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VOLUME
Vol.05 Issue05 2025
PAGE NO.
355-360
10.37547/ajsshr/Volume05Issue05-73
24
International Migration in Central Asia: An Analysis of
Causes, Historical Stages, And Principal Trends
Bobir Normo‘minovich Mamarajabov
Senior Lecturer, Denov Institute of Entrepreneurship and Pedagogy, Denov, Uzbekistan
Received:
31 March 2025;
Accepted:
29 April 2025;
Published:
31 May 2025
Abstract:
As a result of the colonial policy of the Russian Empire, the active migration of the peoples of Central
Asia was observed, but this issue in the history of the peoples of the region has not yet been fully studied by local
historians. Research conducted abroad on this topic cannot provide unbiased information for students due to
different ideological views. In this article, a historiographical analysis of the study of the migration of Central Asian
peoples by Western and local historians is carried out.
Keywords:
Ideological approach, national interests, cultural identity, national identity, integration, cultural
alienation.
Introduction:
The first third of the 20th century was
one of the most tragic and transformative periods in
the history of Central Asian peoples. It was a time
marked by immense human losses, mass migrations,
fatalities, displacement, and forced departures from
their homelands. Sacred family ties were disrupted for
many Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, and Turkmens
during this era. As a consequence of the 1917
revolution and its aftermath, waves of migration gave
rise to the emergence of Central Asian diasporas in
neighboring countries.
A diaspora refers to a community that originates from
a specific homeland but exists outside its territorial
boundaries. Typically, a diaspora is considered a
temporary and unstable formation. Over time, its
members either integrate into the host society or
return to their homeland (reemigration). Integration is
usually
smoother
when
the
host
country’s
geographical, cultural, and religious environment
closely resembles that of the country of origin. For this
reason, Tajiks and Turkic-speaking peoples were able to
integrate into Afghan and Turkish societies without
significant threats to their national and cultural
identities.
Although the new lives of Central Asian migrants
outside their historical cultural space, with all their
complexities and consequences, have only recently
started to attract the attention of regional historians,
these processes have long been the subject of
extensive research in Western historiography.
Numerous comprehensive academic studies have
explored these migration phenomena in detail.
METHODS
This study employs a range of research methods,
including the analysis of scholarly and methodological
literature, memoirs, and archival materials. The
research also draws on the examination and synthesis
of advanced practical experiences. Analytical and
synthetic
methods,
induction
and
deduction,
systematic-logical approaches, as well as historical and
statistical analysis methods, have been applied
throughout the study.
The State of Research on the Topic
One of the earliest researchers to study Central Asian
migrants was Owen Lattimore, who conducted
investigations in Xinjiang during the 1920s. He was
among the first to identify the unique character of
Central Asia, shaped by the region’s extraordinary
diversity. Other notable works on Central Asian
migration include studies by Esserton, Bailey, Malleson,
Skrine, and Swedish diplomat and scholar Gunnar
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American Journal Of Social Sciences And Humanity Research (ISSN: 2771-2141)
Jarring. Also noteworthy are the accounts of Georgy
Agabekov, a participant in Central Asian events of the
1920s; and the research of N. Shahrani and I. Nabi on
Afghan Kyrgyz and Uzbeks; as well as G. Lias’s works on
the Kazakhs.
In 1976, American ethnographer Audrey Shalinsky
began studying Afghan Uzbeks, stating that she turned
to Afghan ethnography to better understand her
“Sovietized” colleagues.
Local scholars began investigating the history of
migrants in earnest only in the 1990s. The issue of
emigrants who settled abroad has been addressed to
varying degrees in the works of Q. Radjabov, R.
Shamsiddinov, R. Abdullaev, D. Ziyayeva, S.
Shadmanova, A. Mamajonov, A. Ermetov, and others.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
From the Russian Empire's conquest of Tashkent in
1865 until the Revolution of 1917, the peoples of
Central
Asia
experienced
unprecedented
transformations. Long-standing traditions of national
culture, statehood, values, and religion, sustained for
centuries, were either destroyed or subjected to
intense pressure. In the wake of these upheavals, a
significant portion of the population, unable to resist
the changes, began fleeing to neighboring regions.
Thus, the people of the region underwent perhaps the
first major migration in their history.
During the first two decades following the Russian
Revolution of 1917, two major waves of migration
occurred in Central Asia. The first of these began in
November 1917 with the Bolsheviks' seizure of power
in Tashkent and continued through the fall of the
Kokand Autonomy in February 1918, culminating in
1920 with the collapse of the Emirate of Bukhara and
what came to be known as the “Day of Separation” for
the Bukharans
—marked by Emir Said Alim Khan’s flight
from Bukhara. This initial wave of migration concluded
around mid-1926 when Ibrahim Bek Chakobay oghli
(Laqay), leader of the Eastern Bukhara independence
movement (1921
–
1932), crossed the Soviet-Afghan
border.
The Red Army’s invasion of the Emirate of Bukhara
primarily impacted the inhabitants of the border
regions
—
namely, the nomadic and semi-nomadic
Uzbek and Turkmen tribes
—
who fled their homeland
alongside the Emir in a bid to escape the military
onslaught of the Bolshevik forces. During this stage, the
largest group of migrants was composed of Turkmens
and Uzbeks, followed by Tajiks. According to Red Army
reports, Tajiks made up 60% of the population in
Eastern Bukhara (modern-day central and southern
Tajikistan and southeastern Uzbekistan), while Uzbeks
comprised 30%. However, the ethnic composition of
the Eastern Bukhara independence groups reflected
the opposite: 60% were Uzbeks and 30% were Tajiks.
Similarly, the majority of the migrants were also
Uzbeks.
This discrepancy appears to have stemmed from
differences in the social and political status of the two
groups. Uzbeks, possessing greater social status, had
historically maintained political dominance over the
Tajik
majority,
who
were
less
militarized.
Consequently, Tajiks were more likely to accept the
new Soviet regime, which led to the collapse of the
existing Uzbek tribal-feudal power structure. Uzbeks
and Turkmens, whose livelihoods were based on
nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralism, were more
inclined to migrate, as they could easily relocate their
livestock. In contrast, Tajik peasants, who owned only
the land they cultivated, were unable to take it with
them.
Nonetheless, following the establishment of Soviet
power in Bukhara, a segment of the Tajik population
also fled
—
not only to Afghanistan but also to remote,
mountainous Tajik-inhabited areas such as Qaratagin
(Garm) and Darvaz. Soviet forces entered these areas
only in the summer of 1923 after launching a large-
scale military campaign. According to data from the
government of the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic, by the end of 1926, 44,000 families
—
approximately 206,800 individuals
—
had fled Eastern
Bukhara, accounting for 25% of the total population
and 33% of the Tajik population. Most migrants
originated from Qurgonteppa, Kulob, and Hisor regions
and were primarily Uzbeks and Tajiks. In Qurgonteppa,
only half of the original population remained, and the
local government commission documented 49
completely abandoned villages. Houses and other
structures had been destroyed.
Moreover, people fled not only from Tajikistan but also
from
Uzbekistan’s Surkhandarya region. In the early
1920s, approximately 40,000 Uzbeks and Tajiks
migrated from Surkhandarya to Afghanistan. These
groups were joined in the early 1920s by 1,300 Kyrgyz
families from Qaratagin and the Vakhsh Valley and
more than 1,000 Kyrgyz from Eastern Pamir, who
crossed into Afghanistan’s Badakhshan and Kataghan
regions[3].
The second wave of emigration began in the second
half of the 1920s, shortly after the first wave. It reached
its peak between 1929 and 1932, during a period of
widespread economic, social, political, and cultural
transformation, including collectivization, violent anti-
Islamic policies, the “cultural revolution,” and the
forced emancipation of women aimed at dismantling
traditional society in the Central Asian region. This new
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wave of refugees fled from the constraints, strict legal
control, and suppression of dissent characteristic of the
Soviet regime. During the second phase of migration,
people of various ethnic backgrounds from all parts of
the region, including the neighboring mountainous
areas of Bukhara, migrated abroad. These migrants
became known as individuals who emigrated or fled in
order to protect, preserve, and develop their religious
identity.
In the early 1920s, hundreds of thousands of Central
Asians began pouring into Afghanistan, settling along
the northern border from Badakhshan in the east to
Herat in the west. Thus, by the second decade of the
twentieth century, what is now Central Asia
experienced its first migration crisis. By the end of this
crisis in 1932, there were close to one million Central
Asian refugees in Northern Afghanistan and western
China, as well as in Northern India, Iran, and Turkey.
The actual number of migrants was likely somewhat
higher than reported. Small migrant settlements were
also established in Kabul, Peshawar (Pakistan),
Mashhad, and other cities in Afghanistan, India, and
Iran. According to Soviet statistical surveys conducted
in Central Asia in 1922, 1924, and 1926, the conclusion
was reached that: “The pop
ulation decline due to
emigration is a phenomenon characteristic of the
entire region.”[4]
Today, historians interpret this form of mass migration
as a form of resistance to the Russian Revolution.
Alongside the issue of analyzing the deeper causes of
this
migration, the question arises: “Why did the
majority of Central Asians choose not to migrate?” The
negative perception of the Soviet past and the
portrayal of Russian rule as despotic are widespread in
both Western and contemporary Central Asian
historiography. However, this interpretation fails to
adequately describe the brutal force of the 1917
revolution and thus cannot fully explain how Soviet
power managed to survive from the outset despite
significant resistance. Was it due to the weakness of
the fo
rces that we have long labeled as “Basmachis,”
but were independence movements, resulting from
poor leadership and a limited social base for
resistance? Or was it because the West, Turkey, Iran,
and Afghanistan were unable to support the
independence fighters?
Indeed, several factors aided the Bolsheviks in
consolidating their position in the region and
weakening the strong opposition from independence
fighters, notably:
During the conflict between “Reds and Whites” among
Russians, which lay at the core of the revolution and
civil war, most Central Asians sided with the former, as
the Reds promised land, freedom, and peace to all
people regardless of nationality or religion.
By the end of the 1920s, the Soviets presented
themselves as the only real and effective
—
albeit
unjust
—
government. The amirs, khans, and the
Provisional Government of Russia had failed and
discredited themselves in the eyes of the majority of
the population.
Prolonged internal conflicts and disorder gave rise to
traditions of political obedience among Central Asians.
The Bolsheviks portrayed themselves not merely as
Russophile but also as anti-imperialist, and neighboring
Eastern states perceived them as allies in the struggle
for independence. While the Bolsheviks partly
reasserted Russian dominance in Central Asia, Turkey
and Afghanistan viewed them as a bulwark against
Western imperialism. Neither Amir Amanullah of
Afghanistan nor Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of
modern Turkey, offered significant support to the
independence movements. The international isolation
of anti-Soviet resistance bolstered the legitimacy of the
new government among the population of Central Asia.
These factors contributed to the establishment of
relative stability in the region and slowed the
outmigration of the population from Central Asia.
The history of these “Bolshevik exiles” came to an end
in the mid-1930s when the USSR consolidated its
power in the region and established secure and closed
borders with Afghanistan and other southern
neighbors.¹ The decl
ine of émigrés and mujāhidīn in the
second half of the 1930s coincided with significant
political changes in Central Asia. In Afghanistan, both
the universal religiosity of non-
state ʿulamāʾ and
traditional Islamic forces on the one hand, and the
idealistic secular reformism of leaders such as
Amanullah on the other, gradually lost their influence,
creating conditions for further stability.
In Soviet Central Asia, the national delimitation of 1924
represented a disastrous fragmentation; however,
improvements in economic development, the success
of mass secular education, advances in public health,
and the emancipation of women altered the situation.¹
This inevitably required the separation of religion from
the political sphere and the disconnection of Qur’an
-
based concepts held by the émigrés and mujāhidīn
from the emerging realpolitik in Central Asia. This
ushered in a relatively stable period in which the
Muslim community gradually disengaged from direct
political participation.¹ The formation of centralized
“stans” in Central Asia and the stabilization of
Afghanistan in the early 1930s coincided with the
gradual strengthening of nationalism, the emergence
of formal state religious institutions, and the
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incorporation of religious strata into state structures.
When examining the history of Central Asian
emigration, a central question arises: why did the
majority
of
exiles
relocate
to
economically
underdeveloped Afghanistan? Several explanations
exist: geographic proximity, open and unguarded
borders, lack of foreign military presence, and shared
historical and ethnic affinities. Yet the most compelling
factor was the common faith.
The vast majority of those leaving Central Asia were
Muslims. Indeed, the concepts of movement and
migration are deeply familiar to Muslims and
encompass a range of forms: pilgrimage (ḥajj),
educational travel (riḥla), visits to sacred sites (ziyāra),
and emigration (hijra). These acts are not only physical
movements but also spiritual practices
—
that is, forms
of worship. The concept of hijra is present in the
Qur’an, and in Arabic, the term means “to leave, to
migrate, to abandon.”¹ The practice of hijra began in
622 CE with the migration of the Prophet Muhammad
(peace be upon him) and his followers from Mecca to
Medina.¹ Subsequently, hijra
—
the migration from
lands where Islam could not be freely practiced to
those where it could
—
became a core tenet of Muslim
religious obligation, particularly in contexts where such
restrictions did not exist.
In the 1920s, when the Bolsheviks occupied Bukhara,
Muslim preachers advised the peoples of Central Asia:
“Now migration is a sacred duty” (“Hijrat fard va vojib
ast”). According to Islamic doctrine, a person is
obligated to declare their homeland as enemy territory
(dar al-harb) if it is no longer governed by Islam, and
until it is restored as an Islamic state (dar al-Islam), a
sacred war (jihad) must be waged against it. Otherwise,
migration (hijra)
—
leaving the country entirely
—
is
necessary.[5]
Ideally, hijra is a transition from the state of ignorance
to a state of spiritual and intellectual purity. The
decisive factor of hijra lies in preserving one’s religious
and cultural identity; pragmatic motives should remain
secondary to this aspiration. In an ideal scenario, those
in exile or emigrants should migrate to the holy cities of
Mecca and Medina. During the first half of the 20th
century, the religious elites of Central Asia, the
Caucasus, and Afghanistan often found refuge in
Muslim sanctuaries in these sacred cities.[6]
In his perspective on the adaptable nature of Islam,
Dale Eickelman argues: “The motivations for many
Muslim social movements, particularly migration or
travel, are inevitably sacralized and integrate social,
economic, and poli
tical interests.”[7] From this point of
view, hijra may be assessed not only as a mere
migration process but also as a form of social
movement functioning within a cultural framework
shaped by Islam.
The majority of Central Asians fled to Afghanistan. This
was due to the fall of the Ottoman Empire between
1918 and 1923, after which many regarded
independent Afghanistan as the only legitimate Islamic
state in the region. During the 1920s, the country
served as a refuge for Muslims from Central Asia, as
well as for nearly 20,000 coreligionists from British
India who had organized the Hijrat movement.[8]
Afghanistan offered no economic benefits to the
migrants; instead, its value lay in restoring the spiritual
equilibrium disturbed by external oppression. In other
words, it was a religiously imagined “journey of the
mind” across geographical and political borders, an
escape from harsh realities, and a reflection of the
deeply revered utopia of dar al-Islam
—
the imagined
“golden village,” or ideal home. In exile,
new bonds of
brotherhood (mu’ākhāt) were forged between the
migrants and the ansar (hosts, in this case Afghan
Muslims).
This supranational, interethnic religious identity
transcending political borders persisted despite
colonial divisions and the secular concepts of the
nation-state and nationalism. It is important to note
that the doctrine of hijra contradicts the secular notion
of migration and diaspora formation, as it rejects both
the nationalist idea of a particular ethnic group and the
definition of homeland as a specific territorial entity.
Ideally, hijra encouraged Muslims to distinguish
themselves from those who refused to leave dar al-
harb. Religious doctrine aimed to unite migrants with a
new state not based on ethnicity but on religion.
At the same time, secular diasporas tend to cherish the
memory of their countries of origin. Unlike migrant
groups, diasporas never fully abandon the idea of
returning to their historical homeland. Rather than
identifying primarily with their host states, diasporas
maintain a stronger connection with the homeland
they left behind.
Migrants in exile faced numerous hardships, including
linguistic, cultural, racial, and national differences that
inevitably existed within the broader Muslim
community or ummah. They had to come to terms with
the reality that every state
—
even an Islamic one
—
could not remain entirely immune to wars, revolutions,
uprisings, and other violent upheavals.
Nevertheless, the Central Asian mujahideen and
emigrants in exile perceived their religion as a source
of agency and freedom, as it helped them find haven in
Afghanistan and facilitated communication with local
Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and other Afghan groups. Islamic
faith and piety reinforced their social status and self-
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confidence, serving as a symbolic capital among fellow
Muslims. Local Afghans treated them both as exiled co-
religionists and as outsiders, often referred to as por-i-
darya (“from across the river”). For the refugees and
migrants, belonging to an imagined Muslim
brotherhood (umma), which rejected political,
geographic, and ethno-national boundaries as well as
the secular, Uzbek-Tajik (Bukhara or Ferghana) societal
divisions, provided a sense of material stability, cultural
continuity, and emotional balance. From this
perspective, the studied region emerges as a site where
new forms of identity were shaped that do not conform
to conventional understandings of national and ethnic
affiliation.
Today, members of the Central Asian diasporas and
irredentists constitute a significant portion of
Afghanistan’s population. The arrival of half a million
Central Asians during the 1920s and 1930s had a
considerable impact on the country’s historical
trajectory. Despite their ethnic diversity, these
“minorities” possessed a certain degree of sh
ared
group consciousness, distinguishing themselves both
from the majority Pashtuns in Afghanistan and from
their compatriots “left behind” across the river. This
sense of affinity intensified over time. The Islamic and
ethnic solidarity in Central Asia, which was not rooted
in ethnographic boundaries, became a serious factor in
the political instability on both sides of the Amu Darya,
where weak centralized authority and declining
international oversight played key roles. The potential
of Afghanistan as a refuge has long been one of the
main structural features of instability in Central Asia, as
it was inhabited by Muslims of similar background and
remained beyond the effective control of central
governments. This situation was present in the early
1920s in the Soviet Union, and in the late 1920s to early
1930s in Afghanistan. A similar pattern re-emerged in
the early 1990s in Tajikistan and Afghanistan
simultaneously. The border between these two states
once again became a site of regional turmoil, as waves
of migrants arrived in search of a “state of purity.”
Migrants from various regions of Central Asia
significantly contributed to the economy, culture, and
environment of their host countries. The Bukhara elite
in exile, mostly composed of Jadids, supported King
Amanullah Khan in his efforts to modernize
Afghanistan. Some of them, including the Ferghana
qurbashi (commander) Shermuhammad (Kurshermat),
defended Amanullah against the insurgents in 1928
–
1929. However, other exiled Bukharan basmachi
fighters under the leadership of Ibrohimbek sided with
the opposing faction
—
Habibullah Bacha-i Saqao, the
new Emir of Afghanistan. The more traditional Persian-
speaking (Tajik) Bukharans tended to favor Afghanistan
as their host country, whereas Turkestani Turks
(primarily Uzbeks) chose Turkey. The second
generation of Bukharan exiles made significant
contributions to Afghanistan’s cultural development in
the 1960s, laying the foundations for the study of
journalism, modern pedagogy, and Persian literary
history in Afghanistan.[9] In Turkey, Turkestani émigrés
actively participated in the establishment of Ankara
University, especially its Faculty of Agriculture.
During the second wave of emigration between 1926
and 1934, many Central Asians who had been in
extensive contact with Russians were, in comparison
with local Afghans and Xinjiang residents, generally
more educated and demonstrated a more modern
outlook on life. These migrants contributed to the
cultivation of maize and sugar beet, the development
of sericulture, the expansion of flocks of the renowned
Hisar sheep, and the flourishing of the carpet-weaving
industry in Afghanistan. Shortly after the Soviet
authorities had established a cotton-growing economy
in southern Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, a young Afghan
named Abdulaziz from Kataghan Province realized that
the region’s natural conditions resembled those of the
best cotton-growing areas of Central Asia. He
purchased land in Kunduz Province, where migrants
had settled, and founded the Spin Zar (“White Gold” in
Pashto) company, which significantly boosted cotton
production in Afghanistan.[10]
The activities of these migrants profoundly altered
Afghanistan’s social, economic, cultural, and ecological
landscapes. At the same time, the development of
northern Afghanistan facilitated the exiled life of
Central Asian migrants, enabling a modernization of
their worldview within the framework of a Muslim
state. Eventually, many acquired Afghan citizenship
and gradually closed the cultural and social gap with
the local Uzbek population.
The early Soviet-era international migration brought
about significant changes in the demographic and
ethnic composition, and later in the political landscape,
of the entire Central and South Asian region. A large
proportion of those fleeing from Central Asia were
semi-nomadic Uzbeks living near the Tajik border,
along with others who migrated from various provinces
of Soviet Central Asia during the first half of the 1920s
and 1930s. In Afghanistan, they joined the local Uzbeks,
particularly those from the Kataghan tribe, who had
been enslaved by Pashtuns in the 1760s. Together,
Afghan Uzbeks emerged as the third largest ethnic
group and one of the most potent political and military
forces during the Soviet
–
Afghan War and the Taliban
era.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the border, in
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American Journal Of Social Sciences And Humanity Research (ISSN: 2771-2141)
southern Tajikistan, the exodus of semi-nomadic
Uzbeks
—
who, before the arrival of the Red Russians in
the 1920s, had controlled and even oppressed
sedentary Tajik farmers
—
led to the settlement of
impoverished Tajiks from Hisar and other inner
provinces in these vacated territories. It is not
surprising that these Tajiks viewed the Soviets as
liberators and interpreted their arrival as an
opportunity for economic advancement. By the mid-
1930s, the suppression of the Basmachi movement
marked the end of Uzbek control over eastern Bukhara,
a region predominantly inhabited by Tajiks. This shift
also facilitated the irrigation of the Vakhsh Valley and
enabled the cultivation of fine-grade (grey) cotton,
which was deemed
vital for securing “cotton
independence.”
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the large-scale migration processes of
Muslims from Bukhara, Russia, and the USSR during the
early Soviet era had a decisive impact on the
reconfiguration of Muslim society and culture in what
we now understand as “modern South Asia” and the
“Middle East.” The Red Army’s invasion and
subsequent military conflicts led to the displacement of
so-
called “Bolshevik exiles,” bringing hardship and
suffering to the region. Yet, from a translocal research
perspective, this migration emerges as a complex
phenomenon that challenges the state-centric and
static historical narratives that link identity solely to
fixed cultural, ethnic, and territorial boundaries.
Rather than rendering its participants helpless refugees
or defeated insurgents, this migration endowed them
with increased social agency and greater opportunities.
It enhanced their capacity to pursue diverse forms of
life and social aspirations. People, ideas, symbols, and
skills crossed conser
vative political, “civilizational,”
national, regional, and technical boundaries. In this
sense,
the
migration
redefined
conventional
understandings of space, identity, and power in the
broader Muslim world.
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