SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA AND ITS EFFECT

EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES

ISSN: 2750-8587

VOLUME04 ISSUE12

198

SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA AND ITS EFFECT

Toshpolatov Aziz

Target international school, Uzbekistan

AB O U T ART I CL E

Key words:

Sanctions, Russia, Russian economy,

EU, US a ban, banks, illegal annexation, Crimea,

military operations, non-respect

agreement,restrictions, counter-sanctions,

extension,agricultural products,warfare.

Received:

09.12.2024

Accepted

: 14.12.2024

Published

: 19.12.2024

Abstract:

In 2014 Europe Union and United

States had implied Russia with sanction as a result

of illegal annexation of Crimea. Those sanctions

were just small wave and more sever sanctions

had been added when Russia shooted down
malaysian aircraft, after presense military

operations in Donbass, and non-respect Minsk

agreement. Even though restrictions were very

serious and affected all sectors of Russian
economy, sanctions had not brought any positive

results. Huge mounts of banks and companies had

suffered especially companies who had debt in

dollars but had been earning in roubles in reason
of depreciation of rouble. Russian economy had a

serious hit after falling oil prices

In the end of summer in 2014 Russian implied a

counter-sanctions against EU and US that meant

Russia refused the exports from Western Europe
and US. Counter sanctions included extension and

agricultural products. Russia had not suffered too

much, on other hand developed countries like

Germany, UK and Polland had got a huge damage.

INTRODUCTION

People used to think economic sanctions as peaceful way to coerce into behaving. In reality, economic

sanctions became a tool of a modern warfare. League of Nations named sanctions as an “economic
weapon”.

Sanctions are method of warfare, that

affects other countrie’s economy by not declaring any war. But

are they really effective to coerce other countries change their intentions?

VOLUME04 ISSUE12

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55640/eijmrms-04-12-36

Pages: 198-201

EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES

ISSN: 2750-8587

VOLUME04 ISSUE12

199

Literature view

In 2014, EU and US had implied a several sanctions against Russia as a result of illegal annexation of
Crimea,like underestimating Ukraine territory. This sanctions were supported by a host of countries

including Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, Australia and etc.

First wave of sanctions were like a warning, not hurting. However instead of limitting itself to sanctions

Russian pilot shooted down malaysian aircraft, presented military operation in Donbass, and non-

respect at Minsk agreement. It became “clear” that warning was not enough. So EU and US implied then

more serious sanctions on Russia.

Restrictions included:

Freezing any stocks or assets

⚫

Freezing any stocks or assets

⚫

Visa bans for people responsible to invasion to Ukraine.

⚫

European Bank suspended preferential economic development loans to Russia

⚫

A ban on trading equity and brokering services product exceeds 30 days maturity period

⚫

a ban on loans to five Russian state banks, including Sberbank.

⚫

A prohibition to export dual-use items,and industrial goods,that can be used as a weapon, or to
produce them

⚫

Interdiction on exporting energy-related equipment to Russian innovative energy projects like

Arctic, deep-water exploration,shale oil.

Sanctions affected sectors including finance, energy, ferrous metallurgy, mining, electronics,

engineering and transport, and also its Central Bank, oil exports. Meanwhile, foreign countries had left

from the Russian market as a result of “self

-

sanctioning” trend. Russian fiscal revenues have not

suffered from sanctions sufficiently to reduce the length of the war.

Effective management of the Russian banks had quickly prevented financial disbalance and protected

real economy. However, Russian economy had taken a serious hit as a falling of oil prices and

depreciation of its currency “rouble”. After sanction GDP of Russia had a decline for 1

-1,5%. Citibank

analyzed that 90% of initial decline was observed by falling oil prices.

EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES

ISSN: 2750-8587

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Even though Russia itself occupied a dominant position at international forums, participates from

Russia could not attend anymore. Hundreds of its diplomats had been expelled to Russia. Some
countries ended all relations with Russia, meanwhile others just lowered them.

Counter sanctions

In August of 2014 Russian had implied counter-sanction against Western Europe and United States, that

meant Russia refused the US and EU’s export of food and agricultural products. Each EU country had

suffered differently, with Germany had the most loss of exports. Relative losses were also large in UK,

Poland, Hungary, and Greece. According to these trade losses ,EU had lost less than 0,2 % of its value-

added and employment, because of sanctions.

If it comes to Russia, country had not suffered significantl

y. Since 2000’s Russia had been improving

domestic food and agricultural sector to be less dependent on other countrie’s export, so we can say the

mission had succesfully completed.

In addition, the reason of Russian resilience to sanctions in 2022 was an effort to rid its economy of

dollars. Fresh call for China to reduce its relience on the dollar system have only furthered speculation

about the American currency’s status.

CONCLUSION

Overall, global trade decreased to 4,8 billions dollars per month after sanctions implied.

The overall negative effect inflow from 2014 to 2017 is astimated about 280 billion dollars while effect

on net capital inflows is about 160-170 billion dollars.

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