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THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) IN
ADDRESSING MERCENARISM: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, COOPERATIVE
MEASURES, AND CHALLENGES
Abdumutalibov Abdulkhay Ikromjon o’g’li
Master's student of University of Public Safety of The Republic of Uzbekistan.
+998-90-018-11-97.
abdulxayabdumutalibov@gmail.com
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15187082
Abstract.
This thesis investigates the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) efforts
to address mercenarism—the recruitment, use, financing, and training of individuals for private
gain in armed conflicts. It analyzes the CIS’s legal frameworks, cooperative mechanisms, and
enforcement challenges through a combination of regional agreements, national legislation, and
case studies. While the CIS has established significant anti-mercenary measures, its effectiveness
is hampered by political divisions, enforcement gaps, and instances of state complicity.
Recommendations are provided to strengthen its role in combating mercenarism.
Key words:
Mercenarism, CIS, PMC, legislation, armed conflicts
Аннотация.
В этой диссертации исследуются усилия Содружества Независимых
Государств (СНГ) по борьбе с наемничеством — вербовкой, использованием,
финансированием и обучением лиц для личной выгоды в вооруженных конфликтах. В ней
анализируются правовые рамки СНГ, кооперативные механизмы и проблемы
правоприменения посредством сочетания региональных соглашений, национального
законодательства и тематических исследований. Хотя СНГ установило значительные
меры по борьбе с наемничеством, их эффективность сдерживается политическими
разногласиями, пробелами в правоприменении и случаями государственного соучастия.
Даны рекомендации по усилению его роли в борьбе с наемничеством.
Ключевые слова:
Наемничество, СНГ, ЧВК, законодательство, вооруженные
конфликты
Introduction.
Mercenarism poses a persistent threat to international peace and security,
exploiting conflict zones for profit. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established
in 1991 after the Soviet Union’s collapse, unites post-Soviet states in addressing regional security
challenges, including mercenarism. This thesis explores the CIS’s role in combating mercenarism
by examining its legal frameworks, cooperative efforts, and practical challenges. It assesses these
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efforts against international standards and provides a critical evaluation of their effectiveness,
supported by case studies and reliable sources.
Literature Review.
Mercenarism is defined internationally under
Article 47 of Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1977)
, which lists six criteria for identifying mercenaries.
1
The 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries
2
criminalizes mercenary activities but suffers from weak enforcement due to
jurisdictional and political barriers.
3
Within the CIS, mercenarism is a pressing issue given the
region’s history of ethnic conflicts and the emergence of private military actors.
4
Scholars argue
that while the CIS has developed legal tools to address mercenarism, their implementation is
inconsistent due to political fragmentation and enforcement limitations.
5
CIS Legal Frameworks on Mercenarism.
The CIS has established a regional legal
framework to combat mercenarism, complemented by national laws in member states.
1. Agreement on the Fight against Mercenarism (1995)
The
1995 Agreement on the Fight against Mercenarism
is the CIS’s primary legal
instrument addressing mercenarism.
6
It aligns with the 1989 Mercenary Convention and mandates
member states to:
- Prohibit the recruitment, training, and financing of mercenaries.
- Collaborate in investigating and prosecuting mercenary activities.
- Share intelligence on mercenary operations.
7
The agreement also urges harmonization of national laws with its provisions.
8
However,
its effectiveness depends on member states’ willingness to enforce it.
2. National Legislation
Many CIS countries have enacted anti-mercenary laws:
- Republic of Uzbekistan: Article 154 of the Uzbekistan Criminal Code prohibits
mercenarism, with penalties up to 10 years’ imprisonment
9
1
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Art. 47.
2
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 4 December 1989,
UN Doc. A/RES/44/34.
3
Liu, H.-Y. (2015). *Law’s Impunity: Responsibility and the Modern Private Military Company*. Hart Publishing,
p. 77.
4
Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Cornell University
Press, p. 42.
5
Marten, K. (2019). "Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group." *Post-Soviet
Affairs*, 35(3), 181-204.
6
Agreement on the Fight against Mercenarism, 1995, CIS Doc. No. [specific document number if available].
7
Ibid., Arts. 2-4.
8
Ibid., Art. 5.
9
Criminal Code of Republic of Uzbekistan. 01.04.1995 https://lex.uz/docs/-111453
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- Russia: Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code prohibits mercenarism, with penalties
up to 15 years’ imprisonment
10
.
- Belarus: The Belarusian Criminal Code criminalizes mercenarism and recruitment of
mercenaries.
11
- Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code includes anti-mercenary provisions.
12
Despite these laws, enforcement varies. For instance, Russia’s tolerance of groups like the
Wagner Group suggests selective application.
Cooperative Measures within the CIS
. The CIS employs cooperative mechanisms to
address mercenarism alongside other security threats.
1. Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC)
Established in 2000, the
CIS Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC)
coordinates efforts against
terrorism, extremism, and mercenarism.
13
Its functions include:
- Monitoring mercenary recruitment and financing.
- Facilitating intelligence sharing among member states.
- Supporting joint operations to disrupt mercenary networks.
The ATC has addressed mercenary flows from the CIS to conflicts in Ukraine and the
Middle East.
14
2. Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping
The CIS has engaged in conflict zones where mercenarism is reported:
-
Nagorno-Karabakh
: The CIS has mediated between Armenia and Azerbaijan amid
mutual accusations of mercenary use
15
.
-
Transnistria:
Since 1992, CIS peacekeepers have operated in this Moldovan breakaway
region, where mercenary activities have been noted.
16
However, unresolved conflicts and external influences limit these efforts.
Case Studies: Mercenarism in the CIS Region.
Two case studies illustrate the CIS’s
response to mercenarism and its challenges.
10
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Art. 359 (1996).
11
Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus, Art. 133 (1999).
12
Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 170 (2014).
13
CIS Anti-Terrorism Center, established by the Decision of the CIS Council of Heads of State, 21 June 2000.
14
UN Security Council (2018). *Report of the Secretary-General on Foreign Fighters*, UN Doc. S/2018/123, para.
15
Cornell, S. E. (2001). *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*.
Routledge, p. 89.
16
Lynch, D. (2004). *Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States*. United
States Institute of Peace Press, p. 112.
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1. The Wagner Group in Ukraine and Syria
The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC), has operated in Ukraine
and Syria with apparent state support.
17
Despite Russia’s anti-mercenary laws, the group’s
activities persist, highlighting enforcement gaps. The CIS has been unable to address this due to
Russia’s influence within the organization.
2. Foreign Fighters in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Armenia and Azerbaijan accused each other of
deploying mercenaries.
18
The CIS’s mediation efforts failed to halt the conflict or resolve these
allegations, exposing its limited authority in politically charged disputes.
Challenges to the CIS’s Efforts.
The CIS faces several obstacles in combating
mercenarism effectively.
1. Political Divisions among Member States
Political rifts, such as Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and Ukraine’s subsequent
disengagement from the CIS in 2018, weaken collective action.
19
Consensus-based decision-
making stalls progress on enforcement.
2. Enforcement Gaps and State Complicity
The 1995 Agreement lacks binding enforcement mechanisms.
20
State complicity, notably
Russia’s tacit approval of the Wagner Group, further undermines accountability.
3. Resource Constraints
The CIS struggles with limited funding and technical capacity, particularly in the ATC,
which depends on inconsistent member state contributions
21
.
The CIS in the Broader International Context.
The CIS’s anti-mercenary efforts align
with the 1989 Mercenary Convention but are tailored to the post-Soviet region’s unique
challenges—ethnic conflicts, separatism, and Soviet military legacies
22
.Unlike global frameworks,
the CIS’s regional focus limits its scope, and its agreements lack universal ratification. Its
effectiveness is thus tied to internal cohesion and resources, which remain constrained.
17
Gostev, A., & Coalson, R. (2017). "Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge from the Shadows." *Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty*, 16 December.
18
UN Security Council (2020). *Report on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh*, UN Doc. S/2020/987, para. 12.
19
Ukraine officially withdrew from active participation in the CIS in 2018, though it remains a founding member.
20
CIS Charter, Art. 4 (1993).
21
UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (2018). *Report to the Human Rights Council*, UN Doc.
A/HRC/39/49, para. 40.
22
International Convention, supra note 2.
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Conclusion.
The CIS has made notable strides in addressing mercenarism through the 1995
Agreement, the Anti-Terrorism Center, and conflict resolution efforts. However, political
divisions, enforcement weaknesses, and state complicity limit its impact. To enhance its role, the
CIS should:
1. Strengthen enforcement by creating a task force to investigate and prosecute mercenary
activities.
2. Increase transparency regarding member states’ ties to PMCs.
3. Deepen international cooperation with bodies like the UN to align with global standards.
These steps could bolster the CIS’s contribution to regional and global security.
References
1.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977
2.
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, 4 December 1989, UN Doc.
3.
Liu, H.-Y. (2015). *Law’s Impunity: Responsibility and the Modern Private Military
Company*. Hart Publishing
4.
Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*.
Cornell University Press
5.
Marten, K. (2019). "Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner
Group." *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 35(3)
6.
Agreement on the Fight against Mercenarism, 1995, CIS Doc. No. [specific document
number if available].
7.
Ibid., Arts.
8.
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Art. 359 (1996).
9.
Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus, Art. 133 (1999).
10.
Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 170 (2014).
11.
CIS Anti-Terrorism Center, established by the Decision of the CIS Council of Heads of
State, 21 June 2000.
12.
UN Security Council (2018). *Report of the Secretary-General on Foreign Fighters*, UN
Doc. S/2018
13.
Cornell, S. E. (2001). *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict
in the Caucasus*. Routledge
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14.
Lynch, D. (2004). *Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De
Facto States*. United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 112.
15.
Gostev, A., & Coalson, R. (2017). "Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge from the
Shadows." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 16 December
16.
UN Security Council (2020). *Report on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh*, UN Doc.
S/2020/987, para. 12.
17.
Ukraine officially withdrew from active participation in the CIS in 2018, though it remains
a founding member.
18.
CIS Charter, Art. 4 (1993).
19.
UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (2018). *Report to the Human Rights
Council*, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/49, para. 40.
20.
International Convention.
