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PUBLISHED DATE: - 25-12-2024
DOI: -
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PAGE NO.: - 42-46
THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE IN
THE SYSTEM OF STATE POWER
Makhmudov Alisher Abdusalimovich
Independent researcher of the Law Enforcement Academy of the Republic
of Uzbekistan
INTRODUCTION
In every
state’s legal system, the prosecutor’s
office, or a structure performing its functions, is
shaped by the state’s and society’s traditions of
statehood and legal culture, mentality, socio-
economic conditions, demography, geography, and
other specific features. There is no universal
approach globally to defining the status, powers,
and functions of the prosecutor’s office.
The
position of the prosecutor’s office within the state
system is determined by these factors and is
subject to continuous improvement. Legal
literature and the laws of foreign countries reflect
a variety of scientific and theoretical perspectives
on the place of prosecutorial bodies in the system
of state power and governance. These perspectives
demonstrate diversity, which is rooted in the
historical
development,
socio-economic
complexity, and distinctive characteristics of the
statehood and legal systems of various countries.
The prosecutorial system is characteristic of nearly
all developed countries. Beyond its most general
function of participation in criminal justice
(representing the state in prosecution, ensuring
investigations), the prosecutor’s office also serves
as a mechanism for ensuring the rule of law and
restraining the executive branch. Despite their
differences, countries such as Germany, France, the
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and
China maintain prosecutorial bodies that perform
functions ranging from administering justice to
overseeing the implementation of laws.
The prosecutor’s office holds a special place
in
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Open Access
Abstract
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nearly all advanced legal systems as an
independent div with broad powers aimed at
checks, balances, and oversight. Unlike other state
bodies, it engages in extensive cooperation with
both judicial and executive authorities. It is also
worth noting that many scholars argue that the
prosecutor’s office should be “integrated” into the
state system and operate in a manner that ensures
the positive development of society and the state
within the framework of cultural, economic, and
legal evolution. The role
of the prosecutor’s office
in the system of state institutions is primarily
determined by the essence of its functions.
Scholars propose two main approaches to
determining the models of prosecutorial bodies.
One group of scholars classifies prosecutorial
models based on their role in modern legal
systems, while another group categorizes them
according to their place in the system of state
power.
Researchers T. Reshetnikova and M. Frolova
analyzed the classification of prosecutorial models
from the perspective of their role in modern legal
systems. According to their findings, in countries
with the Anglo-American model of prosecution,
prosecutorial bodies historically emerged as legal
departments of the government. In England and its
former colonies, the development of the legal
system and public relations necessitated the
creation of a professional apparatus of public
prosecutors, typically implemented in the form of
the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Ensuring prosecution in court, including advising
state bodies and protecting the fiscal interests of
the treasury in civil disputes, has historically been
one of the specific functions of public legal activity.
In the Romano-Germanic legal system, the
institution of the prosecutor is often referred to as
the “State Ministry,” “Fiscal Department,” or “Office
of the State Advocate.”
Unlike the Anglo-American model, in Continental
European countries, the prosecutor not only
conducts criminal prosecution but also oversees
pretrial stages of the criminal process and
supervises criminal investigations. For instance, in
France, prosecutors oversee police investigations
and preliminary inquiries, while in Italy, they
initiate criminal cases, conduct investigations, and
supervise judicial police.
Both foreign and domestic scholars have studied
the role of the prosecutor’s office in the system of
state power. Specifically, E. L. Nikitin and N. V. Kulik
identify the following types of prosecutorial
systems based on their functional essence:
1. Prosecution within the executive branch: The
prosecutor’s office operates as part of the executive
branch and serves to fulfill its tasks (e.g., the United
States, Poland, Japan). In these systems, the main
function of the prosecutor’s office is the
implementation of criminal prosecution.
2. Prosecution subordinate to the legislative
branch: The prosecutor’s office is accountable to
the parliament and serves to ensure legality.
3. Prosecution integrated within the judiciary: The
prosecutor’s office is
organized within the judicial
system and facilitates the administration of justice
(e.g., the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France).
4. Independent prosecution: The prosecutor’s
office operates independently of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches, working to
strengthen legality (e.g., former Soviet states,
China).
5. Nonexistent or delegated prosecution: The
functions of the prosecutor’s office are performed
by other bodies, and a distinct prosecutorial
institution is not established (e.g., Australia,
Jamaica, the United Kingdom).
A. Mezhetsky, considering the peculiarities,
functions, powers, significance, and normative
regulation of prosecutorial bodies, classifies them
into four groups:
1. Countries where the prosecutor’s office is part
of the judiciary (e.g., France, Germany, Japan,
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Romania).
2. Countries where the prosecutor’s office is
integrated into the judicial system and operates
under its supervision (e.g., Spain, Bulgaria, Finland,
Brazil).
3. Countries where the prosecutor’s office is
accountable to the parliament and the head of state
(e.g., China, Vietnam, North Korea).
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4. Countries like England, where there is no
separate prosecutor’s off
ice or analogous
institution.
T. Reshetnikova and M. Frolova propose a similar
classification and distinguish the following groups:
1. In the first group of countries (e.g., Denmark,
Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Norway, Slovenia, the
Philippines, Sweden, Estonia, as well as the United
States and other former British colonies), the
prosecutor’s office (or prosecutorial bodies) is
classified as part of the executive branch.
2. In the second group of countries (e.g.,
Azerbaijan, Andorra, Bulgaria, Spain, Latvia,
Moldova), prosecutorial functions are assigned to
the judiciary.
3. In the third group (e.g., France, Germany,
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania),
prosecutors are organizationally subordinate to
the Ministry of Justice but are attached to the courts
and operate as part of the judiciary. According to V.
N. Dodonov, they occupy an intermediate position
between the executive and judicial branches.
4. In the fourth group of countries (e.g., most CIS
countries, Albania, Hungary, North Macedonia,
Serbia, Slovakia, Croatia, several Latin American
countries, former Portuguese colonies, Indonesia,
Georgia), the prosecutor’s office operates
independently of any branch of power, occupying
an autonomous position in the system of
separation of powers.
E. L. Nikitin and N. V. Kulik emphasize the functions
of the prosecutor’s office when determining its
model. Based on its assigned functions, they
identify four models: oversight, prosecution, mixed
oversight-prosecution, and mixed prosecution-
oversight models.
Legal scholars from other CIS countries have
expressed
differing
opinions
about
the
prosecutor’s role within the system of state bodies.
For example, academician Nersesyants views the
prosecutor’s office as closer to the executive
branch, while G. Chugulazov considers it part of the
legislative system. Nevertheless, many legal
scholars (e.g., E. Ryabova, O. Kutafin , S. Avakyan ,
A. Mytsykov , V. Koshlevsky ) emphasize that the
prosecutor’s office does not belong to any branch
of power and underline its independence.
Understanding the prosecutor’s societal role and
its independence from all branches of power is
regarded as a significant achievement of modern
state-building practices.
Another group of scholars interprets the
prosecutor’s office as a distinct part of
the
legislative branch. For instance, Uzbek scholar F.
Nazarov advocates this view. According to V.
Lomovsky, once laws are enacted, the supreme
legislative authority cannot remain indifferent to
their enforcement; thus, it retains the function of
ensuring the unity of legality, which it carries out
not only directly but also through the prosecutor’s
office. Continuing his argument, the scholar
highlights that the prosecutor’s office cannot fulfill
its tasks in isolation and requires support.
Furthermore, Lomovsky suggests that because the
prosecutor’s office must often oppose “powerful
individuals,” it should remain under the influence
of the legislative branch.
The Uzbek researcher U. Abdualimov critically
evaluates the aforementioned views, asserting that
they are not entirely compatible with the national
legal system. According to him:
1. The first group of scholars does not sufficiently
address the activities of the prosecutor’s office
related to the enforcement of laws.
2. The second group of scholars, conversely, places
excessive emphasis on this aspect while neglecting
the functions of the prosecutor’s office related to
criminal prosecution and assisting in the
administration of justice.
Expressing his stance on this matter, U.
Abdualimov argues that
the prosecutor’s office
should be considered an independent institution,
not belonging to any branch of government. He
justifies this view based on legal considerations
and the historical essence of the prosecutor’s office,
which serves to ensure the supremacy of law and
maintain a balanced relationship between the
branches of government.
In the current context, state authorities are tasked
with new challenges, such as: ensuring legality and
legal order; implementing democratic and socio-
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economic reforms; protecting human rights and
freedoms reliably. The resources and capabilities
of the prosecutor’s office have been fully mobilized
to achieve these goals by ensuring the
unconditional enforcement of legislative acts
aimed at these purposes.
Given that the prosecutorial systems of CIS
countries have historically developed within a
shared environment, the scientific community in
this region generally emphasizes the following:
• The prosecutor’s office should not belong to any
branch of government;
• It must
maintain independence and be free from
political influence;
• It should serve as a centralized supervisory
institution in a strongly centralized state system.
The Constitutional Position of the Prosecutor’s
Office in Uzbekistan Article 145 of the Constitution
of the Republic of Uzbekistan establishes that the
prosecutor’s office: is independent of other state
bodies, organizations, and officials; is an organ
vested with broad powers.
However, the provision on independence alone is
insufficient to fully pro
ve that the prosecutor’s
office does not belong to any branch of
government. For instance, the Constitution grants
organizational independence to other state
institutions, such as the bar association and the
central bank, as well.
From
our
perspective,
organizational
independence and functioning within a specific
branch of government are not mutually exclusive
criteria. Furthermore, determining whether a state
div, official, or organization belongs to a
particular branch of government is often
contentious. The evolution of governmental
branches is based on their specific functions and
the principles of separation of powers, checks and
balances, and the limitation of absolute authority.
New institutions, such as the central bank or the
prosecutor’s office, w
hich do not belong to any
branch of government, are not required to be part
of any branch, provided that they do not disrupt the
balance of power. Similarly, T. Ashurbekov argues
that regardless of departmental affiliation, the
prosecutor’s office occupies
an independent and
unique position.
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