International Journal Of Literature And Languages
72
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ijll
VOLUME
Vol.05 Issue07 2025
PAGE NO.
72-75
10.37547/ijll/Volume05Issue07-19
Speech Act Theory: Development, Structure, And
Classifications (Through Examples from Oliver Twist)
Murodova Mutabar Ibodullayevna
3rd year PhD student at Samarkand state institute of foreign languages, Uzbekistan
Received:
25 May 2025;
Accepted:
21 June 2025;
Published:
23 July 2025
Abstract:
The object of this research is the theory of speech acts as a key component of pragmatic linguistics. The
article investigates the evolution and structure of speech act theory, tracing its development from the
foundational ideas of J.L. Austin
—
particularly the distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and
perlocutionary acts
—
to J.R. Searle’s refinements involving propositional content and felicity conditions. Central
notions explored include illocutionary force, communicative intention, and the classification of speech acts based
on their function and effect. The study further reviews the contributions of modern scholars such as D.
Wunderlich, G.G. Pocheptsov, G. Leech, and others, who expanded the traditional categories by introducing
additional types (e.g., erothetives, retractive acts, vocatives) and integrating sociopragmatic variables. By
analyzing selected examples from Oliver Twist by Charles Dickens, the article demonstrates how speech acts
function within literary discourse and reflect broader communicative strategies. The practical relevance of speech
act theory is emphasized through its application to both real-world and fictional interactions.
Keywords:
Speech act, illocution, performativity, pragmatics, taxonomy.
Introduction:
Speech act theory revolutionized the
understanding of language, viewing utterances as
actions rather than mere statements. Instead of
treating language solely as a system for describing
facts, theorists began to see it as a tool for doing things
—
issuing commands, making promises, expressing
emotions, or altering social reality. This perspective
was most notably developed by J.L. Austin and later
refined by J.R. Searle, whose frameworks established
foundational distinctions in the study of meaning and
use, particularly between locutionary, illocutionary,
and perlocutionary acts.
LITERATURE REVIEW
J.L. Austin (1962) distinguished three levels in speech
acts:
•
Locutionary act: the act of saying something
with a particular meaning and reference.
•
Illocutionary act: the conventional force
behind an utterance (e.g., warning, promising).
•
Perlocutionary act: the effect or result
intended on the listener (e.g., convincing, frightening).
For instance, in the line “I promise you solemnly,”
answered Rose, the act operates on all three levels: she
is saying something meaningful (locution), committing
herself to a promise (illocution), and potentially
calming or reassuring the listener (perlocution).
Later developments in speech act theory, particularly
by John Searle, introduced a more refined structure of
utterances by inserting the propositional act between
locutionary and illocutionary acts. This addition
emphasizes the role of propositional content, referring
to the actual state of affairs being described, and
involves two key sub-components: reference (the
identification of entities) and predication (what is
asserted about them).
J. Searle (1969) formalized the structure of a speech act
using the notation F(p), where F denotes the
illocutionary force (such as a command, question, or
assertion), and p represents the propositional
content
—
the embedded statement or idea.
Building on J. Austin’s concept of felicity cond
itions,
both philosophers argued that for a speech act to be
successful, certain criteria must be met. These include
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International Journal Of Literature And Languages (ISSN: 2771-2834)
the correct and recognized use of a conventional
procedure, the authority and sincerity of the
participants,
and
appropriate
contextual
and
intentional alignment. In other words, a performative
utterance can fail not only by being factually incorrect,
but also through misused conventions, lack of sincerity,
or inappropriate context.
J. Searle (1969) further systematized these
requirements into four key categories known as
Searle’s rule groups:
1.
Propositional content rules
–
the rules restrict
the kind of proposition that can occur in a specific
speech act. For example, a promise must refer to a
future act by the speaker: If you are not afraid to come
with me, say so, my boy; and I shall take you home with
me. (The propositional content here refers to a future
action (taking Oliver home), which suits the structure of
an offer. This fits the propositional content rule for a
commissive speech act (offering, promising)).
2.
Preparatory conditions
–
these specify that the
context must be suitable
—
the speaker must have the
authority or status, and the act must be needed or
appropriate: I have orders to apprentice him to a
chimney-sweep. (Mr. Bumble has institutional
authority as the beadle to make such assignments. The
preparatory conditions are met: there’s a boy needing
placement and an adult with legal power.)
3.
Sincerity conditions
–
the speaker must
genuinely believe or desire what they express. A
promise should be made with the intent to keep it; an
apology should reflect real regret: I know he’s a good
boy! I know he is! ( Nancy passionately defends Oliver.
Her sincerity is not in question
—
this emotional
insistence shows she genuinely believes in his
innocence. If she were lying or uncertain, the speech
act would fail the sincerity test.)
4.
Essential conditions
–
these state what act is
being performed
—
i.e., what the utterance counts as
in the act of communication: You must go out
tomorrow morning with the Dodger and Charley. (This
is not just a suggestion
—
it functions as a command.
The essential condition for a directive is fulfilled: Fagin
is using his authority to get Oliver to do something.)
According to J.L. Austin (1962) speech acts present five
types:
1.
Verdictives
–
giving verdicts: He has been hurt
already, said the old gentleman in conclusion
2.
Exercitives
–
exercising power: That boy will be
hung, said the gentleman in the white waistcoat.
3.
Commissives
–
orders, advice, etc.: My advice,
or, leastways, I should say, my orders, is, said the fattest
man of the party, ‘that we ‘mediately go home again.
4.
Behabitives
–
social behavior
–
apologizing,
congratulating: I am very sorry if I have disturbed you,
sir.
5.
Expositives
–
clarifying, explaining: That boy,
said Mr. Brownlow, may be a thief. But the women’s
story is so curious, and the boy’s face is so honest...
METHODS
This study employs a qualitative analytical method,
drawing on both descriptive and comparative
approaches within the framework of pragmatics.
Primary theoretical models by J.L. Austin and J.R. Searle
are examined through conceptual analysis, while later
modifications by linguists such as D. Wunderlich, G.
Leech, and G.G. Pocheptsov are integrated through
literature review and systematization. To illustrate
theoretical claims in practice, selected utterances from
Charles Dickens’s Oliver Twist are subjected to
discourse analysis, identifying the type, structure, and
function of speech acts in context. This literary corpus
serves as a practical testing ground to validate and
compare classic and contemporary speech act
taxonomies. The method also includes contextual
interpretation, allowing the analysis to account for
speaker intention, social hierarchy, and perlocutionary
effects within the narrative.
RESULTS
John Searle’s classification of speech acts identifies five
major categories, each defined by its communicative
function, the direction of fit between language and the
world, and the speaker’s underly
ing psychological
state.
Representatives are used to assert or describe a state
of affairs. In this type of act, the speaker attempts to
make their words correspond to reality
—
a words-to-
world fit. These acts express belief, as in the simple
statement, H
e’s an orphan, born in the workhouse.
Directives aim to get the hearer to perform an action,
thus intending to change the world to match the
speaker’s words —
a world-to-words fit. These reflect
the speaker’s desire or wish, as seen in commands or
requests like Hold your tongue, you young rascal!
Commissives function by committing the speaker to a
future course of action. Like directives, they involve a
world-to-
words fit, but the emphasis is on the speaker’s
intention rather than the hearer’s response. A c
lassic
example is, I shall take you home with me.
Expressives serve to convey the speaker’s emotional
state or attitude about a situation. These do not
necessarily involve a directional fit between words and
the world but are tied to internal states such as
gratitude, regret, or joy
—
as in God bless the poor
child!
International Journal Of Literature And Languages
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International Journal Of Literature And Languages (ISSN: 2771-2834)
Finally, declarations are unique in that they bring about
a change in the external reality solely through the act
of being uttered, provided the speaker has the proper
authority and context. These involve a dual fit
—
both
world-to-words and words-to-world
—
and do not
necessarily depend on a psychological state. A clear
example is the performative utterance, I have orders to
apprentice him to be a chimney-sweep. which enacts a
real change upon being spoken.
DISCUSSION
Several scholars have expanded upon the classical
framework of speech act theory, offering nuanced
taxonomies that emphasize different aspects of
communicative behavior. Among them, D. Wunderlich
(1976) introduced additional categories such as
erothetives (questions), satisfactives (expressions of
thanks or apology), retractives (withdrawals or
retractions), and vocatives (calls or summons). These
categories enrich the understanding of how speech
acts function in everyday discourse beyond the original
classifications proposed by Austin and Searle.
In parallel, G.G. Pocheptsov emphasized the
importance
of
communicative
intention
and
illocutionary force, categorizing utterances into
constatives, commissives, performatives, directives,
and interrogatives. G. Leech (1983), focusing on the
pragmatics of politeness, contributed by formulating
politeness maxims and exploring their interaction with
rhetorical structure. Meanwhile, Bach K., and Harnish
R.M (1979) and Bogdanov (1980) offered a detailed
categorization
grounded
in
pragmatic
intent,
institutional context, and speaker-hearer dynamics.
To illustrate these classifications, selected examples
from Oliver Twist demonstrate how speech acts are
employed in literary dialogue:
•
Directive: “Hold your tongue, you you
ng
rascal!” —
a clear command issued by authority figures
such as Mr. Bumble or Mrs. Mann.
•
Commissive: “I shall never forget your
kindness, sir,” —
Oliver expresses a future commitment
to gratitude.
•
Erothetic: “What have you done with the boy?”
—
an interrogative from Mr. Brownlow, seeking
information.
•
Representative: “He was born in the
workhouse,” —
a factual assertion conveying belief.
•
Satisfactive: “Thank Heaven she is alive!” —
an
expression of relief and gratitude from a character such
as Rose Maylie.
•
Retractive: “I didn’t mean to say that...” —
an
example of a character like Nancy or Oliver retracting a
prior statement.
•
Declaration: “He is to be apprenticed to a
chimney-
sweep,” —
a formal declaration altering
Oliver’s social status, perfor
med by an institutional
figure.
•
Vocative: “Oliver! Come here, boy!” —
a direct
address to summon or call upon the listener.
These examples also reflect the core distinction
between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. For
instance, when Mr. Brownlow sa
ys, “I trust you, my
boy,” the utterance carries illocutionary force (an
expression of belief and commitment), while the
perlocutionary effect may be to reassure or
emotionally move Oliver. In another case, the
exclamation “Run for your life!” may be inter
preted
both as a warning (illocution) and a trigger for action
(perlocution).
Moreover, ambiguous utterances
—
such as Fagin’s
subtle remark “You’ve learned quickly, haven’t you?”
—
may be interpreted as either praise, sarcasm, or
implicit threat, depending on context, tone, and
relational dynamics. Such examples highlight the
importance of pragmatic inference and contextual
clues in interpreting speech acts, especially within
fictional narratives.
CONCLUSION
Speech act theory has undergone significant
theoretical development since its inception, evolving
from J.L. Austin’s foundational triadic model to more
refined and context-aware classifications proposed by
later scholars such as J. Searle, D. Wunderlich, V.I.
Bogdanov, G. Leech, and others. These developments
underscore that language is not merely a vehicle for
conveying information, but a tool for performing
actions
—
from asserting facts and giving orders to
expressing emotions and shaping social reality.
While Austin and Searle laid the groundwork by
identifying core distinctions like locution, illocution,
and perlocution, contemporary models have extended
these insights to encompass more diverse and nuanced
speech functions. Additions such as erothetives,
retractives, and satisfactives reflect an ongoing effort
to account for the complexity of real-world
communication, where tone, context, speaker
authority, and social conventions constantly influence
interpretation.
At the center of all these models remains the concept
of illocutionary force and communicative intention,
which together form the backbone of pragmatic
analysis. Yet, this very centrality introduces a persistent
tension: the need for structured, typological
categorization often clashes with the inherently fluid,
context-dependent nature of language use. The
International Journal Of Literature And Languages
75
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ijll
International Journal Of Literature And Languages (ISSN: 2771-2834)
difficulty in drawing rigid boundaries between
categories like expressives and representatives or
between illocution and perlocution reflects deeper
theoretical questions about meaning, intention, and
inference.
Moreover, literary texts such as Oliver Twist offer
fertile ground for testing these theoretical constructs.
Dickens’s characters perform speech acts not just
within fictional dialogue, but also within power
structures, emotional relationships, and moral
dilemmas
—
allowing researchers to explore how
linguistic form and social function intertwine.
Ultimately, speech act theory continues to evolve
because communication itself does. As new forms of
discourse emerge
—
from digital communication to
multimodal interaction
—
the theory must remain
adaptable. Its continued relevance lies in its ability to
bridge formal structure and human nuance, offering a
powerful lens through which to understand both
everyday
conversation
and
complex
literary
expression.
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Austin J.L. Words and deeds by G.J. Warnock. Austin-
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ISBN9780203849682
Bach, Kent. Speech acts and pragmatics // Blackwell
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Dickens Ch. Oliver Twist; or, the parish boy’s progress.
Edited by Global Grey, Global Grey, 2022
https://globalgreyebooks.com/oliver-twist-
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