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POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR NEXT-GEN TELECOM
INFRASTRUCTURE
Suyunov Shohijakhon Xolmumin ugli
Tashkent University of Information Technologies
named after Muhammad al Khwarazmiy
3rd year student of the Faculty of Telecommunication Technologies
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15671884
Abstract
The arrival of practical quantum computing poses a critical threat to
classical cryptographic algorithms widely used in telecom infrastructure. RSA,
ECC, and Diffie–Hellman—all fundamental to authentication, key exchange, and
encryption—can be broken by Shor’s algorithm running on a large-scale
quantum computer. This paper explores the integration of
Post-Quantum
Cryptography (PQC)
into next-generation telecom systems (5G, 6G, and
beyond). We analyze the computational performance, key sizes, and latency
trade-offs of various NIST-standardized PQC algorithms (e.g., Kyber, Dilithium,
BIKE), and evaluate their suitability for different layers of telecom architecture
including RAN, core, and edge networks. Our findings reveal that PQC can be
integrated with manageable overheads, but raises new challenges in key
management, backward compatibility, and standardization.
Keywords:
Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQC, Telecom Security, 5G/6G,
Kyber, Dilithium, NIST PQC, TLS, IPsec, Quantum-Safe Infrastructure, Quantum-
Safe Security, Telecom Networks, Network Security, Hybrid Cryptography, MEC,
Edge Security.
Introduction
Next-generation telecom systems are rapidly evolving to support a hyper-
connected world through 5G, 6G, IoT, autonomous vehicles, and smart
infrastructure. These systems rely heavily on public-key cryptography for:
Secure signaling between base stations and core networks
Authentication of user equipment (UE) and network slices
Confidentiality and integrity of data-in-transit
However, the security foundations of public-key cryptography—RSA and
ECC—are threatened by the development of
quantum computers
, which can
solve integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time.
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has initiated
standardization of
quantum-resistant algorithms
, known as
Post-Quantum
Cryptography (PQC)
. These algorithms are based on hard mathematical
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problems such as lattice-based, code-based, and multivariate polynomial
constructions.
This paper addresses how PQC can be effectively integrated into telecom
infrastructure. It considers performance, interoperability, and deployment
readiness of PQC candidates in telecom-specific environments.
Methods
Algorithm Selection
The selection of post-quantum algorithms for telecom use must balance
security, performance, and implementation efficiency across diverse
components of the infrastructure—from high-throughput core networks to
constrained edge and IoT devices.
We selected algorithms based on the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography
Standardization Project, focusing on Round 3 finalists and approved standards
(as of 2024). Selection criteria included:
Security level (targeting NIST Level I–V, comparable to AES-128 to AES-
256)
Key and signature sizes, critical for bandwidth and memory usage
Computational efficiency on telecom-grade hardware
Availability of open-source implementations and support in cryptographic
libraries (e.g., OpenSSL, liboqs)
Selected Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs):
1.
Kyber (lattice-based, CPA-secure)
o
NIST standard (2024)
o
Excellent performance and compact ciphertext
o
Chosen variant: Kyber-768, offering a strong balance of security and
speed
2.
BIKE (code-based)
o
Strong resistance to side-channel attacks
o
Slightly larger keys and slower encapsulation times
3.
FrodoKEM (lattice-based, based on LWE)
o
Conservative design with no structured lattices
o
More computationally expensive and larger ciphertext
Selected Digital Signature Algorithms:
1.
Dilithium (lattice-based)
o
NIST standard (2024)
o
Good performance for signing and verification
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o
Recommended variant: Dilithium-2 for constrained devices;
Dilithium-3 for core
2.
SPHINCS+ (hash-based)
o
Stateless and minimal assumptions
o
Very large signature sizes (~8–16 KB), making it less practical for
bandwidth-sensitive applications
3.
Falcon (lattice-based)
o
Compact signatures and high verification speed
o
Numerically fragile; more difficult to implement securely on
general-purpose hardware
The selected algorithms cover a wide range of cryptographic operations
needed in telecom environments, including:
Key establishment protocols (e.g., TLS handshakes in RAN and core)
Firmware and image signing (e.g., for base stations and MEC devices)
Mutual authentication (e.g., in SIM/eSIM provisioning, slice access control)
These algorithms were benchmarked in the following sections for
integration into telecom stacks, focusing on latency, resource usage, and
compatibility with existing protocols such as TLS 1.3, IPsec, and QUIC.
Results
To evaluate the feasibility of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in next-
generation telecom infrastructure, we measured the computational and
bandwidth impact of integrating selected PQC algorithms into real-world
security protocols. Tests were conducted using liboqs integrated with OpenSSL
3.0 on telecom-grade edge servers and virtual RAN environments.
Key Metrics Evaluated:
Key Generation Time
Key Exchange and Signature Latency
Ciphertext and Signature Sizes
CPU Utilization and Memory Overhead
TLS/IPsec handshake impact on total session setup time
Discussion
The transition to PQC in telecom systems is both
necessary and feasible
.
Our analysis suggests:
RAN and core networks
are technically ready for PQC integration with
minimal architectural changes.
Edge and IoT devices
require optimization, hardware acceleration, or
lightweight PQC variants.
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Hybrid deployments
(e.g., ECC + PQC in parallel) ensure backward
compatibility and phased rollout.
However, challenges remain:
Key management
schemes must evolve to handle larger key sizes and
certificate chains.
Standardization
across vendors and operators is critical for
interoperability.
Quantum-safe security policies
must account for evolving threat models,
including “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks.
Conclusion
Post-Quantum Cryptography is essential to ensure long-term security of
telecom networks in the quantum era. This paper shows that PQC algorithms—
especially Kyber and Dilithium—can be deployed in next-generation telecom
infrastructures with
acceptable latency and resource trade-offs
. Future work
should focus on:
Hardware-based PQC acceleration for edge nodes
Lightweight PQC protocols for 6G IoT
Integration of PQC with
Zero Trust Architecture
and
quantum key
distribution (QKD)
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ISSN:(E)2792-1883
https://literature.academicjournal.io/index.php/literature/article/view/167
