, only one fiscal year, 1990
–
1991,
was profitable [3]. Real GDP per capita in the emirate
fell by more than half, from $31,000 in 1984 to $15,000
in 1994.
Against this backdrop, Emir Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad
Al Thani was forced to implement austerity measures
in the mid-1980s. Public discontent was growing in the
emirate, and a series of strikes swept across the
country, during which political demands were put
forward.
Under these circumstances, Qatar could not afford to
get involved in a costly adventure in Afghanistan. The
young and immature state had to address more
pressing socio-economic issues. Otherwise, Doha could
face popular unrest.
Perhaps Qatar, which practices the Wahhabi sect of
Islam, wanted to support the mujahideen in
Afghanistan, but the emirate had neither the financial
capacity nor the human resources to do so. In 1980, the
population of the emirate was only 220,000 (including
immigrants from other countries). Given this, the
Qatari authorities would hardly have allowed even the
most ideological of their citizens to risk their lives in
Afghanistan
The second stage - Qatar seeks to find its niche in
Afghanistan
The second stage (1996-2010) is characterized by
Qatar's attempt to take its place in the Afghan issue.
Qatar maintained very close relations with the Taliban,
although it did not recognize Taliban’s authority during
their first rule (1996-2001).
As one of the key US allies in the Middle East, Doha did
not join the US-led military operation in Afghanistan in
response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
In this context, it is significant that on November 16,
2001, the Americans “mistakenly” dropped bombs on
the offices of the Qatari satellite television channel Al
Jazeera in Kabul. The Pentagon denied that the channel
was deliberately targeted, but could not explain the
reason for the attack [4].
After the fall of the Taliban regime, several high-ranking
figures of the Movement even sought asylum in Qatar.
Doha rejected them for a number of reasons, including
the fact that the Taliban were on the UN/US sanctions
list.
However, some lower-ranking Taliban managed to
travel to Qatar and other Gulf states under the guise of
ordinary Afghan workers and businessmen. Given the
presence of Afghan diasporas in these countries, they
could easily mix with them and live without attracting
much attention.
However, after the sanctions were lifted, a number of
high-ranking Taliban still emigrated to Doha. In
particular, in 2011, former Guantanamo prisoner and
Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Abdul Salam
Zaif moved from Kabul to Qatar with his family [5].
The third stage
–
Doha’s involvement in Afghan
settlement issues
In the third stage (2010-2021), the emirate becomes
one of the key players on the Afghan track. This was
primarily facilitated by the opening of the Taliban
political office in Doha in 2013. Thanks to this, the
Qatari capital is turning into a diplomatic hub in Afghan
settlement issues.
The consolidation of Qatar in Afghanistan was largely
facilitated by the US fatigue with the “endless war” in
this country. The Americans imagined a new Vietnam,
and, in an attempt to prevent it, Washington tried to
set ground for establishing direct contacts with the
Taliban.
In particular, in 2008-2009, the United States and its
NATO allies began to attempt to start negotiations with
the Taliban. In September 2009, German intelligence
officers and diplomats met with the Taliban in Dubai.
Over the course of the year, Germany held eight more
meetings with the Movement.
This laid the foundation for the involvement of the
United States in the negotiation process with the
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
34
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ijhps
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences (ISSN
–
2771-2222)
Taliban. On November 28, 2010, the first direct meeting
between the United States and representatives of the
Movement took place near Munich. However,
according to Pakistani journalist A. Rashid, the Taliban
wanted to see a neutral Muslim country at the table, so
they asked to invite Qatari officials to the meeting.
In February and May 2010, two more meetings
between the United States and the Movement took
place in Qatar and Germany. The parties tried to
develop measures to strengthen confidence between
the Taliban and the Americans, which included lifting
sanctions on the Taliban, releasing imprisoned
Movement fighters, and opening a representative
office of the Movement [6].
In 2011, with the assistance of the United States and
the government of Qatar, families of members of the
Qatari political office were transported from Pakistan
to Doha [7]. On June 18, 2013, the ceremonial opening
of the political office of the Taliban Movement in Doha
took place, which had far-reaching consequences for
the Afghan settlement.
According to Afghan scholar O. Nessar, in addition to
legalizing the Taliban's contacts with representatives of
foreign states and international organizations, the
opening of the office made it possible to partially
remove the Taliban movement from Pakistan's
influence. According to various sources, there were up
to 500-600 Taliban and members of their families in the
Qatari capital, led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.
Before this, the families of leading Taliban figures were
effectively hostages in Pakistan, which ensured the
"good behavior" of the Taliban [8].
The placement of the Taliban political office gave Qatar
the opportunity to exert a certain influence on the
parties to the Afghan settlement. Just a year after the
Taliban office began operating, the Taliban exchanged
prisoners of war with the United States (2014) through
the mediation of the Emir of Qatar.
In response to the release of Sergeant B. Bergdahl, the
United States released a number of high-ranking
members of the movement from Guantanamo Bay.
Among them were the former governor of Herat
Province and one of the founders of the group,
Khairullah Khairkhwa, the former commander of the
army, Mullah Mohammed Fazl, the former civilian head
of the northern zone, Norullah Nuri, and the former
deputy head of intelligence, Abdul Haq Wasiq. [9]. All
of them subsequently began working in the Taliban
political office in Doha.
Not stopping there, Doha continued its activities in this
direction. With the direct participation of the Emir of
Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hammad al-Thani, in the
summer of 2015, the Taliban freed four Tajik border
guards who had crossed the border of Kunduz Province
in search of firewood. In total, the soldiers spent more
than 6 months in captivity.
It is quite natural that the presence of the political
office of the Taliban in Qatar caused discontent in
Afghanistan and a number of Arab countries of the
Persian Gulf. In February 2017, the President of the IRA
Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, participating in negotiations
with the Qatari authorities, stated that the office of the
insurgent movement should be closed if the Taliban did
not abandon violent armed struggle [10].
Moreover, according to O. Nessar, the increasing
influence of foreign countries on the peace process in
Afghanistan and the Taliban caused concerns in
Washington, which sought to maintain monopoly
control over issues of war and peace in this country. In
July 2018, the New York Times reported that “the
Trump administration has instructed the State
Department to prepare for direct negotiations with the
Taliban.” An important moment in this regard was the
appointment of Z. Khalilzad as the US Special
Representative for Afghan Reconciliation in September
2018. The emphasis was on the fact that Khalilzad is an
ethnic Pashtun, knows Afghanistan well and is allegedly
close to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani [11].
According to the US Congressional Research Service,
two confidential meetings were held in Doha between
US officials and Taliban representatives. The first was
held with the participation of Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State E. Wells (July 2018), the second - with
US Special Representative for Afghanistan Z. Khalilzad
(October 2018). At the same time, Washington did not
officially confirm the fact that the above-mentioned
meetings were held [12].
Moreover, the United States also attempted to change
the negotiating platform. This was facilitated by offers
from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which promised to
organize meetings with the “real” Taliban leader
s. In
2018, Khalilzad held talks in Dubai and Abu Dhabi,
which, however, ended in complete failure [13].
In October 2018, the Trump administration began
formal direct talks with the Taliban in Doha, to which
members of the Afghan government were not invited.
A total of 9 rounds of talks took place, which lasted 18
months with varying success. On February 29, 2020, the
United States and the Taliban signed a historic peace
agreement in Doha. Its provisions included the
withdrawal of all Western troops from Afghanistan, a
promise by the Taliban to prevent al-Qaeda activity in
areas under Taliban control, and negotiations between
the Taliban and the Afghan government.
The agreement set a timeline for the withdrawal of
American and coalition troops. In fact, it opened the
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
35
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ijhps
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences (ISSN
–
2771-2222)
way for the complete withdrawal of Western troops,
accompanied by the fall of the A. Ghani regime and the
coming to power of Taliban. At the same time, it is quite
obvious that the withdrawal of the American
contingent from Afghanistan is not a direct
consequence of the Doha deal, but of the
miscalculations and mistakes made by Washington
during its 20 years of presence in Afghanistan.
Stage Four - Qatar's transformation into a key player
on the Afghan track
Stage Four (August 15, 2021 - present) marked the
apotheosis of Qatari policy in Afghanistan. The Taliban
Movement's rise to power in Afghanistan, considered a
disaster by many countries, opened a new window of
opportunity for Qatar. Taking advantage of its position
in Afghanistan, as well as its connections with the
Taliban leadership, the emirate stepped up its policy in
this direction.
Qatar played one of the key roles in the evacuation of
foreign citizens and Afghans from Afghanistan. The
emirate placed the evacuees at the Al Udeid military
base, which became the main transit point for
passengers from Afghanistan. According to Qatari data,
more than 75 thousand were placed there in the initial
stages of the seizure of power, according to American
data - 58 thousand. In total, during this period, a total
of 124 thousand people were taken out of Afghanistan
[14].
In addition, Qatari officials secured a decision from the
new Afghan authorities to extend the evacuation
period for all those who wanted to leave the country.
The Qatari ambassador to Afghanistan personally
accompanied people leaving through Taliban’s
checkpoint.
Together with Turkey, the Qatari authorities, under
security guarantees provided by the Taliban, restored
the operation of the control and technical services of
the international airport in Kabul, which allowed
humanitarian and domestic flights to resume in early
September 2021.
According to American analyst D. Esfandiari, "no
country has managed to carry out a large-scale
evacuation process without the participation of Qatar."
The evacuation was carried out either by planes of the
national carrier Qatar Airways, or through the
American Al-Udeid airbase, from where foreign citizens
could fly to third countries. Moreover, Qatar financed
the construction of an emergency field hospital,
shelters and toilets, and ensured the uninterrupted
delivery of essential supplies [15].
Qatar's efforts were recognized by the United States.
On August 20, 2021, then-US President Joseph Biden
thanked Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani for his
assistance in organizing the evacuation. Biden noted
that "this was the largest airlift operation in history, and
it could not have been done without the assistance of
Qatar."
Qatar received the greatest dividends in the diplomatic
space. After the Taliban captured Kabul, most Western
embassies - the United States, Great Britain, Italy,
Japan and other countries - were moved to Qatar.
Against this background, Western diplomats and
politicians began to visit Doha more often.
In August-September 2021, the heads of the diplomatic
missions of the United States, Germany, Great Britain,
the Netherlands and Italy visited Qatar. Moreover, in
November 2021, the United States and Qatar agreed
that the Qatari embassy would represent the
diplomatic interests of the American side in
Afghanistan.
US-Taliban meetings in Qatar continued after the
Taliban seized power in Afghanistan. On October 8,
2022, senior White House officials held their first talks
with the Taliban in Doha since the elimination of al-
Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The American delegation included CIA Deputy Director
David Cohen and Special Representative for
Afghanistan Thomas West. The Taliban were
represented by the head of the intelligence agency,
Mullah Abdul Haq Wasiq. Thus, for a time, Qatar
became the main mediator between the collective
West and the new Afghan authorities. There has never
been a precedent like this before or since in the modern
history of Qatar. The emirate's diplomacy has reached
unprecedented heights. For a state that was under
economic and diplomatic blockade just a couple of
years ago, this is a major achievement.
CONCLUSIONS
Qatar's foreign policy in Afghanistan has gone through
several successive stages. The Emirate gradually
increased its efforts in the Afghan direction, wisely
using its existing capabilities. No less importantly, Qatar
took into account some of the shortcomings of its
policy (Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and partly Palestine), so it
did not force its participation in Afghan affairs.
The turning point that determined Qatar's role in
Afghanistan was the opening of the political office of
the Doha. From that moment on, Doha actively joined
the struggle for advanced positions in the Afghan track.
The Emirate hosted the first intra-Afghan negotiations,
facilitated the signing of a peace agreement between
the United States and the Doha, and also provided a
platform for negotiations between the Taliban and the
United States and a number of other countries. During
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
36
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ijhps
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences (ISSN
–
2771-2222)
the hasty and, frankly speaking, poorly organized
campaign to evacuate foreigners and Afghans, Qatar
played a critical role, allowing Western countries to
withdraw thousands of people and save some face.
As a result, the emirate became the center of gravity of
the international community on almost all key issues
concerning Afghanistan. For some time, Doha became
the main mediator between Western countries and the
Taliban. After the fall of the A. Ghani regime, many
Western embassies were relocated to Doha. Naturally,
this status is temporary. Qatar does not have the
strength or the ability to occupy such a position for a
long time. However, the very fact that such a small
state has received this status in such a complex case as
the Afghan conflict seems to be a unique phenomenon
that should be studied in the world's leading diplomatic
academies.
REFERENCES
Коргун В.Г. История Афганистана. XX век. М.: ИВ РАН:
2004.
–
C.45.
Бирден М. Афганистан –
кладбище империй
//
Россия в глобальной политике. 2021. Т. 19. No. 5. –
С.
10-22.
Дербенев А.С. Катар в конце XX
-
начале XXI в.:
динамика политических процессов // Вестник
Московского
университета.
Серия
13.
Востоковедение.
2019.
№1.
URL:
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/katar-v-kontse-xx-
nachale-xxi-v-dinamika-politicheskih-protsessov (date
of access: 05.02.2022).
Al-Jazeera accuses US of bombing its Kabul office.
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2001/nov/17/w
arinafghanistan2001.afghanistan, November 17, 2001.
How
Qatar
came
to
host
the
Taliban.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23007401,
June 22, 2013.
Ahmed Rashid: Talks with Taliban must be secret to be
successful.
https://www.afghanistan-
analysts.org/en/recommended-reading/ahmed-
rashid-talks-with-taliban-must-be-secret-to-be-
successful/, (date of access: 04.02.2022).
О.Нессар.
Афганский
марафон:
почему
на
переговорах в Дохе никто не спешит // ИМЭМО РАН.
2021. №1 (60). https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/
afganskiy-marafon-pochemu-na-peregovorah-v-dohe-
nikto-ne-speshit (date of access: 02.11.2023).
Руттиг Т. Дорога через Катар: путь в тупик?
Возможности и препятствия для политического
решения в Афганистане с участием «Талибана» //
Центральная Азия и Кавказ. 2013. №3. URL:
https://cyberleninka.
ru/article/n/doroga-cherez-katar-put-v-tupik-
vozmozhnosti-i-prepyatstviya-dlya-politicheskogo-
resheniya-v-afganistane-s-uchastiem-talibana (date of
access: 02.11.2023).
Освобождение
талибов
из
Гуантанамо
–
неоднозначная
оценка
экспертов.
https://www.golosameriki.com/a/analysts-unclear-on-
impact-of-taliban
-prisoner-release-
/1930351.html. июнь 2014.
Ханова Н. Представительство «Талибана» в Катаре:
cудьба американского проекта // Афганистан.Ру.
09.10.2017. URL: https://afghanistan.
ru/doc/115210.html, (date of access: 03.02.2022
Мачитидзе Г.Г. США
-
Талибан: сравнительный
анализ этапов переговоров // Сравнительная
политика. 2020. №1. URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/
article/n/ssha-taliban-sravnitelnyy-analiz-etapov-
peregovorov, (date of access: 02.11.2023).
Clayton T. Momentum Toward Peace Talks in
Afghanistan / Congressional Research Service.
Washington,
2018.
Mode
of
access:
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN109
35/
The same resource.
Qatar helped evacuate over 75,000 from Afghanistan’.
https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/20/08/2023/qa
tar-helped-evacuate-over-75000-from-afghanistan,
August 20, 2021.
Хайруллин Т., Коротаев А. Борьба между катарско
-
турецким и саудовско
-
эмиратским блоком за
влияние в Афганистане // Контуры глобальных
трансформаций: политика, экономика, право.
2022.
№2. URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/borba
-
mezhdu-katarsko-turetskim-i-saudovsko-emiratskim-
blokom-za-vliyanie-v-afganistane (date of access:
18.05.2023).
