The article highlights the factors that led to a major restriction of the investigator’s procedural independence as a result of a sharp growth in the number of procedural-administrative and procedural-control powers held by the chief of the investigative body.
One of these reasons is explained by the author’s efforts to address the conse-quences from the well-known crisis of law enforcement agencies in the 1990s, which resulted in a decline in the quality of preliminary investigation. The second justifica-tion is connected by the author to the Soviet preliminary investigation’s administra-tiveization and the assignment of traditional jurisdictional (judicial-investigative) powers to the executive authorities.
As a result, it is determined that the procedural independence of the investigator is merely another doctrinal illusion at the moment. It should be noted that the investi-gator’s discretionary powers are actually limited to a minimum, and their potential use depends on the procedural omnipotence of the chief of the investigative body.
In conclusion, in light of the topic of this article the prospects for the further development of the preliminary investigation bodies are examined.
