Volume 03 Issue 10-2023
11
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
03
ISSUE
10
P
AGES
:
11-15
SJIF
I
MPACT
FACTOR
(2021:
5.
705
)
(2022:
5.
705
)
(2023:
6.
713
)
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
ABSTRACT
Recently, there has been growing concern and speculation about the conflict between the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan and Iran over the water issue. Water scarcity and its management are serious problems facing many
countries of the world. In this article, we aim to shed light on the potential factors behind the water resource tensions
between Afghanistan and Iran. It is essential to approach the subject with an open mind as we strive to gain a deeper
understanding of the complexities surrounding the region's water challenges.
KEYWORDS
Kajaki and Kamolkhan dams, Helmand River, water shortage, water infrastructure, regional water resources,
International Fund to Save the Island.
INTRODUCTION
Water scarcity and its management are causing serious
problems for countries around the world. The water
conflict between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
and Iran illustrates the complexities involved in sharing
water resources, particularly in regions where water
scarcity is a pressing issue. It is imperative that both
countries engage in constructive dialogue in search of
equitable solutions that meet the needs of their
populations and ensure sustainable management of
shared water resources.
The main part
It has been a point of contention between Iran and
Afghanistan, and water is an important resource for
both countries. Iranian and Afghan farmers have
historically depended on water flow from Helmand.
Research Article
PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTION OF WATER RESOURCES BETWEEN IRAN
AND AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IMPACT ON CENTRAL ASIA
Submission Date:
October 01, 2023,
Accepted Date:
October 06, 2023,
Published Date:
October 11, 2023
Crossref doi:
https://doi.org/10.37547/ijhps/Volume03Issue10-03
Sarvarbek A. Fayzullaev
Independent Researcher of Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies, Uzbekistan
Journal
Website:
https://theusajournals.
com/index.php/ijhps
Copyright:
Original
content from this work
may be used under the
terms of the creative
commons
attributes
4.0 licence.
Volume 03 Issue 10-2023
12
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
03
ISSUE
10
P
AGES
:
11-15
SJIF
I
MPACT
FACTOR
(2021:
5.
705
)
(2022:
5.
705
)
(2023:
6.
713
)
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
About 97 percent of the water taken from this river is
used for agriculture in Afghanistan, and about 80
percent of the downstream is used for irrigation in Iran.
Afghanistan and Iran have accused each other of
stopping the flow of Helmand water. Iranian officials
have repeatedly disputed Afghanistan's claims in the
past year and criticized hydroelectric dams built across
Helmand.
In 2020, Iran and Afghanistan diverted the flow of
water, continuing to dig wells and build dams. Most of
the dam construction projects are located near the
Iranian border. These development projects include
Salma Dam, Kamal Khan Dam and Bakhshabad Dam. As
the construction of the Kamal Khan Dam nears
completion in December 2020, former Iranian
ambassador to Afghanistan, Abolfazl Zohrevand, has
warned that the dam will affect the flow of water into
Iran's wetlands. Such warnings have been issued by
Iranian officials before, and some dam projects were
attacked by the Taliban in 2020. In October last year,
the Taliban killed six security personnel guarding the
Kamal Khan hydroelectric and irrigation dam located in
Chahar Burjak district of Nimroz region [1].
Iran's Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Hassan Kazemi-
Komi, announced on June 16, 2023 that the Taliban-led
interim government of Afghanistan had agreed to
allow Iranian experts to assess water levels at
Afghanistan's Kajaki Dam on the Helmand River. The
decision comes amid heightened tensions over Iran's
right to draw water from the river.
The Helmand River, which flows through Iran's
drought-stricken Sistan and Baluchistan provinces, has
been the subject of a long-standing agreement based
on a 1973 treaty. This agreement is Iran's river to the
year
It provides for the right to receive 820 million cubic
meters of water.
In recent weeks, Iranian officials, including President
Ibrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-
Abdullah Khan, have demanded that the Taliban
respect Iran's water rights. Iran's space agency has
previously accused the Taliban of altering the course of
the river, according to satellite images.
Despite calling Iran's frequent requests and comments
"harmful," the Taliban declares its commitment to the
1973 accord. The Taliban's acting foreign minister, Amir
Khan Muttaqi, confirmed in early May that the Taliban
had recognized Iran's stake in water resources.
However, recent tensions along the Iran-Afghanistan
border once again point to the weakness of the Taliban
regime. While high-ranking officials are negotiating
over water resources, militants are provocateuring and
declaring jihad across the country.
In the conditions of the division of labor in Central Asia,
the Soviet Union equipped Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
with water dams to store water in the winter and to
irrigate the cultivated fields of Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan during the farming
seasons (spring and especially summer). In return,
those three republics were supposed to supply
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with oil, natural gas and coal,
especially in winter to meet their energy and heat
needs. The independence of the Central Asian
republics in 1991 called into question this system of
joint management of water resources. Eager to
develop their hydropower potential as a form of
energy autonomy from their hydrocarbon-producing
neighbors, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, together
responsible for 85% of Central Asia's water supply, have
begun building dams (Kambarota in 2022 for
Kyrgyzstan, Rogun in 2016 for Tajikistan), primarily for
Volume 03 Issue 10-2023
13
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
03
ISSUE
10
P
AGES
:
11-15
SJIF
I
MPACT
FACTOR
(2021:
5.
705
)
(2022:
5.
705
)
(2023:
6.
713
)
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
their domestic put forward a water management
strategy aimed at meeting their needs.
Dependent on water supplies from Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, the three downstream countries do not see
themselves as exactly in the same situation. On the one
hand, Uzbekistan (80 percent) and Turkmenistan (97
percent) are much more dependent on water than
Kazakhstan, with only 40 percent of water coming
from abroad. There are similarities between
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but both countries
depend on non-Central Asian water suppliers. Before
flowing into the part of the Caspian Sea under the
sovereignty of Kazakhstan, the Ural River rises from
the mountains of the same name in Russia, the Ili River
rises in Xinjiang and flows into the Balkhash basin,
where the development of hydropower projects is of
concern to the Kazakh government. Turkmenistan, in
turn, depends on the Harirud and Murgob rivers
(Afghanistan) and the Atrek river (Iran) [2]. On the
other hand, low population density, high standard of
living, and industrialization of the economy make
Kazakhstan use water resources more responsibly
than its neighbors in lower Central Asia. In
Turkmenistan (20%) and Uzbekistan (26%) [90% of
water consumed in Uzbekistan is used for agriculture
[3]. It is worth noting that Uzbekistan alone occupies
half of the irrigated land in Central Asia, or 4.2 million
hectares] The importance of agriculture as a share of
GDP means that the two countries with the highest
water use in the region have high water consumption:
for Turkmenistan, 112, 5% and 120.5% for Uzbekistan.
Although their indicators of water use are quite
reasonable, Kazakhstan (21.7%), Kyrgyzstan (32.6%) and
Tajikistan (44.6%), according to the criteria set by the
European Environment Agency ( water use rate above
20%).
Annual water contribution of Syr Darya and Amudarya by countries (km3)
The country
Syrdarya
Amudarya
Kazakhstan
2.5
0
Uzbekistan
5.6
6.8
Turkmenistan
0
1.4
Kyrgyzstan
27.5
1.6
Tajikistan
1
58.8
Afghanistan and Iran
0
10.8
Total
36.6
79.4
In 40 years, the availability of water resources in
Central Asia has decreased from 8400 m3 per capita to
only 2500 m3. If annual population growth continues
to see 1.5%
–
with a peak of 1.6% in 2023
–
Central Asia
risks falling below the water-stressed threshold from
2030 onwards. The inadequacy of the local water
infrastructure is mainly from the Soviet era [4]. Since
1991, it has not been adequately maintained by the new
authorities and cannot effectively respond to the
increased demand for water.
Volume 03 Issue 10-2023
14
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
03
ISSUE
10
P
AGES
:
11-15
SJIF
I
MPACT
FACTOR
(2021:
5.
705
)
(2022:
5.
705
)
(2023:
6.
713
)
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
For example, in agriculture, 70 percent of water
destined for irrigated land in lower Central Asia is lost
en route, with additional explanatory factors, including
drought and climate change, for which the region is
already paying a high price [5]. Warming in Central Asia,
which has been twice the global average since the
1970s, is causing glaciers to melt in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, resulting in reduced river flows. In its most
negative predictions, the World Bank predicts a 5%
drop in the Syrdarya basin, and a 15% drop in the
Amudarya.
Initiatives aimed at the comprehensive management
of water resources at the regional level have failed
since 1991, but the appointment of Shavkat Mirziyoyev
as the President of Uzbekistan in 2016 gave new life to
this issue. Uzbekistan, which opposed hydropower
projects in upstream countries under Islam Karimov, is
now making joint efforts in this regard: in 2018, it
formed a working group on cooperative water
management with Tajikistan, and even Qambar- He
offered to finance the construction of Qambar-
Qambar-Qambar. Ata project in Kyrgyzstan and Rogun
HPP in Tajikistan.
In addition, on August 6, 2021, the third consultative
meeting of the leaders of the Central Asian countries in
Turkmenbashi (the next initiative of President
Mirziyoyev) led to the adoption of a joint declaration
on water-related issues. At that meeting, the five
Central Asian leaders emphasized the importance of
agreeing
on
common
positions
on
glacier
conservation, water purification and drinking water
consumption, as well as the importance of supporting
the actions of the International Fund for Saving the
Island, an organization that Kyrgyzstan has turned
away from. For its part, Kazakhstan is showing great
interest in water management: after the establishment
of the Water Council in March 2022, the government of
Astana is seeking to restart the canceled project of the
Central Asian Hydropower Consortium [6].
Unlike Turkmenistan, which remains the largest
consumer of water in Central Asia at the national level,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are fighting against the
waste of this resource. Kazakhstan
It announced the renewal of 120 irrigation canals by
2025, with the goal of reducing water loss by 800
million m3 annually. Uzbekistan has chosen to build an
infrastructure
focused
on
intelligent
water
management: for example, it intends to make wider
use of water-saving technologies (planned to be
introduced on 2 million hectares of cultivated land) and
micro-irrigation technologies (600,000 hectares). 53
The decline in Uzbekistan's cotton exports between
2000 (40%) and today (10%) shows how Uzbekistan has
shifted its focus to other agricultural products. In this
regard, it took a lead from Kazakhstan, which quickly
switched from cotton to wheat, which uses half as
much water. The restructuring of the agricultural
industry allowed Kazakhstan to establish itself as a
major grain producer, better positioned to overcome
food insecurity caused by the war in Ukraine. The truth
is that if Central Asian countries want to increase their
water productivity, the main challenge they will have
to face is to end the practice of extensive irrigation of
arid and semi-arid areas inherited from the Soviet
Union to redirect river flows.
"By 2050, the water level in the two largest rivers of our
region - Syrdarya and Amudarya - will decrease by
almost 15%. We call for more funding to support the
International Fund for Save the Island in order to
prevent ecological disaster in the region. Water
problems and climate change are closely related.
Central Asia is a region where water security can be
achieved only through close cooperation and
effectively selected joint measures," Tokayev said in his
Volume 03 Issue 10-2023
15
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
03
ISSUE
10
P
AGES
:
11-15
SJIF
I
MPACT
FACTOR
(2021:
5.
705
)
(2022:
5.
705
)
(2023:
6.
713
)
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
speech at the Astana International Forum on June 8,
2023.
IN CONCLUSION
currently, the Koshtepa canal, which is planned to be
285 km long, 100 meters wide, and 8.5 meters deep,
with a capacity of 650 cubic meters per second, may
cause a big problem for Uzbekistan.
According to a 2012 report by the US Central
Intelligence Agency, "The misallocation of water
causes many conflicts. Water basins are widely used for
political pressure worldwide, and there is a possibility
of using water as a weapon.
This issue of water distribution is one of the important
and priority tasks that require a solution. Untimely
measures will inevitably have a negative impact on the
relations between Central Asian countries in the near
future, and may even cause armed conflicts.
LIST OF SOURCES AND REFERENCES
1.
Six Security Personnel Protecting Kamal Khan Dam
Killed. TOLOnews, 24 October 2020. // URL:
https://tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan-
167277.
2.
Cariou A. Water and land development in Central
Asia: a key resource for development that needs to
be redesigned. //
–
Bishkek, 2015.
–
P. 7-8. // URL:
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/2019-04-005-
karyu-a-voda-i-obustroystvo-territorii-v-
tsentralnoy-azii-vazhneyshiy-resurs-razvitiya-
trebuet-pereosmysleniya-cariou.
3.
Maurel M. Water Yearbook: Central Asia and
Around the Globe. // UNRCCA, 2020.
–
P. 121. // URL:
https://unrcca.unmissions.org.
4.
Central Asia. Water and Energy Program. Working
for Energy and Water Security. // World Bank, 6
September
2019.
–
P.
3.
//
URL:
https://documents.worldbank.org.
5.
Sidos R. Water in Central Asia: a difficult
conversation. // Regard sur l’Est, 22 April 2019. //
URL: https://regard-est.com/leau-en-asie-centrale-
un-dialogue-difficile.
6.
Lapteva S. Kazakhstan starts work on the creation
of a Central Asian hydropower consortium. //
Вечерный Бишкек, 28 July 2022. // URL:
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