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«OPERATION “DESERT SABRE”» («OPERATION “DESERT SWORD”») (24-28
TH
FEBRUARY, 1991)
Umurbaev Rustam Shakirjanovich
Graduate of Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies Tashkent
E-mail:
Tel.: +998946995982
Abstract.
This paper though the long-running war between Iran and Iraq had ended in a United
Nations-brokered ceasefire in August 1988, by mid 1990 the two states had yet to begin negotiating
a permanent peace treaty. When their foreign ministers met in Geneva that July, prospects for peace
seemed bright. Two weeks later, however, Saddam Hussein delivered a speech in which he accused
neighboring Kuwait of siphoning crude oil from their common border, claiming that Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia were conspiring to keep oil prices low in an effort to pander to Western oil-buying
nations.
Key words:
military, countries provided, assessments, including, emphasized, effectiveness.
Introduction
The logistical support of operation «Desert Shield» (aimed at both the deterrence of further Iraqi
aggression and the defense of Saudi Arabia) and operation «Desert Storm» (aimed at ejecting Iraqi
military forces from Kuwait) included these same materiel and service requirements. However, the
logistical support requirements and planning were in many ways unique. Long before the crisis,
Saudi Arabia had started a program to modernize its armed forces, principally under the U.S.
security assistance program. They had constructed a coastal logistics infrastructure of sea- and
airports, military bases and a rudimentary inland road system, thus making unnecessary the massive
construction effort so often required in a new theater of operations.
The host nation, Saudi Arabia, and other coalition countries provided transportation, water, food,
fuel, and support personnel, further reducing the demands on U.S. military resources. Time also
worked in favor of the allies as limited strategic lift assets were pressed into service. The lack of
inland infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, particularly supply bases and extensive roadways, required a
measured pace of unit personnel deployments by airlift to coincide with the arrival of unit
equipment and supplies by sealift. Still, the logistics challenges were massive in scale and magnified
by the complex force structure deploying to the region. Only the United States had the wherewithal
to organize the strategic move of personnel and materiel over vast distances to Southwest Asia, and
the theater management capabilities and organizations to receive, control and distribute the materiel
necessary to support the operation.
Material and Methods
In addition to Hussein’s incendiary speech, Iraq had begun amassing troops on Kuwait’s border.
Alarmed by these actions, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt initiated negotiations between Iraq
and Kuwait, but Hussein broke off the negotiations after only two hours, and on August 2, 1990
ordered the invasion of Kuwait. Hussein’s assumption that his fellow Arab states would stand by
him proved to be a miscalculation. Alarmed by these actions, two-thirds of the 21 members of the
Arab League condemned Iraq’s act of aggression, and Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, along with
Kuwait’s government-in-exile, turned to the United States and other members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization for support.
U.S. President George H.W. Bush immediately condemned the invasion, as did the governments of
Britain and the Soviet Union. On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council authorized the use
of «all necessary means» of force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait by the following
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January 15. Hussein defied the Security Council, and early on the morning of January 17, 1991 the
Persian «Gulf War» began with a massive U.S.-led air offensive known as «Operation “Desert
Storm”». The U.S. was accompanied by troops sent by NATO allies as well as Egypt and several
other Arab nations. The coalition effort benefited from the latest military technology, including
Stealth bombers, Cruise missiles, so-called «Smart» bombs with laser-guidance systems and
infrared night-bombing equipment. The Iraqi air force was either destroyed early on or opted out of
combat under the relentless attack.
Results
Operation «Desert Storm» was a highly successful and decisive military operation. The air
campaign, which incurred minimal casualties while effecting the collapse of the Iraqis’ ability to
resist, helped liberate Kuwait and elicit Iraqi compliance with resolutions. However, our analysis of
the air campaign against strategic targets revealed several air power issues that require attention
before the next campaign. First, the effectiveness of air power in «Desert Storm» was inhibited by
the aircraft sensors’ inherent limitations in identifying and acquiring targets and by failure to gather
intelligence on the existence or location of certain critical targets and its inability to collect and
disseminate timely battle damage assessments. Pilots noted that infrared, electro-optical, and laser
systems were all seriously degraded by clouds, rain, fog, smoke, and even high humidity, and the
pilots reported being unable to discern whether a presumed target was a tank or a truck and whether
it had already been destroyed. The failure of intelligence to identify certain targets precluded any
opportunity for the coalition to fully accomplish some of its objectives. And the reduced accuracies
from medium and high altitudes and absence of timely BDA led to higher costs, reduced
effectiveness, and increased risks from making unnecessary restrikes.
Second, U.S. commanders were able to favor medium- to high-altitude strike tactics that maximized
aircraft and pilot survivability, rather than weapon system effectiveness. This was because of early
and complete air superiority, a limited enemy response, and terrain and climate conditions generally
conducive to air strikes. Low-altitude munitions deliveries had been emphasized in prewar training,
but they were abandoned early. The subsequent deliveries from medium and high altitudes resulted
in the use of sensors and weapon systems at distances from targets that were not optimal for their
identification, acquisition, or accuracy. Medium- and high-altitude tactics also increased the
exposure of aircraft sensors to man-made and natural impediments to visibility.
A primary goal of our work was to cross-validate the best available data on aircraft and weapon
system performance, both qualitative and quantitative, to test for consistency, accuracy, and
reliability. The data we analyzed in this report are the best information collected during the war.
They were compiled for and used by the commanders who managed the air campaign. These data
also provided the basis for postwar DOD and manufacturer assessments of aircraft and weapon
system performance during «Desert Storm». We balanced the limitations of the data, to the extent
possible, against qualitative analyses of the systems. For example, we compared claims made for
system performance and contributions to what was supportable given all the available data, both
quantitative and qualitative.
Discussion
We collected and analyzed data from a broad range of sources, including the major DOD databases
that document the strike histories of the war and cumulative damage to targets; numerous after-
action and lessons-learned reports from military units that participated in the war; intelligence
reports; analyses performed by DOD contractors; historical accounts of the war from the media and
other published literature; interviews with participants, including more than «Desert Storm» pilots,
key this analysis of the campaign, aircraft, munitions use, and effectiveness benefited from our use
of the most comprehensive strike, BDA data produced from the Persian «Gulf War», a previously
untried methodology to match inputs and outputs on targets; additional qualitative and quantitative
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data obtained from «Desert Storm» veterans, after-action reports to corroborate information in the
primary databases, and our utilization of the results of other «Desert Storm» analyses, such as the
«Gulf War» Air Power Survey.
This study is the first to match available «Desert Storm» strike and BDA data by target and to
attempt to assess the effectiveness of multiple weapon systems across target categories. Despite the
data limitations discussed below, our methodology provided systematic information on how weapon
systems were employed, what level and types of weapons were required to achieve success, and the
relative cost-effectiveness of multiple platforms. The reliability and validity of these findings are
strengthened by our use of interviews, after-action reports, and other «Desert Storm» analyses to
better.
Conclusion
We sought to work around data limitations through qualitative analysis of systems, based on diverse
sources. Claims made for system performance were assessed in light of the most rigorous evaluation
that could be made with the available data. We have explicitly noted data insufficiencies and
uncertainties. Overall, data gaps and inconsistencies made an across-the-board cost-effectiveness
evaluation difficult. However, there were sufficient data either to assess all the major claims made
by DOD for the performance of the major systems studied or to indicate where the data are lacking
to support certain claims. DOD and associated agencies have undertaken initiatives since the war to
address many, but not all, of the limitations of the air campaign that we identified in our summary
and conclusions. We have not analyzed each of these initiatives in this report; however, we briefly
describe those that apply to one or more of our conclusions below.
Acknowledgement
Our analyses of campaign inputs (from the Missions database) and outcomes (from the phase III
reports) against ground targets have limitations of both scope and reliability imposed by constraints
in the primary «Desert Storm» databases. Systematically correlating munition inputs against targets
to outcomes was made highly problematic by the fact that the phase III BDA reports did not provide
a comprehensive compilation of BDA for all strategic targets and could not differentiate the effects
of one system from another on the same target.
References:
1. AUSA Background Brief, Army Equipment Performance in Operation Desert Storm, No. 34,
Arlington, VA, April 1991.
2. AUSA Special Report, Beyond the Cold War: A Global Assessment, 1990, Arlington, VA, 1991.
3. AUSA Special Report, The U.S. Army in Operation Desert Storm: An Overview, Arlington, VA,
June 1991.
4. Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Gulf War Military Lessons Learned: Interim
Report of CSIS Study Group on Lessons Learned from the Gulf War, Washington, DC, July 1991.
5. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress,
Washington, DC, July 1991.
