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The issue of improving the political and legal mechanisms for
regulating religious policy in the context of countering
extremism
Fariza RAMAZANOVA
1
Institute of strategic and regional studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan
ARTICLE INFO
ABSTRACT
Article history:
Received January 2021
Received in revised form
15 January 2021
Accepted 20 January 2021
Available online
10 February 2021
The article highlights the issues of improving the system of
regulation of religious policy and countering extremism in this
area, based on the analysis of national legislation. Moreover,
measures are proposed to improve the religious policy in the
Republic of Uzbekistan in terms of countering the spread of
extremist ideology, taking into account modern challenges and
threats.
2181-
1415/© 202
1 in Science LLC.
This is an open access article under the Attribution 4.0 International
(CC BY 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.ru)
Keywords:
Religious policy
Extremism
Extremist activity
Radicalization
SUMMARY
The evolution of understanding of the freedom of conscience
and religion during the 30-year period of independence, and the
problems of law enforcement practice in the area of the rights of
believers have been the most actual and widely discussed in
Uzbekistan in the last 3-4 years. Lack of wider public discussion
of problems in the past and limited discussions of accumulated
contradictions in legislation and law enforcement practices in
Uzbekistan encourage the political elite and experts to
objectively and critically assess the forms of religious policy of
the recent past and legislative acts of that time.
Here in this article, we offer an overview of the forms of
religious policy before and after independence in Uzbekistan
(late 1989s until 2016). The repressive religious policy of this
period has been shaped by many reasons. The analysis of these
reasons is necessary for us to understand the peculiarities of the
conditions in which uncompromising forms of the policy and
1
Independent Researcher of the Higher School of strategic analyze and foresight of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
E-mail:
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laws have been formed, and to formulate solutions for
conservative interpretations of religious freedoms. In addition,
this review is very important for assessing the current state of
problems that have their roots in the past.
Экстремизмга қарши курашиш шароитида диний сиёсатни
тартибга солишнинг сиёсий
-
ҳуқуқий механизмларини
такомиллаштириш масалалари
АННОТАЦИЯ
Калит сўзлар:
Диний сиёсат
Экстремизм
Экстремистик фаолият
Радикаллашув
Ушбу мақолада миллий қонунчилик таҳлили асосида
диний сиёсатни тартибга солиш ва ушбу соҳада
экстремизмга
қарши
курашиш
тизимини
такомиллаштириш масалалари ёритилган. Шу билан бирга,
бугунги кундаги замонавий ҳавф ва таҳдидларни ҳисобга
олган ҳолда, экстремистик мафкурасининг тарқалишига
қарши
курашиш
нуқтаи
назаридан
Ўзбекистон
Республикаси
диний
сиёсатини
такомиллаштириш
юзасидан амалга оширилиши лозим бўлган чора
-
тадбирлар
таклиф этилган.
К
вопросу
совершенствования
политико
-
правовых
механизмов регулирования религиозной политики в
контексте противодействия экстремизму
АННОТАЦИЯ
Ключевые слова:
Религиозная политика
Экстремизм
Экстремистская
деятельность
Радикализация.
В данной статье освещены вопросы совершенствования
системы
регулирования
религиозной
политики
и
противодействия экстремизму в данной сфере на основе
анализа национального законодательства. Вместе с тем,
предложены меры по совершенствованию религиозной
политики в Республике Узбекистан в части противодействия
распространению
идеологии
экстремизма
с
учетом
современных вызовов и угроз.
METHODS
In terms of research methods, this research is based on a critical assessment and
objectivity, including an assessment of the evolution of legal norms regarding apparent
violations or limitations of believers' rights. However, a critical approach should not interfere
with an objective assessment of the circumstances of the emergence of certain legal norms
that, from the point of view of today's assessments, may (and should obviously) be perceived
critically. At the same time, the reviews and analyses below will consider that legal norms are
formed in a certain political, social, historical and cultural space, which cannot be the same in
different countries. In other words, criticism and critical thinking should not exclude an
objective review and assessment of the circumstances in which laws, including those that
restrict religious rights, have emerged.
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BACKGROUND
As a result of the long atheistic policy of the Soviet era, the collapse of Soviet ideology,
under the influence of the war in Afghanistan (1979-89) and for a number of other reasons,
Uzbekistan has seen a revival of Islam. At the same time, a radical movement of Islamists was
formed. Taking advantage of the liberalization of politics at the end of the Gorbachev era, the
Islamists hurriedly formed unauthorized groups that took over the functions of "Sharia watch
dogs", organizing pogroms in bars and shops selling alcohol, insisting on separate education
of boys and girls in schools, etc. The de facto question was about creating parallel power and
parallel legislation, while de jure these actions fell under the classification of violation of
elementary norms of existing laws.
Islamists have initiated violent seizures of mosques, driving away Muslims loyal to the
regime (in Kokand, Andijan, Margilan, Karshi and other cities). Further, groups of Islamic
radicals made themselves known in clashes with Meskhetian Turks in May-August of 1989.
They called for beating and driving away Meskhetian Turks as "bad Muslims"
2
. The new
madrasas started by Islamists have ostentatiously abandoned legal registration and
completely rejected secular sciences in their curricula. Specialists recorded manuals on "jihad
against infidels" and other literature of radical content among the textbooks used in these
madrasas. These actions looked like a spontaneous attempt of historical and cultural revenge
for atheistic policy in the former Soviet Union
3
initiated by some theologians. However, it
caused serious conflicts, especially in Ferghana Valley, and threatened with further escalation
of tension in other areas. Such actions, unheard of in the Soviet period, seriously frightened
politicians and the majority of the population.
Since gaining independence (September 1, 1991), the active members of the Muslim
elite have been insisting on the "full revival of Islam" (as they expressed it) and restoration of
the Islamic state. They insisted on the abolition of secular laws and secular education and
establishment of Sharia administration
The Islamists attempted to forcibly seize power in one region (e.g. Namangan region,
December, 1991). The Islamic police '' and "Adolat" group” seized the building of the regional
mayor's office (khokimiyat), declared Namangan as "Islamic region" and demanded to declare
Uzbekistan an Islamic republic. The parallel spontaneous mass rally, which took place in
Namangan at the same time refused to accept the "coup". Their demands were exclusively of
an economic nature, as the country was experiencing hyperinflation, food shortages, etc
4
.
Relying on the opinion of the majority, the government has stopped these attempts to
establish a "Sharia state" and "Sharia rule" within the Namangan region. In response,
supporters of the Islamic state idea (Islamists) have also intensified radical measures of
struggle (explosions in public places, killings of law enforcement officials, local rebellions),
while trying to justify their actions with Islamic dogmas.
2
Babadzanov B.
Le Jihad -
ideologie “l’Autre” et de “l’Exile” a travers l’étude de documents du Mouvement Islamique
d’Ouzbékistan
// Cahiers d’Asie
centrale, No 15-16 (2007)
–
Les Islamistes d’Asie centrale. (ed. H. Fathi), pp. 140
-159.
3
Babadjanov B.
Islam in Uzbekistan: From the Struggle for "Religious Purity" to Political Activism
–
In: B. Rummer
(ed.) Central Asia
–
a
Gathering Storm
?
Part IV. New-York, London, 2002, 299-332 (reprinted in Tokyo in 2003); Ibid.
The Economic and Religion History of a Kolkhoz Village: Khojawot from Soviet Modernization to the Aftermath of the
Islamic Revival
. In: St. Douduanion and Kr. Noac “
Allah’s Kolkhozes. Migration, De
-Stalinization, Privatization and the
New Muslim Congregations in the Soviet Realm (1950-2000s)
”
(Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Band 314). Berlin:
Klaus W.S., 2014. P. 202-264.
4
Babadzanov B.
Le Jihad.
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As a result of tough measures in the early 1990s (mass arrests, abolishing of
unauthorized religious institutions, etc.), Islamic radicals mostly left the country, taking part
in global jihad (initially in Afghanistan and later in the Middle East). Some of them went
underground, sometimes declaring themselves through loud terrorist attacks (explosions in
Tashkent in February 1999, terrorist attacks in 2004-2005).
Such a tension provoked a response from the political elites in Uzbekistan and directly
contributed to the tightening of some laws concerning the registration of religious
organizations, responsibility for religiously motivated extremism and terrorism, etc. At the
same time, norms and guarantees of freedom of religion were also legitimized in the
Constitution (articles 31 and others), although there were problems with their observance.
The assessment of the rather rigid religious policy of the first 20 years of independence
and the specifics of the formation of religious freedoms norms in Uzbekistan raises a number
of questions for experts and scholars of Islam and leads to different assessments. These ideas
and attitudes are also important in the sense that the government's response to some
aggressive forms of revival of Islam should be assessed as impartially and objectively as
possible. Within the framework of this research objectives, the "legislative response" of legal
institutions is particularly interesting, meaning, how the described situation affected the
forms of legislative norms concerning religious freedoms or their limitations.
Law enforcement and especially law enforcement agencies were totally frustrated.
Attempts by the prosecutor of the city of Namangan (Ferghana Valley) to bring criminal cases
against public order violators ended with Islamists breaking into his office. They took these
documents of criminal cases and burned them in the yard of the prosecutor's office (shouting
"Allah Akbar"). The prosecutor himself was beaten and stayed in the hospital for a month (the
events of June-November 1991).
Fearing that spontaneous demonstrations would turn into mass civil unrest,
Uzbekistan was the first Soviet republic to adopt the Law "On freedom of conscience and
religious organizations" (14 June 1991). For the first time this Law defined the basic
provisions on freedom of religion and religious belief in accordance with international
standards, and stated the renunciation of atheist policy. At the same time, the Law introduced
provisions on mandatory registration of religious associations and organizations and expert
examination of religious literature and religious items. The State Committee on Religious
Affairs (SCRA) became responsible for regulating relations between the state and religious
organizations, supervising religious education, especially for children (in order to avoid
radical Islam training), compulsory registration of religious institutions, etc. Thus, the Law
officially declared the renunciation of atheistic policies and recognized the rights of believers
to freedom of conscience (Articles 1,2). At the same time, it seriously relaxed the rules of
registration of religious institutions (Articles 6,7) and liberalized the laws on religious
freedom (Articles 1,3), allowed free opening of mosques, temples and institutions of other
confessions, religious educational institutions (Articles 8,9), while observing the rules of
registration (Article 10).
The difficult situation associated with the spontaneous revival of Islam, including its
aggressive forms, prompted politicians to retain the former institutions of control, which at
the time seemed to be a reasonable choice. Moreover, no one - neither politicians nor law
enforcement agencies - had any experience of non-violent forms in religious policy. The same
was true for the Islamists, who also had no experience of peaceful political activity and wanted
to restore the Islamic state "here and now”. In any case, the new Law did not meet th
e
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expectations of Islamists, who hoped to get full freedom to establish their organizations
openly expressing their claims to power and the establishment of Sharia.
At the same time, the Law explicitly prohibits religious organizations from establishing
their political and security forces, establishing and operating any religious political party, as
well as branches, departments, branches of religious parties established outside the Republic,
etc. (art. 5,7 as well as art. 57 of the Constitution of the RU). Such political restrictions are
explained by the fact that in those difficult conditions"politicization" could mean unhindered
preparation for the continuation of violent actions by the most active Islamists (see below).
Thus, the Law accumulated all the contradictions of the period of perestroika and the
beginning of the restless era of the revival of Islam.
However, the advocates of return of political status to Islam themselves had a very
vague idea of the form of government they were declaring to be "under Sharia", without
offering any political or economic program. The overwhelming majority of the population did
not and still does not support such forms of Islamic revival and the replacement of existing
laws with Sharia. Similarly, the majority of Muslims reject the revival of the political status of
Islam
5
, considering it sufficient to renounce atheistic politics, open mosques and provide the
opportunity to obtain religious education, freely perform religious rituals and celebrate
holidays. In other words, from the point of view of the majority of the population, Islam is seen
only as a regulator of personal, family, and public ethics.
Thus, there are diverse scholars’ assessments of religious policy in Central Asian
countries, including Uzbekistan (sometimes they come up with completely opposite
assessments). One group of observers and experts came out with a conclusion that religious
policy in Uzbekistan, and in Central Asian countries in general, was overly rigid during the first
two decades of independence
6
. It is partly justified by the existing conditions in which
politicians feared a resurgence of violent actions by Islamic radicals, as was the case at the
beginning of independence. Other experts believe that the post-Soviet radicalization of some
Muslims is a myth of local regimes that want to justify the form of authoritarian rule and
persecution of political opponents
7
. Moreover, the authors of the second point of view are
either unaware of the tense situation associated with the obvious increase in violent forms of
extremism among some Islamists, or deliberately ignore these facts in order to put forward
their own "original" point of view.
We will leave aside the arguments of advocates of both opinions, as this is beyond our
objectives here. We are interested in the form of "legislative response" given the complexity
of the situation at that time. This reaction was expected to manifest itself in extreme forms
(including religious policy). The constant references to radical manifestations of the revival of
5
Violent Extremism in Central Asia, 2018: An overview of terrorist groups, legislation in Central Asian countries and
law enforcement practices to counter violent extremism online, p. 21 (
cnt/uploads/2019/07/Violent-extremism-online_public_rus.pdf
6
Babadjanov, [
Who are Beyond the Barricades? About Sect of Akramiya and the Others
] // Races and Peoples, 2006,
issue #32. Moscow: Science, p. 42-106;
Adeeb Khalid.
Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia
.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007;
7
John Heathershaw and David W. Montgomery.
The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalization in the Central Asian Republics
.
In:
Russia
and
Eurasia
Programme.
November,
2014.
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Islam in the late Soviet period and at the beginning of Independence
8
served in a way as
justification.
Meanwhile, by the end of the 1990s the situation had already settled to some extent. It
was expected that the laws and concepts of religious policy adopted at a time of extreme
instability would have to be revised, for example through the development of a state strategy
for religious policy and liberalization. However, the bombings in Tashkent in February 1999
by Islamic terrorists, terrorist attacks in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, and the terrorist attack on
Southern Uzbekistan from the so-called Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
9
once again pushed
back efforts of liberalizing policies and laws on religion. New terrorist attacks in 2004-2005
aggravated the situation and once again provided arguments in favor of those strata of the
political establishment who defended the policy of "hard power" in the religious sphere. There
was no place to discuss full observance of religious freedoms. The usual paradox for such
situations was that the current legislation, if fully implemented, could have successfully
provided all religious freedoms. The actual implementation of the laws remained the problem.
The crisis of such an approach became obvious in the early 2010s. The situation required new
approaches both in religious policy and its legislative enforcement.
Thus, the new approach to drafting legislation and ensuring religious freedom in
Uzbekistan has been seriously delayed and only now has it become relevant because of
reforms, although it still remains mostly in the stage of discussion.
As for the second approach in assessing the religious situation in Uzbekistan at the
beginning of independence, they do not recognize the real radicalization of some Muslims.
This view (voiced mainly by the younger generation of experts) is not based on a detailed
study of the religious situation in Uzbekistan. It is mainly based on statistical data according
to which there are few supporters of radical Islam
10
. Leaving aside the calculation method
(which is doubtful by itself), we note the main message here is to unveil the regime that
seemingly manipulates data on the scale of terrorist threats and is trying to use the situation
to tighten the regime and suppress civil and religious rights. This view is also open to criticism.
It is formulated a priori and takes little account of a number of contradictory domestic
circumstances of which the authors are poorly aware. Below we will present specific legal data
that show that the number of religious institutions opened has increased, even during periods
that are assessed as "limiting religious freedoms". There were and still are 16 denominations
in the country, open access to religious education and so on. In addition, religion has been and
remains a factor in official ideology and is studied in educational institutions
11
. At least,
without taking into account these circumstances and without having specific data on the
complex evolution of the religious situation inside the country and the open aggression of the
bearers of the ideology of VE, it was not worth making an unequivocal conclusion about the
suppression of religious freedoms in Uzbekistan. This issue is much more complex and goes
beyond the scope of propaganda assessments, as some experts who have never conducted
research inside the country do
12
.
8
Babadjanov, [
Who are Beyond the Barricades? About Sect of Akramiya and the Others
] // Races and Peoples, 2006,
issue #32. Moscow: Science, p. 42-106;
Adeeb Khalid.
Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia
.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007;
https://ria.ru/20090526/172345801.html
10
Edward Lemon.
On the threats posed by terrorism in Central Asia and beyond (Russia, Turkey, Europe and the
United States)
Report (
https://caa-network.org/archives/14501
).
11
However, some experts are critical of such “flirting with the religion” of official authorities (B. M. Babadjanov).
12
John Heathershaw and David W. Montgomery. The Myth.
W.S., 2016. р. 252
-264.
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Current status in liberalization of religious policy and legislation on freedom of religion
By 2016-2017, it became clear that the laws adopted at the beginning of independence
no longer met the new conditions and modern requirements. Since President Sh.Mirziyoev
came to power, he openly voiced a number of problems related to legislative acts and law
enforcement practice, including the actual implementation of religious freedom standards. In
September of 2017, during his speech at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, the
President of Uzbekistan Sh. Mirziyoev proposed the adoption of a special resolution
"Education and Religious Tolerance", which is designed to promote tolerance and mutual
respect, religious freedom, protection of the rights of believers and prevention of
discrimination against them. The President also stated the need to promote the humanistic
essence of Islam and stressed that the fight against religious extremism by force alone does
not justify itself and that most crimes related to extremist activities and violence are
committed by people under 30. Therefore, the President proposed to educate young people
and create conditions for their self-realization as an alternative, which could create a barrier
to the spread of the "virus" of violent ideology
13
.
In his first pre-election and post-election speeches, the President drew attention to the
need to improve legislation, to reform the legal framework and law enforcement
(investigation and judicial) practice in this area, while liberalizing both legislation and its
application. The logical sequence of these reforms was the manifestation of the political will
of the President in the real implementation of liberalization in this area. Thus, according to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the past three years more than 20,000 people convicted on
religious grounds have been pardoned and removed from the so-called "black lists"
14
.
The existing method of political governance and the principle of decision-making
dictated this method of reforms "from above", since the crisis of the legal system and outdated
approaches in this area were obvious. At the same time, the legal system itself (including
investigative and judicial practices) worked on the basis of outdated laws and old approaches,
and therefore, due to its inertia, was not able to initiate changes. This is the main feature of the
reforms of the legal system in Uzbekistan, including with regard to improvements in ensuring
real religious freedoms.
It is important that in the period of reforms (2016 - to the present day), there is a real
positive dynamic in the process of ensuring freedom of conscience and religion. Wide-ranging
reforms are carried out to strengthen inter-ethnic and inter-confessional peace and harmony
in the country, to ensure conditions for the realization of the rights of citizens and religious
organizations. To date, the conditions have been created for citizens who profess Islam (up to
94 per cent of the population) to freely fulfil the five pillars of Muslim obligations. In other
words, believers can perform their rituals in temples without hindrance, and Muslims can
perform the Hajj pilgrimage in mosques and outside. For the convenience of foreign pilgrims,
the State Committee for Tourism Development has obliged all hotels in the republic to make
Quran, Bible and Torah available free of charge. Uzbekistan Airways has opened a 24-hour
prayer room at Tashkent airport. At the same time, the government launched a program
worth 3 billion UZS ($367,000) to reconstruct mosques, cemeteries and places of worship.
“Uzstandart” introduced the Halal certification system for the first time. This system sets out
requirements for the production, storage, transportation and sale of food products according
http://uza.uz/ru/society/uzbekistan-na-novom-etape-svodiv-religii-i-ubezhdeniy-06-08-2018
http://muslim.uz/index.php/rus/novosti-2018/item/15945-shavkat-mirzijoev-vzyalsya-za-peresmotr-
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to Islamic canons. The same conditions have been created for representatives of other
confessions and missionary churches
15
.
To improve the status of religion, the Muslim Spiritual Board organized a national
contest of Koranic readers. It turned out to be quite popular - five thousand people applied for
participation. The first Islamic online radio appeared in Uzbekistan. Training courses on
Koran and Arabic language were opened. All other prescribed rituals are freely performed. At
the same time, the issue of teenagers visiting mosques was positively resolved, which was the
subject of long discussions within the country
16
, including among Muslim theologians
themselves, some of whom (including the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan) were against
teenagers attending midday and Friday prayers.
At the same time, there are some problems of a legal nature, related to the actual
exercise of religious freedoms one way or another. For example, with regard to the wearing
of hijabs in educational institutions. According to the charters of all educational institutions in
the country, clothing and attributes emphasizing religious affiliation is prohibited in their
buildings. As known so far, this provision is borrowed from the French legal system, and it
also causes the same problems in neighboring countries of the region (for example,
Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan), as well as in European countries (primarily France).
In case of Uzbekistan, it cannot be said that the ban on wearing the hijab was in direct
contradiction with the provisions of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religion, (The
Law of Republic of Uzbekistan “On freedom of conscience and religious organizations”, of May
1, 1998, №618
-I)
17
. Formally, educational institutions followed their Charter. At the same
time, the Laws do not prescribe a religious dress code with clear formulas, which also leads to
legal uncertainty.
However, this conflict was resolved through long discussions, based on the wishes of
some believers who insisted on wearing the hijab in schools, colleges and universities. The
compromise form of the hijab in the form of a national shawl was suggested by President
Sh.Mirziyoev himself
18
. The fears of many politicians and the secular part of society were in
vain - there was no complete spread of Hijabs in schools or higher education institutions.
This precedent and its positive resolution without special legislative or bureaucratic
procedures (e.g., in the form of special government decrees) is important in the sense that,
firstly, it showed that the legal system is not ready to adequately respond to such legal conflicts
in the area of religious freedom. It should be borne in mind that the legal system consists not
only of laws (not always ideal), but also of a whole system of law enforcement agencies, in
turn, consisting of specific people, some of whom are not always inclined to change, corrupted
and do not perceive reforms, which has been repeatedly stated from the high tribunes of the
political Olympus of Uzbekistan
19
.
Secondly, complex social changes and internal discussions in society one way or
another affect the real promotion of a more liberal understanding of religious and other
freedoms in the legal and political spheres of Uzbekistan. In other words, the problem is not
15
https://www.standart.uz/ru/news/view?id=465
https://www.fergananews.com/articles/9456
17
Another case
–
two incidents (Tashkent and Namangan) of forced shaving. Prosecutorial office had a rapid and
adequate response to the incident: the initiators and perpetrators of these actions were punished or removed from office.
https://www.fergananews.com/articles/9456
19
Our main goal is to strengthen people's trust in the judicial system by protecting the rights and freedoms of
citizens, turning the court into a true "Abode of Justice", said President Shavkat Mirziyoyev.
(
https://podrobno.uz/cat/politic/esli-nado-izmenim-konstitutsiyu-kak-mirziyeev-otchital-sudey/
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only and not so much in the formulas of the law. Rather the problem is in actual
implementation of these laws in society and especially in the law enforcement system, which
also needs to be reformed and overcome the former inertia of working methods and legal
control.
Thirdly, in the process of incidents of this kind, it became obvious that changes in
legislative and especially in law enforcement practice are related to many circumstances of
social nature, in particular, the perception of the law, legal culture of the population and so on.
This generally explains the difficulties in promoting reforms in the sphere of compliance with
the whole complex of legislation and freedom of believers in particular. Especially considering
that the existing rights in the religious sphere are perceived differently by believers.
Moreover, even the perception of Islam, from the point of view of existing laws, is not
uniform either. A recent Ijtimoi fikr/public opinion poll showed that the number of people
who consider their family's way of life to be secular has decreased by 14% among Uzbeks.
More than half of the respondents (52%) expressed a desire to make a hadj (pilgrimage to
Mecca). At the same time, a significant proportion of the population (78.5%) is familiar only
with certain Islamic requirements. In general, the overwhelming majority of believing
Muslims positively assess the work of the authorities in the field of religion (90%) and believe
that they fully enjoy their religious freedoms. However, there are also respondents (7.3%)
who believe that increasing religiosity may threaten the secular nature of the state. Only a
small number of respondents (0.8%
20
) believe that it is necessary to establish an Islamic state
with Sharia rule in order to fully observe religious freedoms
21
.
RESULTS. REFORMS, NEW METHODS AND TOOLS FOR RESOLVING LEGAL
CONFLICTS.
A particular difficulty in law enforcement practice, both for government agencies and
ordinary citizens, is the fresh memories of terrorist actions in Uzbekistan, which helps to
maintain a suspicion (as in many countries of the Central Asian region) of the manifestations
of the religious particularities of a part of the population. Accordingly, lawmakers and law
enforcement agencies often face the problem of choosing between preserving security for the
sake of preventing manifestations of religiously motivated extremism and terrorism on the
one hand, and ensuring freedom of religion on the other.
The existing imperfections in the legal and regulatory framework and law enforcement
practice in Uzbekistan are also due to the fact that it is necessary to take into account the
current religious situation in the country. In particular, there is a need to correlate the reforms
with the features of the revival of religion, sometimes very aggressive. In addition, it is
necessary to bear in mind the excessive conservative nature of Islam among the population of
Uzbekistan. This complicates law enforcement on the one hand and creates conditions where
the norms of secular law are poorly perceived or hardly perceived among believers on the
other. This is evidenced by the huge amount of religious literature, the authors of which do
not operate with notions of the legal provisions of the existing legal system of the state as
secular in origin. In other words, the existing legislation in religious discourse is practically
ignored.
20
It can be assumed that not all respondents wanted to answer such a delicate question related to the establishment
of an Islamic state and the restoration of Sharia. That is, this figure (0.8%) may be higher according to our
observations and has an upward trend.
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On the other hand, a significant number of Muslims in Uzbekistan at times prefer the
so-called "parallel" rules of law, rooted in Sharia. This applies, for example, to the norms of
inheritance distribution, certain norms of marital relations (e.g., the actual precedents of
polygamy), forced early marriages, restrictions on women in social life, the use of violence
against them, polygamy, forced wearing hijabs in religious families, etc.
I. Procedure for registration, re-registration and termination of religious organizations
(including missionary organizations)
According to the definition, religious organizations in Uzbekistan are voluntary
associations of Uzbek citizens formed for the joint practice of faith and the performance of
religious services, rites and rituals (religious societies, religious schools, mosques, churches,
synagogues, monasteries and others). Current legislation provides that the establishment of a
religious organization is initiated by at least 50 Uzbek citizens who have reached the age of 18
and are permanently resident in the country. It is assumed that a community seeking for
registration must have the consent of the local civil authorities, the mahalla. In addition, the
registration of the central governing bodies of religious organizations is carried out by the
Ministry of Justice in consultation with the SCRA under the Cabinet of Ministers. This provision
in itself proves that the government continues to interfere and control the activities of
religious organizations.
II. Ensuring freedom of religious education for children by their parents, as well as
children's attendance of temples
Secular and religious education, religious education institutions.
Under the Constitution, everyone has the right to education (art. 41). Under the
Education Act, everyone is guaranteed equal rights to education, irrespective of sex, language,
age, race, ethnic background, beliefs, attitude towards religion, social origin, occupation, social
status, place of residence or length of residence (art. 4).
As it is in all secular and democratic countries, according to international standards, the
main principles of state education policy are: consistency and continuity of education, the
obligatory general secondary education, etc.
At the same time according to the Law on Freedom of Religion and Religious
Organizations (art. 7) the education system in Uzbekistan is separate from religion. It is
prohibited to include religious subjects in the curricula of the education institutions. The right
to secular education is guaranteed to Uzbek citizens regardless of their attitude towards
religion. This does not apply to the study of the history of religion or religious studies.
Under article 9 of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,
religious education must be provided after secondary education (except for Sunday schools)
and providing religious teaching in private is prohibited. Teaching is the prerogative of
registered religious organizations, which must be licensed.
The largest changes due to the reforms have been introduced in the sphere of religious
education. Its liberalization is obvious and has removed almost all previous restrictions, with
the exception of remote monitoring of the educational process in order to prevent the teaching
of religious intolerance, inter-ethnic hatred or other subjects with the propaganda of the VE
ideology. At least this is the reason why the Ministry of Justice justifies keeping the
requirement of obtaining licenses as a tool of control. The procedure for obtaining a license
for religious education is established in the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers "On
approval of the regulation on licensing the activity of religious educational institutions"
(March 1, 2004, No. 99). Only legal entities may apply for a license. Standard (simple) licenses
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are issued for the right to carry out activities in the sphere of religious education. The license
for the right to carry out activities in the sphere of religious education is issued without any
limitation of its duration (Quote from the above-mentioned law: "It is not permitted to teach
minors religious education against their will, against the will of their parents or persons in
place of parentis (guardians), as well as to include propaganda of war, violence in the process
of education...").
At the same time, in recent years, many registered (licensed) training courses were
reactivated or started. Teenagers can safely attend these courses outside of school hours to
learn languages, the basics of religion, etc. However, the liberalization of laws in the field of
religious education has not kept pace with fast growing interest in it.
CONCLUSION
Thus, there are a number of problems in the legislation and in the real implementation
of religious freedoms. They are related not only to the wording of the legislation, but also to
the existence of a serious “burden of the past”, meaning long
-established laws that need to be
revised in the spirit of the time and Uzbekistan's international obligations.
The continuing complexity of the religious situation and both, latent and open conflicts
of religious norms (mainly Muslim) on the one hand, and the existing legislation on the other,
impact the nature of implementation of religious freedoms in Uzbekistan. Added to this are
the dangers of radicalization (primarily of young people), challenges in the sphere of cyber-
security (open and mass recruitment to radical groups through cyber networks), lack of
experience in building communication strategies in cyberspace, and the use of "soft power" in
stabilizing the religious situation, etc.
At present, there is no unified understanding of the essence of extremism and extremist
crimes. Lack of clear definitions and differentiation of extremist crimes create difficulties in
law enforcement practice. It is important not only to determine the illegality of certain
extremist acts and their punishment, but also to form a clear conceptual apparatus, hierarchy
of principles and subjects of counteraction to this phenomenon. To date, legal practice does
not stipulate exact distinctions between the concepts of terrorism, religious extremism,
separatism, fundamentalism, etc., which does provide right approach to law enforcement
agencies in their work on prevention and suppression of such activities. It also does not allow
to properly identify if a socially dangerous act took place or not, to what extent the perpetrator
is guilty, and other circumstances that are important for the correct resolution of the case.
The composition and quality of the Muslim community in Uzbekistan is very diverse.
Believers (primarily Muslims) have their own - most often mutually exclusive - views on
religious freedoms, dress codes, norms and rules of relations between the state and religion
and other issues. The Muslim community in Uzbekistan is characterized by intense internal
discussions (sometimes reaching into conflicts) on all the issues mentioned in the research.
Thus, the regulation of complex relations within the Muslim community also falls on the
shoulders of law enforcement agencies, the authorities and society itself. All this complicates
the situation and makes one extremely cautious in choosing strategies for religious policy and
legal regulation of religious freedom, as well as in seriously discussing with society the norms
of legislation.
All these circumstances require a very well-thought approach to initiation and
implementation of legal norms when it comes to religious communities, some of which do not
always take a positive view of the dominance of law. Therefore, not only law enforcement and
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regulatory bodies, but also the believers themselves, at least the most active part of them,
should undergo their own journey to recognition of laws as the only tool for regulating
religious-state relations.
Unfortunately, external evaluations do not take these complexities into account and
offer a one-sided and extremely limited view of the problems or rely on outdated data. These
conditions, associated with the serious dispersion of opinions within society and among legal
scholars in relation to the "Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations"
revised in 2018, seriously delay the necessary consensus among the public and legal scholars.
This has led to a delay in the adoption of this document. In addition, international experience
suggests that such documents should be oriented not only to the declarations on freedom of
religion adopted in other countries, but also to the peculiarities of their own domestic
situation. The adoption of such an instrument without achieving the necessary public and
legal consensus, without taking into account one's own cultural and historical traditions, as
well as international experience, can lead to unpredictable consequences.
Reforms are transforming old rigid religious situation control patterns and activity of
religious organizations. Reforms have also touched upon the scope of legislative initiatives
and law enforcement. The easing of restrictions and liberalization in these areas are evident.
At the same time, a number of problems of a legal nature that hamper the liberalization
of religious freedoms remain. These problems are solvable and cannot be justified by
references to a difficult situation. In particular, the existing laws use some terms (e.g.
"fundamentalism") which are not formulated as legal terms containing a clear definition of
their social danger or as a form of encroachment on the constitutional order. Other terms
("extremism", "radicalism") have not essentially changed their definitions since the pre-
reform era, nor differentiated them (e.g. as violent and non-violent forms, in the case of
extremism). This leads to the fact that in sentencing/giving judicial verdict, judges do not have
the possibility to differentiate the punishment according to the seriousness of the act.
The positive impact of the reforms should also be assessed by the fact that government
agencies start to realize that problems in the religious sphere cannot be solved by means of
only one-time administrative and legal acts (for example, in the form of presidential decrees
and decisions). In addition, for a number of reasons, Uzbekistan tries to respond to external
criticism regarding the implementation of religious freedoms, which is associated with the
obligation to implement signed international treaties and declarations, improve the
investment climate, increase stability as a guarantor of tourism development, etc.
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