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CHINA'S GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS AND APPROACHES IN THE SOUTH ASIA
REGION
Hamidov Bakhtiyor Ilyosovich
Head teacher of history at the Bukhara Academic
Lyceum of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
e-mail:
phone:+998933833912
Abstract:
This article analyzes China's geostrategic interests and political approaches in the
South Asian region. As South Asia increasingly becomes a key area in global politics and
economic relations due to its strategic location, large population, and economic potential, China
is making the region a growing priority within the framework of its broader foreign policy and
global ambitions. The article examines China's role in developing trade and investment relations
with South Asian countries through economic reforms, with particular attention given to the
significance of the "Belt and Road Initiative" in enhancing infrastructure development and
regional integration. It discusses the complex aspects of China-India relations, China's strategic
partnerships with other countries in the region, and the debates surrounding "debt-trap"
diplomacy. The article also explores China's expanding presence in terms of access to the Indian
Ocean, military cooperation, and regional security, as well as efforts to secure energy and natural
resources, its rivalry with the US Indo-Pacific strategy, and China's long-term geostrategic
objectives.
Keywords:
China's foreign policy, South Asian countries, geostrategic interests, Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), String of Pearls strategy,
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM), the United States of America,
Indo-Pacific Strategy, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework (IPEF), regional security, infrastructure diplomacy, energy security, geoeconomic
approach, strategic partnership.
INTRODUCTION:
South Asia is a region of significant geopolitical and economic importance
in global politics due to its strategic location, large population and rich resources. As a
crossroads of maritime and land trade routes, it has become an arena of competition between
major powers, especially global powers. In recent decades, China's geostrategic interests in
South Asia have increased sharply. This is due to its desire to gain economic dominance, energy
resources and regional influence, as well as to counter rival powers. This article analyzes China's
multifaceted approaches to the region and considers the impact of these approaches on the
political, economic and security environment of South Asia. The relevance of the study is that it
sheds light on China's emergence as a global superpower and its strategic actions in South Asia.
The role of this region is especially important within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road"
initiative. Through diplomatic relations, economic investments and military cooperation, China
has deepened its influence. The article discusses key issues such as China's control over strategic
ports, its need for energy and resources, and its "debt trap" diplomacy, which has sparked
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debates about economic dependence. It also analyzes China's competition with the US Indo-
Pacific strategy and its long-term goals to change regional dynamics.
RESEARCH METHODS:
This scientific article combines qualitative and analytical research
approaches. The main goal is to identify China's geostrategic interests in South Asia, analyze the
political and economic approaches implemented on the basis of these interests, and explain the
dynamics of relations with countries in the region. During the writing of the scientific article,
scientific books and articles by political scientists, analytical documents of research centers were
widely used.
DISCUSSION:
South Asia's geopolitical importance is due to its proximity to the important sea
lanes through the Indian Ocean that provide global trade and energy flows. The region is home to
over 1.9 billion people, a large part of the world's population. India, located in the region, stands
out as an emerging economic power. Economically, South Asia is experiencing steady growth.
According to the World Bank's 2024 forecast, India's GDP is expected to exceed US$3 trillion,
making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world
. The region's proximity to conflict-
prone areas of the Middle East and its role as a "buffer zone" between major powers make it an
important place in global security dynamics. Politically, South Asia is a region of states with
diverse systems of governance. While India has chosen the path of democracy, Pakistan has a
mixed political system, and the remaining small states have diverse political structures. The
rivalry between India and Pakistan over their nuclear capabilities and unresolved territorial
disputes (Kashmir issue) further complicate the region's place in global politics. The integration
of South Asian countries into global institutions such as SAARC (South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation) and their expanding ties with major external powers are increasing the
diplomatic weight of the region. As a rising power, China is seeking to expand its influence in
South Asia. Through this, it aims to secure its economic interests, balance India's dominance in
the region, and achieve strategic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. The "One Belt, One
Road" initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects clearly demonstrate
China's economic and geopolitical ambitions in the region
.
China's objectives in South Asia are multifaceted and include economic, strategic, and political
interests. Economically, China seeks access to markets and resources in South Asia and secure
maritime routes through the Indian Ocean. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, is a
key pillar of China's economic strategy. It has seen major investments in infrastructure projects
in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
worth more than $60 billion, is intended to connect China's Xinjiang region with Pakistan's
Gwadar port. This would give China direct access to the Arabian Sea
. Strategically, China
1
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Sawaira Rashid, Gulshan Majeed, Muhammad Ikram. (2023). China's Belt and Road Initiative and its Implications
for the South Asian Region. UCP Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences (HEC Recognized-Y Category), 2(1),
pp . 49-66.
3
Hussain E. (2019). CPEC: Governance and security challenges—Implications for the Belt and Road Initiative.
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seeks to counterbalance the influence of India, which it sees as a regional rival in South Asia.
China is seeking to strategically surround India by developing strong ties with Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, and Bangladesh. This approach is often referred to as the “String of Pearls” strategy
. It
allows China to protect its maritime interests and project its presence in the Indian Ocean by
developing ports and infrastructure in the countries surrounding India. Politically, China wants to
maintain stability in South Asia to secure its investments and ensure that regional governments
align with China’s global geopolitical goals. This includes supporting smaller states such as
Nepal and the Maldives to reduce dependence on India and developing partnerships to strengthen
China’s “soft power.” China’s support for authoritarian regimes or mixed regimes in the region
is consistent with its non-interference in domestic politics and differs from the West’s approach
.
China's economic reforms began with policies aimed at opening its economy to the global
market, attracting foreign direct investment, and promoting export-led growth. As a result of
these reforms, China has become the world's second-largest economy by nominal GDP, with an
emphasis on industrialization and infrastructure development. By the early 2000s, China was
facing overproduction in its steel and cement industries, which prompted it to seek overseas
markets and investment. The Belt and Road Initiative emerged as a solution to these problems,
and became a means of channeling excess capital and expertise into overseas infrastructure
projects, securing trade routes, and increasing geopolitical influence
. South Asia, with its
proximity to China and rapidly developing economies, has become one of the key regions under
the Belt and Road Initiative. The region's geographic location, connecting East Asia to the Indian
Ocean and beyond, is in line with China's goal of securing maritime and land trade routes.
According to a study published in the journal PLOS One in 2023, economic growth,
industrialization, and rising savings in China and South Asia have significantly boosted trade
cooperation under the Belt and Road
Initiative. This cooperation reflects China's goal of
integrating South Asia into its global economic strategy and expanding transport and trade links
by harnessing the region's potential. The Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Asia, Africa,
and Europe through infrastructure, trade, and cultural exchanges
. South Asia is central to this
strategy because it serves as a "bridge" between East Asia and the Indian Ocean, and provides
access to markets in Africa and Europe. The region is home to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal,
Bangladesh and the Maldives, all of whom are key partners in the Belt and Road Initiative, and
projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) and the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor (THICC)
4
Kaplan RD (2011). Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. Random House, p.400.
5
Shambaugh D. (2013). China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford University Press, p.409.
6
Cai
P.
(2017).
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Danlu Hu, Qinyi Fu, Yanghai Mao, Ling Zhou. (2023). A study on the Belt and Road Initiative's trade and its
influencing factors: Evidence from China-South Asia's panel data. PLoS One, 18(4).
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are underway. South Asia's role is not only economic, but also geopolitical. The Belt and Road
Initiative is seen as a diplomatic tool to expand China's "soft power" through infrastructure,
digital technologies and cultural exchanges. However, the initiative has also raised some
concerns, particularly from India. India sees the Belt and Road Initiative, and especially the
CPEC project, as a strategic move by China to encircle it through alliances with neighboring
countries against it
. Nevertheless, South Asia remains an attractive region for Chinese
investment, having achieved an average annual economic growth of 7.6% between 2014 and
2018.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was launched in 2015 and is a flagship project
of the Belt and Road Initiative. Its total investment is estimated at 62 billion US dollars. The
main objective of the project is to connect the city of Kashgar in China's Xinjiang province with
the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea coast of Pakistan through a network of roads, railways,
pipelines and energy projects
. The first phase, covering the period 2015-2020, focused on
developing energy and infrastructure, which was intended to overcome Pakistan's long-standing
energy shortage and modernize its transport network. In 2016, Chinese cargo was delivered to
the port of Gwadar by land, marking the partial commissioning of the corridor. The strategic
importance of CPEC is that it provides China with a direct access to the Indian Ocean and
bypasses the dangerous Strait of Malacca. For Pakistan, the corridor promises economic
transformation through job creation, industrial growth, and improved transport links. The
Rashakai and Dhabiji Special Economic Zones are being built with the aim of transforming
Pakistan into a regional manufacturing hub
. However, Pakistan's debt to China of more than
$29 billion by 2024 and a lack of transparency in the projects have drawn criticism
. Since
2020, CPEC has been expanded to focus on industrial cooperation, agriculture, and digital
infrastructure development. The Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), co-chaired by Pakistani
and Chinese officials, coordinates these efforts. Despite geopolitical tensions and internal
political instability in Pakistan, CPEC remains a model for the Belt and Road Initiative and
demonstrates China's ability to advance its strategic goals while adapting to local conditions
9
Pant HV, & Shivamurthy AG (2025). A China-led trilateral nexus as India's new challenge. The Hindu
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-china-led-trilateral-nexus-as-indias-new-
challenge/article69745715.ece/amp/
10
David Sacks. (2021). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—Hard Reality Greets BRI's Signature Initiative.
Council on Foreign Relations
https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-hard-reality-greets-bris-signature-initiative
11
Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni, Hassan H. Carrar. (2024). China, Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative: The
Experience of an Early Adopter State. Routledge, p.176.
12
Afzal M. (2020). "At all costs": How Pakistan and China control the narrative on the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor. Brookings Institution https://www.brookings.edu/articles/at-all-costs-how-pakistan-and-china-control-the-
narrative-on-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/
13
Siegfried O. Wolf. (2023). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative: Concept,
Context, and Assessment. Springer, p. 412.
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China's infrastructure projects in South Asia are not limited to Pakistan, it has also invested
significantly in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. These projects are part of the "Maritime Silk
Road" of the "Belt and Road" initiative, which will facilitate China's access to the Indian Ocean
and strengthen trade networks. Sri Lanka's strategic location in the Indian Ocean has become a
focus for Chinese investment. The port of Gambantota, one of the key projects of the "Belt and
Road", was leased to China for 99 years in 2017 after Sri Lanka defaulted on a $1.1 billion debt
. This has led to accusations of "debt trap diplomacy", with Sri Lanka's debts to Japan, the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank being much higher than its obligations to China.
The Colombo Port City projects aim to transform Sri Lanka into a regional financial hub, but
they have raised concerns about their environmental impact and growing Chinese influence.
Nepal officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2017, and its Trans-Himalayan Economic
Corridor project aims to improve transport links across the Himalayan mountain range. The
project includes highways, hydroelectric power plants and a rail link to China
. However, the
projects have been slow to progress due to financing disputes and geopolitical risks related to
India. Nepal's desire to balance China with India suggests it is taking a cautious approach to Belt
and Road projects, prioritizing economic benefits but avoiding becoming overly dependent on
Chinese loans. Bangladesh has become a key partner of the Belt and Road Initiative, with
projects such as the Payra Port and the Padma Bridge serving to boost transport links and trade.
In 2025, Bangladesh officially joined the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which
marks the country's deeper integration into China's economic corridors
. These projects aim to
take advantage of Bangladesh's rapidly growing economy and strategic maritime access.
However, as the amount of debt borrowed from China has reached record levels, there are
concerns about debt sustainability
.
The economic reforms of China in 1978 and India in 1991 transformed both countries into global
economic powers, paving the way for significant growth in bilateral trade. By 2024, trade
between China and India was expected to reach US$135.9 billion, making China India's largest
trading partner, surpassing the United States
. India's exports to China, which included iron ore,
cotton, and organic chemicals, were US$16.8 billion, while imports from China, mainly
electronics, machinery, and pharmaceuticals, amounted to US$118.4 billion, resulting in a trade
14
Adhe Nuansa Wibisono. (2019). China's “Belt and Road Initiative” in Sri Lanka : Debt Diplomacy in Hambantota
Port Investment. Journal Mandala Journal Ilmu Hugangan Internasional 2(2), pp.222-245.
15
Indira Devi Prasain. (2024). The Belt and Road Initiative: Assessing Its Implications for Nepal's Development.
Interdisciplinary Journal of Management and Social Sciences 5(2), pp.102-113.
16
Yuvraj Tyagi. (2025). China Deepens South Asia Footprint with Trilateral Engagement of Pakistan, Bangladesh
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.timesnownews.com/world/asia/china-hosts-trilateral-talks-with-neighbors-
excludes-india-from-south-asia-axis-article-152155836/amp
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Mallick S. (2025). China's Belt and Road Initiative: Impact on South Asia's Geopolitical Landscape and Regional
Dynamics. Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, 28(1), pp.7-30.
18
China-India Economic Ties: Trade, Investment, and Opportunities https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-
india-economic-ties-trade-investment-and-opportunities/
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deficit of US$101.6 billion. This imbalance reflects India's dependence on Chinese
manufacturing, particularly in the electronics and active pharmaceutical ingredients sectors; by
2023, 70 percent of India's active pharmaceutical ingredients imports came from China.
Economic cooperation is not limited to trade, but also encompasses investment and technology.
Chinese companies such as Xiaomi, Vivo and BYD are investing heavily in India's consumer
electronics and automotive industries, creating jobs and contributing to the "Make in India"
initiative
. At the same time, major Indian IT companies such as TCS and Infosys operate in
China and serve the digital market there. While China joined the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement in 2022, India withdrew from the agreement in 2019,
reflecting its cautious approach to economic integration with China
. The risk of the Indian
market being oversaturated with Chinese products and strategic vulnerabilities have led to this.
The 3,488-kilometer Line of Actual Control (LAC) border dispute between China and India
remains a major obstacle to stable relations. The dispute dates back to the colonial-era McMahon
Line Agreement of 1914 and involves competing territorial claims in Aksai Chin and Arunachal
Pradesh. The 1962 Sino-Indian War resulted in China gaining control of Aksai Chin,
exacerbating the historic distrust
. In recent years, the border has seen sporadic clashes. The
most serious incident occurred in June 2020 in the Galwan Valley, where 20 Indian and an
unknown number of Chinese soldiers were killed
. It was the bloodiest conflict since 1962,
prompting military deployments, economic retaliation, and a partial disengagement. In October
2024, both sides agreed to resume patrols in the Depsang and Demchok areas, indicating a easing
of tensions, but tensions remain over unresolved issues in other parts of the Line of Control.
These border disputes are being further complicated by infrastructure development. India is
concerned that China is building roads, airstrips, and villages near the Line of Control as part of
its Belt and Road Initiative, which it sees as a strategic encroachment. India is responding by
ramping up its own border infrastructure, with the Atal Tunnel and roads in Arunachal Pradesh
being built to increase its military presence. The Line of Control disputes reflect a broader
geostrategic competition, not just territorial claims, where both countries are seeking to expand
their spheres of influence using military and economic means.
The relationship between China and India is increasingly defined by geostrategic competition.
The two countries are competing for leadership in Asia and shaping the global order. China's
"One Belt, One Road" initiative, launched in 2013, is the cornerstone of its global strategy,
aiming to increase connectivity through infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa and Europe.
South Asia is a key part of this initiative, as is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which
India opposes because it passes through disputed territories such as Gilgit-Baltistan. India sees
19
Sylvia Malinbaum. (2025). India's Quest for Economic Emancipation from China. Asia. Visions, No. 145, Institut
français des relations internationales, p. 9-30.
20
Abraham Hugo Pandu Wicaksono. (2021). India's Withdrawal from Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP). Nation State Journal of International Studies 4(2), pp.231-246.
21
Karackattu JT (2018). India–China Border Dispute: Boundary-Making and Shaping of Material Realities from the
Mid-Nineteenth to Mid-Twentieth Century. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 28(1), pp.135–159.
22
Sharma A. (2020). The recent deadly India–China border clash. New Zealand International Review, 45(5), pp.4–7.
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the "One Belt, One Road" projects, particularly the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the Payra
Port in Bangladesh, as part of China's "String of Pearls" strategy, through which China seeks to
encircle India by sea and land. India is responding by promoting its own regional initiatives, such
as the "Act East Policy", the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor with Japan, and the International
North-South Transport Corridor with Russia and Iran. These initiatives are intended to increase
India's influence in the Indo-Pacific and Central Asia and counter China's dominance. India leads
the Quad group, along with the United States, Japan, and Australia, and is strengthening military
ties with Western countries, signaling its intention to counter China's growing influence
RESULTS:
The US Indo-Pacific Strategy, formalized by the Trump administration in 2017 and
further refined under the Biden administration, aims to preserve the principle of a “free and open
Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). The strategy emphasizes the international rules-based order, the freedom
of navigation, and strengthening alliances to counter China’s growing influence
. The 2022 US
National Security Strategy singles out China as “the only adversary with the ambition to change
the international order and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do
so.” This approach clearly demonstrates that US-China competition is shaping the future of the
Indo-Pacific region. The FOIP strategy is based on three core principles: security, economic
cooperation, and governance. On the security front, the United States has deepened alliances
with India, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN countries, and has strengthened cooperation through
joint military exercises and defense agreements. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad),
which includes the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, is a key pillar of this strategy.
Created in 2007 as a simple platform for dialogue, the Quad has now expanded its scope to
include military exercises, vaccine diplomacy, climate change, and collaborative initiatives on
key technologies such as 5G and artificial intelligence
. The Quad’s development reflects a
growing consensus among members to counter China’s aggressive maritime actions and promote
a rules-based order in the region. In South Asia, the United States has chosen India as a key
partner, viewing it as a counterweight to China. India’s military capabilities, including its naval
and nuclear arsenals, make it an equal competitor to China, but its policy of “strategic
autonomy” limits its ability to form a full-fledged alliance with the United States. The United
States has sought to strengthen economic and security cooperation with smaller South Asian
states such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives, with the aim of broadening their
strategic options and reducing their dependence on China
. U.S. assistance to support Rohingya
23
Darshana M. Baruah. (2018). India's Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia. CARNEGIE
INDIA https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/08/indias-answer-to-the-belt-and-road-a-road-map-for-south-
asia?lang=en
24
Lee C. (2023). An Analysis of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy in US-China Competition. American Journal of
Chinese Studies, 30(1), pp.43-59.
25
Emmanuel Selome Fasinu, Beatrice Jesutayo, Titilayo Olaniyan, John Eloche. (2024). Assessing the Politics of the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and its Impact on India-United States Relations: Implications for Security
and Trade Cooperation. Journal of Public Administration and Social Welfare Research, 9(3), pp.115-125.
26
Tehseen M. (2017). Sino-US Competition: Implications for South Asia and the Asia-Pacific. Strategic Studies,
37(4), pp.1-17.
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refugees in Bangladesh and for economic diversification is aimed at counterbalancing China’s
infrastructural influence. The United States also launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Platform
(IPEF) in 2022, which promotes high-standard trade, supply chain sustainability, and clean
energy cooperation
. However, IPEF's emphasis on setting economic standards rather than
investment makes it less attractive than China's Belt and Road Initiative, which offers specific
infrastructure projects.
South Asian countries are adopting a strategy of “hedging” in the US-China rivalry. This
approach allows countries to engage with two major powers simultaneously, reaping economic
and security benefits, and reducing the risk of becoming overly involved in conflicts between
major powers
. While Sri Lanka has welcomed Chinese investment through infrastructure
projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, it is also seeking support from the US and India to
counterbalance Beijing’s influence. Bangladesh has also used its strategic geographic location as
a leverage to attract investment from China and the US, while maintaining a neutral stance on
regional security issues. ASEAN’s approach provides a useful comparison in this regard.
ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam have adopted a “light” or
“moderate” hedging strategy, seeking to gain economic and security benefits from engaging with
the United States and China, but refraining from forming an outright alliance with either power
.
Smaller states in South Asia are also facing similar pressures, but their diplomatic options are
relatively limited. Nepal is trying to avoid becoming overly dependent on Beijing by balancing
Chinese investments in hydropower and transport infrastructure with assistance from India and
the United States. The Maldives is also showing how small states can adopt a delicate strategic
approach, seeking to balance the influence of China and India.
The rivalry between the US and China has profound implications for stability in South Asia,
creating both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, it has fostered cooperation in the region
on non-traditional security issues, such as climate change, maritime security, and public health.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Quad’s vaccine diplomacy initiatives and focus on
combating climate change have demonstrated a commitment to working together to address
common regional challenges. Such cooperation can enhance regional cohesion and resilience. On
the other hand, it risks polarizing the region by forcing countries in South Asia to choose
between two powers or subjecting them to economic and security pressures. Singaporean Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong warned in 2019 that US-China tensions could lead to the emergence
of “rival blocs” and undermine ASEAN’s central role
. China’s assertive actions in the South
China Sea and border disputes with India are increasing tensions in the region. The US response
27
Wardani RY, Cooray NS, Waruwu AH, Putri AN, & Maulani AA (2024). The IPEF as a Grand Strategic Design
for the US Economic Gains. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 37(1/2), pp.43-56.
28
Haacke J. (2019). The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia: a critique and a proposal for a
modified conceptual and methodological framework. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 19(3), pp.375-417.
29
Peter Brian M. Wang. (2025). US-China Competition and ASEAN Unity: Why Economic Resilience Matters. AEI
Insights An International journal of Asia-Europe relations 10(1), pp.15-30.
30
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Dunst.
(2020).
How
the
US
Can
Win
Back
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to this situation by increasing its military presence in the Indo-Pacific and supporting the Quad
alliances, while aiming to contain China, risks exacerbating the conflict. A 2024 report by the
Carnegie Endowment warned that a major US-China military conflict over Taiwan could create a
new “Cold War” scenario and destabilize the entire Indo-Pacific, including South Asia
.
CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, China’s strategy in South Asia is complex but coherent. It is
shaping the region’s economic infrastructure while expanding its sphere of political influence.
China’s future strategy in South Asia has the potential to profoundly change the geopolitical
landscape of the region, serving its long-term geostrategic goals. This strategy is being
implemented not only through economic projects, but also through political and military means.
China sees South Asia as one of the key directions for its foreign policy and economic interests,
and is trying to strengthen its influence there. This is clearly manifested in the infrastructure
projects, ports and roads implemented through the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. China’s
long-term geostrategic goals are to provide security guarantees, control regional trade routes,
access to energy resources and achieve geoeconomic superiority. China is gaining direct access
to the Indian Ocean, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with Pakistan
and ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal. This will allow it to expand its strategic freedom
of movement and influence on global sea routes. However, the growing economic and
infrastructural dependence of South Asian countries on China is threatening their political
sovereignty. Through loans, investments, and infrastructure projects, China is enslaving the
countries of the region. As a result, concerns are being raised in some countries about “debt trap
diplomacy.” At the same time, while these countries are gaining short-term economic benefits
from close ties with China, long-term sovereignty issues remain open. South Asia is an important
area for China to strengthen its image as a global superpower. South Asia, with its strategic
location in the region, the presence of a major geopolitical rival like India, and as a crossroads of
global sea routes, is becoming a bastion for China's global ambitions. China is seeking to
position itself in the region not only as an economic partner, but also as a guarantor of security
and political stability.
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