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STRATEGIC CROSSROADS: GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSIONS
OF EU–UZBEKISTAN RELATIONS (1991–2024)
Nusratulloyev Shaxzod Amonjon oʻgʻli
Oʻzbekiston jurnalistika va ommaviy kommunikatsiyalar universiteti,
magistratura bosqichi, xalqaro munosabatlar va jahon siyosati yoʻnalishi
2-bosqich talabasi
Abstract:
This article provides a professional and data-driven analysis of political
relations between the European Union (EU) and Uzbekistan from 1991 to 2024.
Drawing on a broad range of scholarly literature and official sources, it traces the
evolution of EU-Uzbekistan cooperation through stages of diplomatic engagement,
sanctions, strategic recalibration, and institutional partnership. Special focus is given
to legal frameworks, geopolitical realignments, mutual interests, and recent diplomatic
developments. It concludes by outlining the potential trajectory of the relationship amid
Uzbekistan’s ongoing reforms and the EU’s evolving priorities in Central Asia.
Keywords:
European Union, Uzbekistan, political relations, EPCA, foreign
policy, Central Asia
1. Introduction
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally transformed the
geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. Among the newly independent republics,
Uzbekistan emerged as a key state due to its resource base, population size, and
strategic geographic location. Recognizing this potential, the European Union (EU)
promptly engaged with Uzbekistan to support democratic transition, regional
cooperation, and market reforms. The EU’s early strategy also aimed to contain
potential instability in a region bordered by Afghanistan, Iran, and China.
In 1992, the EU formally recognized Uzbekistan’s independence, setting in
motion a diplomatic relationship that would grow increasingly strategic over time. As
both parties navigated their interests—Europe's desire for energy diversification, and
Uzbekistan's need for diversified foreign partnerships—the groundwork was laid for
enduring cooperation.
2. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (1991–1996)
Uzbekistan’s declaration of independence on August 31, 1991, opened a new
chapter in its foreign relations. The EU acknowledged Uzbekistan’s independence in
1992, followed by the establishment of formal diplomatic ties. This led to the signing
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in Florence in 1996,
provisionally applied that same year and fully enforced by 1999 (European
Commission, 2005).
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The PCA laid the legal foundation for cooperation in trade, investment, institution
building, and political dialogue. Early EU engagement was characterized by technical
assistance under the TACIS program and the promotion of legal reforms, market
liberalization, and administrative capacity (Bohr, 2004). Between 1996 and 2003, over
€80 million was allocated to Uzbekistan through various EU instruments, underscoring
Brussels’ commitment to supporting transition reforms (European Commission, 2005).
According to Uzbek researchers Alimov and Toshmuhamedov (2000), the PCA
was crucial in enabling Uzbekistan to diversify its foreign policy beyond Russian
influence and to start building institutional links with Western partners.
3. Political Engagement and Sanctions Era (1997–2010)
During this period, EU-Uzbekistan political dialogue intensified through regular
meetings and sectoral cooperation. However, a major turning point came in 2005 with
the Andijan unrest. The Uzbek government’s forceful response to riots led to casualties
and international condemnation. In response, the EU imposed travel bans on senior
Uzbek officials and suspended arms exports (Peyrouse, 2009).
The EU justified its sanctions by citing the need for an independent investigation,
while Tashkent emphasized non-interference and national sovereignty. Scholars like
Usmonov (2006) argue that Western reactions often ignored the internal security
threats Uzbekistan perceived at the time. Despite the diplomatic chill, some EU
member states maintained channels of communication, facilitating a gradual return to
dialogue by 2009.
A. Sodiqov (2011) noted that EU sanctions, although rooted in principle, risked
isolating civil society actors who depended on EU support for reform initiatives. The
lifting of sanctions in 2009 signaled a cautious willingness on both sides to resume
cooperation.
This era highlighted the tension between the EU’s normative agenda—
democracy, human rights, and rule of law—and the geopolitical imperatives of security
and stability in a sensitive region. Even during this strained period, trade volumes
continued to grow, with EU exports to Uzbekistan increasing by 20% between 2005
and 2008 (Eurostat, 2009).
4. Strategic Realignment and EPCA (2011–2024)
The 2010s marked a new phase, starting with the establishment of the EU
Delegation in Tashkent in 2011. This permanent diplomatic presence fostered more
structured political, economic, and civil society engagement. Through programs such
as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and Instrument for Stability (IfS),
the EU supported judicial reform, public administration modernization, and education
policy (European External Action Service, 2020).
Following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s accession in 2016, Uzbekistan
underwent wide-ranging reforms. These included lifting restrictions on media and civil
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society, simplifying business procedures, and improving judicial independence. This
reform momentum was well received in Brussels and triggered the launch of
negotiations for an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) in
2019. The agreement was signed in 2022, signaling a new strategic phase (European
Commission, 2022).
The EPCA enhances cooperation in areas including human rights, rule of law,
energy sustainability, transport infrastructure, and education. High-level exchanges—
such as visits by President Macron, Chancellor Scholz, and Prime Minister Meloni in
2023—reinforced the EU’s strategic interest in Uzbekistan.
The EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference held in Samarkand in November
2023 further anchored Uzbekistan in Brussels’ regional strategy. It emphasized
digitalization, green energy, and trans-Eurasian connectivity, reflecting both economic
and geopolitical imperatives (EEAS, 2023).
The EU views Uzbekistan as an anchor of stability and a gateway to South Asia
and the Caucasus via the Middle Corridor. In a speech delivered at the 2023 Samarkand
Conference, Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov emphasized Uzbekistan’s readiness to
be a “connective bridge” between Europe and Asia (Saidov, 2023).
According to Egamberdiyev (2023), the compatibility of Uzbekistan’s multi-
vector diplomacy with the EU’s normative power model creates a favorable climate
for long-term cooperation rooted in mutual respect and pragmatism.
5. Prospects and Geopolitical Implications
The future trajectory of EU-Uzbekistan relations will be shaped by both domestic
reforms in Uzbekistan and the EU’s evolving foreign policy under its Global Gateway
strategy. Uzbekistan has emerged as a frontrunner in EU-Central Asia relations, as
acknowledged in the EU’s 2024 Central Asia Strategy revision (European Council,
2024).
Analysts such as Haukkala and Gromadzki (2024) argue that the EU’s shift
towards Central Asia reflects broader global recalibrations driven by the Russia-
Ukraine war, energy diversification, and the search for reliable transit partners.
The institutionalization of cooperation via the EPCA, connectivity platforms, and
trilateral dialogues involving Afghanistan and Kazakhstan further illustrates the
strategic depth of the partnership. In 2022, the EU's BOMCA program trained over 500
border and customs officers in the region, enhancing cross-border security and trade
facilitation (BOMCA, 2022).
The EU’s support for education has resulted in multiple dual-degree programs
with European institutions, creating academic bridges and enhancing soft power
influence (Abdurahmonov, 2019).
According to data from the Delegation of the EU to Uzbekistan (2023), trade
turnover between Uzbekistan and the EU reached €3.7 billion in 2022, reflecting a 34%
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increase compared to the previous year. Key exports included precious metals, textiles,
and chemicals, while imports featured machinery and pharmaceutical products.
6. Conclusion
EU-Uzbekistan political relations have evolved significantly since 1991,
transitioning from a foundation of cautious cooperation to a broad-based strategic
partnership. Institutional frameworks like the PCA and EPCA reflect the depth and
breadth of this relationship.
Uzbekistan’s role as a reformist and neutral actor in a volatile region enhances its
strategic relevance to the EU. Although challenges remain—particularly in democratic
governance and civil liberties—the relationship continues to progress through critical
engagement and shared objectives.
The geopolitical significance of Uzbekistan, as a pivot state in Eurasian
connectivity, positions it as a vital partner in the EU’s long-term foreign policy
calculus. The relationship now stands as a potential model for EU engagement beyond
its traditional neighborhood.
References:
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Bohr, A. (2004). Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional
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ISSN:3030-3613
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