Роль Узбекистана в развитии северного Афганистана

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Uzbekistan's role in the development of northern

Afghanistan to the present day

Aziza MUKHAMMEDOVA

1

Institute for Advanced International Studies

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Article history:

Received July 2024

Received in revised form

15 August 2024

Accepted 25 August 2024

Available online

15 September 2024

The article analyzes Uzbekistan's foreign policy approaches

towards Afghanistan over the past decades. The key principles

and directions of cooperation are identified, and the results of

bilateral interactions are assessed. Particular attention is paid

to the impact of the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan on

regional security and relations with neighboring countries.

Based on the analysis, Uzbekistan's main priorities in the

Afghan direction for the medium term are formulated, which

allows for a deeper understanding of the current state of

Afghanistan and answers pressing questions concerning its

future and influence on the region.

2181-

1415/©

2024 in Science LLC.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47689/2181-1415-vol5-iss8/S-pp18-28

This is an open access article under the Attribution 4.0 International

(CC BY 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.ru)

Keywords:

Uzbekistan,

Afghanistan,

Taliban,

economic,

cooperation,

infrastructure projects,

humanitarian aid,

security concerns,

trade turnover,

regional stability.

Шимолий Афғонистон тараққиётида Ўзбекистоннинг

ўрни

АННОТАЦИЯ

Калит сўзлар:

Ўзбекистон,

Афғонистон,

Толибон,

иқтисодиёт,

ҳамкорлик

,

инфратузилма

лойиҳалари,

гуманитар ёрдам,

хавфсизлик муаммолари,

савдо айланмаси,

минтақавий барқарорлик.

Сўнгги ўн йилликларда Ўзбекистоннинг Афғонистонга

нисбатан муносабатини таҳлил қилиш, ҳамкорлик

тамойиллари, йўналишлари ва бунинг натижаларини

аниқлаш

Ўзбекистоннинг

бу

йўналишдаги

ташқи

сиёсатининг ўрта муддатли истиқболларини белгилаш

имконини беради. Афғонистонда Толибоннинг ҳокимиятга

келиши ва бунинг Афғонистонга қўшни мамлакатларга

таъсирини ҳисобга олган ҳолда, биз ҳозирги босқичдаги

вазиятни объектив таҳлил қилиб, кўпчиликни ташвишга

солаётган саволга жавоб бера олишимиз мумкин:

“Афғонистон бугунги

кунда минтақа учун нимани

англатади?”.

1

Researcher, Institute for Advanced International Studies. Tashkent, Uzbekistan. E-mail: azizasolieva10@gmail.com

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Роль Узбекистана в развитии северного Афганистана

АННОТАЦИЯ

Ключевые слова:

Узбекистан,

Афганистан,

Талибан,

экономика,

сотрудничество,

инфраструктурные

проекты,

гуманитарная помощь,

проблемы безопасности,

торговый оборот,

региональная

стабильность.

В статье проведен анализ внешнеполитических

подходов Узбекистана в отношении Афганистана на

протяжении последних десятилетий. Выявлены ключевые

принципы и направления сотрудничества, а также оценены

результаты

двусторонних

взаимодействий.

Особое

внимание уделено влиянию прихода к власти движения

«Талибан» в Афганистане на региональную безопасность и

отношения с соседними странами. На основе проведенного

анализа

сформулированы

основные

приоритеты

Узбекистана в афганском направлении на среднесрочную

перспективу, что позволяет глубже понять текущее

состояние Афганистана и ответить на актуальные вопросы,

касающиеся его будущего и влияния на регион.

SUMMARY

Uzbekistan’s involvement with northern Afghanistan has shifted significantly over

the decades. Historically, Afghanistan was of particular interest to Uzbekistan due to its

ethnic Uzbek population and regional security concerns. Initially, the Uzbek language was

the official language in northern Afghanistan, reflecting the ethnic and cultural

connections.

The analysis of Uzbekistan's policies towards Afghanistan is divided into

three periods: the 1990s, the 2000s under Karzai and Ghani, and the post-2021 Taliban

takeover. During the 1990s, Uzbekistan focused on security concerns related to the

Taliban and Islamist extremism. In the 2000s, Uzbekistan shifted towards economic and

infrastructural cooperation with Afghanistan. Since 2016, under President Mirziyoyev,

there has been a strategic emphasis on economic growth and humanitarian aid, even

amid the complex political landscape shaped by the Taliban’s return to power. Thus, In

the 1990s, Uzbekistan implemented a security-driven policy, constructing fortifications

and participating in diplomatic efforts like the "6+2" format for conflict resolution. In the

2000s, economic collaboration flourished, with significant projects like the construction

of the Termez-Mazar-e-Sharif railway and increased trade turnover. Post-2016, the

relationship evolved to include extensive humanitarian aid and support for Afghan

infrastructure projects. Since the Taliban’s return in 2021, Uzbekistan has continued its

humanitarian support and advocated for the unfreezing of Afghan assets, reflecting a

balanced approach to engagement despite the Taliban's controversial governance. To

conclude, Uzbekistan's relationship with northern Afghanistan has transformed from a

focus on security to a multi-faceted approach incorporating economic cooperation and

humanitarian aid. By participating in infrastructure projects and increasing trade,

Uzbekistan aims to enhance regional stability and prosperity. This evolving strategy

demonstrates Uzbekistan’s commitment to fostering sustainable development and

maintaining security in Central Asia.

Uzbeks have played an important role in the history, culture, socio-economic life

and politics of Afghanistan. Before the Taliban came to power, outside the Republic of

Uzbekistan, only in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan the Uzbek language was the

official state language. Following the requirements set out in Articles 1 and 4 of Chapter

16 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, the Uzbek language was recognized as an official

language in the northern provinces of Afghanistan.

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Based on various socio-political circumstances in Afghanistan and its neighboring

countries, Uzbekistan's interest and involvement in developing relations with northern
Afghanistan can be divided into three periods. Each period reflects the changing

dynamics and priorities in the region.

1.

Uzbekistan’s approaches toward Afghanistan in the 1990s

The first period, encompassing the 1990s, was marked by turbulence, and

Afghanistan was largely seen as a source of threats by Uzbekistan. During this time,

Afghanistan was experiencing a civil war following the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the
rise of the Taliban regime. Political instability, growing extremism, and potential spillover

effects on neighboring countries, including Uzbekistan, characterized this period.
Consequently, Uzbekistan's interest lies in promoting regional stability and security.

The collapse of the USSR and the consequent collapse of the friendly Mohammad

Najibullah regime in 1992 and the coming to power of the armed opposition represented

by the Taliban group in Afghanistan in 1996 have defined a whole range of security
challenges and threats not only for Uzbekistan but also for the entire Central Asian

region. The most important of these risks were the following:

–

the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban in the second half of

the 1990s raised concerns that hostilities could be shifted to northern Afghanistan and
destabilize the areas bordering Central Asia and populated primarily by Uzbeks and Tajiks;

–

during the first stage of the country's independence, one of the strongest threats

to the sustainability of Islam Karimov's secular policy was the spread of radical Islamism

in Uzbekistan, which received support from Afghanistan. Although harsh state policy and
repression of Islamist radicals eventually reduced the threat of radicalism spreading in

the country, the Islamist opposition represented by such organizations as Hizbut-Tahrir
al-Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU, now Islamic Party of Turkistan), and

Akramiya continued their activities from abroad, primarily from Afghanistan. The 1999-
2000 Batken events with the attempt of militants to enter Uzbekistan through the

territory of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan underlined the vulnerability of the regional
security system and the level of challenges and threats emanating from neighboring

Afghanistan due to the presence of radical Islamist organizations there;

–

drug trafficking remained one of the most pressing problems for the countries of

Central Asia and Uzbekistan, especially since the region is a key transit route for heroin
exports, primarily from Afghanistan, the world's leading producer of drugs. (pic. 4)

Pic. 4

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This set of challenges and threats, as well as the dynamics of their changes,

determined the formation and transformation of the policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan
to Afghanistan. The domestic political processes in Uzbekistan itself, as well as global

geopolitical struggle processes in Eurasia, had an additional influence on the approaches
to the southern neighbor.

The beginning of the first stage in the development of relations between

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan (early 90s) was quite promising, taking into account the

realities of that time. Diplomatic contacts were established, and economic cooperation
began developing. However, the gradual deterioration of the situation in the neighboring

country, as well as the growing popularity of Islamists in Uzbekistan itself, prompted the
authorities of the republic to revise its relations with Afghanistan and start a

securitization policy. Thanks to the rapid response and capabilities of the Uzbek army,
which is still considered one of the most powerful in the Central Asian region, and the

limited length of the border, Tashkent managed to build serious fortifications along its
bank of the Amu Darya, thus ensuring the necessary level of external border security.

Uzbekistan's approaches at the diplomatic level in the 1990s were undoubtedly

based primarily on the recognition of the importance of coordinated international

cooperation in view of the developing situation in Afghanistan, as well as the importance
of establishing a dialogue between the warring parties. In this regard, the country

pursued a foreign policy in Afghanistan in several directions.

Political settlement

The first one is political settlement and cooperation in resolving the Afghan

conflict. Organization of direct dialogue, without preconditions, between the central

government and the main armed opposition forces, especially the Taliban. Facilitating the
settlement of the Afghan crisis at the political and diplomatic level.

Thus, to resolve the Afghan crisis, Uzbekistan came up with several initiatives.

In 1997, on the initiative of Uzbekistan and under the aegis of the United Nations, the

"6+2" format began to operate, which assumed the joint efforts of the neighboring
countries

–

Pakistan, Iran, China, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan

–

and

guarantor countries

–

the United States and Russia. The format also included

representatives of the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. The aim of the format was

primarily to resolve the Afghan conflict through reconciliation between the Northern
Alliance and the Taliban. Thanks to the Contact Group's activity, the "Tashkent

Declaration on Fundamental Principles of Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict in
Afghanistan" was signed on July 21, 1999, in the presence of the confronting parties.

Geopolitical interests of Uzbekistan’s policy towards Northern Afghanistan

Thus, the second direction constituting Uzbekistan's foreign policy toward its

southern neighbor is the pursuit of its geopolitical policy, focused mainly on the northern
regions of Afghanistan, because of the presence of ethnic Uzbeks there as well as the

desire to stabilize the situation in the border areas. It is the effective and pragmatic
implementation of this strategy that has strengthened Uzbekistan's position in the

northern regions of Afghanistan, controlled by Abdul-Rashid Dustum, one of the main
military and political figures in Afghanistan of Uzbek origin.

Although there is no official data on the Uzbek government's cooperation with the

general, Abdul-Rashid Dustum's participation in the political life of Afghanistan was very

important for Uzbekistan, as he did a lot to create an alliance between the main leaders of

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Afghan ethnic minorities of different diasporas, including the Uzbek one. It helped to

control the situation on the Uzbek-Afghan border and, to a certain extent, create a buffer
zone against threats from the south.

2.

Uzbekistan’s approaches towards Northern Afghanistan during

the reigns of

Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai

The second period

coincides with the administrations of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf

Ghani when Afghanistan became relatively more stable, and its potential for economic

ties and infrastructure projects began to be considered. Uzbekistan displayed a growing
interest in developing relations with northern Afghanistan, focusing on economic

cooperation and expanding trade links. Uzbekistan actively engaged with Afghan
authorities, participating in infrastructure reconstruction projects, establishing

transportation corridors, and fostering energy connections.

The analysis of Tashkent's economic strategy in relation to Afghanistan shows that

the geo-economic projects were of strategic importance to Uzbekistan. Trade and
economic cooperation between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan involved the joint

implementation of major projects in transport and logistics, energy, and trade. The first
step in the realization of this strategy was the bilateral agreement on joint repair,

maintenance, and operation of the railway-truck bridge "Hayraton" on the border
crossing Galaba (Uzbekistan)

–

Hayraton (Afghanistan), which was the only way to

connect the two countries.

With efforts of international donors, Uzbekistan has implemented about

10 projects on the construction of road bridges, mainly on the reconstruction of the
Mazar-e-Sharif

–

Kabul highway. Uzbek specialists have been involved in repairing and

helping to restore 11 bridges. In 2010, construction of a railway line between the Uzbek
city of Termez and the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif began. The idea of its construction

was proposed by Germany at the end of 2008. In the framework of the strategy, other
projects were also implemented, such as the construction of two stations and two passing

tracks, a container yard at the station Mazar-e-Sharif, and the modernization of the
existing station Hairaton. Construction of the road was completed in November 2010,

and the road was handed over to

“

Uzbekiston temir yullari

”

Company for temporary

management.

Thus, from 2000

–

2009, Uzbekistan had already accumulated significant

experience in participating in joint projects on the reconstruction of Afghanistan,

particularly in road construction and repair, power engineering, railroad construction,
mining, and the exchange of specialists.

In turn, targeted economic assistance for Afghanistan has also become a priority.

As early as 2002, Uzbekistan began active economic cooperation with Kabul. As a result,

mutual trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan has considerably expanded.

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Pic. 5

Thus, since 2007, there has been a marked increase in trade turnover between the

two countries. If before 2005 the Uzbek-Afghan trade turnover did not exceed
130 million dollars, in 2007 it was already about 326 million dollars, and in 2008 it was

$520 million. In 2010, Uzbekistan was one of the top three importers of Afghan goods
(after Pakistan and Russia). In 2010, the trade turnover between Uzbekistan and the

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan amounted to $663.5 million, while in 2011, the Uzbek-
Afghan trade turnover totaled $798.6 million. Thus, the positive trend in the

development of trade turnover between the countries is evident (see pic.4). We suppose
that the increase in trade turnover and economic and infrastructure projects in the 2000s

was conditioned by the fact that in previous years Uzbekistan had a cautious policy
toward Afghanistan in connection with the unstable military situation in the country,

whereas with the introduction of American and NATO troops the situation in the country
has stabilized to a certain extent.

Up until 2017, Uzbekistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan remained

consistently restrained. It was based on the impossibility of solving Afghanistan's

problems militarily and the need to create conditions for the country's economic growth.
In particular, by working together to implement certain infrastructure and economic

projects (the construction of bridges, the Hairaton-Mazar-e-Sharif railroad, the power
transmission line connecting southern Uzbekistan with northern Afghanistan, etc.).

However, Afghanistan was also seen as a source of security risks for the country and the
region (the spread of terrorism and instability in general, drug smuggling).

2.1.

Transformations in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy after 2016

The election of President Mirziyoyev as head of state in 2016 marked a radical

restructuring of the country's foreign and domestic policies. This marked a significant
shift in how Uzbekistan was positioned in the international arena and Afghanistan. Since

$130 000 000,00

$326 000 000,00

$520 000 000,00

$663 000 000,00

$798 000 000,00

2005

2007

2008

2010

2011

Dynamics of growth of trade turnover between

Afghanistan and Uzbekistan in 2005-2011

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2017, there has been a transformation in Uzbekistan's approach to Afghanistan, which is

now seen not only as a source of challenges and threats but also as a potential partner in
joint cooperation in the political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

Since President Mirziyoyev came to power in early 2017, the "Strategy for the Five

Areas of Uzbekistan's Further Development for 2017

–

2023" was published which

outlines the country's main development and reform initiatives for the next five years.

The plan has five key goals, among which the work to strengthen the republic's

international economic ties stands out.

Completion of this work would help Uzbekistan's economy transition to an export-

oriented model, which the authors of the document believe would help ensure long-term

domestic development, attract investment, create jobs and ultimately raise living

standards in the country. Building the most honest and practical relations with

Uzbekistan's main trading partners is essential for the country to transform its economy

into an export-oriented one and gain access to these markets for its products. That is why

during the first few months after the change of power in the country a restructuring of

the foundations of Uzbekistan's foreign policy began.

First and foremost, border and customs controls over the movement of goods,

which were restricting trade and economic interaction between the two countries, were

eased. This contributed to an increase in trade turnover between the countries. This

immediately contributed to an increase in mutual trade. In just 2017, trade turnover

grew by 20 percent and reached $617 million, with 99 percent of the turnover coming

from Uzbek exports to Afghanistan. During the same period, Uzbekistan's exports rose

from $444.4 million to $774.6 million. In addition to services, they included chemical

products, non-ferrous and non-flammable metals, energy and oil products, food, and

other goods. The volume of Afghan goods and services imported to the Uzbek market has

also quadrupled from 600 thousand to 2.3 million dollars.

Uzbekistan covered 52% of Afghanistan's electricity purchases in 2020, with

electricity exports to Afghanistan totaling 2.6 billion kWh.

Overall, Uzbekistan accounted for 7.4% of Afghanistan's international trade, while

Afghanistan accounts for 1,5% of Uzbek's international trade.

The construction of the free trade zone "International Trade Center Termez" has

begun, which was thought to serve as a significant transport and logistics hub on the

route of goods to Afghanistan and South Asia in general. At the same time, contacts at the

political level also intensified. To strengthen the work in the Afghan direction, in the

summer of 2017, the post of special presidential representative for Afghanistan was

created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. A landmark

event was the three-day visit of Afghan leader A. Ghani to Tashkent and Bukhara in early

December 2017, exactly one year after the election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as president.

During the visit, 20 interstate agreements were signed, including memorandums on the

construction of the Mazar-e-Sharif-Shibirgan-Maimana-Herat railroad and the Surhon-

Puli-Khumri power transmission line, as well as 40 commercial contracts worth a total of

$500 million. In addition, the visit resulted in the resumption of political dialogue at the

highest level. Uzbekistan began actively introducing educational and humanitarian

programs in the southern part of the country aimed at citizens of Afghanistan. For

example, in the city of Termez in Surkhandarya Province of Uzbekistan, an educational

center for training Afghan citizens was established under the Ministry of Higher and

Secondary Special Education with the goal of training and retraining Afghan students.

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3.

Uzbekistan’s approaches towards Afghanistan after the Taliban seize power

The Taliban's ascent to power was the most important development in Afghanistan

in 2021. The Taliban have seized power in Afghanistan for the second time in the nation's

history, toppling President Ashraf Ghani's government in the process. Experts listed

several inferences that can be made according to the existing circumstances.

From a

political and economic

point of view, another attempt to modernize

Afghanistan, pursued by the policy of the former government of the country, failed,

because the military-political movement "Taliban" is anti-modernization and

fundamentalist in nature, despite the presence of "moderate Taliban" in the leadership.

From a

geopolitical

point of view, the position of a permanent US military presence in the

region over the previous twenty years has been destroyed. Moreover, the fact that the

United States left $85 billion worth of military equipment in the country creates new

opportunities and risks.

From a

geo-economic

point of view, given the new state of the situation, the

question is raised: how would infrastructure and transport projects, as well as plans for

energy cooperation, which, as anticipated, were supposed to connect South Asia, the

Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caspian region, creating an opportunity for Uzbekistan

to become a stronger transit country? In light of the aforementioned, establishing a

foreign policy for Taliban-run Afghanistan has become a topic of discussion for all

nations, including Uzbekistan.

Humanitarian assistance

One of the biggest problems facing Afghanistan today is mass starvation. Before

the Taliban came to power, international donations and humanitarian aid accounted for

almost 75% of government spending. Most of these initiatives have now been stopped,

and the reserves of the Central Bank of Afghanistan, which are mainly based in the United

States, have been frozen. Thus, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),

and the U.S. Federal Reserve have already denied Afghanistan access to international

funds. On August 17, two days later, the U.S. froze Afghanistan's central bank reserves of

about $10 billion.

Afghanistan, whose assets are frozen in foreign banks and whose budget was

formed by foreign aid, plunged into the deepest economic and humanitarian crisis. As a

result, Afghanistan's banking and economic systems are dangerously close to collapse.

In this regard, at all international forums without exception, Uzbekistan promoted

the thesis about the need to unfreeze the financial assets of Afghanistan abroad and

reduce the degree of pressure on the government in Kabul. Moreover, Tashkent proposed

to give the new Afghan authorities some time to fulfill the key demands of the

international community: the creation of an inclusive government, respect for the rights

of women and national minorities, and a complete break with various terrorist groups.

In this regard, since the beginning of the crisis, one of Uzbekistan's priorities in

cooperation with the TM government has been the provision of humanitarian assistance

to the country. For instance, since the beginning of the crisis, Uzbekistan has

continuously provided and continues to provide humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Thus,

since 2021

–

2022 Uzbekistan sent more than six batches of humanitarian cargo to

Afghanistan, with a total weight of at least 10,000 tons. A multifunctional transport and

logistics hub was created in the border town of Termez to deliver humanitarian aid,

which has been actively used by various UN agencies since the beginning of the crisis.

Despite the fact that formally this hub was not given an international status, in fact, it has

been operating at the international level from the very beginning.

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Activation of international platforms for the Afghan problem resolution

Tashkent's role in Afghan affairs also depends on how global players react to it.

The Afghan conflict is so multifaceted that it intertwines the interests of both

international and regional actors. For example, on July 26, 2022, the International
Conference on Afghanistan "Afghanistan: Security and Economic Development" was held

in Tashkent. In the presence of the Taliban, they discussed the prospects of an Afghan
settlement, as well as the requirements of the international community. In this context,

Uzbekistan's peaceful and constructive foreign policy, including in Afghanistan, does not
infringe on the interests of other actors. Uzbekistan, getting closer to one of the centers of

power, will not be alienated from the other, and vice versa. Therefore, Uzbekistan's
participation in the peaceful resolution of the Afghan conflict is welcomed by the

international community, particularly the United States, Russia, China, and Pakistan. To
date both regional players and the international community have taken a wait-and-see

attitude and are in no hurry to recognize the new power in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Thus, Uzbekistan's interest and participation in the development of relations with

northern Afghanistan have undergone significant transformations over time. From

perceiving Afghanistan as a source of threats to recognizing its potential as a partner for
economic cooperation and regional stability, Uzbekistan has displayed a commitment to

fostering sustainable development and enhancing mutual understanding. By engaging in
infrastructure projects, promoting trade, and supporting social initiatives, Uzbekistan

aims to contribute to the prosperity and security of both its nation and the broader
Central Asian region.

Uzbekistan has played a significant role in the development of northern

Afghanistan, particularly in areas such as trade, infrastructure, and security. It has been

involved in various initiatives aimed at promoting stability, economic growth, and
regional cooperation in Afghanistan.

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