INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 761
CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL ASIAN INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF UZBEK-
KAZAKH RELATIONS (1991–2016)
Musurman Khurramov
Senior lecturer, PhD, International Islamic Studies Academy of Uzbekistan,
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Abstract:
This article examines the issues of regional integration within the framework of
Uzbek-Kazakh relations during the years of independence. It analyzes the efforts made by
both countries to promote regional cooperation, the challenges encountered, and the influence
of external actors on the integration process. The study also explores the collapse of Central
Asian integration initiatives and evaluates the roles played by the leaders of Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan in shaping the trajectory of regional cooperation. Particular attention is given to
the differing approaches of the two countries toward regional integration.
Key words:
Central Asia, integration, external forces, virtual regionalism, Organization of
Central Asian Cooperation, International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, EurAsEC, Union of
Central Asian States.
Introduction
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as the locomotive states of Central Asia, paid close
attention to regional integration processes from the earliest years of independence. This focus
was driven not only by geographical proximity, historical, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and
religious commonalities, but also by the existence of shared economic and socio-
environmental problems that could only be addressed through close cooperation (Karimov,
1995, p.39). However, regional cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan faced
numerous objective challenges, and the dynamics of integration fluctuated over time.
It is worth noting that efforts at integration among Central Asian states began even
before the republics formally gained independence. In the summer of 1990, the leaders of the
Central Asian republics held their first regional meeting without Moscow’s involvement in
Almaty. During this meeting, they agreed to coordinate their activities across political, social,
and economic spheres. The primary focus of this summit was to find collective solutions to
emerging economic problems. Furthermore, proposals were made to establish regional
councils addressing common issues in culture, education, and environmental protection.
As a continuation of the Almaty summit, a second meeting of regional leaders took
place in Tashkent in August 1991, again without Moscow’s consent. Here, the leaders agreed
to collaborate in resolving economic problems within Central Asia. The subsequent summit
occurred on December 12, 1991, in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. Unlike the previous meetings,
this one was shaped by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and its agenda focused on
completely new tasks.
Despite the positive momentum, several obstacles arose that hindered integration
efforts. The next meeting in Bishkek on April 23, 1992, was notably marked by Tajikistan’s
absence due to its escalating civil war, which adversely affected the regional integration
process. Turkmenistan’s declaration of "permanent neutrality" in December 1995 further
complicated cooperation within the region.
Nonetheless, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, recognizing their significant potential,
continued striving to deepen regional integration.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 762
Early efforts at regional integration (1990–1994)
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as the leading states of Central Asia, devoted serious
attention to regional integration processes during the early years of their independence. This
was motivated not only by their geographical proximity, historical, ethnic, linguistic, cultural,
and religious commonalities but also by the abundance of shared economic and socio-
ecological problems, which could only be addressed through mutual cooperation (Karimov,
1995, p. 39).
However, regional cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not proceed
smoothly, due to various objective factors. The dynamics of integration were often unstable
and fluctuating.
It is noteworthy that attempts at regional cooperation began even before the Central
Asian republics formally achieved independence. In the summer of 1990, a historic summit
was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, where for the first time, without Moscow's involvement,
regional leaders gathered to discuss cooperation. At this meeting, the leaders agreed to
coordinate their activities across political, social, and economic sectors (Bobokulov, 2006).
The central issue on the agenda was the search for joint solutions to emerging economic
problems. Proposals were also made to establish regional councils to address shared
challenges in the fields of culture, education, and environmental protection.
Following the logic of the Almaty summit, the second meeting of regional leaders
took place in Tashkent in August 1991. Again, this meeting occurred independently of
Moscow’s approval. During the summit, the leaders of Central Asian states agreed to jointly
tackle possible economic problems that might arise within the region. However, the third
summit of regional leaders, held in Ashgabat on December 12, 1991, marked a turning point.
By then, the Soviet Union had collapsed, and the agenda shifted to address entirely new
challenges posed by the emerging post-Soviet reality.
The subsequent summit occurred on April 23, 1992, in Bishkek. This meeting differed
from the previous ones as Tajikistan was unable to participate due to the deteriorating internal
situation and the looming civil war. The absence of Tajikistan negatively impacted the fast-
developing integration processes within Central Asia. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s official
declaration of “permanent neutrality” in December 1995 further strained regional cooperation
efforts.
Despite these difficulties, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as the most economically and
politically capable states in the region, made continued efforts to accelerate the processes of
integration.
In July 1993, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on measures to deepen
economic integration for the period 1994–2000. In January 1994, the two countries, later
joined by Kyrgyzstan in April, signed a treaty to establish a Single Economic Space
(Karimov, 1995, p. 40). An Executive Committee was established to coordinate their
integration efforts, and a Central Asian Cooperation and Development Bank was created to
finance joint projects. As a result of these efforts, the Council of Prime Ministers of the
Republics signed decisions in Bishkek outlining priority investment projects and initiatives to
economically bring the republics closer together by 2000.
It is important to note that within the framework of the Commonwealth of Central
Asian States, established in 1994, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan played a particularly crucial
role. The success of this organization largely depended on how relations between these two
countries evolved. As the two largest and most capable states in the region, Uzbekistan and
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 763
Kazakhstan needed to coordinate their efforts in several critical areas, including ensuring
social protection during the transition to a market economy, addressing environmental
challenges, pursuing a coordinated economic and financial policy, and developing unified
customs and tax regulations. Additionally, issues such as establishing a unified information
and defense space also emerged on the agenda. Overall, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan sought
to play leading roles in developing integration ties within Central Asia.
External challenges and the disruption of integration (1994–2000)
The rapid development of warm relations among Central Asian states was not
welcomed by all external actors. Certain powers, viewing the potential reunification of Turkic
peoples as contrary to their own interests, sought to sow discord and mistrust among the
newly independent Central Asian countries. When no substantial pretexts could be found,
various false narratives and misinformation were circulated.
For example, an article by V. Yurtaev and A. Shestakov, published in Nezavisimaya
Gazeta on May 13, 1993, alleged that the creation of the Commonwealth of Central Asian
States was merely a tactic to pressure Russia into providing greater economic assistance. The
same article falsely claimed that Uzbekistan was preparing to intervene militarily in
Kyrgyzstan under the pretext of protecting the interests of 800,000 ethnic Uzbeks residing
there (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1993).
In response to such disinformation, President Islam Karimov, speaking at ceremonies
commemorating the memory of the three great Kazakh biys (tribal judges), urged vigilance:
“We must not fall for the false promises of subversive forces and allow our friendship
to be undermined” (Karimov, 1995, p. 40).
It must be emphasized that the emerging processes of Central Asian integration
conflicted with Russia’s interests for several reasons. First, the Central Asian market, which
had developed during the Soviet era, was gradually being filled with products from newly
industrialized countries, thus reducing Russia’s economic dominance.
Second, Central Asian leaders increasingly sought to resolve regional conflicts
without external intervention, thereby diminishing Russia’s traditional military influence.
Third, Uzbekistan’s initiative, in cooperation with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine,
to create an alternative transportation corridor bypassing Russia (TRACECA project)
undermined Moscow’s ability to exert direct economic pressure on Central Asian states.
Consequently, Russia actively sought to disrupt Central Asian integration through
various means. Russian dissatisfaction became increasingly open, and negative commentary
toward Central Asian states intensified in the Russian media. Nezavisimaya Gazeta played a
particularly leading role in this regard. For example, in its March 26, 1997 issue, it argued:
“The existence of any bloc in the Central Asian republics, regardless of its orientation,
does not serve Russia’s national interests. The 1994 formation of the Central Asian Union
poses a potential threat to Russia and must be countered by using all available means to
disrupt the emerging bloc and intensify regional competition” (Zatulin & Migranyan, 1997).
Clearly, from Moscow’s perspective, it was undesirable for Central Asian countries to
pursue an independent policy contrary to Russian interests.
Achievements of regional integration despite challenges (1993–1998)
Despite the aforementioned difficulties, Central Asian states managed to achieve
several important milestones in regional integration, which are worth highlighting.
First, the establishment of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) in
1993 marked a major achievement. This fund, created by the leaders of five Central Asian
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 764
countries, aimed to attract resources for projects related to the Aral Sea and to promote
rational use, protection, and monitoring of transboundary water resources. It represented the
first significant regional institution to emerge in the post-Soviet era in Central Asia (Laruelle
& Peyrouse, 2012).
Second, in December 1997, at a summit in Akmola (now Nur-Sultan), the heads of
state agreed to establish an international consortium focused on cooperation in energy, food
security, and mineral resources.
Third, in 1996, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship,
which Kyrgyzstan later joined in 1998. This treaty reflected the political will to strengthen
regional ties and mutual support among the three states.
Fourth, under the auspices of the United Nations, a Central Asian Peacekeeping
Battalion was established in December 1995. This initiative aimed to enhance regional
security and demonstrated the ability of Central Asian states to coordinate on defense matters
without external domination.
Fifth, the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia was signed by all
five regional states on September 8, 2006, in Semipalatinsk. This initiative, originally
proposed by President Islam Karimov at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly on
September 28, 1993, created an unprecedented level of political trust among the Central
Asian states concerning security and non-proliferation efforts (Khalq Sozi, 2006).
Finally, in March 1998, Tajikistan officially joined the Central Asian Union, which
indicated a recovery of sorts for regional cooperation following the end of Tajikistan’s civil
war.
Thus, despite considerable external pressures and internal political difficulties, the
Central Asian states demonstrated that regional integration was not only possible but could
achieve tangible results in critical areas such as environmental protection, security, and
economic collaboration.
The emergence of fragmentation and decline of integration (1998–2005)
In an effort to further strengthen regional cooperation, the heads of state of the Central
Asian countries agreed in 1998, during a summit in Cholpon-Ata (Kyrgyzstan), to rename the
Central Asian Union as the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). Russia, Georgia,
and Turkey were granted observer status within the organization. However, ironically, from
this very period onward, regional integration began to falter.
A major blow came in 1998, when Kyrgyzstan became the first Central Asian state to
join the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a result, the other three members of the
CAEC—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan—were compelled to adjust their trade,
taxation, and customs policies toward Kyrgyzstan. In particular, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
were forced to adopt protective measures to safeguard their domestic industries from the
influx of re-exported goods through Kyrgyzstan (Islamov, 2001, p. 176).
Moreover, a second major disruption occurred on February 26, 1999, when
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a treaty with Russia and Belarus to join a
Customs Union, seeking closer economic ties with Moscow. This initiative further
complicated regional economic cohesion.
Shortly thereafter, on October 10, 2000, these same states signed an agreement to
establish the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which officially entered into force
on May 30, 2001. As a result, regional integration efforts among Central Asian states were
significantly weakened, and fragmentation deepened.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 765
Taking into account growing security threats and aiming to expand the scope of
regional cooperation, President Islam Karimov proposed in December 2001 that the Central
Asian Economic Community be renamed the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation
(OCAC). He also suggested organizing a conference of Central Asian entrepreneurs in
Tashkent to stimulate economic collaboration (Pravda Vostoka, 2001).
In line with these proposals, in 2002, four countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan (excluding Turkmenistan)—signed an agreement in Almaty to
establish the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation.
The Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) and its collapse (2002–
2005)
Following its rebranding, the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC)
initially generated cautious optimism among scholars and policymakers. Two notable
developments in 2002–2004 particularly stimulated regional collaboration.
First, parliamentary cooperation was initiated. On November 18, 2002, the first
meeting of parliamentarians from the OCAC member states was held in Tashkent. During the
meeting, participants approved a memorandum emphasizing the importance of developing
common legislative principles and decided to establish a Parliamentary Conference as a
permanent cooperation platform (Narodnoe Slovo, 2002).
Second, business cooperation was actively promoted. Several business forums were
held in Tashkent (November 28–29, 2002) and Osh (May 6, 2003). During these forums,
regional business representatives stressed the need to develop joint projects, harmonize
legislation, liberalize trade regulations, and strengthen direct contacts between enterprises
across Central Asia.
However, despite these initiatives, very limited tangible progress was achieved
between 2002 and 2004 in creating a common market for Central Asia. Efforts to harmonize
customs procedures, deepen cooperation in water, energy, transport, and communications
sectors largely remained declarative and symbolic, giving rise to what scholars termed
"virtual regionalism" (Bobokulov, 2006, p. 85).
In October 2004, during a summit of the OCAC Heads of State Council held in
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Russia officially joined the organization. President Islam Karimov at
that time viewed Russia's accession as an "objective and natural process" (Pravda Vostoka,
2004). Russia was perceived as a potential guarantor of stability in the event of conflicts
among Central Asian states.
However, the outcome diverged from expectations. Rather than promoting regional
cohesion, Russia increasingly became a source of division, manipulating differences among
Central Asian countries for its own strategic advantage. Given the region’s critical strategic
importance, Russia's involvement in the OCAC foreshadowed the organization’s demise.
Shortly thereafter, in October 2005, during a summit of the OCAC Heads of State
Council in St. Petersburg, a historic decision was made to merge OCAC into the Eurasian
Economic Community (EurAsEC). This merger effectively marked the end of independent
Central Asian integration initiatives. From that point onward, the dream of building a self-
sustained regional bloc in Central Asia faded into history.
Nazarbayev’s proposal for a new union and the final collapse of Central Asian
integration
In February 2005, President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed the idea of creating a
new regional bloc called the Union of Central Asian States during his address to the people of
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 766
Kazakhstan. He suggested that the 1997 Treaty on Eternal Friendship, signed between
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek, could serve as a solid foundation for
this new union (Official Website of the President of Kazakhstan, 2005).
The President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, expressed support for Nazarbayev’s
initiative. However, in 2008, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov firmly rejected the
proposal. Thus, efforts to revive regional integration through the creation of a new Central
Asian union came to an end.
This development raised an important question: Why did Central Asian integration
collapse? Why were the states unable to unite? The answer lies in several key factors:
Firstly, an alternative integration project was being simultaneously promoted by
Kazakhstan — the idea of establishing a Eurasian Union. This concept was first introduced
by Nursultan Nazarbayev during his speech at Moscow State University on March 29, 1994
(Nazarbayev, 1997, p. 32). The Eurasian Union, however, was envisioned primarily as a
political association and was not capable of solving the deep economic crises across the post-
Soviet space. In an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 1994, Islam Karimov criticized
this idea, stating:
“Those advocating this concept are primarily aiming to boost their domestic ratings in
Kazakhstan and trying to resolve post-Soviet crises through political means. I am
categorically against resolving such matters through political tools; I advocate gradual and
evolutionary solutions instead” (Karimov, 1994).
Karimov’s remarks clearly revealed that the Eurasian Union project aimed at
elevating Kazakhstan as the core state in regional integration, while in previous Central Asian
cooperation initiatives, Uzbekistan’s geographic position naturally placed it at the center.
Such differences in strategic vision contributed significantly to tensions.
Secondly, by the early 2000s, Kazakhstan's foreign policy increasingly moved away
from a purely Central Asian orientation toward a "Eurasian" trajectory. Proponents of this
course argued that:
“Kazakhstan borders Central Asia geographically but is not a Central Asian country.
We are a Eurasian nation influenced strongly by European and Western values. Our historical
models are not Saudi Arabia, but rather Norway, South Korea, and Singapore” (Tolipov,
2006, p. 22).
This shift in identity and foreign policy priorities diminished Kazakhstan's
commitment to Central Asian integration.
Thirdly, Kazakhstan gradually leaned more heavily toward Russia in its foreign policy.
This was largely due to the immense length of their shared border (7,591 km) and the fact
that by the late 1990s, nearly half of Kazakhstan’s population was ethnically Russian
(Official Website of the President of Kazakhstan, 2022). Speaking at a press conference on
December 4, 1997, Nazarbayev stated:
“We are neighbors with Russia by divine will, sharing a 7,000 km border. Any
politician in my place would take this fact into account. Cooperation with Russia is crucial
for us economically, as it provides a huge market for our goods” (Foreign Ministry Archives,
Dossier No. 083).
Thus, the "Russian vector" gradually gained dominance in Kazakhstan’s foreign
policy, weakening the country's interest in developing an independent Central Asian
integration framework.
Broader causes of failure: structural, political, and geopolitical factors
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 767
Although Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were considered the driving forces behind
Central Asian integration, both states fell short of fully fulfilling their leadership roles. The
level of mutual trust between the Central Asian countries remained extremely low. Often,
treaties signed at summits were not implemented, and agreements were left declarative rather
than practical. This chronic gap between rhetoric and action seriously undermined the
prospects for deep regional cooperation.
Professor Roy Allison of the School of Global and Area Studies at Oxford University
analyzed the systemic weaknesses in Central Asian regionalism. He outlined four major
factors explaining why efforts at regional integration consistently faltered (Allison, 2020):
1. State Capacity Gaps: Variations in administrative, economic, and technical
capabilities among Central Asian countries made it difficult to implement collective,
region-wide projects. The gap in state capacities was significant and persistent.
2. Ideological Divergences: National self-assertion and sovereignty-building efforts in
the 1990s led Central Asian states to prioritize their own independence over regional
solidarity. Consequently, political leaders often focused more on emphasizing
differences rather than searching for common ground and shared regional interests.
3. Economic Competition: Instead of complementing each other, the economies of
Central Asian states often competed. Furthermore, the transport infrastructure
inherited from the Soviet Union made economic integration difficult, reinforcing
patterns of competition rather than cooperation.
4. External Pressures: Competition among major external powers — Russia, the United
States, and China — weakened regionalism. Rather than pursuing a unified Central
Asian policy, the states increasingly sought bilateral relations with powerful external
actors.
Similarly, researcher Chori Kocharov highlighted the macro-economic
incompatibilities among Central Asian states as a major obstacle. The national economic
development strategies and programs of each state differed significantly, creating structural
imbalances that complicated any attempt at joint development (Kocharov, 2008, p. 19).
Another major hindrance was the low level of trust and transparency among Central
Asian leaders. Instead of prioritizing collective regional interests, personal ambitions often
took precedence.
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev later aptly observed:
"Openness and trust are not always qualities found among many leaders. However,
when leaders set aside ambition and prioritize the interests of their peoples, reason prevails,
and goals can be achieved" (Mirziyoyev, 2017).
Indeed, the development of regional cooperation depended heavily on the nature of
interpersonal relations between the heads of state. Frequent summits between presidents
served as clear indicators of the state of bilateral and multilateral relations at any given time.
Conclusion
The case of Uzbek-Kazakh relations between 1991 and 2016 offers crucial insights
into the complex and ultimately unsuccessful attempts at regional integration in Central Asia.
Although the initial momentum for cooperation was strong — driven by shared historical,
cultural, economic, and geographic ties — the region's path toward integration was
obstructed by a combination of internal weaknesses and external pressures.
Internally, the absence of mutual trust, disparities in national capacities, ideological
divergence over sovereignty, economic competition, and competing leadership ambitions
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 768
significantly undermined the feasibility of deeper integration. While Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan held the greatest potential to serve as joint drivers of regional cooperation, their
conflicting strategic visions — particularly Kazakhstan’s pivot toward a Eurasian foreign
policy orientation — created a lasting structural imbalance.
Externally, persistent interference by major powers, especially Russia, further
complicated integration. Rather than supporting Central Asian unity, Russia viewed
independent regional consolidation as a threat to its influence and actively worked to
fragment emerging initiatives. Other global powers, such as the United States and China, also
encouraged bilateral relations over regional multilateralism, further weakening intra-regional
ties.
Despite the significant achievements such as the establishment of the International
Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and the temporary
progress under the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation, these efforts proved
unsustainable. The ultimate dissolution of the OCAC into the Eurasian Economic
Community in 2005 symbolized the end of a distinct Central Asian regional integration
project.
Today, the experience of Central Asia serves as a cautionary tale about the difficulties
of building effective regionalism without genuine political commitment, economic
complementarity, and protection from external geopolitical rivalry. Nevertheless, the lessons
drawn from this period continue to inform new efforts toward regional cooperation in a more
complex and multipolar world.
References:
1. Allison, Roy. 2020. "Challenges and Prospects for Central Asian Regionalism."
Uzbekistan in the Context of Regional Security and Global Change, UWED GCRF
COMPASS Conference Proceedings, February 2020.
2. Bobokulov, I. 2006. "Central Asia: Is There an Alternative to Regional Integration?"
Central Asian Survey (March-June): 75–91.
3. Foreign Ministry Archives of Uzbekistan. Dossier No. 083.
4. Islamov, Bakhtior A. 2001. The Central Asian States Ten Years After: How to Overcome
Traps of Development, Transformation and Globalization. Tokyo: Maruzen Co. Ltd.
5. Karimov, Islam. 1995. Turkiston – Umumiy Uyimiz. Do‘stligimiz Quyoshi Ming
Yilliklar Qа’ridan Nur Sochadi. Tashkent: Uzbekistan.
6. Khalq So‘zi. 2006. "Uzbekistan’s Initiative on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central
Asia Gains International Recognition." Khalq Sozi, accessed [link].
7. Kocharov, Chori. 2008. Problems of the Central Asian Regional Integration Process. PhD
diss., Tashkent.
8. Laruelle, Marlene, and Sebastien Peyrouse. 2012. "Regional Organizations in Central
Asia: Patterns of Interaction, Dilemmas of Efficiency." UCA IPPA Working Paper No. 10.
9. Mirziyoyev, Shavkat. 2017. "Leaders Come and Go, but Nations Remain." Gazeta.uz,
October 6.
https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/10/06/talks/
.
10. Nazarbayev, Nursultan. 1997. Eurasian Union: Ideas, Practice, Prospects 1994–1997.
Moscow: Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences.
11. Narodnoe Slovo. 2002. "Meeting of Parliamentarians from CAS Member States,"
Narodnoe Slovo, June 23.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ISSN: 2692-5206, Impact Factor: 12,23
American Academic publishers, volume 05, issue 05,2025
Journal:
https://www.academicpublishers.org/journals/index.php/ijai
page 769
12. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1993. Yurtaev, V., and A. Shestakov. "Asia’s Gas Will Go to
Europe." Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 13.
13. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1997. Zatulin, K.F., and A.M. Migranyan. "CIS: Beginning or End
of History." Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 26.
https://zatulin.ru/sng-nachalo-ili-konec-
14. Official Website of the President of Kazakhstan. 2005. "Kazakhstan on the Path of
Accelerated Economic, Social, and Political Modernization: Address by President
Nazarbayev." Accessed [link].
15. Official Website of the President of Kazakhstan. 2022. "Republic of Kazakhstan."
https://www.akorda.kz/ru/republic_of_kazakhstan/kazakhstan
.
16. Pravda Vostoka. 2001. "Central Asia: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow." Pravda Vostoka,
December 29.
17. Pravda Vostoka. 2004. "On the Path to Peace, Stability and Progress." Pravda Vostoka,
October 19.
18. Tolipov, Farkhod. 2006. "Central Asia is Five 'Stans': A Polemic with Kazakhstani
Eurasianists." Central Asia and the Caucasus 2(44): 18–29.
