Implementation Of Dual-Use Technologies in Defense and Public Security

The American Journal of Political Science Law and Criminology

40

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TYPE

Original Research

PAGE NO.

40-48

DOI

10.37547/tajpslc/Volume07Issue06-08

OPEN ACCESS

SUBMITED

11 April 2025

ACCEPTED

26 May 2025

PUBLISHED

18 June 2025

VOLUME

Vol.07 Issue 06 2025

CITATION

Kristijan Ilovača. (2025). Implementation Of Dual

-Use Technologies in

Defense and Public Security. The American Journal of Political Science
Law and Criminology, 7(06), 40

–

48.

https://doi.org/10.37547/tajpslc/Volume07Issue06-08

COPYRIGHT

© 2025 Original content from this work may be used under the terms
of the creative commons attributes 4.0 License.

Implementation Of
Dual-Use Technologies
in Defense and Public
Security

Kristijan Ilovača

CEO of Sky Fort Systems d.o.o Croatia, Zagreb

Abstract:

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis

of the mechanisms for introducing dual-use
technologies

into

defense

and

public-security

frameworks. The topic’s relevance stems from rapid

advances in technical solutions that blur the traditional
lines between civilian and military applications

—

creating new opportunities to boost efficiency across
multiple sectors, while simultaneously posing significant
risks of international destabilization and threats to
national integrity. The study aims to survey
contemporary models for integrating dual-use
technologies, to identify regulatory, economic, and
ethical constraints, and to pinpoint the most promising
practices for strengthening defense capabilities and
enhancing public protection in a holistic manner.
Emphasis is placed on technological domains such as
artificial intelligence, biological systems, cybersecurity,
and autonomous unmanned platforms. Drawing on
current research, the paper demonstrates how adaptive
management strategies for dual-use technologies can
deliver flexible responses to rapidly evolving challenges.
Special attention is given to the need for robust
interagency and transnational coalitions, as well as the
creation of legal frameworks that simultaneously foster
innovation. The findings will benefit defense-policy and
security-management

professionals,

technology-

transfer experts, and representatives of governmental
bodies and high-tech firms seeking balanced solutions in
an era of technological turbulence.

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Keywords:

dual-use technologies; defense; public

security;

innovation;

artificial

intelligence;

cybersecurity; technology transfer; national security;
risk management; export control.

Introduction:

Dual-use technologies (DUT)

—

capable of

operating in both civilian and military domains

—

have

become a focal point in discussions of national and
international security [1, 2]. Their rapid development
and widespread adoption are reshaping established
approaches to defense policy and law enforcement,
opening new opportunities while simultaneously
introducing serious challenges for state institutions [3].
The urgency of analyzing DUT implementation
mechanisms is driven by the need to recalibrate
governance strategies in response to swift technological
change [6].
Recent R&D dynamics reveal a tight interweaving of
civilian and defense innovations. Consequently,
commercial solutions frequently outpace specialized
military analogues in functionality or serve as their
foundation

—a phenomenon known as “spin

-

on” and

“rev

erse spin-

off” [4, 5].

In the public-security sphere, dual-use technologies
already see broad deployment: video-surveillance
systems with machine-vision analytics, big-data
platforms for crime forecasting, and more [8, 9]. The use
of drones for emergency response, search-and-rescue
operations, and terrain mapping has become standard
practice in many countries [10].
At the same time, the expanded use of DUT entails
significant risks: from the leakage of information vital to
national interests to the intensification of technological
races and the emergence of ethical dilemmas
surrounding autonomous systems and pervasive
surveillance [11, 12]. Uncontrolled proliferation of such
technologies can undermine stability at both regional
and global levels [13].
The aim of this paper is to analyze the processes by
which dual-use technologies are integrated into defense
and law-enforcement contexts, drawing on current data
and scholarly publications.
The scientific novelty lies in a systematic examination of
the relationships among the pace of technological
innovation, the flexibility of regulatory regimes, and the

strategic priorities of national security as they pertain to
DUT.

The author’s hypothesis is that optimal strategies for

implementing dual-use technologies should rest on
principles of proactive risk management, close
cooperation among government, academia, and
industry, and the development of international
partnerships to establish unified standards and codes of
conduct for key dual-use technologies.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study employs a system-structural analysis
combined with an interdisciplinary synthesis of
knowledge. Its empirical base comprises leading
monographs, peer-reviewed journal articles, and official
documents and analytical reports from major
international organizations and government bodies.
Within the regulatory and legal domain, control over
dual-use technologies is exercised through national and
multilateral regimes. A CNAS report [1] recommends
strengthening U.S. export controls on high-technology
components. The European Commission [2] emphasizes
the need to coordinate national control regimes to
counter technological risks, while source [5] examines
public-security considerations within the single market.
Whang C. [15] identifies differences in evaluation
criteria and decision-making procedures between the
U.S. and the EU. The Wassenaar Arrangement [25] and
U.N. conventions [18, 19] codify universal obligations to
update lists of controlled technologies.
In the biotechnology sector, WHO guidelines [26] set out
principles for responsible management of research
projects, with particular focus on biothreat assessment
at each stage. Xue Y., Yu H., and Qin G. [27] explore
adaptive control mechanisms to support sustainable
development.

Reis J. et al.’s Quintuple Helix model [4] illustrates the

interaction among university, industry, civil society,
government, and ecology in EU defense innovation

—

a

linkage corroborated by the EDA Annual Report 2024
[28] and increased IT project funding in the Pentagon
budget [20]. Kasikci T. and Yetim M. [11] underscore the
necessity of balancing innovation with disarmament.
Source [6] documents shifts in the AI market alongside

the development of “Responsible AI” principles by SIPRI

[13] and examines ethical risks associated with AGI

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(Bikkasani D. C. [12]) and strategic threats (CSET [21]).
Psycho-moral aspects of remote military operators are
analyzed by Rauch M. and Ansari S. [3], predictive
policing practices by Sandhu A. and Fussey P. [8], and the
applicability of AI solutions in jurisprudence by Grimm P.
W., Grossman M. R., and Cormack G. V. [9]. Rosenberg I.
et al. [24] investigate defenses against adversarial-ML
attacks, while ICRC [29] highlights a legal vacuum in
regulation. Svoboda O. [14] critiques export controls in
the context of digital surveillance.
Unmanned systems are governed by CAA regulations [7]
and see active deployment in emergency response
operations (Daud S. M. S. M. et al. [10]), with the
commercial drone market expanding in OEM and service
segments [30].
Cyber-threats in space are assessed by the CFR [17],
state preparedness by the ITU [22], and ENISA identifies
key trends for 2023 [23].
Quantum computing as a dual-use technology is
characterized by its scaling potential and barriers, as
examined by Memon Q. A., Al Ahmad M., and Pecht M.
[16].

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The integration of dual-use technologies (DUT) into
defense and public-security domains has achieved
significant milestones while confronting a variety of
technical, regulatory, and ethical barriers. Since 2001,

the Florida Attorney General’s Office, in pa

rtnership

with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE),

formed an interagency task force dubbed “LEGIT” (Law

Enforcement Getting Identity Thieves) to uncover and
halt crimes involving identity theft. The team comprised
five full-time FDLE agents and regional officers from local
and federal agencies, all trained in investigating these
offenses and conducting statewide workshops for their
peers. A landmark success came in collaboration with

the Hernando County Sheriff’s Office, the State
Attorney’s O

ffice, and SSA/OIG: an offender who had

assumed a California resident’s identity for over twelve

years

—

purchasing and selling real estate, opening bank

accounts, and evading arrest three times

—

was finally

apprehended. LEGIT’s coordinated effort led to the

annulment of all illicit transactions and restoration of

the victim’s reputation and legal rights. Once its active
mission concluded, LEGIT’s procedures were folded into

routine law-enforcement operations, and the task force
was disbanded.
Today, a different suite of solutions is in use, built on a
variety of innovative platforms. In artificial intelligence,
for

example,

systems

combine

deep-learning

algorithms, multi-module data processing, and adaptive
control frameworks to deliver precise intelligence
analysis and broaden the capabilities of autonomous
platforms. Militaries employ AI not only to optimize
logistics and support real-time decision-making but also
to automate cybersecurity tasks

—

such as intrusion

detection and response [16, 20]. In public-safety
applications, machine-learning algorithms sift through
massive datasets to identify organized crime networks,
perform real-time facial and object recognition in video
streams, and enable predictive-policing methods [9]. At
the same time, the rise of lethal autonomous weapon
systems (LAWS) has provoked profound ethical and legal
debates

over

accountability,

compliance

with

international humanitarian law, and the risk of
unintended civilian casualties [12, 28].
A broad spectrum of unmanned systems

—

ranging from

micro-UAVs to heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicles,
as well as autonomous ground and maritime
platforms

—

is being integrated for both military

missions

(reconnaissance,

target

designation,

preventive and strike operations) and emergency-
response functions. These systems are deployed for
border and crowd monitoring, search-and-rescue
missions, and the delivery of critical supplies [7, 10].
According to forecasts in source [30], the commercial
UAV market will expand from USD 5.32 billion in 2024 to
USD 9.34 billion by 2030

—

an average annual growth

rate of 11.2 percent between 2024 and 2030. Employing
drones to inspect telecommunications towers, for
instance, can achieve more cost-effective surveillance in
a fraction of the time. Figure 1 illustrates the structure
of the commercial UAV market for increased clarity.

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Fig.1. The structure of the unmanned aerial vehicles market [30].

Cybernetic technologies have become a key arena of
confrontation between offensive and defensive tools in
national and corporate security. The modern suite of
dual-use

technologies

in

this

field

includes

infrastructures for proactive penetration testing,
enhanced cryptographic protocols designed to resist
quantum-computing threats, and multi-layered systems
for detecting and preventing sophisticated attacks
(SIEM, EDR, XDR) [22, 23]. At the same time, the rise in
AI-driven cyberattacks demands the development of
counter-AI technologies capable of identifying and
neutralizing self-learning malicious agents [17, 24].

Recent advances in biotechnology

—

chiefly CRISPR-Cas9

and its improved variants for genome editing, synthetic
biology, and neurotechnologies

—

open new frontiers in

medicine, agriculture, and industry. However, these
innovations also carry the risk of unintentionally or
intentionally creating novel pathogens and biotoxins,
underscoring the need for strict international biosafety
mechanisms and early-warning systems for biological
threats [25, 26]. The COVID-19 pandemic has vividly
demonstrated the importance of global cooperation
transparency, and rapid response in biocontrol.

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Figure 2 illustrates the dual-use technology implementation cycle and identifies the key stakeholders involved.

Fig.2. The TD implementation cycle and key stakeholders [20, 21, 25, 26].

Modern export-control regimes, designed in the era of
heavy armaments, have proven insufficiently flexible to
regulate effectively intangible assets

—

software and AI

training datasets

—

and dual-use equipment with broad

civilian applications [19]. The inability of institutions
such as the Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat to
update assessment criteria for emerging digital
technologies in a timely manner creates a dual effect: it
increases the risk of unauthorized dissemination of
strategically sensitive developments, while unduly
hindering international trade and scientific

–

technical

collaboration [25][14, 15].
Concurrently, large-scale deployment of intelligent
algorithms in surveillance systems and autonomous
combat platforms calls into question their compliance
with existing norms of international humanitarian law
and fundamental human rights. The absence of
transparent audit procedures and clear lines of
accountability for decisions made by autonomous
systems heightens the risk of unintended conflict
escalation and legal disputes. At the same time, the lack

of universally recognized international standards for
lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) severely
restricts the establishment of adequate control
frameworks and legal oversight for these technologies
[12, 18, 28].
Organizational barriers and technological divides
between the civilian and military sectors are
exacerbated by complex bureaucratic processes and
mismatched industry standards. Innovative products
often undergo lengthy approval and adaptation cycles
to meet defense-agency requirements, delaying
deployment and eroding competitive advantage. As a
result, the most promising solutions are either held up
indefinitely or deployed through unofficial channels,
diminishing the overall efficiency of technology transfer
[1, 4].
Finally, the intensification of geopolitical competition

has given rise to “technological nationalism,” aimed at
limiting foreign partners’ access to cutting

-edge

research and components. Yet the transnational nature
of modern threats

—

from cybercrime to pandemics

—

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demands new forms of international coordination and
collective response. This dual dynamic between the
pursuit of monopoly control over technological

resources and the imperative for global cooperation
remains a principal challenge in shaping defense-
industrial innovation strategies [3, 13].

Table 1. Examples of dual-use technologies and associated challenges in defense and public safety [6, 7, 9, 10, 12,
20, 23, 25, 28, 29]

Technology

Use in Defense

Use in Public Security

Key Challenges (General)

Artificial
Intelligence (AI)

Autonomous

systems,

intelligence

analysis,

cyber operations

Predictive

analytics,

facial

recognition,

chatbots

Ethics (LAWS, algorithmic bias),
oversight,

vulnerability

to

attacks, arms race

Unmanned
Aerial Systems
(UAS)

Reconnaissance,

strike

missions, logistics

Monitoring, search &
rescue,

delivery,

mapping

Proliferation,

airspace

regulation,

counter-UAS

measures, privacy

Cyber
Technologies

Cyber warfare, network
defense, intelligence

Combating cybercrime,
protecting

critical

infrastructure

Attack attribution, dual-use
nature,

data

protection,

international law

Biotechnology
(genetic
engineering)

Defensive

measures,

biosensors

Diagnostics,
epidemiological
surveillance

Bioweapon risk, genome-editing
ethics,

technology

access

controls

Quantum
Technologies

Quantum

computing

(codebreaking), sensors,
communications

Potential for secure
communications

Quantum-supremacy race, high
costs,

threats

to

existing

cryptography

Establishing a flexible regulatory framework requires the regular review and rapid adjustment of legal instruments

in line with the pace of technological change. Key tools include “regulatory sandboxes” and detailed cost–

benefit

analyses, which together provide a balanced assessment of the potential risks and advantages of deploying new

dual‐use technologies [14, 15].

Institutional partnerships rest on the synergy among
government bodies, research institutes, and the private
sector. To spur joint R&D and demonstration projects,
targeted grant programs, tax incentives, and other
support measures are recommended

—

with particular

emphasis on engaging small and medium-sized
innovative enterprises [5, 27].
The development of international platforms and
multilateral dialogues aims to forge universally

recognized standards of “responsible conduct” in the

dual-use domain. It is proposed to establish high-level
forums that bring together state authorities, industry
associations, and NGOs to prevent an arms race in

emerging technological niches and to oversee the
transfer of sensitive technologies [3, 18].
Enhancing technological literacy and instituting
mandatory ethical reviews call for systematic training
and upskilling of both technical experts and
policymakers. Recommended actions include the design
of specialized educational curricula, regular workshops,
and the creation of independent committees charged
with evaluating the social, environmental, and legal
dimensions of dual-use projects [12, 28].
Ensuring the resilience and security of global supply
chains depends on diversifying sources of critical
components,

building

strategic

reserves,

and

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implementing digital registries of trusted suppliers. Such
a multi-layered approach minimizes disruption risks and
guarantees access to essential technologies regardless
of geopolitical upheavals.
Together, these measures form a continuous, adaptive
governance process for dual-use technologies

—

capable

of responding to rapidly evolving technological and
geopolitical conditions. A robust feedback mechanism,
integration of multi-level risk-benefit analyses, and

alignment of the international community’s interests in

fostering innovation while minimizing potential threats

are vital prerequisites for this strategy’s success.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of dual‐use technologies stands as
a primary driver in transforming twenty‐first‐century
defense systems and public‐safety mechanisms. This
study has shown that innovations such as artificial‐

intelligence

algorithms,

autonomous

unmanned

platforms, advanced cybersecurity solutions, and
bioengineering frameworks open fundamentally new
capabilities for accelerating monitoring, forecasting, and
rapid response to both traditional and emerging threats.
At the same time, the dual nature of these technologies
introduces a host of associated risks: uncontrolled
dissemination of critical know-how, misuse by hostile
actors, and the emergence of unresolved ethical
dilemmas that demand immediate legislative and
institutional attention.
The findings confirm the initial hypothesis that effective

management of dual‐use technologies cannot be

reduced to technical controls alone. A comprehensive
strategy is required

—

one that fortifies the regulatory

framework,

implements

flexible

public

–

private

cooperation mechanisms, and intensifies international
partnerships.
Looking forward, it will be essential to strike an optimal
balance between fostering innovation and ensuring
security within an ever-evolving threat landscape.

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