Volume 04 Issue 12-2024
24
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
04
ISSUE
12
P
AGES
:
24-30
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
ABSTRACT
The article provides an interpretation of the domestic and foreign policy activities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
within the framework of the national program “Vision 2030” It presents information on measures taken in the country
in various areas in response to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, as well as efforts to improve national economic sectors,
increase the potential of the chemical industry, and strengthen the country’s defense capabilities. Additionally, based
on an analysis of emerging processes, the article offers insights into the justification for collective initiatives of Central
Asian countries and the pragmatic actions of the Republic of Uzbekistan in ensuring national and overall regional
security.
KEYWORDS
National program, policy, visa-free regime, potential, defense complex, Vision-2030, the G20, mediator, humanitarian
contribution, non-oil sector, strategic partnership, proactive diplomacy, armed conflict and sanction.
INTRODUCTION
In today’s era of intensifying globalization, relations
between nations are more closely intertwined than
ever before. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is not
only a major political actor in the Middle East but also a
leading state in resolving international issues and
conflicts. Historically, the leadership of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia has implemented a number of projects
aimed at developing the country and enhancing
regional security. In light of ongoing global events, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is implementing active
measures to enhance the country’s potential in various
areas thro
ugh the national program “Vision 2030”.
Among other spheres, special attention is given to
regulating migration processes, developing the
chemical industry, and improving the defense
complex.
Research Article
“VISION 2030”: ACCESS TO MANEUVERS IN THE UKRAINIAN
-RUSSIAN
CONFLICT
Submission Date:
December 01, 2024,
Accepted Date:
December 06, 2024,
Published Date:
December 11, 2024
Crossref doi:
https://doi.org/10.37547/ijhps/Volume04Issue12-05
Qurbonov Arslonqul Amonovich
Independent expert, Uzbekistan
Journal
Website:
https://theusajournals.
com/index.php/ijhps
Copyright:
Original
content from this work
may be used under the
terms of the creative
commons
attributes
4.0 licence.
Volume 04 Issue 12-2024
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International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
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2771-2222)
VOLUME
04
ISSUE
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P
AGES
:
24-30
OCLC
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1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
MAIN PART
Vision 2030 is prominently associated with King
Salman’s son Mohammed bin Salman –
or “MBS” –
newly promoted to crown prince as of June 2017. The
strategy has helped to brand MBS as a figure of
considerable influence both within Saudi Arabia and
internationally.[1] But if it is seen as unsuccessful,
existing criticisms of his individual leadership style are
likely to deepen among those who resent his rapid rise.
Personality politics within the royal family could thus
end up being a distraction from the fundamental need
to implement economic diversification.
One way to understand many of Saudi Arabia’s recent
policy innovations is through the lens of Saudi Vision
2030, the crown prince’s flagship development
initiative launched in 2016. MBS announced his new
strategy soon after his father came to power in 2015
and named him deputy crown prince, head of the
newly created Council of Development and Economic
Affairs and minister of defense . Today, MBS is both
crown prince and prime minister. His success as a
leader
–
at least during the present period
–
is being
judged in large part by his ability to see Saudi Vision
2030 to fruition.
The central goal of Saudi Vision 2030 is to better
position Saudi Arabia to weather the global transition
to clean energy through economic diversification. The
realization that the country must reduce its
dependence on hydrocarbon sales is not new
–
oil
makes up 74 per cent of all exports
–
but the urgency
has grown acute after the global economic fallout from
the COVID-19 pandemic, when oil prices fell to record
lows. [2] The diversification mindset has persisted even
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which pushed
global energy prices to new highs, leading to record
profits in 2022 for Saudi Aramco, the state oil company.
Riyadh is therefore significantly expanding its non-oil
economic activity. It plans to do so by, for example,
bolstering religious and non-religious tourism. It hopes
to attract foreign residents and capital through mega-
projects like Neom Line, a linear city no more than
200m across that will stretch for 170km along the Red
Sea coast, run on renewable energy and accommodate
nine million people.[3] Vision 2030 will also draw on
Saudi Arabia’s $700 billion sovereign wealth fund to
make unprecedented investments in developing non-
oil sectors, such as renewable energy, sports and
entertainment, and artificial intelligence.
When it comes to political rights, however, the
situation remains grim. MBS has maintained an
absolute monarchy, ruling with an iron fist and leaving
no space for dissenting political views. Saudi Arabian
citizens face arrest for social media posts that mildly
criticize government policies. In a prominent recent
case, Saudi authorities sentenced to death a retired
teacher (and the brother of a dissident living in exile in
the UK), Mohamed Elghamdi, for calling out corruption
to his dozen or so followers.[4] This punishment is the
most severe they have handed down for social media
activity. Other citizens who have used such platforms
to voice disapproval of government policies have
received long prison terms, ranging between twenty
and 45 years.
These changes in the regional environment of the
Kingdom coincided with the adoption of the
Kingdom’s ambitious Vision 2030, which aims to make
the Kingdom “
a successful and leading model in the
world at all levels”, as stated in King Salman’s
presentation of the vision, and to be at the “forefront
of the countries of the world”, as expressed by the
Crown Prince in his presentation of the vision.[5]
International strategic partnerships are one of the
most prominent pillars of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030,
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VOLUME
04
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OCLC
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1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
which requires an active Saudi foreign policy and open
to all potential partners away from alignment and axes,
and this explains the Kingdom’s keenness to upgrad
e
its relationship with China, Russia, India, and several
other countries to the level of partnership, while
maintaining its traditional relationship with the West
without allowing it to be an obstacle to these
partnerships.
In addition to these two main factors: (1) changes in the
regional environment, (2) a new leadership that
harbors different perceptions, other factors have also
contributed to activating Saudi foreign policy to play
regional and international roles, which raised
expectations of it as an important player to address
many regional and international issues:
Firstly, the Ukraine conflict and the unprecedented
sanctions imposed by the West on Russia and their
impact on the restoration of oil after failed Western
efforts to bypass it using the pretext of climate change.
Western countries have tried to convince the Kingdom
to participate in the sanctions on Russia and abandon
its coordination with Moscow through OPEC+, to
deprive Russia of its most important sources of
income, but they were surpr
ised by the Kingdom’s
refusal to get involved in the game of energy policy,
despite its condemnation of the use of force to resolve
the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.[6] The
Kingdom’s refusal to participate in the sanctions
reflects two things: (1) t
he Kingdom’s keenness to
partner with Russia and (2) the Kingdom’s interest and
the success of Vision 2030 requires coordination with
Russia and the rest of the oil-producing countries, and
production and price policies cannot be subjected to
narrow Western political calculations.
Secondly, Repeated statements by successive US
administrations that the Middle East has lost its
importance, and that it has regressed in US priorities,
which have shifted eastward to focus on confronting
China as a rising great power. This trend has
strengthened the conviction of the Kingdom and the
rest of the region of the need to diversify partners, as
the interests of the region and its countries require not
relying on the historical Western partnership at a time
when Western countries are going through
transformations in their international orientations and
internal conditions that weaken confidence in them as
reliable partners.
Thirdly, The weakness caused by the events of the Arab
Spring to many Arab countries such as Iraq and Syria
and the retreat of regional powers such as Egypt, has
increased the responsibility of countries with
capabilities and prestige such as the Kingdom to bear
the burden of restoring stability in the region,
preventing further deterioration and maintaining Arab
cohesion in the face of fierce regional interventions,
especially from Iran, and confronting extremist militias
and terrorist organizations.[7] It is evident from this
that KSA is currently advancing a series of initiatives
aimed at mitigating and ending the Russia-Ukraine war,
based on the framework of the Vision 2030 project.
A political settlement, while undoubtedly complicated
and requiring difficult compromises from all parties
involved, is the only responsible path forward not only
for Russia and the West but for the entire world.
Putin’s threat serves as a stark reminder of the fragility
of peace in the 21st century and the urgent need for
dialogue and cooperation on the global stage.[8] The
prospect of a Donald Trump comeback seems to
motivate President Joe Biden and the G7, as seen in
their last meeting to ensure sustained support for
Ukraine. Unfortunately, many consider this statement
to supply Ukraine with weapons as a sign that the
conflict’s end is not coming soon.
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OCLC
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Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
It is important to acknowledge the significant
diplomatic efforts by actors like Saudi Arabia to
mediate and de-escalate the conflict in Ukraine. Saudi
Arabia is emerging as a potentially acceptable
mediator for both Ukraine and Russia in the ongoing
conflict. During his visit to the Kingdom on June 12,
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that he
had held “productive” talks with Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman.[9] These discussions focused
on the Peace Summit in Switzerland (held June 15-16,
2024) and on strengthening bilateral ties.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s proactive diplomacy
stems from a deep understanding of global security’s
interconnected nature and the recognition that
prolonged fighting inflicts devastating human costs
while exacerbating existing tensions and fueling
instability far beyond the original conflict zone.[10]
Based on these efforts, Saudi Arabia is positioning
itself as a strong candidate to resolve the conflict in
Ukraine and is increasingly becoming an important
player in the new world order.[11] As an influential
middle power in the evolving international landscape,
Saudi Arabia’s role would positively affect not only
Europe but also extend to the Middle East and beyond.
Maintaining and strengthening regional stability has
been a consistent trend in Saudi foreign policy over the
decades, based on a firm belief in the impact of the
stability of the region on the internal stability of all its
countries. The Kingdom has confronted all extremist
trends that may threaten security and peace in the
region and has made continuous efforts to contain
differences and resolve disputes between the
countries of the region and prevent their development
into armed conflicts.[12] As a result of the Kingdom’s
keenness on the policy of calm and containing crises, it
has always been classified as a “Status quo state”.
With the adoption of Vision 2030, the Kingdom’s
conviction of the importance of restoring regional
stability has increased; because achieving this vision
requires a stable regional environment that attracts
investments and international companies, which is
necessary for the success of multiple development
projects.
During the last eight years, Saudi foreign policy has
adopted a broad concept of security that is not limited
to just restoring stability and containing crises but goes
beyond it to achieve development and prosperity for
all peoples of the region because of the organic
relationship between security and development, as the
state of turmoil suffered by many countries in the
region is due to the failure of development,
widespread poverty, the state of despair and
hopelessness.
This new Saudi vision for security in the region is
reflected in the crown prince’s famous 2018 statement
that “the Middle East will be the new Europe” and his
conviction that this goal is achievable and that he does
not want to “die before he sees the Middle East
globally advanced.”[15] This vision is not just a passing
talk but has turned into initiatives, the foremost of
which is the Middle East Green Initiative, funding its
programs, establishing centres, and forming a
permanent secretariat to coordinate efforts to achieve
this goal.
Today, the Saudis believe that there is a need to adopt
a comprehensive vision of regional security that is not
limited to mere balances of power, the expansion of
influence, and increased military capability, but aims to
create an enabling environment for development and
prosperity and aims to create a decent life for all
peoples of the region.[14]
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OCLC
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1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
The first step towards this goal is to move from the
narrative of conflict and confrontations to the
narrative of construction and development, creating
new perceptions and concepts about the real
challenges facing the region that will hopefully help
decision makers get rid of the inevitability of the zero-
sum game and replace it with a belief in collective
gain.[15]
Today, armed militias represent one of the dangerous
challenges that the region faces that requires
collective efforts to dismantle them and restore state
control and monopoly over the means of violence.
These armed militias deplete capabilities and threaten
the cohesion and survival of states, and countries in the
region will not be able to invest their resources, grow,
maintain civil peace, and move effectively in the
international arena without their total elimination. This
is the first step towards building stable and prosperous
societies and advancing toward a new Middle East.
CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis of available materials, it is
considered advisable to conclude that the internal and
foreign policy maneuvers of the KSA are aimed
primarily at strengthening geopolitical positions on a
regional and international scale, for which the Vision-
2030 creates favorable access.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has played a
notable role in international efforts to address the
ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine,
reflecting its strategic interests and diplomatic
ambitions on the global stage. As a key player in the
Middle East and a member of the G20, Saudi Arabia has
sought to position itself as a mediator and facilitator of
dialogue, emphasizing its commitment to peace and
stability.
Saudi Arabia’s approach has been characterized by
several key initiatives. Firstly, the kingdom has
engaged in diplomatic outreach, hosting discussions
and summits aimed at bringing together various
stakeholders. By facilitating dialogue between
conflicting parties, KSA aims to create an environment
conducive to negotiations and conflict resolution. This
reflects a broader strategy to enhance its diplomatic
clout and showcase its ability to mediate complex
international issues.
Secondly, KSA has demonstrated a commitment to
humanitarian assistance in response to the crisis. The
kingdom has provided financial aid and support to
alleviate the suffering of those affected by the war,
particularly in Ukraine. This humanitarian approach not
only addresses immediate needs but also reinforces
Saudi Arabia’s image as a responsible global actor
committed to humanitarian values.
Moreover, KSA’s effor
ts can be seen within the context
of its broader foreign policy objectives. By engaging in
the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Saudi Arabia seeks to
balance its relationships with both Western nations
and Russia. This balancing act is crucial for maintaining
its strategic interests, particularly in energy markets
and regional security dynamics.
Saudi Arabia’s involvement in efforts to stop the
Russia-Ukraine war highlights its aspirations for
greater influence in global affairs and its commitment
to peace and humanitarian principles. While the path
forward remains fraught with obstacles, KSA’s
diplomatic initiatives and humanitarian contributions
represent significant steps toward fostering dialogue
and addressing the consequences of the conflict. As
the situation evolves, KSA’s continued engagement
will be crucial in shaping the trajectory of international
responses to the war and reinforcing its role as a key
player on the world stage.
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Traditionally Saudi Arabia, like most other Gulf petro-
monarchies, initially maintained neutrality at the onset
of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Riyadh refused to
join
western sanctions against Russia and was even
accused of being pro-Russian. However, after more
than a year of war, it appears that the Saudi kingdom
has managed to strike a delicate balance in its relations
between the United States and Russia.[16] At the same
time, it has maintained a cordial relationship with
Ukraine, to whom it provided a financial aid package of
400 million US dollars on February 26th.
Such a development of processes fully coordinates the
foreign policy activities of international law
functionaries from Central Asia, including the Republic
of Uzbekistan, justifies, if necessary, any of their
initiatives in the field of ensuring national and regional
security.
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Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
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