American Journal Of Philological Sciences
91
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ajps
VOLUME
Vol.05 Issue06 2025
PAGE NO.
91-95
10.37547/ajps/Volume05Issue06-26
J.L. Austin And the Philosophy of Speech Acts:
Language, Meaning, And Action
Hаbibоvа Mаnzilа Nuriddinоvnа
Tеаchеr аt thе Dеpаrtmеnt оf Uzbеk Lаnguаgе аnd Litеrаturе, Russiаn аnd Еnglish Lаnguаgеs, Bukhаrа Stаtе Mеdicаl Institutе nаmеd
аftеr Аbu Аli ibn Sinа, Uzbekistan
Received:
14 April 2025;
Accepted:
10 May 2025;
Published:
12 June 2025
Abstract:
J.L. Austin played a pivotal role in the linguistic turn in philosophy during the twentieth century,
particularly through his influence on both analytic and ordinary language philosophy. Unlike many philosophers
who saw the study of language as a philosophical priority, Austin approached it as a matter of common sense and
scholarly responsibility. His methods, focused on the systematic study of linguistic expressions, led to significant
contributions in areas like lexical semantics, speech act theory, and t
he philosophy of perception. Austin’s
distinction between ‘constative’ and ‘performative’ utterances, and his development of illocutionary acts, paved
the way for future work in speech act theory, influencing philosophers such as Searle. In his later work, Sense and
Sensibilia, Austin applied his methods to the philosophy of perception, rejecting the view of direct perception of
material objects and contributing to the debate on realism in perception. This paper explores Austin’s methods,
his theory of illocutionary acts, and his approach to philosophical analysis, highlighting their lasting impact on the
philosophy of language and perception.
Keywords:
J.L. Austin, linguistic turn, speech acts, illocutionary acts, performative utterances, constative
utterances, lexical semantics, philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, ordinary language philosophy.
Introduction:
J.L. Austin played a central role in the
"linguistic turn" in 20th-century philosophy, especially
in England and the United States. For Austin,
philosophy begins with a systematic study of words and
expressions
that
reflect
deeper
conceptual
frameworks. Unlike many of his contemporaries in
analytic and ordinary language philosophy, who
approached language study out of philosophical
conviction, Austin considered it a matter of common
sense and scholarly responsibility.
The Dual Role of Linguistic Analysis
Such linguistic scrutiny serves two distinct purposes.
First, it can contribute to the investigation of language
itself, aligning with lexical semantics or theoretical
semantics and pragmatics. Second, it can support
philosophical inquiry by analyzing problems framed
through specific linguistic expressions. Austin’s How to
Do Things with Words exemplifies the first, offering a
framework for categorizing speech acts. His Sense and
Sensibilia represents the second, applying linguistic
analysis to philosophical theories of perception.
The results of such a systematic scrutiny of linguistic
expressions can be used for two utterly different
purposes. First, they can be used as part of an
investigation the object of which is language itself.
Second, they can be used as a stage in a philosophical
analysis of certain problems and attempted solutions
that are phrased in terms of expressions that include
words and phrases of that family. The former use is
related to the lexical semantics of English, or any other
language, as studied by linguists, or to theoretical
semantics or pragmatics, as developed by philosophers
and linguists in adjacent areas. The latter use, familiar
to students of philosophy, both ancient and modern,
belongs to a philosophical tradition, stretching from
Socrates and ‘Plato to G. E. *Moore, of carrying out
conceptual analysis of some kind before proceeding to
a discussion of major claims of philosophical interest
and significance made for critical or theoretical
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purposes. How to Do Things with Words includes
numerous examples of the first kind of use, since it
develops a theoretical framework for describing and
classifying speech acts in general. Sense and Sensibilia
is an example of the second kind of use. It is a work in
philosophy of perception, which employs an analysis of
expressions used in common’ “theories of perception”,
such as ‘appear’, ‘look’ and ‘seem ‘, as well as ones used
in previous philosophical theories of perception, such
as ‘sense data’.
METHODOLOGY
Studying Language through Expression Families
Austin’s method of linguistic scrutiny of ‘families’ of
expressions in volves has two noteworthy steps. First, a
family of expressions is collected by a person or by a
group of persons, such as Austin’s ‘Saturday morning
group’, described by G. J. Warnock in Berlin et al.
(1973). This is done on the grounds of their natural
linguistic competence as well as of dictionaries that
point out different uses, specify synonyms, and show
examples of usage. Such a process of the collection
depends on the linguistic intuitions commonly held by
whoever participates in it, quanative speaker of a
natural language, and on decisions made by writers of
dictionaries on grounds of their linguistic intuitions,
quanative speakers. A dictionary rests also on some
conception of what is a dictionary, but usually, this is
not an articulate conception of language or any other
object of philosophical discussion, such as perception.
Second, participants in the process create ‘stories’ that
involve using an expression that belongs to the
delineated family, in a context of utterance that allows
sitting but does not allow replacing it by some other
expression or expressions of that family. A gain,
portrayal of such a ‘story’ involves just linguistic
intuitions for using certain expressions under certain
circumstances. Thus the linguistic data collected and
created during such a process of linguistic scrutiny is
confined to linguistic intitions held by native speakers
of a natural language, independently of any given
conception of language or a theory in any branch of
philosophy.
Toward Speech Act Theory: From Constatives to
Performatives
Austin’s first step towards his theory of illocutio
nary
forces was to make the distinction between
‘constative’ and ‘performative’ utterances. The
technical distinction rests on a seemingly simple
observation: when I say ‘The book is on the desk,’ under
certain circumstances, I describe a certain part of the
situation. A natural question that arises is whether
what I said is true or false. However, when I say ‘I
promise to put the book on the desk,’ under some
circumstances I have bound myself to others and
staked my reputation. Similarly, when I say ‘I kno
w that
the book is on the desk,’ I give others my word: I give
others my authority for saying that the book is on the
desk [1, 9]. When the latter utterances are made, the
question of whether what I have said is true or false
does not arise, though elements of the circumstances
of utterance can be true or untrue.
The Limits of the Constative/Performative Distinction
The ‘descriptive fallacy, so common in philosophy’, is to
suppose that utterances are descriptive, disregarding
the fact that utterances of exp
ressions such as ‘I
promise,’
etc.,
under
ordinary
appropriate
circumstances, ‘are not describing the action we are
doing, but doing it’ [1, 103].
Austin identified a recurring philosophical error
—
the
“descriptive fallacy”—
which assumes all utterances
describe states of affairs. However, performatives like
“I promise” are actions, not descriptions.
Although
initially
compelling,
the
constative/performative distinction proved difficult to
maintain. For example:
•
A constative statement (“The light is red”)
might also serve as a warning.
•
A performative (“I claim the light was green”)
can raise truth-value questions, much like its constative
counterpart.
•
Both types of utterances share similar felicity
conditions
—
preconditions required for the utterance
to succeed.
To resolve these ambiguities, Austin proposed the
theory of illocutionary forces, or speech act theory.
Each utterance involves multiple layers:
•
Phonetic act
–
producing sounds
•
Phatic act
–
producing words with grammatical
structure
•
Locutionary act
–
producing meaningful
expressions (sense and reference)
•
Illocutionary act
–
performing an action (e.g.,
asserting, warning)
•
Perlocutionary act
–
producing effects (e.g.,
persuading, deterring)
The illocutionary act is central
—
it represents the
speaker’s intent and the performative force of the
utterance.
As much as the idea of drawing a clear distinction
between constative and performative utterances
seems plausible and applicable, it is easier said than
done. Austin himself became aware of the
shortcomings of the distinction as suggested. The
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distinction makes sense when certain utterances are
compared with each other, but it became apparent that
the theoretical move from clear and seemingly
illuminating examples to a general and fruitful, fully
fledged theory is rather difficult. Each component of
the distinction was found to be a source of problems.
First, a constative utterance such as ‘The light is red,’
said by one person to another, when the two approach
traffic lights, is descriptive, but at the same time it can
function as a warning, which is not descriptive. Second,
a performative utterance, such as ‘I claim that the light
was green,’ said under ordinary circumstances, gives
rise to the question of whether it was true or false that
the light was green. Moreover, it does so to the same
extent as the utterance of ‘The light was green,’ said
under the same circumstances. Third, the infelicity
conditions (the conditions under which ‘something
goes wrong and the act... is therefore at least to some
extent a failure’) [2,14] of utterances of both kinds
seem quite similar to each other. Preconditions that
have to be obtained for a constative utterance to be
felicitous are on par with preconditions that have to be
obtained for a performative utterance to be felicitous.
Austin’s theory of illocutionary forces solves those
problems; the theory of forces is actually a theory of
speech acts. Whenever you make an utterance, in an
appropriate context, you do something. As a matter of
fact, what you do, in a context of utterance, can be
described on different, related levels of action. Hence,
in a context of utterance, you can perform, at one and
the same time, a ‘phonetic act’ of making noises of
certain phonetic qualities, as well as a ‘phatic act’ of
uttering words and expressions of certain grammatical
qualities. More interestingly, at the same time, you
perform three other acts. First, there is a ‘locutionary
act’ of uttering those words and expressions as having
certain semantic qualities, in particular sense and
reference. Second, there is an ‘illocutionary act’ of
uttering those words and expressions, having their
semantic qualities, including sense and reference, as
having a certain force, such as that of asserting,
warning, or promising. Third is a
‘perlocutionary act’ of
uttering those words and expressions, having certain
semantic qualities and having a certain force, as
achieving certain effects.
Illocutionary Acts as the Core of Speech Acts
One of Austin’s examples in How to Do Things with
Words was:
Locution: He said to me, ‘You can’t do that.’
Illocution: He protested against my doing it.
Perlocution: He stopped me.
Although Austin specifies five different dimensions of
language use, it is just one of them, the illocutionary
act, that plays the major role in the theory. To put it in
terms of speech acts, the first three dimensions
(phonetic, phatic, and locutionary) involve elements of
a speech act, while the fifth one (perlocutionary) has to
do with effects of the speech act. The illocutionary
dimension is that of the force of the speech act itself.
Thus, Austin’s theory points out the illocutionary act as
the unit of
language use. Accordingly, ‘the total speech
act in the total speech situation is the only actual
phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged
in elucidating‘ [2, 148]. This deep insight paved the way
to a whole research programme of language use that
has included Searle’s Speech Acts (1969) and many
illuminating studies of speech acts in general and of
particular ones (for a collection of the major ones, see
Kasher 1998). An important shortcoming of that
research programme, even in its more advanced
stages, is that it has hardly brought philosophical
theories of action to bear on philosophical theories of
language use, which are first and foremost theories of
illocutionary and other acts. Austin further proposed a
preliminary classification of utterances into five classes,
according to their illocutionary force.
The first, ‘verdictives’, are typified by ‘essentially giving
a finding as to something
—
fact, or value
—
which is for
different reasons hard to be certain about’ [2, 151].
Examples are those that involve the first-person
singular present indicative active form of ‘acquit’,
‘diagnose’, and ‘understand’.
The second, ‘exercitives’, are typified by ‘exercising of
powers, rights, or influence’ [2, 151]. Examples are
‘appoint’, ‘dismiss’, and ‘name’
.
The third, ‘commissives’, are typified by committing the
speaker to doing something, for example ‘promise’,
‘swear’, and ‘vow’.
The fourth, ‘behabitives’, ‘are a very miscellaneous
group, and have to do with attitudes and social
behavior’ [2, 152]. Austin’s examples include
‘apologize’, ‘blame’, ‘thank’, and ‘welcome’.
The fifth class is ‘expositives’, which ‘are difficult to
define.
They make plain how our utterances fit into the course
of an argument or conversation, how we are using
words, or, in g
eneral, are expository’ [2, 152]. Examples
(which Austin classified into twelve sub-classes) include
‘postulate’, ‘quote’, ‘revise’, ‘turn next to‘, and
‘withdraw’. Austin’s proposed classification was
followed by a different one put forward by Searle in
1975. Classifications are useful to the extent to which
they serve as a starting point for some explanation or
theory. But Austin’s and Searle’s classifications have
not been widely used for explanatory exposition or
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American Journal Of Philological Sciences (ISSN
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theory construction. A notable exception is
Vanderveken (1990, 1991), which is an attempt to
construct all speech acts from a core of certain speech
acts and a few additional distinctions.
Among the five dimensions of speech acts, the
illocutionary act is the focal point. It reflects the force
behind the utterance, not just its structure or effect.
This insight laid the foundation for future research,
notably John Searle’s Speech Acts (1969) and the
broader development of speech act theory.
Austin proposed a five-part classification of
illocutionary acts:
1.
Verdictives
–
giving
judgments
(e.g.,
"diagnose", "acquit")
2.
Exercitives
–
exercising authority (e.g.,
"appoint", "dismiss")
3.
Commissives
–
committing the speaker (e.g.,
"promise", "swear")
4.
Behabitives
–
expressing attitudes (e.g.,
"apologize", "thank")
5.
Expositives
–
clarifying discourse (e.g.,
"postulate", "quote")
Searle later offered an alternative classification in 1975.
Though not widely used for formal theory construction,
Austin’s categories inspired later attempts, such as
Va
nderveken’s work (1990, 1991) to build a
comprehensive taxonomy of speech acts.
Broader Impacts and Applications
Another fruitful branch of philosophy of language that
has emerged from Austin’s How to Do Things with
Words is that of the study of performative utterances.
(For the major contributions to this field, by Urmson,
Searle, Bach and Harnish, and Recanati, see Kasher
1998). Austin’s other major work, Sense and Sensibilia,
is a discussion of a certain theory of perception, put
forward by the contemporary philosophers A. J. Ayer,
H. H. Price, and G. J. Warnock. According to that theory
‘we never directly perceive or sense material objects
(or material things), but only sense-
data’ [3, 22].
Austin’s analysis of the meaning of ‘perceive’ and
related terms
led him to the conclusion that ‘there is no
one kind of thing that we “perceive” but many different
kinds’ [3, 4]. The full nature and exact number of those
kinds is a matter of scientific research rather than of
philosophical investigation. In a highly illuminating
application of his methods of philosophical discussion,
Austin rejected the claim ‘that we ought to be
“realists”, to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do
perceive material things’ [3, 3]. Chapter VII of the book
is devoted to an elucidati
on of the meaning of ‘real’, as
contrasted with ‘makeshift’, ‘fake’, ‘artificial’, ‘dummy’,
and other expressions. In understanding Austin’s
methods and results, it is important to notice that he
did not consider a theory of perception to be a theory
of perception-expressions in a language. As Sense and
Sensibilia shows, Austin was just as interested in the
facts of language as in the facts of perception, and the
same holds when he discusses any other topic of
philosophical investigation.
CONCLUSION
J.L. A
ustin’s contributions to the philosophy of
language have had a profound and lasting impact on
the field. His innovative approach to the study of
linguistic expressions, particularly through his focus on
ordinary language and its underlying conceptual
frameworks, revolutionized the way philosophers and
linguists engage with language. Austin’s work on
speech acts, including his distinction between
constative and performative utterances, laid the
groundwork for the development of speech act theory,
influencing subsequent thinkers such as John Searle.
Moreover, his analysis of illocutionary acts, which
highlights the force behind utterances rather than their
mere descriptive function, has become central to
understanding language use in both philosophical and
practical contexts.
Austin’s methods, which blend linguistic intuition with
philosophical analysis, provided valuable insights into a
wide range of topics, from the semantics of ordinary
language to the nature of perception. His rejection of
direct realism in Sense and Sensibilia and his insistence
on the importance of examining language in its
everyday use shifted philosophical debates in
significant ways, particularly within the philosophy of
perception and realism. Ultimately, Austin's legacy
remains crucial to modern philosophy, particularly in
the areas of language, meaning, and action. His work
continues to inspire scholars across disciplines, offering
a unique perspective on how language functions both
as a tool for communication and as a fundamental part
of human experience. The influence of his theories on
speech acts and the careful examination of linguistic
expressions ensures that Austin’s contributions will
remain a cornerstone in the study of language and
philosophy for years to come.
REFERENCES
Austin, J. L. (1970). Philosophical Papers (J. O. Urmson
& G. J. Warnock, Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Original work published 1961)
Austin, J. L. (1975). How to Do Things with Words (2nd
ed., J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà, Eds.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. (Original work published 1962)
Austin, J. L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia (G. J. Warnock,
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Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Austin, J. L. (1963). Performative-constative. In C. E.
Caton (Ed.), Philosophy and Ordinary Language:
Selected Essays (pp. [insert page numbers]). Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press. (Original work published in
Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie No. IV: La
Philosophie Analytique, 1962)
Frege, G. (1968). The Foundations of Arithmetic: A
Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of
Number (2nd rev. ed., J. L. Austin, Trans.). Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press. *(Original German
work: Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik) (1st English ed.
published 1950)
.
