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THE PRESENTATION OF NON-ISLAMIC DOCTRINAL BELIEFS IN MUHAMMAD
IBN ABDULKARIM AL-SHAHRASTANI'S NIHĀYAT AL-IQDĀM
Mumin Mirzo Abdupattaev,
Senior Lecturer at the Department of Religious Studies and Comparative Study of World
Religions (UNESCO),
International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan, PhD
Abstract:
In this article, information is given about “Nihayat al-Iqdam” by the great scientist
Imam Abul Fath Shahrastani (1076-1153), who lived and created in the “The Great Seljuk
Empire” (1037-1194), and the analysis of the beliefs of the religions included in the work is given.
Keywords:
Shahrastani, ʿAqīdah (Creed), Belief, Philosophy, Christianity, Judaism, al-Milal
waʾl-Niḥal, Huduth (Origination), Universe, Creation.
Imam al-Shahrastani, who held an exceptional place in the intellectual and scholarly landscape of
medieval Central Asia, was born in 1076 in the city of Shahristan, located between the cities of
Merv and Khwarazm. The scholar devoted the core of his academic activity to the study of the
history and doctrines of religions. In this regard, he authored his famous work al-Milal waʾl-Niḥal
(Religions and Sects).
Nevertheless, he also engaged deeply with the science of kalām (Islamic theology). His work
Nihāyat al-Iqdām is considered one of the significant sources on ʿaqīdah (creed) and kalām. The
full title of the book is Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī ʿIlm al-Kalām ("The Ultimate Steps in the Science of
Kalām"), and it is regarded as Shahrastani’s second major and well-known work after al-Milal
waʾl-Niḥal. This book is also referred to as Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī al-Uṣūl. It covers various issues
related to Islamic creed, primarily relying on rational (ʿaql-based) arguments.
The scholar explains the purpose of writing his work as follows:
“In this book, I have not committed myself to merely reporting the subjects of kalām. Rather, I
have committed myself to addressing the problems related to rational matters, and to clarifying
the levels of the kalām scholars in their knowledge of rational—rather than transmitted—
sciences” [1:277].
The primary feature that distinguishes this work from other theological treatises is that the author
included only those topics that he personally encountered most frequently and debated during his
life.
The Turkish researcher Hakan Coşar, in his study, concludes that Nihāyat al-Iqdām was written
from a philosophical perspective. He states:
“The work was composed with philosophical reflection, in which the views of Aristotle, al-Fārābī,
al-Kindī, and Ibn Sīnā on existence, divinity, necessary being (wājib al-wujūd), and origination
(ḥudūth) are criticized” [2].
The researcher attributes this critical stance to the fact that, during Shahrastani’s time, philosophy
had reached its peak under the influence of Muʿtazilite thought.
The researcher’s views are quite convincing, as the scholar devoted much of his life to philosophy.
He regarded Imam al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā as his intellectual mentors. Moreover, he authored a
philosophical treatise titled Muṣāraʿat al-Falāsifa (The Struggle with the Philosophers). In Nihāyat
al-Iqdām, he also included key philosophical issues of his time and responded to them using
rational arguments.
Today, several manuscript copies of Nihāyat al-Iqdām are preserved. The majority of these are
located in the Republic of Turkey, including:
Bayezid State Library (Ms. No. 2154 and No. 1192),
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Hacı Selim Ağa Library (Ms. No. 666 and No. 964),
Köprülü (Hoca Ragıp Pasha) Library (Ms. No. 1169),
Süleymaniye Library (Ms. No. 3164, No. 14698, and No. 35168),
Topkapı Palace Museum Library (Ms. No. 1845),
Istanbul University Library (Ms. No. 5225 and No. 5224).
Additionally, copies are held in several European libraries, including:
The National Library of France (Ms. No. 1246),
The Bodleian Library at Oxford (Ms. No. 356), and
The Prussian State Library in Berlin (Ms. No. 579).
Based on three of these European manuscripts, the first modern edition of the work was published
in 1934 by the British orientalist Alfred Guillaume (1888–1965).
The work consists of twenty chapters and incorporates the methodologies of the classical Sunni
kalām tradition. In each chapter, the author provides a distinct title and begins by presenting the
views of philosophers, the Muʿtazilites, and other theological schools on the topic under
discussion. He then outlines the perspectives of Sunni scholars.
In this book, written after al-Milal waʾl-Niḥal, the author adopts a comparative approach to the
doctrinal views of Islamic sects—distinct from the method used in his earlier work—and defends
Sunni ʿaqīdah from the standpoint of Ashʿarite theology. He responds to sectarian theological
concepts with rational arguments.
In many sections of Nihāyat al-Iqdām, the opinions of key Ashʿarite figures such as Abū al-Ḥasan
al-Ashʿarī (873–936), Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (940–1013), Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī (949–1047), and
Imām al-Juwaynī (1028–1085) are introduced with the phrase “The People of Truth say...”.
In various parts of the work, the reference to “our master” (ustādh) is understood to mean Abū
Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī; “our shaykh” refers to Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī; and “the judge” (qāḍī) points
to Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī. Imām al-Juwaynī is frequently mentioned as Imām al-Ḥaramayn.
Beyond the beliefs of Islamic sects, the work also addresses the doctrines of philosophers as well
as religious and theological systems such as Brahmanism, Sabianism, and Zoroastrian dualism
(Sanawiyyah).
The first chapter of Nihāyat al-Iqdām deals with the creation of the universe (ḥudūth), discussing
whether the world is “eternal” (qadīm) or “created” (muḥdath). Presenting the views of various
schools, the scholar states:
“According to the doctrine of the People of Truth (ahl al-ḥaqq), the universe is created. It was
created by Allah, the Exalted. At the moment of its creation, nothing existed except Allah.
Ancient philosophers such as Thales, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Empedocles
held divergent views on this issue. We explained this in detail in al-Milal waʾl-Niḥal. Later
thinkers like Proclus, Aphrodisius, Themistius, as well as Muslim philosophers such as Abū Naṣr
al-Fārābī and Abū ʿAlī Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sīnā, also believed the world to be eternal”
[1:3].
Shahrastānī argues against the eternity of the universe:
“Allah, the Exalted, is eternally wājib al-wujūd (Necessary Being). Reason accepts that a being
who is eternal cannot perish. The world, on the other hand, is composed of substances (jawāhir)
and is muḥdath (created), meaning it is perishable. If the universe were eternal, then reason would
reject the idea of two eternal beings existing simultaneously” [1:3].
The second chapter of the work is dedicated to the belief that the entire cosmos was created by
Allah. At the beginning of this chapter, the author writes:
“This chapter contains refutations against the Muʿtazilites, philosophers, and the Magians
(Zoroastrian dualists). According to the belief of the People of Truth and the People of Islam, the
entire existing universe was created by Allah, the Exalted. Nothing exists without Him” [1:49].
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Regarding the cosmological beliefs of the Magians, he states:
“In their doctrine, the creation of the universe is explained in detail. According to the Magians,
the emergence of the universe was caused by the intermingling of light and darkness. When light
becomes separated from darkness, the universe ceases to exist” [1:50].
In al-Milal waʾl-Niḥal, the cosmological beliefs of the Magians (Zoroastrians) are elaborated in
detail. The scholar presents their views as follows:
“According to the Magian belief, light (nūr) and darkness (ẓulumāt) are two opposing primordial
elements. Yazdān and Ahriman are likewise opposing entities and are the origin of all that exists.
From the merging of light and darkness, compositions (arkān) arose, and from these various
compositions, forms (ṣuwar) emerged. God is the creator of both light and darkness. He is One,
having neither partner, nor rival, nor likeness. Good and evil, righteousness and corruption, purity
and impurity — all arise from the intermingling of light and darkness. If light and darkness had
not merged, the universe would not exist. There is a constant struggle and opposition between the
two until light overcomes darkness, good triumphs over evil, and each returns to its own realm —
this is the cause of salvation. God, having observed wisdom in these compositions, caused light
and darkness to mix and made light the essence. The existence of light is true existence, while
darkness is like a man’s shadow — it appears to exist but is not real. Once light was created,
darkness followed it and became subject to it. For opposition is necessary to existence. Therefore,
the presence of darkness among creation is, like a man and his shadow, a necessary reality”
[3:283].
In the third chapter of Nihāyat al-Iqdām, titled Tawḥīd (Divine Unity), the dualist beliefs of the
Sanawiyya are discussed. These dualists believe in the eternal existence of light and darkness,
considering them both to be primordial and uncreated. The Magians, however, oppose this idea,
claiming that “darkness appeared only later.”
The scholar refutes these claims, stating:
“Our scholars say: ‘Divine unity (tawḥīd) is an indivisible oneness. Allah, the Exalted, is unique
in His essence — He is not composed of parts. He is unique in His attributes — none is like Him.
He is unique in His actions — none is equal to Him’” [1:85].
In al-Milal waʾl-Niḥal, the author further classifies the Sanawiyya into four sects: the
Manichaeans, the Mazdakites, the Dayṣāniyya, and the Marqūniyya. He writes:
“They unanimously agreed on the equal eternity of both light and darkness. However, they
differed in their views concerning the essence, nature, actions, location, types, appearances, and
spirits of these elements” [3:290].
The fourth chapter of Nihāyat al-Iqdām, titled Rejection of Anthropomorphism (Tashbīh),
addresses the doctrines of the Jahmiyya and the Karrāmiyya. The scholar asserts:
“According to the People of Truth, Allah does not resemble any of His creation, and none of the
creation resembles Him. As the Qur’an states: ‘There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the All-
Hearing, the All-Seeing’ (Qur’an 42:11). Allah is neither a div nor an accident (ʿaraḍ). He is not
confined to any place or time” [1:97].
The chapter also critiques the extremist (ghulāt) Shiʿi sects such as the Mughiriyya, Bayāniyya,
and Hishāmiyya, who likened Allah’s attributes to those of created beings. These groups often
cite the prophetic tradition:
“Indeed, Allah created Adam in the image of al-Raḥmān (the Merciful).”
This ḥadīth is narrated by Abū Hurayra (ra) and recorded by al-Bukhārī in his Ṣaḥīḥ (ḥadīth no.
6227). ʿAbdullāh ibn ʿUmar (ra) interpreted the phrase “in the image of al-Raḥmān” as referring
to divine attributes such as knowledge and understanding that are also found, in limited form, in
humans [5].
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Furthermore, the chapter discusses the Karrāmiyya’s belief that Allah has a div (jism), and it
records the rebuttals of Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī against their views.
Chapters five and six of Nihāyat al-Iqdām, titled The Falsehood of the Taʿṭīl Doctrine and States
(Aḥwāl) respectively, contain critical refutations of the theory of aḥwāl advanced by Abū Hāshim
al-Jubbāʾī, a key Muʿtazilī thinker. The theory was proposed as an attempt to avoid both
anthropomorphism (tashbīh) and negation of divine attributes (taʿṭīl), but the scholar dismantles it
thoroughly [1:97–127].
The seventh chapter, titled Does the Non-Existent Exist?, addresses the debate over the existence
of non-being (maʿdūm) — a central issue for certain Muʿtazilīs and Greek-influenced
philosophers such as Aristotle. It compares the views of the Ahl al-Sunna, Muʿtazilīs, and the
philosophers on the concept of primordial substance [1:146–166].
Chapters eight and nine are devoted to The Affirmation of Knowledge, while chapter ten
discusses The Eternal Nature of God's Knowledge. These chapters counter the views of figures
like Jahm ibn Ṣafwān and Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, who claimed that God does not have knowledge
of temporal events. Al-Shahrastānī responds:
“God is pre-eternal and singular. He has complete knowledge of all things — both universal and
particular. Ibn Sīnā states: ‘The Lord, exalted be He, knows everything in a universal and
particular manner through His own essence’” [1:206].
The eleventh chapter tackles a long-standing point of theological divergence among Islamic sects:
the nature of Divine Will (irāda) and Speech (kalām). The twelfth chapter continues with a
discussion on The Eternality of God's Speech, and chapter thirteen focuses on The Divine
Attribute of Speech. Chapter fourteen explores The Reality of Human Speech and Expression.
Chapter fifteen, titled The Presence of Knowledge within the Names al-Baṣīr (the All-Seeing) and
al-Samīʿ (the All-Hearing), rejects the Muʿtazilī claim that these attributes are merely aspects of
God’s name al-ʿAlīm (the All-Knowing). The scholar reports:
“Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (may Allah have mercy on him) opposed Kaʿbī and his group, asserting:
‘Allah is Samīʿ in His essence. His attributes of seeing and hearing are distinct from the attribute
of knowledge’” [1:330].
Chapter sixteen, titled The Possibility of Seeing God According to Reason and Revelation,
presents both rational and textual proofs affirming the Ahl al-Sunna view that God can be seen in
the Hereafter. These arguments are posed as responses to Muʿtazilī denials of such a possibility.
Chapter seventeen addresses the question of taḥsīn (moral approval) and taqbīḥ (moral
condemnation). Al-Shahrastānī summarizes the Ahl al-Ḥaqq (People of Truth) position:
“According to us, the intellect alone cannot determine the goodness or evil of actions in matters of
divine obligation. Human reason needs the guidance of revelation (sharīʿa) to distinguish right
from wrong.”
He notes that this position is contested by Sanawiyya, transmigrationists (tanāsukhiyya),
Brahmins, Khārijites, Karrāmiyya, and Muʿtazilīs, who hold that:
“Reason alone, even without revelation, can discern what is good and what is evil — and that
reward or punishment should follow accordingly.”
To support the Sunni position, the scholar cites Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, who said:
“All knowledge is acquired through reason, but acting on that knowledge depends on the guidance
of revelation” [1:365].
The Brāhmaṇs' doctrine — namely, “We do not need divine revelation (sharīʿa) in order to know
anything. The intellect may accept or reject what a prophet commands via the sharīʿa. If the
intellect accepts it, then the prophet is unnecessary, because the intellect alone can attain the truth
of the matter. If the intellect rejects it, the matter itself must be rejected” — is also presented and
examined in this chapter [3:370].
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This section likewise addresses the theological claim that before the arrival of revelation, no
servant of God can be held accountable, and that no reward or punishment is recorded for their
actions.
The eighteenth chapter is titled There Is No Causal Motive Behind God’s Acts, and affirms the
Sunni theological position that God's actions are not compelled by causes, motives, or purposes
comprehensible to human reason.
Chapters eighteen and nineteen of Nihāyat al-Iqdām are further devoted to the concept of
Prophethood and the Proof of the Messengerhood of Muḥammad (peace be upon him). In these
chapters, al-Shahrastānī briefly notes that the Brāhmaṇs reject the concept of prophethood
altogether, stating succinctly: “They deny the reality of prophethood.”
However, in his other work al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, the scholar elaborates on their doctrines in
greater detail. He identifies Brāhmaṇism as the most prominent creed among the Indian traditions
and remarks:
“One of the great doctrines of the Indians is Brāhmaṇism. They categorically reject prophethood.
Some of them incline toward atheism (dahriyya). Among them are also those who worship idols
and statues. Certain people have attempted to associate the name ‘Brāhmaṇa’ with the prophet
Abraham (Ibrāhīm, peace be upon him), but this is absolutely false. How can a group that denies
prophethood be named after a prophet?” [3:601].
Al-Shahrastānī also mentions sects that have branched off from Brāhmaṇism. Among them, he
includes Buddhism. Concerning the name “Buddha,” he writes:
“According to the Indians, this name signifies one who was never born, never married, never ate
voluntarily, and never died. The first Buddha in the world, according to them, was Shākyamuni.
There are five thousand years between him and the Hijra. The highest spiritual rank in Buddhism
is Bodhisattva, which means ‘one who seeks the true path.’ They adhere to ten fundamental
prohibitions” [3:603–604].
Al-Shahrastānī appears to have erred in his estimation of the chronological gap between Buddha
and the Hijra. Historically, Siddhartha Gautama was a real figure born between 567 and 488 BCE
in the region of Kapilavastu, located near the present-day border of India and Nepal, into the royal
Shākya clan. At the age of thirty-five, Siddhartha sat beneath a tree in deep meditation (Latin:
meditatio – to think, reflect, or concentrate with the aim of reaching higher truth), vowing not to
rise until he had attained the ultimate reality — which he eventually did [4:144]. From this, it is
evident that over a millennium separates Buddha’s lifetime from the advent of Islam.
Interestingly, al-Shahrastānī likens Buddha to the figure of Khidr (peace be upon him) as
described in Muslim tradition. In addition to classifying Buddhists among the offshoots of
Brahmanism, he also mentions groups such as the ashāb al-fikr wa-l-fahm (“people of thought and
understanding”) and tanasukhiyyūn (those who believe in transmigration of souls).
The twentieth and final chapter of Nihāyat al-Iqdām begins by presenting proofs for the
prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), emphasizing that the Qur’an itself is the
greatest of such proofs. It then proceeds to address eschatological matters such as the grave,
resurrection, the balance (mīzān), the cistern (ḥawḍ), intercession (shafāʿa), the definition of faith
(īmān), the distinction between faith and deeds, and the legal status of one who commits a major
sin.
This chapter also devotes special attention to the doctrine of imāma, critically assessing and
rejecting the Shīʿī understanding of it, presenting arguments against their theological claims.
Other subjects covered include the miracles (karāmāt) of saints (awliyāʾ), the abrogation of
previous religions by Islam, and related issues [1:410–504].
In the conclusion of his work, al-Shahrastānī defends the necessity of kalām (theology) as a
discipline. He criticizes philosophers for their approach and refers to them as “imaginative
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speculators” (ahl al-khayāl) due to what he sees as their excessive reliance on abstract speculation
over revealed knowledge.
In his edition of Nihāyat al-Iqdām, Alfred Guillaume included an appendix containing another of
al-Shahrastānī’s treatises: Baḥth fī al-Jawhar al-Fard (“A Treatise on the Simple Substance”). This
work compares and critiques the views of philosophers, Muʿtazilites, and theologians on the
nature of “substance” (jawhar) and “atom”.
Although Nihāyat al-Iqdām is considered one of the authoritative sources in Islamic theological
discourse, it has not yet been fully studied or critically edited in modern scholarship. The
theological and doctrinal material it contains often surpasses what is presented in his earlier work
al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal, thus increasing its scholarly value and importance.
References
1.
Shahristani, Muhammad ibn Abdulkarim. Nihayat al-Iqdam fi Ilm al-Kalam. Cairo:
Maktabat al-Thaqafah al-Diniyyah, 2009. – 522 pages.
2.
Çoşar, Hakan. Şehristânî’s Philosophical Views According to Nihâyetü’l-İkdâm.
Master's Thesis. Ankara: Ankara University, 2003. – 89 pages.
3.
Shahristani, Muhammad ibn Abdulkarim. Al-Milal wa al-Nihal. Beirut: Dar al-Ma‘rifah,
2001. – 664 pages.
4.
Foundations of Religious Studies. Chief Editor: I. Usmonov. Tashkent: Tashkent Islamic
University Publishing-Printing Union, 2013. – 320 pages.
5.
“Clear and Allegorical Verses.”
. (Last accessed: June 10, 2025).
