Volume 04 Issue 12-2024
71
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
04
ISSUE
12
P
AGES
:
71-75
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
ABSTRACT
This article is devoted to examining some of the changes in India's strategy towards Afghanistan and the reasons for
establishing cooperative relations with the Taliban.
KEYWORDS
Taliban, Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Kashmir, Zaranj-Delaram road, Salma Dam, Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan, Kunar River, Shahtut Dam.
INTRODUCTION
The current international relations system is facing
unexpected changes. Along with traditional security
threats, this system is increasingly viewed as an arena
of intense competition between major power centers
in the world order, determined by the desire to gain a
"geopolitical share" of strategic territories. In
particular, intense political events such as the
withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan in
2021 and the re-occupation of Kabul by the Taliban
movement, the Russia-Ukraine war that began in 2022,
the Palestinian-Israeli war in 2023, and the fall of the
Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in 2024 require states
to assess today's international relations with new
approaches.
Professor Abdusamat Khaydarov comes to the
conclusion in his article that the basis of the current
situation is the omissions and underestimation by the
former government and Western countries of the role
of cultural code of Afghans. It is noted that finding a
compromise between the international community
and the interim Government of Afghanistan,
apparently, will not be easy and will require
considerable efforts on both sides and time
(Khaydarov, 2023, p.85). The withdrawal of American
troops from Afghanistan as a result of negotiations
between the US and the Taliban in 2021, and the
subsequent capture of Kabul by the Taliban in August
of that year, have created a worrying picture in India's
Research Article
THE TALIBAN FACTOR IN INDIA’S NEW STRATEGIC APPROACH TO
AFGHANISTAN
Submission Date:
December 10, 2024,
Accepted Date:
December 20, 2024,
Published Date:
December 28, 2024
Crossref doi:
https://doi.org/10.37547/ijhps/Volume04Issue12-12
Shoislom Akmalov
Candidate Of Political Sciences, Associate Professor, International Islamic Academy Of Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan
Journal
Website:
https://theusajournals.
com/index.php/ijhps
Copyright:
Original
content from this work
may be used under the
terms of the creative
commons
attributes
4.0 licence.
Volume 04 Issue 12-2024
72
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
04
ISSUE
12
P
AGES
:
71-75
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
foreign policy. In particular, it is becoming increasingly
clear that India has changed its previous views in the
regions close to its region and has begun to develop a
new strategy. This can be seen in the example of
relations with the Taliban government that currently
rules Afghanistan.
METHODS
In the article, historical and comparative analysis
methods were used.
RESULTS
The establishment of the Taliban government in
Afghanistan
This is because concerns about Pakistan, India's
traditional rival, re-establishing its influence in
Afghanistan through the Taliban have created
unregulated, complex and ambiguous problems for
the New Delhi leadership. The sudden end of the very
close cooperation established with the Ashraf Ghani
government that led Afghanistan before that was a
painful situation for India. Moreover, the possibility of
some proxy groups supported by Pakistan becoming
active in Afghanistan and directing them towards
Kashmir could further increase New Delhi's concerns.
According to some reports, the activities of a number
of religious and political groups known for their
methods of combat terrorism reflect Islamabad's
strategic interests as a tool for waging a war against
India in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Notably, Western
intelligence officials attribute the July 2008 attack on
the Indian Embassy in Kabul to the Haqqani network
(Waldman, 2010, p.17). The Indian Ministry of External
Affairs also strongly condemned the terrorist attack on
a Sikh religious minority temple in Kabul in March 2020
(India strongly condemns…). India is alarmed by the
presence of another anti-Indian terrorist group in the
Afghan conflict, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). LeT, a loyal
proxy of the Pakistani military more cohesive and lethal
than JeM, was forged in the crucible of the anti-Soviet
war. In 2008 the group carried out multiple attacks in
India’s financial capital of Mumbai that left 166 dead,
including six Americans. In Afghanistan, LeT has
attacked Indian diplomatic facilities, government
employees, and aid workers. LeT augments the
Taliban’s capabilities with expertise and fighters. Yet
LeT does not claim responsibility for the violence it
perpetrates in Afghanistan to avoid provoking
international pressure on Islamabad, according to
former State Department intelligence analyst Tricia
Bacon. Stephen Tankel, another terrorism specialist,
writes that in addition to striking Indian interests, LeT’s
influx into Afghanistan enables ISI to gather
intelligence on the “militant state of play across
the
border” (Zachary Constantino, 2020, p.6.).
India was a key donor to Afghanistan, and the
cumulative level of commitment of Indian assistance to
Afghanistan amounted close to US$3 billion. The
Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between India
and Afghanistan in 2011 provided a further boost to the
relationship. Most of India’s development projects in
the past could be broadly divided into four categories:
1.
Large Infrastructure Projects: India initiated
several medium and large infrastructure projects in its
assistance program to Afghanistan, including the
construction of a 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram,
a 220/110/20 kV sub-station at Chimtala and 220kV DC
transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul. The
inauguration of the new Afghan Parliament (2015) and
the Salma Dam (2016), known as the Afghan-India
Friendship Dam, located in the Herat province in
western Afghanistan, were significant initiatives that
were part of the Indian assistance.
Volume 04 Issue 12-2024
73
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
04
ISSUE
12
P
AGES
:
71-75
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
2.
Humanitarian
Assistance:
Indian
efforts
included the supply of wheat and commitment to
regularly contribute to the Afghan Red Crescent
Society for the treatment of Afghan children with
Congenital Heart Disease.
3.
Capacity Building Initiatives: This was a
significant area of Indian assistance to Afghans, and
critical initiatives included Indian Technical and
Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) courses for
Afghan
Government
officials,
training
via
telecommunication at medical facilities, and Indian
Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) fellowships for
Afghan students.
4.
Small Development Projects: These were
initiated in the fields of agriculture, rural development,
vocational training, health, education, etc (Shalini
Chawla, 2024, India adopts…).
It should be noted that India was one of the two
countries that refrained from the situation in
Afghanistan
after
2021,
in
particular,
the
rapprochement of the neighboring countries with the
Taliban and the establishment of dialogue with the
Afghan Interim Government. One of them was
Tajikistan from the Central Asian region, and the other
was India from South Asia, and the position of these
two countries towards the Taliban was associated with
the consequences of Taliban’s past policy (1996
-2001).
For example, the hijacking of an Indian Airline which
was diverted to Kandahar (that was under the Taliban
control) in Afghanistan in 1999 remains a significant
event in the history of India-Afghanistan relations
under the first government of the Taliban (Raghav
Ohri, 2021, 1999 Kandahar…). The traditional ties that
Islamabad has maintained with the Taliban, in turn,
Beijing also expresses sympathy for the Taliban interim
government, which will not leave New Delhi without
worrying that. The following points of view of the
former Indian Foreign Minister Somanahalli Krishna
c
learly express Delhi’s views on this issue: “Delhi does
not recognize the “good” of the Taliban as there is not
the “good” of the terrorists” (Akmalov, 2013, p.189
-
193). The historian William Dalrymple succinctly
describes the dynamics among Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and India as “three countries caught in a deadly
triangle of mutual mistrust and competition” (William
Dalrymple, 2013, A Deadly Triangle…).
India's Evolving Strategic Approach
It is worth noting that, de facto, the political, trade-
economic, and other relations of the Taliban
government with the neighboring countries of
Afghanistan, as well as the growing tensions between
Islamabad
and
the
Taliban,
including
the
transformation of the two sides from "brothers to
rivals," prompted India's establishment to develop a
new strategic approach towards Afghanistan. Tensions
between the Taliban and Islamabad escalated due to
the active involvement of the "Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan" (TTP) group, which created significant
repercussions in the region. In response, Pakistan
deported 1.7 million Afghan migrants and refugees
from its territory in November 2023 (Hussain, 2023). In
retaliation, the Taliban threatened to capture the
lower valleys of the Kunar River in Islamabad and
construct large fortifications in those areas (AmuTV).
The intensification of relations between the Taliban
and Islamabad opened up certain possibilities for New
Delhi. In this regard, New Delhi began efforts to
establish relations with the Taliban, aiming to support
the group against Pakistan. India sent diplomats to
Kabul in 2022 to renegotiate diplomatic relations and
engage in talks with the Taliban. A brief historical
analysis shows that the former Ashraf Ghani
government, with India's assistance, had planned 12
dams along the Kabul River. Naturally, the escalation of
Volume 04 Issue 12-2024
74
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
04
ISSUE
12
P
AGES
:
71-75
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
tensions between the Taliban and Islamabad has
created an opportunity for India to make proposals to
the Taliban to finance the construction of such dams.
In 2022, Bharat Kumar, the representative of India in
Afghanistan, held talks with the Afghan Minister of
Urban Development and Housing, Hamdullah Nomani,
and agreed to jointly implement the construction of
the Shahtut Dam in Kabul (Vaishali, 2023). Abdul
Qahhar Balkhi, the spokesperson of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government of
Afghanistan, in an interview with the "Indian Express"
stated that since there are many and various projects
of India in Afghanistan, but they have not been fully
completed, the "Taliban" side aims to complete these
works (Akmalov, 2024, p.109).
In November 2024, the visit of a delegation led by
India's Special Representative for Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iran, J.P. Singh, to Afghanistan, and the
direct meetings with Taliban Foreign Minister Amir
Khan Muttaqi and Defense Minister Mullah Yaqub
(Sachin Parashar, 2024), can be seen as a result of
strategic changes in New Delhi's approach toward
Afghanistan. During the meeting, the Taliban assured
that there would be no threats from Afghanistan's
territory to India, and the two sides agreed to
cooperate on security matters (...
لیهس رجنس
).
DISCUSSION
It can be said that India's current approach to
Afghanistan has changed due to the "Taliban" factor.
This is primarily linked to India's strategic interests
aimed at ensuring national security, and on the other
hand, the tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban,
which India sees as an opportunity. In turn,
cooperation between the Taliban government and
India not only helps accelerate international processes
aimed at recognizing the Taliban-led government, but
also serves as a significant catalyst for the country's
reconstruction by attracting Indian investments into
the Afghan economy. In this regard, the interests of
both sides are now becoming increasingly aligned.
REFERENCES
1.
Akmalov Shaislam. (2024) New Reality in
Afghanistan: Indian Approach. The American
Journal of Political Science and Criminology.
Volume 6, Issue 1.
2.
India strongly condemns the heinous terror
attack on a Gurudwara in Kabul today //
Ministry of External Affairs of Government of
India.
https://mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/3259
8/india+strongly+condemns+the+heinous+terr
or+attack+on+a+gurudwara+in+kabul+today
3.
Khaydarov Abdusamat. (2023) Strokes to the
Causes And Consequences Of the fall of the
Government of A. Ghani in Afghanistan.
Вестник учёных
-
международников. 2023. № 1
(23).
4.
Pakistani official warns of ‘hostility’ over
Taliban’s Kunar River dam decision. Amu TV,
December 17, 2023. https://amu.tv/76296/
5.
Vaishali Basu Sharma. Afghanistan ‘Unleashes’
Hydro Power on Pakistan; Dam on Kunar River
Powers Taliban, Haunts Neighbors. EurAsian
Times
Desk.
December
27,
2023.
https://www.eurasiantimes.com/afghanist an-
unleashes-hydro-power-on-pakistan dam/
6.
William Dalrymple. “A Deadly Triangle:
Afghanistan, Pa
kistan & India,” Brookings
Institution,
June
25,
2013,
http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/
essays/2013/deadly-triangle-afghanistan-
pakistan-india-c.html\
7.
Акмалов, Ш. (2013) Афганская политика
Индии в контексте ее стратегических
Volume 04 Issue 12-2024
75
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
(ISSN
–
2771-2222)
VOLUME
04
ISSUE
12
P
AGES
:
71-75
OCLC
–
1121105677
Publisher:
Oscar Publishing Services
Servi
интересов в Южной
и Центральной Азии.
ЎзМУ Хабарлари, № 3/1, 2013.
8.
Waldman Matt. (June, 2010) The Sun in the Sky:
The relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and
Afghan insurgents. Carr Center for Human
Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.
9.
Constantiono Zachary. (January, 2020) The
India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan. United
States Institute of Peace, Special Report.
10.
Raghav Ohri. (Aug 30, 2021) 1999 Kandahar
Hijacking: Only one behind bars; real
perpetrators still untried. Retrieved from
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/i
ndia/1999-kandahar-hijacking-only-one-behind-
bars-real-perpetrators-still-
untried/articleshow/85777240.cms?utm_sourc
e=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm
_campaign=cppst
11.
Hussain Abid. (22 November 2023) ‘What’s
wrong?’: The silence of Pakistanis on expulsion
of
Afghan
refugees.
AlJazeera.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11
/22/whats-wrong-the-silence-of pakistanis-on-
expulsion-of-afghan-refugees
12.
Dr Shalini Chawla. (March 28, 2024) India
Adopts a Cautious Middle Path in Afghanistan.
Retrieved from https://capsindia.org/india-
adopts-a-cautious-middle-path-in-afghanistan/
13.
Sachin Parashar. (Nov. 7. 2024) In a first, Indian
official holds talks with Taliban defence
minister.
Times
of
India.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/in-a-
first-indian-official-holds-talks-with-taliban-
defence-minister/articleshow/115035194.cms
14.
هطبار ؛نابلاط اب طباور و دنه یجراخ تسایس. لیهس رجنس
ناکد ،کیژتارتسا
تسین یراد
.Nov 11, 2024
https://8am.media/fa/indias-foreign-policy-
and-relations-with-the-taliban-strategic-
relationship-is-not-shopkeeping/
