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REVEALING HARDWARE USEFULNESS: EXAMINING METHODS OF DESIGN
Elavarasu Udayar
Satya Nilayam Research Institute (University of Madras), India
AB O U T ART I CL E
Key words:
Hardware Design, Functionality,
Design
Methodologies,
Optimization,
Performance, Reliability, Usability, Case Studies.
Received:
21.06.2024
Accepted
: 26.06.2024
Published
: 01.07.2024
Abstract:
This study delves into the functionality
and design methods of hardware, aiming to
uncover the intricacies that define its usefulness.
By examining various design methodologies and
their application in creating functional hardware,
the research highlights key factors influencing
design decisions and outcomes. The study
analyzes case studies and empirical data to
explore how design methodologies contribute to
optimizing hardware performance, reliability, and
usability. Insights gained from this analysis
provide a deeper understanding of the principles
guiding effective hardware design and their
implications for technological advancement.
INTRODUCTION
The various types of entities in the world were of interest to traditional ontology. For
instance, Aristotle in his Classes was keen on grouping the creatures (onta) there are and needed to
distinguish the creatures that are generally major and genuine inside that order (Safeguards, 2007).
Heidegger posed the question in a different way in Being and Time, rather than asking what kinds of
entities there are: what are the sorts of ways that substances can be in the worl. In contrast to Aristotle,
the Heideggerian approach examines the way things are rather than listing the various kinds of entities.
There are many different kinds of beings in our world: objects, people, plants, animals, water, and so
forth These entities could have different ways of "being" in the world, according to Heidegger. In Being
and Time, he discusses the various ways that Dasein's being in the world can be viewed. Heidegger
makes an effort to help his readers comprehend the unitary relationship that exists between the various
aspects of Dasein's being in the world. The concepts of "being-in," "the world," and "that which is in the
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world," also known as "the who" or "the self," are the first three. As per Heidegger, the most ideal way
to concentrate on Dasein‟s existential constitution is by going to what is "optically nearest" as far as we
might be concerned, that is to say, our regular circumstances (Heidegger, 1962). In Heideggerian terms,
we must endeavor to comprehend ourselves in our everydayness, or daily existence. However, this is a
difficult task because we are likely to misinterpret ourselves as soon as we look in the mirror. Seeing
oneself as essentially detached is a common mistake; Heidegger thinks about this as a result of a long
ontologically deluding Cartesian practice that has been acknowledged throughout some stretch of time
without addressing.
In Being and Time, Heidegger's first task is to dismantle this idea and demonstrate that humans are
engaged actors in everyday situations rather than spectators, using the term "Dasein-being-in-the-
world". This suggests that humans are actively engaged beings that are immersed in a living context
made up of things, people, other living things, culture, and so on. The substance might fluctuate from
one individual to another as well as from setting to setting. However, if Dasein is being-in-the-world,
then the world itself is an essential component of our existence. This entails that the fact that humans
are always actively engaged with their world is one of the defining characteristics of human existence.
Further on, Dasein's "equipment" is a fundamental part of the world. It is counterintuitive to think of
"equipment" as merely free-
floating entities. Rather, the gear is Dasein‟s approach to being. However,
Dasein's mode of existence differs from the spatiotemporal characteristics of the world's equipment
(Heidegger, 1962; Heidegger, 1988. When Heidegger states that only Dasein can touch, whereas a chair
can touch the wall, Heidegger makes this distinction very clear. The wall and the seat can't connect each
other in the manner Dasein experiences the seat (Heidegger, 1962). Dasein is capable of encountering
otherworldly beings. In Dasein's interactions with the world, we encounter chairs, walls, computers,
cars, hammers, and tables, according to Heideggerian logic. Although they may exist inertly and
independently of Dasein's practices, they are only relevant in light of Dasein's engaged practices.
Ready-to-Hand and Present-at-Hand:
Heidegger contends that relics can be on the planet in two ways based on how they are being
experienced by Dasein over his dealings with the world. In its everyday world, Dasein typically
encounters entities as "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit) and others as "present-at-hand"
(Vorhandenheit). Most of the things we encounter in our daily lives are readily available. Our
relationship to things that are handy or useful is referred to as the ready-to-hand. Entities are
encountered as a continuous collection of relationships that are interconnected. This is our lived
experience and our primordial relationship with the world. "Tools, objects of use, cultural products,
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things of value and significance" are referred to as equipment in Heideggerian analysis (McDaniel,
2013). According to Heidegger (1962), "we shall call those entities which we encounter in regard
"equipment." In our dealings, we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation,
and measurement. In the Heideggerian framework, the term "equipment" refers to a technical term that
is interpreted not in an ontic but rather in an ontological sense. Even though Heidegger uses the term
"equipment" to explain this idea, its meaning extends beyond just physical tools. Then, equipment could
be anything from a sign to an environment to a service mechanism. He states that "it includes everything
we make use of domestically or in public life" when equipment is taken in this ontological sense, not
just sewing or writing tools. Street lamps are also pieces of equipment in this broad ontological sense
(Heidegger, 1988).
Imagine that while a carpenter is hammering, he comes across a hammer as equipment. According to
Heidegger (1962) and Riemer (2014), the carpenter encounters the hammer because of his familiarity
with it and the work he does, namely hammering (Heidegger, 2014). This "in-order-to" relationship is
one in which one uses equipment to complete a specific task; In the case of a carpenter, it is used for
shaping, driving nails in, and removing them. There isn't much of a hammer in use other than a wooden
shaft and a metallic sphere. When it is ready to use, the hammer as a tool hides itself and its properties.
In the ordinary pragmatic utilization of pounding, the sledge pulls out from our immediate
consideration and stays unnoticeable. It is readily available because it is absent. Heidegger wants to
show, using the hammer as an example, that we encounter equipment in our everyday interactions as
an in-order-to rather than in a theoretical way.
When approached in disengaged reflection, the same entity might also appear to Dasein as present-at-
hand. The entity can be approached for a variety of reasons, including pure curiosity, as a subject of the
first encounter, as a subject of design, as the subject of scientific investigation, and so on. The entity is
present for Dasein in all of these situations, and the object itself
—
through its properties
—
takes
precedence over the practical activity. We consider an entity to be inert, determinate, and isolable at
the moment (McDaniel, 2013).
The point made by Heidegger is that the equipment's existence is not fully revealed in any one mode.
The hammer's Vorhandenheit is revealed through disengaged observation or analysis, while its
Zuhandenheit is revealed through its performance. However, they are not two distinct entities; rather,
they are encounters of the same entity in either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand modes of being. In
the words of Boedeker (2005):
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Neither is presence-to-hand a universal formal structure nor a super-property. Instead, it is just one of
many ways that we can meet entities. It is to be contrasted, for instance, with "readiness-at-hand"
(Zuhandenheit), in which we encounter entities in terms of their usefulness to our practical projects or
their lack thereof. Importantly, "presence-to-hand" and "readiness-to-hand" are not different kinds of
entities because they are just different ways of encountering what Heidegger calls "intraworldly
entities," which are the same as "physical objects." Heidegger says that modern science made the
mistake of treating the "present-at-hand" mode of being as fundamental and superior when, in fact, it
is just one of many ways we can encounter entities. Heidegger (1962) draws a distinction between a
practical understanding and a theoretical understanding that is uninterested:
In the event that we take a gander at things just 'hypothetically', we can get along without
understanding „readiness
-to-
hand‟. Yet, when we manage them by utilizing them and controlling them,
this movement is definitely not a visually impaired one; It has its own kind of sight, which guides our
manipulation...Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the numerous assignments of the
"in order to." (p. 98) Heidegger refers to this kind of sight circumspection as Umsicht; The original way
of seeing is always in relation to our projects, its uses, its function as something that must be done, and
its ability to point beyond itself in relation to the task at hand. Each substance that is first gotten a handle
on by our m
eticulousness is „ready
-to-
hand‟ (Zuhandenheit) before the chance of its being seen or
intuited as present-within reach (Vorhandenheit) (Inwood, 1999 and Riemer, 2011).When the
elements are checked exclusively as present out- within reach, it loses its natural significance and
warmth of relationship with different creatures. It is considered one of the batches of materials with
only numerical representations as it loses its context. These representations fail to capture the
complexity and richness of life that the equipment is associated with.
The Paradox of Invisibility:
Heidegger makes the point that our "present-at-hand mode" of being is not what makes our daily lives
unique. We are not beings who engage in detached contemplation for the majority of our daily lives.
Rather, we are creatures frequently assimilated in specific practices. "The world and all its contents,
including things, artifacts, our div and others, are both invisible and subordinate to our practices"
when we engage in such practices (Riemer, 2014). To put it another way, when an entity is in use, it
becomes invisible, but when it fails to perform or is observed from a distance, it becomes visible.
Consider the world of a medical professional who uses a stethoscope to listen to a patient's heartbeat.
Because the stethoscope is so much a part of her, she doesn't see it as a thing made of a specific,
definable substance that spans space and time, but rather as something that helps her do her job. She
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sees the world through the stethoscope. She establishes an embodiment relation, in the words of Don
Ihde (Ihde, 2009). That is, the stethoscope influences her perception of the patient's medical condition
when she listens to the patient's heartbeat. Like the hammer in Heidegger's example, the stethoscope
partially leaves her awareness. This relationship can be described as "world" (doctor and stethoscope).
The stethoscope has become a part of her when she looks out at the world, as indicated by the
parentheses. She becomes embodied in the stethoscope as it disappears from her awareness.
A hermeneutic relation is another possibility (Ihde, 2009). At the point when a specialist needs to have
data about what occurs inside the patient‟s div, she peruses the X
-beam and X-ray reports. The
connection between what is read and the patient's div is then taken for granted. As a means of
observation, the medical reports in this instance do not become a part of the doctor's div but rather
of the world she observes. After that, the connection can be presented as a doctor (world medical
report). Heidegger writes in 1988:
In a familiar environment, we do not always and never have an explicit perception of the things around
us, and certainly not in a way that would make us specifically aware of them as useful. It is definitively
on the grounds that an unequivocal mindfulness and confirmation of their being within reach doesn't
happen that we have them around us in an unconventional manner, similarly as they are in themselves.
(The paradox of equipment is the equipment's invisibility in a familiar setting or when it works well.
When in use, the equipment blends in or remains undetectable. According to Heidegger (Heidegger,
1962), "the equipment withdraws as we concern ourselves in the work." The doctor is so preoccupied
with listening to the patient's heartbeat that she barely notices the stethoscope when she is completely
focused on it. This invisibility exemplifies the paradoxical nature of something that we perceive to be
readily available. Intangibility isn't introduced as anything less beneficial here however as a positive
component of hardware. When we put a piece of equipment to use, not when we look at it or think about
it, we can tell if it is ready to use. "Equipment is truly encountered as what it is only when it is not
experienced at all," according to Kai Reimer (Riemer, 2014). Only malfunctioning, broken equipment
makes its presence known. A messed up hammer, hanged PC, missing device, lost scenes, a bombed
arrangement of administration organization, etc, noisily report their presence.
The stethoscope allows the doctor to fully engage in her ministry of healing as long as it functions
normally. Good equipment never shows up and always disappears. "The distinction between self and
external world (including others) fades" in such an engagement we become so preoccupied with the
task at hand that we "lose ourselves" in it. "The self must forget itself, if lost in the world of equipment,
it is able to actually go to work and manipulate something," Heidegger writes (Heidegger, 1962).
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Equipment as a System:
Equipment does not appear in Dasein's everyday world as an isolated, determinate object or group of
objects. It is constantly experienced as a framework with a „in
-
request to‟ structure as Heidegger calls
it. Heidegger wrote in 1962: If taken strictly, "equipment" does not exist. There is always a totality of
equipment to the Being of any equipment, in which it may be this equipment that it is. A totality of
equipment is constituted by various ways of the "in-order-to," such as serviceability, conduciveness,
usability, and manipulability. Equipment is essentially "something in-order-to....") Heidegger refers to
this in-order-to as an essential structure of equipment that is present in the world. Dasein finds out
what an item is when it is "in order to," or when it is "ready to use." In this sense, a stethoscope is seen
as a "to-listen-to-heartbeat," not as a set of metal wires and a diaphragm. I think of a smart phone as the
one that lets me make calls and send text messages. Even if it's an old clunker, people first see a car as
a means of transportation before seeing it as status, freedom, empowerment, independence, and so on.
It doesn't matter how fashionable a car is if it doesn't serve as a vehicle that facilitates transportation.
This is due to the fact that people first encounter automobiles as "in order to transport" equipment in
everyday interactions. This uncovers to us a crucial truth about the approaches to being of hardware.
Dasein frequently encounters equipment based not on its scientific or metaphysical properties but
rather on its application in a particular circumstance created by other equipment and human practices.
Each piece of equipment is constituted by the system's members because it is a part of a system of
equipment. Equipment is always "being-in-the-totality" of equipment, just like Dasein is always "being-
in-the-
world." Heidegger delivers an alternate comprehension of gear that there is no such „thing‟ as a
piece of hardware. The antic understanding of equipment completely disregards the fact that the being
of any equipment is constituted by a totality of equipment when viewed in terms of material terms
(Heidegger, 1962; Munday, 2006). In fact, every piece of equipment is thought to be part of another
piece of equipment.
Take the room encounter as an illustration. My room is more than just a piece of equipment in the sense
that it is a collection of other pieces of equipment that make up a room. It is also more than just one
piece of equipment. It is not only seen as a geometric space "between four walls," but also as a set of
tools for living made up of other tools and human practices like pens, paper, lamps, furniture,
computers, printers, routers, wires, windows, doors, rooms, and so on. It also includes some behaviors
that are expected to happen in personal rooms. It has already been established that an "individual" piece
of equipment manifests itself in a collection of equipment (Heidegger, 1962; Munday, 2009).
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In the equipment as a whole, each tool has a specific place in the system. According to Heidegger, the
equipment system as a whole is comparable to his world. The ontological understanding of the world
is relational in nature, in which the world is not fixed or absolute but emerges as a result of a
heterogeneous network of entities rather than an assemblage, in contrast to the antic understanding of
the world, which is a collection of entities with each entity having a predetermined structure.
Computers, wires, mobile phones, printers, tables, and electricity are individual tools that are part of
this world; however, these artifacts are not considered equipment in the Heideggerian sense. Indeed,
even the amount of the multitude of individual things of instruments doesn't make up the entirety of
hardware. When the focus is solely on an artifact, the equipment as a network of related entities, which
is also constituted by the task for which the individual piece of equipment stands, remains hidden. For
instance, hammering is only made up of the hammer as a tool. Harman (2002) provides an excellent
summary of Heidegger's point:
Any possibility that independent objects exist in a vacuum away from the relations, functions, and
meanings world. He believes that the tool, in its actual use, is part of a global system that has combined
all of its parts into a single global effect. Specific beings can only ever emerge from within this system.
Heidegger refers to the equipment's totality as a systemic feature. The metal wires, stomach, a sound
transducer, the sound codec gadgets, the speakers, binaural cylinders, batteries, etc in a stethoscope
whenever taken alone don't mean something very similar. It is combined with numerous other
intricately engineered parts. The stethoscope always reflects the characteristics of the associated
equipment. A stethoscope is a tool that "listens" to heartbeats only in relation to other tools. In this way,
the main understanding is that no singular thing of hardware remains solitary however is brought into
an arrangement of hardware pieces making a gear. Despite the fact that we are hardly aware of the
entirety of this equipment in our ontic consideration, the task of stethoscopping cannot be
accomplished without it. Gear, as a matter of fact, capabilities "by disappearing for the noticeable reality
that it brings about"(Harman, 2002) -
metal wires and stomach for stethoscope and carpenter’s
apparatuses for the apparent house. Every piece of equipment used for withdrawal "allows the ultimate
reference to swallow all of its component forces into an invisible system or network lying silently
beneath it". Present-within reach is noticeable of gear and what is behind the apparent the truth is
prepared to-hand. Harman refers to the unidentified labor that exists behind each piece of equipment.
The second insight is that only through our concerned interactions and its use does equipment acquire
its identity and significance. According to Heidegger (1962) and Riemer (2011), equipment always
derives its particular "in-order-to." According to Heidegger's statement (Heidegger, 1962,), "the
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structure of the Being of what is ready-to-hand as equipment is determined by references or
assignments (Verweisung)." The structure of these references or assignments is "in order to". By
referential entirety, Heidegger suggests that a singular thing of gear shows up as alluding to different
substances inside an entirety of hardware (Sinclair, 2006). A doctor uses a stethoscope on a daily basis;
it alludes to the client. It serves a purpose, or "in order to." It likewise alludes to different material things
with which it is made of. Mark Sinclair puts it this way: These references aren't the "things" themselves;
rather, they are the horizon in which they can appear
—
a horizon of meaning or sense through which
equipment can be seen as referring to each other. These snare of references or tasks themselves are not
unequivocally seen yet "they are somewhat 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them… ".
When the "assignment has been disturbed-when something is unusable for some purpose" (Heidegger,
196), it becomes explicit.
“The context of equipment is lit up...With this totality, however, the world announces itself”. “World
hood” is an ontological concept and stands for the structure of on
e of the constitutive items of Being-in-
the-world...moreover, that assignments and referential totalities could in some sense become
constitutive for World hood itself,” Heidegger says. The structure of this referential totality is an a priori
transcendental horizon. Heidegger says that this horizon is a system of relationships that makes up the
equipment's way of being. We frequently disregard the equipment as a whole and treat it as a single
component. But, as Harman points out, the important thing isn't our finding that "equipment is always
found in conjunction with related items... but (sic) what is essential is that at the level of readiness-to-
hand, the idea of a single tool reposing in its solitary effect is shown to be untenable," as Harman puts
it. Instead, a global tool empire has already dissolved individual equipment.
Conceptuality of Equipment:
In the background of some "specific familiarities" and "competencies for dealing things and others,"
equipment is always encountered (Hall, 1993). For instance, a stethoscope can only be considered
"ready-to-hand" equipment for someone who is familiar with the health care environment and its
"network of practical relations." The stethoscope is only present
—
on hand
—
to a person who is
unfamiliar with medical procedures. The user still requires a wider range of more fundamental and
fundamental familiarities to deal with any tools, in addition to the specific familiarities and coping skills
associated with healthcare activities and practical settings. Dreyfus calls it the reasonableness and
fittingness of hardware (Dreyfus, 2007); That is, an artifact must first be suitable for a project before it
can be used as equipment. When it possesses all of the necessary material properties to complete the
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project, it is considered suitable. However, even though suitability is a requirement for something to be
an equipment, it is not sufficient on its own.
According to Reimer (2014) and Dreyfus (1980), the appropriateness of equipment is determined by
its relation to the entirety of other equipment, the shared practices that are involved in it, user
competencies, and other broader social orthodoxies that can only be meaningful in particular contexts
(Reimer, 2014). These are what Dreyfus refers to as practical holism, a broader perspective necessary
for interpreting what it means to be a human being, a tool, a citizen, a student, a doctor, an employee,
and so on. These social practices are learned by being raised in a certain environment, not by learning
rules and beliefs. Heidegger refers to it as "befindlichkeiten" deciphered as "attunement" - a state one
ends up in with no conscious doing, winding up in a setting before one subsides into it, "the state in
which one might be found". ( This background cannot be made explicit in a theoretical form through a
detached analysis (Dreyfus, 1980; Liberman, 2012; Heidegger, 1962). It is possible to argue that even
basic skills like div movement and language, as well as encountering equipment, necessitate some
rule learning. It is accepted, but when a user becomes proficient, "such rules, (sic) are left behind and a
single unified, flexible, purposeful pattern of behavior is all that remains;" furthermore, it is a vain work
to formalize these methodology. Heidegger wrote in 1962:
Assignments and references have significance that "can be formalized in the sense of a system of
Relations...The phenomenal content of these "Relations" and "Relata"... resist any kind of mathematical
fictionalization;" neither are they merely a thought that was initially expressed in an "act of thinking."
They are somewhat connections in which concernful prudence as such as of now abides. Only in the
background of a network of relations
—
familiarity and expertise, which are frequently non-represent
able
—
can an entity in its explicit form be discovered (Hall, 1993). It is referred to by Heidegger as
primordial understanding or truth. The user is able to interact with the equipment in a different way
because of these various background practices. Because of this, when we deal with the equipment with
concern, certain features become relevant or irrelevant. No hardware is plainly obvious. Instead,
everything is bound by supplementary. Therefore, the shared background practices determine the
appropriateness of an individual piece of equipment; the relationship structure. Individual devices like
screws, fasteners, ranges, decks, braces, rails, heap footings, etc gain character and importance by
getting gulped into the bigger arrangement of the extension. So, the use of a tool reveals its meaning,
and the use of equipment reveals its meaning in the larger context of what it is used for in its larger
equip mental way of being in the world. Therefore, there is no point at which it reaches its ultimate end.
Its nature could more accurately be described as circular (Munday, 2006; Heidegger, 1962).
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It is not necessary to decide that the same artifacts belong in another setting. For instance, most Baby
Boomers and Generation Xers only use their cell phones to make calls or send texts. However, a similar
PDA might appear to a millennial as that which permits gaming, web perusing, photography and making
and keeping up with virtual networks or the auto signals become significant with regards to vehicles
and traffic guidelines (Heidegger, 1962). "For Heidegger equipment is its context," as Harman puts it
correctly (Harman, 2002). Outside of its proper context, a piece of equipment is always opaque
(Munday, 2006).
The most important take away from this discussion is not that each piece of equipment acquires
meaning and value in response to the circumstances in which it is used; rather, the most important
takeaway is that every tool is entwined with a particular system of relations that defines and determines
its ways of being. As a result, the equip mental structure's system of relations gives each tool its own
distinct position. It is a unitary phenomenon in which the entire individual realm is already dissolved
while in action, and this totality of equipment is not just a sum total of ontic entities or a location for
tool pieces (Harman, 2002). (Heidegger, 1962; Munday, 2006) Heidegger refers to it as an equip mental
way of being.
Seeing Beyond the Present:
This part reconnects with the past subjects that we talked about by setting them according to plan. We
are more familiar with design in terms of its functional performance, ergonomic comfort, and aesthetic
value, but the ontological conditions that underpin design remain far removed from us. Limiting
ourselves to an ontic understanding of equipment poses a risk because it conceals the true nature of the
equipment's character and leads us to believe that it is an isolated instance of an artifact assisting us in
performing a function. What this paper attempts to bring up is that the ongoing plan concerns ought to
reach out a long ways past the physical and quantifiable ontic highlights to incorporate the failed to
remember ontological circle which coordinates and designs our reasoning and encounters. A crisis in
today's design practice is to ignore equipment's ontological foundation (Buckley, 1992).
Today's design field is a mystery due to its failure to recognize the relational aspect of design and its
original unity with ontic and ontological design. This is because we are stuck in a particular
metaphysical tradition that is frequently referred to as "rationalistic," "Cartesian," "objectivist," and
"mechanistic" (worldview), "reductionist" (science), "positivistic" (epistemologically), and, more
recently, "computation list" (Escobar). Heidegger would refer to this as "machination" or "gestell6" at
other times in Gestell is the technological enflaming of things into standing in reserve, whereas
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machination is the emergence of the manipulative power as a possessive and coercive force of order. It
is the outgrowth of a long western otherworldly custom called mysticism of presence universally
growing its unshakable orderings appeared in our ordinary lived insight, market systems, business
rationalities including configuration rehearses. A fallen state is any attempt to reduce equipment to its
immediate utility or physical appearance. It is referred to as the forgetfulness of the true nature of being
by Heidegger. The being of artifacts disappears, and as a result, it will never be less than what we see or
say about it. Because it is elusive and not readily accessible to us, it necessitates interpretation.
Reductionism is trying to know them only by what is there. "Without any explicit knowledge of the clues
which function here, without any acquaintance with the fundamental ontological function of time or
even any understanding of it and without any insight into the reason why this function is possible,"
Heidegger criticizes this interpretation of being that has emerged since the Greeks' time in Being and
Time (Heidegger, 1962). When Heidegger says, "entities are grasped in their being as "presence,"," he
is advising us about the consequences of metaphysics of presence. This indicates that they are
understood in relation to a specific time period; the "Past". The apparatus takes on meaning for me as
the entirety of my existential possibilities as it appears in my temporality. Therefore, equipment must
be defined by more than just "what is present." It acquires its identity by being a part of an "equip mental
totality" whose ways of being in time shape it. Therefore, the equipment is more than what we perceive.
From a specific perspective, Heidegger spent the entire of his logical profession to explain this
knowledge that being isn't presence. According to Heidegger, "being is understandable only by way of
time," so being is not presence because being is time. We must think and speak of being in terms of the
temporal in order to properly think and speak of being without conflating it with other beings. Time or
temporality is the fundamental ontological foundation of human existence (Heidegger, 1988).
Time cannot be restricted to the present because it is a unified phenomenon that extends continuously
into the past and future. In the sense of reaching out beyond oneself, Heidegger prefers to refer to this
as the ecstatic nature of time. The human way of being is fundamentally based on this ecstatic nature of
time. We stand out in both the world of today and the possibilities of the future. The krisis in
contemporary design practice is that we have confined ourselves to the present while the future is the
primary dimension of our existence, forgetting our fundamental ecstatic nature. Therefore, human
failure to recognize our own existential possibilities constitutes the krisis (Rojcewicz, 2006). Human
might advance in idealizing our logical seeing but be oblivious to our own circumstances that would
make us focused in the bliss of the present. Being is not being seems like technical jargon at first glance,
but a closer look reveals that it is something that takes place in our everyday world. We usually think
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of something as what it looks like or how useful it is to us or how it looks. This is plain to see on account
of, say, versatile or the fluorescent lights that we frequently use. However, according to Heidegger, there
is always more to a mobile phone or fluorescent lamp than what we see or say, so merely referring to
its use, exterior appearance, or concepts is misleading. We do not fully comprehend the existence of
things like phones and fluorescent lights. In other words, being, Heidegger refers to it as "ways to be"
(Heidegger, 1962).
We use a mobile phone or a fluorescent lamp without realizing it. When I turn on the lamp in my room,
I only think about the light that helps me see what's there. When the lamp doesn't give me enough light,
I only pay attention to it. The mobile phone is the same way. It only becomes apparent when it breaks
down. A kind of absence is actually what things really are. Since things can never be straightforwardly
or totally present to us, we are continuously deciphering more than seeing.
However, neither the mobile phone nor the fluorescent lamp is engulfed in absence. It only covers one
side. We would not have seen anything if it hadn't been for that. As a result, there is a lot of the lamp or
mobile that I can see and relate to. Whoever sees it will notice different things about it. Certain aspects
of a thing's nature remain hidden to me whenever I encounter it; for instance, the past while the others
appear to have features that could be "interpreted as tools, weapons, or items of entertainment," the
former stand out to me. The presence of each and every item is a unique interaction of presence and
nonappearance. The existence of all things, including humans, can be extrapolated from the
descriptions of mobile phones and fluorescent lamps. In this play of presence and absence, being is
revealed. This experience is referred to by Heidegger as an "event" (ereignis), which he meant to occur,
occurs, or become visible (Inwood, 1999). We grasp this involvement with our anxiety for the world;
distinguishing it just with mental experience and depicting it as far as a subject-object connection is a
misconception of what being is. Heidegger does not mean that presence is insignificant by saying this.
Rather, that's what his conflict is however presence is rich and complex it doesn't debilitate the
importance of Being. Devastating results result from prioritizing a particular mode of temporality,
namely understanding the "being of equipment" only in terms of the presencing of things (Anwesen) in
the present. For instance, because it is right in front of us, comprehending tools or machines is
straightforward and concrete. Krippendorff (2006) highlights how designers are blind to the
unintended uses and users of equipment, despite the fact that equipment defined as a system is more
complex and accommodates many absent elements as its constituents, such as inventors, operators,
recyclers, consumers, user knowledge, marketers, advertisers, government administrators, and so on:
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A product is used by many people for a variety of reasons before it reaches its intended audience: to
tackle a designing issue, to keep occupations in a plant, to benefit from expanded deals, or to supply
supporting contraptions. After it has been put to use, it might be of interest to repair shops, help
recycling businesses, or cause environmental havoc for communities that live near dumps.) A krisis
situation exists when design considerations are restricted to the producer's profit or the experience of
the end user at the expense of all others who are affected by the equipment. The purported end clients
are just barely one resource in the huge organization equip mental entirety who need to co-work to
carry a plan to presence. Numerous factors that are interested in the end result of a design process
surround designers: customers, workers, engineers, financiers, salespeople, recyclers, the environment,
other living things, researchers, and so on while much is written and debated about the end users,
design practices say little about them. Obliging these variables into the plan interaction of a device or
gear helps plan it better and makes the cycle more just and comprehensive.
According to Wahl (2016), the challenges we face today are unprecedented and necessitate novel design
strategies rather than "business as usual." However, our design methods are preoccupied with
providing quick fixes. A new type of knowledge that can lead us to a new way of being in this world, one
that is concerned beyond the present, is required by our universities, industries, infrastructures, energy
systems, water management, health systems, and agriculture. Tony Fry says that the current design
practices take away our future because we don't know how to make things better for the future. This is
because we live in an illusion of permanence that comes from the metaphysics of presence. We hold on
to the present like it is forever. Our thinking and behavior are profoundly influenced by an obsession
with the present, which hinders the development of a relational, collaborative design culture. We design
systems with a win-lose perspective that assumes the other must be controlled, controlled, and
subdued. The most defining characteristic of this design or method of coming into being is the
transformation of the world into a comprehensive network of resources. This process is always
progressing in a huge proportion throughout the world. In this age, it means that we are given beings
in the form of reserves, disposables, or stocks; everything around us on the planet is viewed as
something there for us to consume. The entire world becomes be stand, or stock, and its existence is set
up so that we can use it.
According to Heidegger, this has occurred as a result of our unconscious entrapment in the
dehumanizing process of everyday normalization. We are being normalized in a particular ontological
tradition that encourages us to pretend to be masters of the earth and centers of the universe while
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being blind to our own condition, which makes us slaves. What we need to do right now is develop
systems that require win-win situations for all stakeholders and guarantee the benefit of nature.
CONCLUSION
An ontological tradition that values presence over absence must be questioned in order to promote an
inclusive design approach to equipment. According to Wildman (2010), p. 55, it calls for revising a
relational ontology that asserts that "the relations between entities are ontologically more fundamental
than the entities themselves."
A significant amount of reconstruction of the current design paradigms is required if this relational
ontology is to be operational zed in design practices. The philosophical phase of this reconstructive
process is the sole focus of this paper. Market-based design practices of today have a bias against
relational ways of being. The thought that an instrument exists as a different element having its own
foreordained design keeps on being one of the "most getting through naturalized, and injurious fictions"
of our societies nowadays (Escobar and Dreyfus, 2011).
The promotion of increasingly serious ontological discussions in design practices is one decisive step
in this direction. Heidegger is one of the contemporary philosophers who, more than any other
contemporary philosopher has made ontological questioning a central part of his thought. The
relational nature of the equipment's way of being in the world is brought to the forefront by an
ontological understanding of equipment. This interconnectedness of beings has enormous implications
for comprehending design agency, design process, and design object. Therefore, design practices need
to focus on more than just the work of what we might refer to as proximate designers
—
those
professionals who are closest to the design process and have direct control over the details of the design
(Feng, 2004). Little attention has been paid to the ways in which cultural assumptions and values about
the product, the future unintended uses of the product, the various stakeholders of the product, ethical
issues, the meanings that product forms have for their users, and so forth have the potential to It is
autocratic, one-dimensional, and exclusive to limit design agency to nearby designers, which worsens
the krisis situation.
The development of interdependent systems is essential to our future. This is only possible if we are
guided in our actions by a relational ontology in the back of our minds. We may be able to explore the
possibilities of how alternative values can be incorporated into the design process in order to produce
designs that are eco-efficient, sustainable, humane, liberating, and eco-friendly rather than oppressive,
controlling, and exploitative if we combine ontological insights with current popular design
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methodologies that are centered on the market. Additionally, it will assist design methodologists in
converting philosophical insights into conceptual design tools to enhance design quality.
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