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PUBLISHED DATE: - 18-12-2024
DOI: -
https://doi.org/10.37547/tajpslc/Volume06Issue12-05
PAGE NO.: - 19-29
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION:
FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS
Adilbaev Bekbosin Abatbaevich
Doctoral student at Karakalpak State University, Uzbekistan
INTRODUCTION
Human activity is so extensive that everything
around him, except the earth and other natural
resources, is his creation. The existence of this
situation cannot be imagined without legal
regulation, as most actions taken by a person are
carried out by legal acts. Legal entities, as a rule,
personally carry out legal actions, for which they
draw up relevant documents, and therefore are
required to participate in the signing or execution
of these documents, but in everyday life there may
be cases where the subject of legal relations cannot
participate in the commission of these actions, and
in such cases, there is a need for another person to
participate in his place and on his behalf. The
intensity of legal document creation depends on
the level of societal development, economic,
cultural development, and others. It is necessary to
emphasize the importance of this process in our
country, especially in the context of reducing the
share of the "shadow economy," transferring all
civil law relations to the legal sphere.
The institution of representation is a set of legal
and technical procedures through which a person
designated as a representative performs legal
actions in relation to a person authorized by third
parties on behalf of and at their expense.
Representation is based on the possibility of
replacing one person with another, a substitution
established by law (legitimate representation) or
permitted
(contractual
and
judicial
representation), and thereby means that the
consequences of the actions committed by one
person arise not directly against him, but against
the person who granted such authority.
One reason for this is that it is a technical means by
which disabled persons exercise their rights and
assume their responsibilities by performing legal
actions through other persons called legal
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Open Access
Abstract
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representatives
(parents
and
guardians).
Individuals often seek representation by other
people by drawing up various contracts that allow
them to receive or transfer salaries, fees, various
documents, or material benefits. The institution of
representation is used to represent interests in
court or arbitration.
The defining elements of representation are the
expressions "by name" and "from name." When it
comes to acting "on behalf" of the representative,
the first acts only physically when the document is
drawn up, but represents the will of the second. In
other words, in civil law relations, the
representative is and remains the owner of his
name and will, but in representation, he becomes
the owner of the name and will of another person
and embodies the will of the authorizer in
concluding the transaction. The meaning of the
phrase "on behalf of the assignee" indicates that the
assignee (in the presence of the assignee) is a
person who assumes the positive and negative
consequences of the legal action. This phrase refers
to the relationship between the representative and
the property of the assignee.
The main aspects of the application of
representation can be summarized as follows: 1)
the need for representation in relation to
individuals can be analyzed in different ways
depending on the following: persons who are
incapable of dealing need representation, as such a
person performs legal actions through their legal
representative;
- persons who have full representative capacity, if
they do not have the opportunity to directly
participate in the conclusion of a transaction, allow
another person to conclude such a transaction.
Reasons that determine representation are usually
factual reasons, among which the following can be
distinguished: illness, absence of a person at home,
lack of desire of the right holder or the person
obliged to exercise the right or fulfill the obligation,
lack of knowledge or skills in a particular area, etc.
2) - persons who have full representative capacity,
if they do not have the opportunity to directly
participate in the conclusion of a transaction, allow
another person to conclude such a transaction.
Reasons that determine representation are usually
factual reasons, among which the following can be
distinguished: illness, absence of a person at home,
lack of desire of the right holder or the person
obliged to exercise the right or fulfill the obligation,
lack of knowledge or skills in a particular area, etc.
It should be noted that legal literature has
developed a number of opinions and approaches to
the concept and essence of representation in civil
law. Since representative relations have existed
among people since ancient times, it is appropriate
that many opinions have been put forward
regarding the understanding and interpretation of
this system of relations. In particular, according to
D.B. Korotkov, "representative organizational and
informational relations, regulated by civil law,
within which the representative determines the
performance of certain legal actions on behalf of
the authorized person"
1
. A.R. Muratova
interprets representation as "the basis for the
emergence, change, and termination of civil rights
and duties, a legal method and legal means of their
implementation."
2
M.Yu. Dorozhenko notes that
"representation
is
a
unique
three-sided
relationship in which the representative carries
out legal actions on behalf of and for the principal,
creating legal consequences." 3 According to
O.V.
Pantelishina,
"representation is the
performance by one person (representative) on
behalf of another person (representative) of legal
actions aimed at the emergence, change, and
termination of rights and obligations in the
representative against third parties, and the
responsibility of the representative for these
actions"
4
.
In our view, representation is an attitude aimed at
entrusting one's powers to another person in
relation to the performance of legal actions. In this
regard, the authorized person, who delegates the
exercise of his powers to another person, must
accept the legal consequences arising as a result of
the exercise, exercise the rights and fulfill the
obligations assumed. Therefore, the essence of
representation here lies in the fact that the
representative transfers the powers that result in
the emergence, change, and termination of these
rights and obligations and gives instructions for the
exercise of these powers. In other words, the
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aforementioned views of D.B. Korotkov on
representational relations of an "organizational-
informational" nature have a certain logical basis.
Because the relationship between the assignee and
the representative, that is, the transfer of the
assignee's powers to the representative, is carried
out in the form of a specific assignment, and the
relationship between the assignee and the
representative forms a certain organizational and
informational character.
In civil doctrine
5
, "representation" is primarily
interpreted through the category of "competence."
Moreover, it is understood from the first part of
Article 129 of the Civil Code that the representative
acts on the basis of the powers granted to him. The
term "competence" is derived from Arabic and
means "representation, jurisdiction, the right to act
on behalf of a person or organization."
6
In legal literature, there is no consensus on the
meaning of the term "authority." From a legal
perspective, it is often interpreted as a subjective
right of the grantor or as a distinct legal reality.
Some authors note that authority is a subjective
right through which a person exercises their rights,
while delegation is considered part of legal
capacity, and the actions of the representative are
determined
by
the
authority
7
.
The
characterization of "authority" as a subjective right
is based on the fact that it is at the grantor's
discretion to grant or withhold it, and to exercise or
not exercise their rights in this way. This stems
directly from the grantor's wishes. A person can
delegate the exercise of their subjective right, such
as property rights, to another person on their
behalf. Such a transfer is carried out by granting
"authority," however, it remains unclear what legal
reality the "authority" itself constitutes.
Several authors have also expressed approaches
that deny the existence of subjective right status in
"authority." In particular, K.I. Sklovsky writes,
"Authority cannot be interpreted as a subjective
right because, unlike subjective rights, authority is
not transferred either in a sessional or traditional
manner. This is evident in the rules for transferring
authority to another person, as when authority is
transferred, the representative's powers are not
annulled. Moreover, while subjective rights are
considered a measure of proper behavior, it is
impossible to determine the boundaries of
authority in certain cases.
Civil law does not consider exceeding the scope of
authority to be a violation of rules; on the contrary,
in such cases, the rights and obligations arising
from the concluded transaction belong to the
representative themselves."
8
A mandate can be viewed as a "license for the
exercise of rights, the conclusion of a transaction"
provided by its issuer. Because there is no
representation without authority, nor does it exist
to make a transaction on behalf of another person.
In civil law, there are cases of interpreting
"command" as a "mandate" of representation as a
category different from the ability to deal
9
. In this
case, the authority is also considered as an
established measure of behavior provided by law
to ensure the individual's own interests.
10
According to J. Hupka, the authority granted to a
representative is "the legal capacity to grant rights
or impose obligations on another person through
their actions."
11
This competence is the
competence of the representative to make a
transaction for the representative, and also
includes the ability to make a transaction, which is
an integral part of the representative's civil
capacity. After all, anyone who is capable of
concluding a transaction can create relevant legal
consequences not only for themselves, but also for
another person by concluding them
12
.
Based on the fact that subjective "civic rights are
voluntary dominance granted by the legal order in
order to ensure its interests for an individual"
13,
276
, K. Larenz and M. Wolf note that "as long as the
authority is granted to the representative "for the
authorizer," in order to ensure his interests, it is
considered a "separate legal dominance" that does
not belong to subjective rights." In this case, the
representative
concluding
the
transaction
entrusted to him pursues his own interests, that is,
his interest in the transaction concluded by him
takes effect not for himself, but for the authorized
person. The satisfaction of this interest by the
representative represents the representative.
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Based on the analysis of these opinions, it can be
said that "competence" is a set of rights and
opportunities that belong to an individual in any
situation, and he disposes of this set at will. Such
disposal may seem to imply both the transfer of
"authority" to another person and the
implementation of the actions that constitute its
content. However, if we delve deeper into the
essence of the issue, "competence" evokes the idea
of a specific "permission" of a person to transfer the
exercise of their rights and capabilities to another
person. That is, in this case, the subject of law gives
"permission, instruction, instruction" to another
person to create, change, and cancel certain rights
belonging to him, and only the person responsible
for this performs these actions on behalf of the
person who gave this "permission, instruction,
instruction." Of course, a person's transfer of the
exercise of their rights to another person and the
preservation of its consequences for himself is
subject to certain legal grounds and procedures.
Nevertheless, the fact that such actions do not have
legal consequences for third parties for the
perpetrator of the right to retain their name in the
rights by delegating the exercise of the right to
another person requires a different approach to the
legal nature of "competence."
According to M.I. Braginsky, "competence is a legal
reality that does not correspond to the dual system
of "legal capacity - subjective law" and is a kind of
third aspect, and this is secondary law."
14, 59
In legal literature, opinions have also formed
regarding the interpretation of "authority" as
secondary rights. Particularly, if we focus on the
essence of secondary law, it is appropriate to
consider the following thoughts of A.B. Babaev:
"secondary law is a subjective civil right, in which
the authorized subject has the absolute possibility
of satisfying their interests, and this is considered
the subject of judicial protection, which can also be
transferred through universal legal succession"
15
. According to S.A. Ivanova, "secondary rights
are the ability of a person to establish (modify)
subjective
rights
through
a
unilateral
transaction
16
, 45-51
." V.E. Karnushin interprets
secondary rights as "a legal opportunity that leads
to the creation, modification, or termination of a
civil law relationship through the expression of a
person's unilateral will."
17, 70
It should be noted that the term "secondary rights"
was first introduced by German scholar A. von
Thur
18
. The category "GEStaltungsrechte" was
proposed and developed by the German scientist E.
Zekkel. It is based on the mutual opposition of
absolute rights and relative rights. Because if the
owner of exclusive rights allows him to address his
claims to any person, the circle of persons to whom
the claim can be filed in relative rights is limited.
However, in relation to the specific right of
individuals, there is also a contradiction of another
group of rights, the nature and essence of which
requires direct research. There are two specific
aspects inherent in all secondary rights. First, these
rights are realized through the expression of
private freedom - a contract, and this is analogous
to the adoption of a document by the state.
Secondly, their content is not the existence of direct
domination over a certain object, person, thing,
material or intangible benefit, but one of the rights
of domination (die Herrschaftsrechte) is the one-
sided creation, change or cancellation, in other
words, creation.
19, 210-211
Overall, the legal literature contains numerous
conflicting opinions on the nature of secondary
rights. While most of these opinions emphasize the
need to interpret these rights as subjective rights
20, 120-122
, others note that secondary law is
essentially a way of exercising a right belonging to
another person by another person for his benefit.
21
According to A.V. Germanov, "secondary legal
relations are a state of expectation due to the legal
possibility of one subject to bind the first person to
the expression of his will by another person, such a
state can be considered an expectation of the
occurrence of a legal fact in the form of the
expression of a foreign will
22, 156
." According to
F.O. Bogatyrev, "traditional secondary rights are
the legal possibility of creating, changing, or
terminating civil law relations by expressing one-
sided freedom granted to a person."
23
In our opinion, the comparison of "competence"
and "secondary rights" and the search for
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commonalities and differences between them are
not particularly relevant from a legal and logical
standpoint. However, within the framework of the
current stage of development of civil law thinking,
there is a certain basis for their mutual
characterization from the point of view of defining
the interpretation of these two legal categories.
Based on the relationship between "competence"
and "secondary rights," it can be concluded that if
"competence" is the possibility of exercising
certain rights granted to this representative by
another person (a delegate), then "secondary right"
can be assessed as the ability of another person to
perform legal actions in the interests of one person
within the framework of a specific legal
relationship within the limits established by law.
There are other approaches to the legal nature of
"competence" in the doctrine of civil law. According
to him, "authority" is a legal fact: a legal act (circle
of actions) that a representative can perform on
behalf of the representative, determined by law or
the relevant contract, the scope of transactions
permitted to be concluded by the representative, a
legal fact that determines the limit of the inclusion
of the legal capacity of the representative in the
legal capacity of the representative, or a legal
document that creates the ability of a certain
person to represent another, because a legal fact
that gives a person certain authority is understood
as actions confirming the authority (transfer The
essence of this concept lies in the consent of the
assignee to the representative to act on his behalf
or to the result of the relevant legal action. After all,
if consent has legal consequences, such consent is a
legal fact, a one-sided agreement.
This concept has certain shortcomings, including:
the scope of actions that a representative can
perform and the authority that determines the
scope of these actions are not the same: the first
expresses the material content of the second. Of
course, the authority arises on the basis of a certain
legal fact (authority), but it is not similar to it in any
way. Any legal fact cannot lead to other legal
consequences, except for the emergence,
modification, cancellation of rights and obligations.
If the authority is recognized as a legal fact, then
one legal fact gives rise to another. The fact that the
representative on the basis of authority "receives
not rights, but only the possibility of exercising the
rights and obligations of other persons or obtaining
them for another person" also indicates the validity
of this concept. If this possibility is not a subjective
right and is not an element of legal capacity (and
the legal doctrine does not know the other meaning
of the term "possibility"), then the authority in the
proposed
interpretation
becomes
incomprehensible. Authority as a legal capacity
belonging to a particular person is a subjective
right
24
. Moreover, to express the same legal
reality - authority, it is not advisable to use terms
that differ in content ("possibility" and "legal fact").
In other words, the proponents of this concept
regarding authority, based on this term, do not use
it in the sense of a legal fact. For in the
interpretation of authority as a legal fact, terms
such as the limits of authority, the authority
granted to a representative, lose their meaning.
In addition, documents (including a bank card or
power of attorney) cannot be assessed as a legal
fact (legal act). A written document may be
recognized as a record of a legal fact (for example,
a one-sided agreement authorizing), but the
document itself cannot undoubtedly be a legal fact,
at least in the generally accepted interpretation of
the term "legal fact."
The debate about the legal nature of power, which
has been going on for a long time in civil law, is still
being enriched with new ideas today. Thus, S.V.
Osipova, along with the subjectivity of law,
emphasizes legal capacity and transactional
capacity,
linking
authority
to
auxiliary
transactional capacity as the subject's ability to
conclude and make transactions with other
persons
25, 28-35
. It is evident that this
statement, firstly, does not express "transparency"
in the interpretation of the legal essence of the
mandate, and secondly, does not implement legal
subjectivity, legal capacity, and transactional
capacity within the framework of a single criterion.
These are different categories: the first includes the
other two, and the second includes the third.
Another approach to the legal essence of authority
in contemporary literature is proposed by V.V.
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Ruzanov
26, 82
. Noting that "command does not
in any way correspond to traditional (publicly
known) civil law formulas," the author proposes
not to attempt to unify already known legal
categories, but to interpret it as "subjective law, the
direction of which is the right for others in
accordance with the purpose of its appointment."
When representing the disabled, according to the
same author, the authority is characterized by the
presence
of
the
following
functions
(characteristics) in the conglomerate (in a specific
set): "this is simultaneously: a) the form of
"actionalization" of the author's rights and
obligations (as an expression of his legal capacity);
b) the form of existence of rights and obligations
(contractual obligation) in certain civil law
relations of the assignee, as a result of which the
representative's ability to conclude a transaction is
realized and the "effect" of the representative's
ability to conclude a transaction is created; c) the
form of the representative's exercise of his rights
and obligations as a parent, adopter, or guardian,
established by law
27, 86
," according to V.V.
Ruzanov, which "on the one hand allows us to
speak of the interdependence of the ability and
authority to make a transaction, and on the other
hand, the presence of elements of competence in
the structure of the authority."
V.V. Ruzanov, defining such a complex structure of
the essence of authority, nevertheless, it can be
considered that authority, by its legal nature, is
subjective right or at least jurisdiction as part of a
complex subjective right.
It is also somewhat more difficult to understand the
interpretation of the powers exercised by Yu.S.
Kharitonova. Studying the scope of the owner's
rights and interpreting them as powers, drawing
on the similarity between them and representative
powers (which is very controversial in itself), Yu.S.
Kharitonova believes that "in all cases, powers
arise from the owner's dominance over property or
from the free expression of a person's will
28
."
Furthermore, the author proposes "solving existing
disputes in the doctrine regarding the definition of
authority as follows." As a result of delegating
authority to a person, their status changes (with
the occurrence of a legal fact - a change in the
situation), its content becomes a right to unilateral
actions (secondary rights), "a power in private law
is not a subjective right, but an expression of legal
capacity." The authority is presented as a one-sided
action. This right arises from capacity, and
although it does not belong to it, it can create a
subjective right or manifest itself as a secondary
right. Nevertheless, further considerations lead the
author to the conclusion that, first of all, "the denial
of the nature of authority as a subjective right, as
well as the determination of status as a state of a
person, leads to the need to consider authority as a
legal fact," and then, conversely, the following
opinion is expressed: "the authority itself is not a
legal fact, but the authority may arise from a legal
fact."
In the literature, there are cases where the
authority is interpreted not as a right, but as the
obligations of the assignee to the representation of
the representative to whom the subjective right
corresponds
29
. Indeed, on the basis of an
assignment
(agency)
agreement,
the
representative also assumes not only the right of
representation (authority), but also the fulfillment
of his obligations under the agreement or
guardianship, but this obligation arises for the
realization of the right to representation - the
authority. And the author (who indicated the
authority above as the duty of the representative)
comments that "competence is an element of legal
fact and legal content, but it is not a specific
subjective right, but only related to it."
Show the complexity of the problem of the above-
mentioned views on the essence of the
representative's
powers,
including
the
considerations of its "hybrid" (can be said exotic),
i.e. the interpretation of authority as both
subjective right, obligation, and legal fact.
In the sense of part one of Article 129 of the Civil
Code, a competence is the ability of one person to
act with direct legal consequences for another
person, therefore a competence cannot be qualified
otherwise than in subjective civil law. This is
recognized by a number of scholars, but the
indication of authority as a subjective right does
not usually indicate the corresponding obligation,
the legal relations in which this right exists are not
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taken into account, its legal content and
characteristics are not disclosed
30, 75
. And in
some cases, the authors, emphasizing the
controversial essence of the concept of authority,
conclude that "in any case, from the point of view
of its content, authority is a measure of the possible
behavior of the representative in relation to third
parties," however, evaluating this "measure" as a
subjective right leaves open the question of the
legal nature of authority.
31
The authority, as the organizational subjective
right of the representative, is primarily
characterized by the fact that it is the ability of
another person to acquire or exercise a subjective
right or obligation in relation to third parties.
According to K.I. Sklovsky, "all actions, obligations,
and rights of the representative are related to
actions that create and terminate them." It is
impossible to extract any other benefit from the
authority, and that is enough
32, 110
." It follows
from this that no one can grant other powers
beyond their right.
The authority of a representative is a structurally
complex subjective right. The main element of its
composition is the right to possess positive actions
in relation to third parties, which have a direct legal
effect for the representative, as an opportunity to
carry out legal activities on behalf of the
representative.
The material content of this right is determined by
the actions that the representative has the right to
perform on behalf of the representative
(contracting, transferring property, claiming and
accepting property, etc.). These actions are legal,
aimed at exercising the legal capacity, subjective
rights and (or) obligations of the authorizing
person, and have binding legal consequences for
him, that is, they are transactions or other
purposeful legal actions.
It should be noted that the material composition of
the mandate is not limited to the ability to make
transactions only (although often the mandate to
make transactions is granted). These can be other
legal actions, i.e. actions that have legal
consequences (for example, receiving the salary of
the power of attorney, participating in court on
behalf of the power of attorney, fulfilling the
contract in whole or in part, refusing to fulfill it,
signing a dispute protocol on the concluded
contract, registering documents in the registry
office and in the registry office, creating a legal
entity, registering as an individual entrepreneur,
registering the rights for inventions, utility models,
industrial designs by authors or other At the same
time, the scope of legal actions that a
representative can take is limited by law in a
certain way (primarily to protect the interests of
the representative). Therefore, in accordance with
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 129 of the Civil Code,
a representative cannot under any circumstances
make transactions in relation to himself personally
on behalf of the representative. It is also unable to
make such transactions in relation to another
person, for whom it is simultaneously
representative, with the exception of commercial
competence. Moreover, by its nature, it is forbidden
to make other transactions specifically specified in
the law, which can only be made personally by the
representative.
In this regard, in particular, it should be taken into
account that a power of attorney issued by a party
to the contract to the husband (or wife) of the other
party may cause certain difficulties. In practice,
there have been cases where a sales representative
signed a sales contract with his wife on his behalf.
According to Article 23 of the Family Code, the
acquired property is the joint property of the
spouses, regardless of whose name it is taken
(unless another regime of property is established
in the marriage contract). In this example, the
representative of the seller acted as if he had
entered into a transaction with the buyer of the
property. However, according to Paragraph 3 of
Article 129 of the Civil Code, a representative is
prohibited from making transactions in relation to
him personally on behalf of the representative.
Therefore, sellers should not issue a power of
attorney to the buyer's spouse, which may
subsequently lead to the possibility of recognizing
such a transaction as invalid.
At the same time, it is almost impossible to agree
with the opinion that the authority is always
limited to the ability to make transactions or other
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legal actions. In addition, it implies the possibility
of performing certain legal actions in all cases and
with legal consequences for the authorized
individual, but may also include the possibility of
performing certain factual actions necessary for
the exercise of the authority (pre-sale preparation
of goods, registration of any documents, trips,
inspections, etc.), which are often mentioned in the
literature.
34, 77
The competence should include the right to
demand as a subjective right, in this case the right
to demand from the representative to bear all the
legal consequences of actions committed within
the competence.
Subjective rights include the ability to activate the
state's enforcement apparatus. Therefore, since the
authority is exercised by the authorized person
(representative) through legal acts that have legal
consequences for the person (representative) who
assumed the obligation, an appeal to the
authorized bodies is not a compulsion of the
representative to fulfill the obligation, but rather a
recognition of the legal consequences arising as a
result of the actions of the representative to
exercise the authority.
The aforementioned aspects of the signs and
structure of the authority allow it to be defined as
the organizational subjective right of the
representative to perform certain legal actions on
behalf of the authorized individual and in his/her
interests, which in his/her relations with third
parties entails legal consequences for the
authorized individual.
A mandate can be created and manifested in its
implementation, as there is a compelling person
against its holder, who must bear all the legal
consequences arising from the proper exercise of
the mandate.
Scholars who interpret authority as a subjective
(secondary) right either show that someone's
obligation to this right is incompatible
35, 56
(but
obligation is an integral ratio of subjective right) or
simply do not name it as a subjective right or
interpret it not as a duty of the representative, but
as a dependence on the obligation
36, 324
, or as
the duty of the authorizer to recognize the legal
consequences of the representative's will
37, 9
, or
to assume all the legal consequences of the
representative's actions within the competence.
Furthermore, it is indicated that this same
obligation contradicts the mandate and is usually
significantly different from the meaning of the term
"acceptance" (see: obligation to accept property
under Article 386 of the Civil Code), as there is no
"transfer" of subjective rights and obligations
arising from the implementation of the mandate
from the representative to the delegate.
The problem of determining the obligations
corresponding to their rights in relation to positive
actions is faced by scientists studying various legal
relationships. Based on the thesis "There is no
obligation without obligation, no obligation
without obligation," attempts are made to justify
the existence of independent obligations that
contradict the right to perform actions that have
legal consequences for other persons. Despite the
difference of positions on which such a rationale is
based, as a rule, there are only obligations that
arise when the "corresponding" right is exercised.
Thus, the right of the lessor to terminate the
contract is comparable to the obligation of the
lessor not to detain the property for more than the
specified period and return it in whole; the right to
determine the method of fulfilling the contract for
the delivery of goods (right to transit) is related to
the acceptance of an execution from a third party
or the fulfillment of an obligation to a third party
when the subject of the transit right of the
counterparty exercises its right.
However, "debt" in the generally accepted sense
does not exist as a necessity to perform or not
perform a specific action, as it is subject to the term
"obligation." Acceptance of this point of view
means recognizing the existence of subjective
rights without obligations and rights without
obligations: on the one hand, before the realization
of a subjective right, a certain obligation does not
contradict it, on the other hand, at the moment of
the realization of the right, that is, at the moment of
its termination, there are obligations that
contradict the already abolished right.
In our view, scholars who focus on the emergence
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of the right to commit actions that have binding
legal consequences for other individuals and the
resolution of the issue of an obligation
corresponding to subjective law, including the right
to express one's will, believe that a person who has
a specific obligation to commit an action that has
certain legal consequences for other individuals,
these consequences arise independently of their
will, without any action. However, even these
authors do not explain the legal nature and
material content of the obligation, debt, and
attachment that are contrary to the relevant law.
38
Based on the above analysis, it should be noted that
representation is the activity of one person on
behalf of another person aimed at concluding
transactions (legal actions) that create legal
consequences for him. The interpretation of
representation as an activity, the services of the
representative, or an action in the interests of
another person (the authorizer) from the point of
view of legal regulation, expresses the elements of
"authorizer - authority - representative."
Therefore, if the "authority" that constitutes the
content of representation is interpreted, on the one
hand, as "permission, consent, or private "license"
for legal action on behalf of another person," on the
other hand, it can be assessed as "subjective law,
secondary law, legal fact." despite the different
approaches to the terms "representation" and
"command" in the civil doctrine, it should be
acknowledged that the task of its appointment does
not change and always remains the conclusion of a
transaction on behalf of another person and with
legal consequences for it.
CONCLUSION
The concept of representation is multifaceted, with
profound implications across cultural, political,
and social landscapes. By critically examining how
representation shapes our understanding of
identity and power, we can better engage in
meaningful discussions about equity and
inclusivity. In an era where media and
communication rapidly evolve, remaining vigilant
about representation's complexities and impacts is
crucial in fostering a more just society.
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