Volume 03 Issue 06-2023
52
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
03
ISSUE
06
Pages:
52-58
SJIF
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FACTOR
(2021:
5.
705
)
(2022:
5.
705
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(2023:
6.
713
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OCLC
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1121105677
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Servi
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the approaches of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Durand Line, and the arguments of both sides
in support of their positions. Also, the views expressed by the official circles of Afghanistan and Pakistan, foreign and
local scientists in this regard are described in detail.
KEYWORDS
Durand Line, The Big Game, Pashtunistan, Baluchistan, Durbar, Taliban movement, FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
INTRODUCTION
After the establishment of the state of Pakistan in 1947,
new challenges arose regarding the demarcation of
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which
has continued for almost a century. The Durand Line
marked by Great Britain has been the main source of
the border problem between the two countries. It
should be noted that this border conflict is not only a
territorial problem between two countries, but also
causes ethnic conflicts and separatism to escalate.
Therefore, solving this problem and finding an
acceptable solution is important for both sides, but
also for ensuring the security of the entire region.
After all, the two neighboring countries have several
reasons for their position on this issue. At this point, it
is necessary to cite the analysis of the Afghan scientist
Suhrob Boronov in this regard, in particular, the
separation of the approaches of the two sides
according to historical, legal and ethnic factors.
Afghanistan Approach:
Historical factor. The first reason that Afghan
politicians, scientists and experts do not recognize the
Durand Agreement is that it was concluded with the
British government and not with Pakistan. Hence, in
essence, the transaction can be considered invalid
(Brad, 2011). This is also confirmed by the words of Aziz
Arianfar, an Afghan diplomat and the director of the
Afghanistan Research Center in Germany: the “Durand
Research Article
APPROACHES OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN TO THE DURAND LINE
Submission Date:
June 20, 2023,
Accepted Date:
June 25, 2023,
Published Date:
June 30, 2023
Crossref doi:
https://doi.org/10.37547/ijhps/Volume03Issue06-10
Sardor Rahimov
Student Tashkent State University Of Oriental Studies Uzbekistan
Journal
Website:
https://theusajournals.
com/index.php/ijhps
Copyright:
Original
content from this work
may be used under the
terms of the creative
commons
attributes
4.0 licence.
Volume 03 Issue 06-2023
53
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
03
ISSUE
06
Pages:
52-58
SJIF
I
MPACT
FACTOR
(2021:
5.
705
)
(2022:
5.
705
)
(2023:
6.
713
)
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
Line” agreement was concluded with British India, not
with independent Pakistan, and this factor will cause
the cancellation of all previous agreements (Buranov,
2020). In the early years after the establishment of
Pakistan, Afghanistan opposed the recognition of the
Durand Line as an international border, even the then
Afghan
government
vote
d
against
Pakistan’s
accession to the UN in September 1947 (Mohapatra,
2021).
After Pakistan gained independence and became a full
member of the UN, the Afghan representative Hussain
Aziz explained the official Kabul approach to the
current situation at the UN General Assembly as
follows: “We will not recognize the North
-West
Frontier Province as the territory of Pakistan until we
are given the opportunity to be free” (Boranov, 2021,
p. 32-33). On July 26, 1948, the Afghan government
formally abrogated all treaties on the Afghanistan-
British India border (Mohapatra, 2021). In 1949, after a
bomb was dropped on an Afghan village by the
Pakistan Air Force, the Afghan government
immediately convened the Loya Jirga (Grand Council)
and declared that it would not recognize the Durand
Line and any previously signed agreements (Boronov,
2021, p.33). This position has remained unchanged
regardless of who is in power in Afghanistan
(Shekhawat, 2022). Therefore, Kabul's official position
on the Durand Line is that Afghanistan does not
recognize the Durand Line as an international border
(Omrani, 2018).
In 2017, the former President of Afghanistan, Hamid
Karzai, also announced that Afghanistan will “never
accept” the Durand Line as an international border
between the two countries (Aqdas, 2019). According
to this position, the Durand Line is a “disputed border
demarcation”. The one
-sided border barriers initiated
by Pakistan have caused strong official protest of the
Afghan government. Afghanistan’s Vice President
Amrullah Saleh writes about this on his personal
Twitter page: “No Afghan politician can ignore the
problem of the Durand Line”. This is an issue that
requires discussion and resolution. It is unrealistic to
expect us to simply pull it off. Peshawar was the winter
capital of Afghanistan (Mohapatra, 2021). It can be
noted that Salih revealed the true intentions of the
Afghan political elite through these comments. In
general, neither the Taliban movement, which ruled
the country from 1996 to 2001, nor the post-Taliban
governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani
accepted the Durand Line as a legal border (Kaura,
2019).
Legal factor. The Afghan government claims that the
Durand Line was established under duress (Khawar,
2005-06). According to Article 52 of the Vienna
Convention, a contract is void if it is concluded by the
threat of force or the use of force in violation of the
principles of international law. The term “force”
usually includes economic and political pressure.
According to this provision, the Durand Agreement
was considered invalid by Afghan sources (Hayat Khan,
2005, p.185). In addition, Article 50 of the Vienna
Convention clearly states that any contract accepted
after bribery or corruption is invalid. The Amir was to
receive £60,000 a year in royalties and military support
after the treaty was signed (Dhaliwal, 2020). Another
noteworthy aspect of the matter is that after the
signing of the agreement, Amir Abdurahman sent
many letters about the invalidity of the “Durand Line”
agreement and tried to cancel it (Reshtia, 1953, p.62).
A well-known Afghan scientist, Professor Hasan Kokar,
informed that the “Durand Line” agreement, signed in
1893, lost its validity after 100 years, that is, in 1993.
Afghanistan also claims that the Anglo-Afghan Treaty
of 1921 has also lapsed since the British government in
India ceased to exist (Khawar, 2005-06).
Volume 03 Issue 06-2023
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International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
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VOLUME
03
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705
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(2023:
6.
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OCLC
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Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
Ethnic factor. Most Afghans insist that all Pashtuns
around the Durand Line and in the NWFP are Afghans,
not Pakistanis, and cannot distinguish between them
as Afghans or Pakistani Pashtuns. Rhea Abraham, a
researcher at the Center for Air Power Studies in New
Delhi, makes an important reference to focus on the
ethnic factor in her article: Pashtuns follow a
“Pashtunwali” code. It is a code of ethics that takes
precedence over any state law. For Pashtuns, despite
changes in politics, ethnicity is more important than
religious beliefs (Buranov, 2020).
According to this factor, Afghanistan encourages
Pashtuns in Pakistan to use the principle of self-
determination of peoples or nations of international
law. In particular, it can be seen from the map below
that the population of Pashtuns is significant not only
in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan. Consequently, in
the lower part of the Durand Line, in Afghanistan and
especially in the southern regions of Pakistan, the
Baloch are also the majority. Most Pashtuns try to unite
around the idea of an independent “Pashtunistan”
and the Baloch “Free Balochistan”.
Based on the above, it should be emphasized that all
the forces in Afghanistan, in particular, the former
Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and
government
representatives,
especially
the
representatives of the Taliban movement, which has
close ties with Islamabad, The period of first and re-
establishment of power in Afghanistan: 1996-2001 and
from August 15, 2021 until now, the Durand Line is not
officially recognized as the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, even the fact that the
parties who fought each other in Afghanistan between
2001 and 2021 are in the same position on this issue
clearly shows the attitude of the entire Afghan society
towards the border problem.
Pakistan Approach:
Historical factor. Evidence provided by Pakistani expert
Muhammad Jamil also makes us ponder. According to
his arguments, Pakistan, as the successor state of
British India, has full sovereignty over the territories
east of the Durand Line and its people and has all the
rights and obligations of a successor state. Pakistan
denies claims that the treaty was coerced because it
was signed in Afghanistan and ratified in subsequent
pacts in 1905, 1919 and 1921. Moreover, according to
Muhammad Jamil's writing, nowhere in the contract
was it stated that it was concluded for 100 years
(Buranov, 2020). In fact, a number of sources mention
that official Islamabad defends its position on the
Durand Line based on four agreements signed in 1905,
1919, 1921 and 1930 after the Durand Agreement
(Boronov, 2021, p.33). The international community
also approves Pakistan's approach to the Durand Line.
In particular, British officials have repeatedly
supported Pakistan's position. For example, in 1950,
the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations, Philip Noel-Baker, quoted the views of the
King of Great Britain and declared that Pakistan was
the successor in international law to the rights and
obligations of the Government of British India, and that
the Durand Line was an international (Vijayan, 2021)
reported that the limit is calculated. Shamshad Ahmed,
the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in 1997-2000, speaking
about the position of the Pakistani elite on the Durand
Line issue, said that this agreement marked the border
between British India and Afghanistan, and it was
internationally recognized. emphasizes recognition.
According to Muazzam Khan, the spokesperson of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, after the
independence of Pakistan and India in 1947, the Durand
Line issue was resolved in the eyes of Pakistan (Ponka,
Dkhar, Dkhar, 2017).
According to historian Lutfur Rahman, the Treaty of
Durand Line was intended to be permanent and
Volume 03 Issue 06-2023
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VOLUME
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(2023:
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already established the border between Afghanistan
and British India. Therefore, according to international
laws, it cannot be unilaterally canceled. Amir
Habibullah, who succeeded Amir Abdurrahman, also
signed an agreement with the British Raj in 1905, which
defined the “sphere of influence” at that time. L.
Rahman, using copies of rare original maps in Pakistan,
emphasizes that the entire Pakistan-Afghanistan
border, except for the 22-mile area, was determined by
the border commissions established after the signing
of the agreement (Afghan-Pakistan Relations.., 2020).
Legal factor. Pakistan’s official position on the legal
status of the Durand Line is based on the assessment
that this line is an international border separating the
sovereign territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This
position is even expressed in the Constitution of
Pakistan (Pakistan const. art. 1, § 2). Pakistan’s
approach is supported by international law and
practice (Brad, 2011).
Tahsin Usman cites the Vienna Convention as an
international legal argument. After 1947, the Kabul
government appealed to Pakistan to change the
Durand Line in order to prevent the partition of the
Pashtun tribes. This proposal was rejected by Pakistan
on the grounds that the boundary could not be
redrawn or abolished, as the Vienna Convention on the
Succession of States by Treaties unanimously endorsed
“uti possidetis juris” in which colonial powers with or
by The right to bilateral treaties between them shall
pass to their successor sovereign states. Therefore,
Afghanistan cannot rebuild or change the Durand Line
(Buranov, 2020).
This position of Pakistan was supported by its allies in
the international arena, such as the members of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1956. In
the Council of the Organization, the member states
announced that they will continue to recognize the
Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan as an
international border (The Durand line..., 2018).
Ethno-religious factor. In addition to the Pashtuns,
other tribal ethnic groups live along the border with
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Besides, both Afghanistan
and Pakistan are Islamic countries. Professor Azmat
Hayat Khan pays special attention to Pakistan's
attitude to the ethnic-religious factor through some
official information on the border of the two countries.
The former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Hussain,
stated that religion was the main factor in the
integration of Pashtuns into Pakistan (Afghan-Pakistan
Relations..., 2020). According to Juma Khan Sufi,
Peshawar Valley, not Kabul, was the center of Pashtun
culture and history (Buranov, 2020). Officials in
Islamabad argue that Afghanistan's use of the principle
of self-determination under international law against
the Pashtuns can be counterproductive. There are
more Pashto speakers in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.
According to estimates, the number of Pashtuns does
not exceed half of the total population of Afghanistan,
the rest are Afghan Tajiks, Hazaras, Afghan Uzbeks,
and Afghan Turkmens. However, if this rule is applied
to Afghanistan itself, it will threaten its statehood,
because in this case it will have to present its territories
to neighboring countries (Buranov, 2020).
The Durand Line plays a very important role for
Pakistan, as it covers more than 60% of its border with
neighboring countries and serves as a factor of
territorial integrity of the country (Ponka, Dkhar,
Dkhar, 2017). From this point of view, the Pakistani
government is trying to implement several practical
measures, including the installation of a fence along
the Durand Line, to reduce the tension on the border.
In 2006, the government of Pakistan proposed to
Kabul to install fences and barriers on the mountainous
border, but
Islamabad’s proposal was rejected
Volume 03 Issue 06-2023
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(2023:
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(Belokrenitsky, Sikoev, 2014, p.172). Fencing Pakistan’s
Afghanistan-Pakistan border with a barbed wire fence
has been a central project of Pakistan Army Chief
General Qamar Bajwa’s security policy on the country’s
western border. Although this project was very
expensive for Pakistan, about 532 million dollars were
spent on the project, there were two main political
goals of Pakistan's actions: 1. to control the flow of
migrants and the movement of goods across the
border; 2. to propose the demarcation of the border,
which was rejected by the previous Afghan
governments;
Although the movement of illegal goods has not
slowed, the movement of civilians and migrants has
largely been restricted to authorized border crossings
(Asfandyar, Olson, Watkins, 2022). Pakistan began
building a border wall along the Durand Line in 2018 to
combat terrorism and the cross-border flow of drugs.
According to Pakistan, the barrier will improve the
security environment in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A
senior Pakistani army officer commented that “the
wall will go a long way in stopping the cross-border
movement of terrorists” (Akbari, 2019). In 2019,
approximately 900 km of this wall was completed
(Trade, livelihoods..., 2019). Even during the pandemic,
work on the fence continued without interruption for
five years. It seems that Islamabad's approach was to
build around 1,000 forts along the border and fences
manned by armed garrisons to reinforce the Durand
Line and, most importantly, contain all Pashtun threats
(Rahul, 2022).
After the border fire on October 27-28, 2019, Pakistan's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following
statement: “We consider the Pakistan
-Afghanistan
border to be an internationally recognized official
border between the two countries in accordance with
all relevant international laws and conventions.
Afghanistan’s position in this regard is baseless”
(Kaura, 2019). According to the well-known Russian
scientist Vyacheslav Belokrenisky, the complexity of
regional and bilateral balance of power does not allow
to predict how the "Durand line" problem will develop.
For a long time, the legality of this border may remain
a controversial issue (Ponka, Dkhar, Dkhar, 2017).
Another main reason for the strained relations
between Pakistan and Afghanistan is that the "Durand
Line" divides the Pashtun tribes into two parts.
Pashtun tribes in both countries see themselves as
representatives of the same ethnic group. Any military-
political move to unify all Pashtun tribes creates a risk
for Pakistan to be separated from a number of its
territories (Boronov, 2021, p.33).
CONCLUSION
Historical facts testify that the Durand Line remains a
problem in general, and that this line has caused
serious consequences not only for the security of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also for international
security.
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