DISTINCTIVE STRATEGIES: VERTICAL HIERARCHIES' IMPACT ON PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS

Abstract

This study examines the dynamics of product differentiation within competitive markets, focusing on the influence of vertical hierarchies on strategic positioning. By analyzing the strategies employed by firms operating within vertically integrated supply chains, the research investigates how different levels of the production process impact product distinctiveness. Through empirical research and theoretical analysis, this study reveals the varying effects of vertical hierarchies on product differentiation, shedding light on the intricate interplay between strategic choices, market competition, and consumer preferences. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the role vertical integration plays in shaping product offerings and market dynamics.

Journal of Management and Economics
Source type: Journals
Years of coverage from 2021
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CC BY f
01-05
64

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Matteo Pagnozzi. (2023). DISTINCTIVE STRATEGIES: VERTICAL HIERARCHIES’ IMPACT ON PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS. Journal of Management and Economics, 3(09), 01–05. Retrieved from https://inlibrary.uz/index.php/jme/article/view/24487
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Abstract

This study examines the dynamics of product differentiation within competitive markets, focusing on the influence of vertical hierarchies on strategic positioning. By analyzing the strategies employed by firms operating within vertically integrated supply chains, the research investigates how different levels of the production process impact product distinctiveness. Through empirical research and theoretical analysis, this study reveals the varying effects of vertical hierarchies on product differentiation, shedding light on the intricate interplay between strategic choices, market competition, and consumer preferences. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the role vertical integration plays in shaping product offerings and market dynamics.

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