

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE TROOPS JALOLIDDIN MANGUBERDI

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Abstract: This article presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence system in the troops of Jaloliddin Manguberdi, the last ruler of the Khorezmshah Empire. Based on a wide range of historical sources, the methods of organizing military intelligence, the specifics of collecting information and their impact on the military campaigns of Manguberdi's army during the period of resistance to the Mongol invasion in the first half of the 13th century are studied. The study reveals the unique features of the Khorezm intelligence system, which allowed it to effectively resist superior enemy forces.

Key words: Jaloliddin Manguberdi, military intelligence, Khorezm, Mongol invasion, military history, medieval intelligence, tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence, military organization, medieval military art.

The military art of medieval Central Asia is a unique phenomenon in which intelligence activities played a key role in ensuring military success. Of particular interest to researchers is the period of Jaloliddin's reign Manguberdi (1220-1231), the last Khorezmshah of the Anushteginid dynasty, who proved himself to be a skilled commander who managed to create an effective system of military intelligence in the face of Mongolian expansion. As Z.M. Buniyatov notes in his fundamental work "The State of the Khorezmshahs – Anushteginids", Manguberdi's intelligence service was a well-organized structure, which largely determined the success of the Khorezm army in a number of battles against the Mongols [1].

In the early 13th century, the Khorezm Empire, which spanned modern-day Iran, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, faced the Mongol threat. Following the execution of Mongol envoys by Khorezmshah Muhammad II in 1218, Chenghis Khan launched an invasion, and by 1220 the major cities of Khorezm – Bukhara, Samarkand, and Urgench – had been destroyed [2]. Muhammad II died, and his son Jaloliddin inherited the title of Khorezmshah, leading the resistance. An- Nasawi writes that Jaloliddin "Gathered his scattered forces and headed for Khorasan to continue the struggle" [3]. His army, made up of Turkic, Persian, and Afghan warriors, was small, making intelligence vital to survival.

Research into the intelligence activities of Jaloliddin's troops Manguberdi is based on a number of primary sources and modern research. The fundamental source is the work of Manguberdi's personal secretary, Shihab ad-Din Muhammad an- Nasawi, "Sirat as-sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni", which describes in detail the methods of conducting intelligence and the organization of military affairs [3]. Additional information is contained in the works of the Arab geographer Yakut al- Hamawi, who described the military organization of Khorezm at that time [4].

Intelligence service in the troops of Jaloliddin Manguberdi had a complex hierarchical structure, headed by the chief of intelligence (amir-i jasus), who reported directly to the ruler. According to Petrushevsky's research, the system included several levels [5]:

Strategic intelligence (ulug jasus):

collecting information about the enemy's plans;
analysis of the political situation;
assessment of the enemy's military potential.

Tactical reconnaissance (kichik jasus):

reconnaissance of the area;
observation of troop movements;
collecting information about the enemy's immediate plans.

Agent network (jasus -i pinhani):

infiltrating agents into enemy camps;
creation of a network of informants;
working with defectors.

Jaloliddin made extensive use of reconnaissance to study the terrain and plan operations. Juvayni describes how, before the Battle of Parvan (1221), the Khorezmshah personally surveyed the terrain, selecting ambush positions and escape routes [6]. For example, he identified a narrow section where the Mongol cavalry lost its advantage in maneuverability, which allowed his troops to strike a surprise blow.

In 1222, during a battle in Khorasan, Jaloliddin sent a small reconnaissance party to explore a river valley near Balkh. The party discovered the main route of the Mongols, which allowed Jaloliddin to set up an ambush on the river bank, destroying a small Mongol force [3]. This example demonstrates his ability to quickly and effectively study the terrain.

In addition, during the campaign near Ganja in Georgia (1226), Jaloliddin used local highlanders as guides to navigate the mountain paths. They helped his troops bypass the main outposts of the Ganja garrison, which allowed them to organize a surprise attack on the city [4].

Agent intelligence was an important element of Jaloliddin's intelligence.

In the troops of Manguberdi, according to the research of Bunyatov, agents penetrated trade caravans, diplomatic missions, settlements on enemy territory, and enemy military units.

Shihabuddin Muhammad notes that in 1221, preparing for a campaign in Ghazni, the Khorezmshah sent scouts to the Mongol camps to find out the number and location of troops [7]. One of the spies, disguised as a merchant, penetrated the camp of the Mongol commander Shigi-Kutuku and reported that the rear positions were poorly guarded, which allowed Jaloliddin to carry out a successful attack.

In 1223, Jaloliddin created a network of spies in Khorasan to monitor the movements of the Mongol troops near Samarkand. One of the local peasants provided information on the Mongol supply routes, which allowed Jaloliddin to attack their convoys and disrupt logistics [8].

During his campaigns in Transcaucasia (1227), Jaloliddin sent secret agents to Tbilisi to exploit dissension among the Georgian aristocracy. These agents discovered that part of the Georgian army had temporarily left the city, allowing Jaloliddin to conduct a swift raid [9].

The local population and tribes provided Jaloliddin with important intelligence. Barthold notes that during the retreat to the Indus River in 1221, the Khorezmshah relied on Afghan and Indian guides who knew secret paths and passes [2]. For example, near Peshawar, local tribes warned him of the approach of a Mongol detachment under the command of Chinggis Khan's son Chagatai, which allowed Jaloliddin to avoid encirclement.

In 1222, near Nishapur in Khorasan, Jaloliddin cooperated with local nomadic tribes. They reported the approach of a Mongol detachment under the command of Genghis Khan's son Tolui. This information allowed Jaloliddin to temporarily leave Nishapur and avoid a clash [6].

In 1225, in Iranian Kurdistan, Jaloliddin used local Kurdish tribes to gain intelligence. They provided information on nearby Mongol garrisons, allowing him to conduct raids on small Mongol outposts [7].

Particular attention was paid to methods of camouflage and disinformation of the enemy [6]. According to an-Nasawi, Manguberdi's scouts used camouflage suits, false troop movements, dissemination of disinformation through front men, and imitation of military activity.

Jaloliddin was a master at using disinformation to deceive the Mongols. Khrapachevsky cites the example of the Battle of Parvan, when the Khorezmshah spread rumors about the arrival of a large army from India, which forced the Mongol commanders to split their forces [8].

In 1224, in Khorasan, Jaloliddin organized false troop movements to confuse Mongol reconnaissance detachments. He spread rumors through local residents that he was heading to Fergana with a large army. In fact, he remained near Balkh and attacked a small Mongol garrison [3].

During his campaigns in Transcaucasia (1226), Jaloliddin used disinformation against the Georgian army. He spread rumors that his main forces were approaching Tbilisi, forcing the Georgians to prepare to defend the city. In reality, he attacked the Georgian garrison near Ganja with a small detachment [9].

In the troops of Jaloliddin Maguberdi created an effective intelligence transmission system, which included:

Courier service: horse couriers, foot messengers, special signalmen.

Signal system: fire signals, sound signals, symbols.

Permanent communication points: observation towers, fortified points, secret shelters.

The effectiveness of intelligence was especially evident during the period of resistance to the Mongol invasion [2]. According to Petrushevsky, thanks to intelligence, Manguberdi managed to: predict the direction of the enemy's main attacks;

evacuate the population and material assets in a timely manner;

organize successful counterattacks.

Intelligence played a key role in a number of successful operations:

1. Battle of Parwan (1221)

The Battle of Parwan was one of Jaloliddin's greatest victories. Juvayni emphasizes that the success was ensured by careful reconnaissance: the Khorezmshah studied the terrain in advance, identifying a narrow section where the Mongol cavalry was vulnerable [6]. An-Nasawi adds that espionage revealed the division of the Mongol forces, which allowed the attack on Shigi-Kutuku's detachment.

Before the battle, Jaloliddin received information from local shepherds about water sources near the main Mongol camp. This allowed him to temporarily cut off their water supply, reducing the Mongols fighting ability [8].

2. Retreat to the Indus River (1221)

After the defeat at Parwan, the Mongols increased the pressure, forcing Jaloliddin to retreat to the Indus River. Petrushevsky notes that the Khorezmshah sent scouts to find river crossings, which allowed part of his army to escape to India [5].

During the retreat, Jaloliddin received information from local fishermen about the characteristics of the current in the Indus River bed. This helped him identify a safe crossing that was not noticed by the Mongols, although their rapid pursuit prevented a complete rescue [2].

3. Campaign in Georgia (1225–1228)

In Transcaucasia, Jaloliddin demonstrated his ability to use political intelligence. Buniyatov describes how he sent agents to Tbilisi to gather information about conflicts between the Georgian queen Rusudan and her nobles [9].

In 1227, during a campaign near Akhaltsikhe, Jaloliddin received information from local Armenian peasants about the hidden fortified positions of the Georgian army. This allowed him to organize a night raid on the Akhaltsikhe garrison, destroying part of it [7].

In 1228, Jaloliddin exploited the local population's discontent with the Mongols in Transcaucasia. Through local leaders, he gathered information about weak points in nearby Mongol garrisons, which allowed him to destroy several small outposts [9].

Jaloliddin's intelligence was tactically effective, enabling him to win battles and avoid encirclement. His ability to gather information about the terrain, the enemy, and the political situation demonstrates a high level of military art. The examples given highlight his complex interaction with the local population and his quick disinformation tactics. For example, attacks on convoys in Khorasan and raids near Ganja illustrate the practical effectiveness of his intelligence.

Khrapachevsky notes, the lack of a centralized intelligence system limited its strategic capabilities [8]. The Mongols, on the other hand, had a developed system of communications and espionage, which gave them a long-term advantage.

Jaloliddin's over-reliance on local allies was a weakness. For example, in 1223 in Khorasan, a local leader betrayed his plans to the Mongols, forcing Jaloliddin to temporarily retreat [3]. This illustrates the instability of his intelligence network. Dependence on local allies also created risks. Barthold cites an example in India, where a local leader revealed Jaloliddin's route to the Mongols, which could have led to his capture [2]. In addition, limited resources and constant pressure from the Mongols prevented the Khwarazmshah from developing intelligence at an institutional level.

In general, intelligence activities in the troops of Jaloliddin Manguberdi was a decisive factor in his fight against the Mongol invasion. Reconnaissance, espionage, the use of local allies and disinformation allowed the Khorezmshah to strike at a powerful enemy. Examples such as the Battle of Parvan, the retreat to the Indus River, the campaigns in Georgia and Khorasan, as well as ambushes near Balkh, raids on Ganja and attacks on baggage trains demonstrate his tactical mastery. However, the lack of a centralized intelligence system and the unreliability of his allies determined his ultimate defeat. A study of these aspects highlights the importance of intelligence in medieval warfare and Jaloliddin's contribution to military history.

The study shows that the intelligence service in Jaloliddin's troops Manguberdi was a highly organized system for its time for collecting and analyzing military information. Its effectiveness was based on a clear organizational structure, a variety of methods for collecting information, and an effective data transmission system.

Many of the principles of intelligence organization used by the troops of Manguberdi were subsequently applied by the troops of Amir Timur [10] and remain relevant in modern military science.

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