THE UZBEK BRIDGE: MAPPING ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
AFGHANISTAN POLICY
Fazliddin Djamalov A Research Fellow at
the Center for American Studies within the
Institute for Advanced International Studies
Abstract.
The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 has
not diminished the region’s importance in U.S. foreign policy, as indicated in the
Biden-Harris National Security Strategy 2022. The U.S. aims to balance
ongoing counterterrorism efforts against Al-Qaeda and Islamic State- Khorasan
cells with pragmatic diplomacy, including potential engagement with the Taliban
government. American policy towards Afghanistan will prioritize maintaining
dominance in the face of emerging powers like Russia and China, while shaping
major regional developments. Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan,
are emerging as crucial intermediaries for the United States in its nuanced
approach towards Afghanistan. This approach involves tactical engagement to
address immediate security concerns, alongside diplomatic isolationism to
pressure the Taliban into making concessions regarding human rights and
inclusive governance. The role of Uzbekistan has gained strategic significance
for the United States due to its geographical proximity, shared values and
traditions, and historical involvement in the region. Uzbekistan’s perspective
prioritizes indirect engagement and regional partnerships to advance U.S.
interests in the region, while incorporating Afghanistan into the regional
framework.
Keywords:
Afghanistan, US Foreign Policy, Taliban,
Counterterrorism, Regional Stability, Geopolitical Dynamics, Uzbekistan,
Central Asia, China, Russia
The issue of Afghanistan has remained salient in American foreign policy
owing to its implications for counterterrorism, regional stability, geopolitical
dynamics, and humanitarian concerns. Despite the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Afghanistan in 2021, the region continues to hold importance in U.S.
foreign policy, as reflected in the Biden-Harris National Security Strategy 2022.
The document emphasizes the need to sustain counterterrorism capacity
against Al-Qaeda and Islamic State-Khorasan cells, while also allowing for
potential engagement with the Taliban government. This suggests that the
Biden administration aims to strike a balance between ongoing vigilance and
pragmatic diplomacy
(The White House, 2022).
Furthermore, experts assert
that American foreign policy towards Afghanistan will prioritize maintaining
dominance in the face of emerging powers such as Russia and China, while
shaping major regional developments. According to Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi,
an expert on the Indian Subcontinent & Middle East issues, the United States
will not completely withdraw from Afghanistan because it considers not only the
Afghan issue itself but also other factors like Central Asia, Iran, Russia, the
Uighurs, and China as more important. In essence, the U.S. presence in
Afghanistan is aimed at exerting control over China
(Mollazehi, 2020).
Analysis
by the Washington Post suggests that Beijing may seize the opportunity created
by the dep
arture of Western forces to expedite Afghanistan’s integration into its
Belt and Road Initiative. This expansive transcontinental infrastructure project
aims to enhance China’s economic and political influence across Eurasia.
Meanwhile, Moscow is positioned to increase its influence over Afghanistan and
neighboring Central Asian countries
(Doshi, 2021).
In contrast to these developments, the emerging U.S. policy approach
toward Afghanistan, with the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate in power, involves a
tactical engagement aimed at addressing immediate security concerns,
alongside a diplomatic stance of isolationism to pressure the Taliban into
making concessions regarding human rights and inclusive governance
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(Dobbins, Radin,& Miller, 2022).The
United States appears inclined to use both
incentives and deterrent measures to influence Taliban behavior. However,
miscalculations in this delicate balancing act could lead to unintended
consequences, as excessive isolation runs the risk of pushing the Taliban
closer to American adversaries. The effectiveness of this nuanced approach
remains uncertain due to the complex dynamics at play.In this context, the role
of Uzbekistan has gained strategic significance for the United States. This is
due to its geographical proximity, shared values and traditions, and historical
involvement in the region. The stance of Uzbekistan on the Afghan conflict was
articulated by Abdulaziz Kamilov, the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Uzbek
President. Kamilov emphasized three key points: firstly, acknowledging that the
Afghan crisis cannot be resolved through military means; secondly, recognizing
the importance of integrating Afghanistan as an inseparable component of
Central Asia; and thirdly, underscoring the necessity for a comprehensive
regional and global approach to achieving a peaceful resolution in Afghanistan
(IA Centre, 2021).
In line
with Uzbekistan’s perspective, the American strategy towards
Afghanistan seems to prioritize indirect engagement rather than direct
intervention, with a focus on advancing U.S. interests through regional partners
such as Uzbekistan. According to “The Hindu”, Central Asian countries,
particularly Uzbekistan, targeted by Washington for closer ties, seem inclined
to acknowledge and adapt pragmatically to the new political order led by the
Taliban in Afghanistan
(Haidar, 2021).
These governments, in the absence of
U.S. involvement, issued a joint statement during the October 2021 ten-nation
Moscow summit with the Taliban, advocating for practical engagement with the
group
(Joint Statement of the Participants in the Moscow Format Consultations
on Afghanistan, 2021)
. This indicates a regional consensus on cautiously
integrating the Taliban, with Uzbekistan positioned as a crucial intermediary for
the United States.
In light of this, it is notable that the shift in the U.S. strategy towards
Afghanistan now encourages Central Asian countries to perceive it as an
integral part of the region rather than a separate entity. Previously, the U.S.
treated Central Asia and Afghanistan as distinct entities, but current officials are
striving to incorporate Afghanistan into the regional framework, as
demonstrated by the South Asia-Afghanistan initiative. This change has been
acknowledged by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central
Asia, Alice Wells, who stated, “the significant change is that Afghanistan is now
considered a Central Asian state, and our policies must reflect this reality in
order to support the region’s efforts to achieve the necessary level of
connectivity required by landlocked nations”
(U.S. Department of State,
2020)
Furthermore, some researchers argue that the construction of the Qosh
Tepa Canal can be interpreted as an expression of soft power, aimed at
facilitating the integration process in Central Asia.
Similar to Afghanistan, Uzbekistan holds a significant geostrategic
position due to its potential to facilitate crucial connectivity between Central
Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. In addition to engaging the Taliban in
negotiations, there have been efforts to encourage broader regional
involvement in Afghan development
(UzDaily, 2021).
Events such as the
“Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity” conference in July 2021 and
the “Peace Process, Security Cooperation, and Regional Interaction Forum” in
March 2018 exemplify Uzbekistan’s interest in Afghanistan as a market and a
gateway for communication with other regions, while also serving as a platform
for promoting American interests. During the “Central and South Asia: Regional
Connectivity” conference in Tashkent in July 2021, a new negotiation group for
Afghan settlement was announced, comprising the United States, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Uzbekistan
(Jagran, 2021).
However, due to the rapidly evolving situation in Afghanistan, this American
initiative “did not see the light”. The connectivity initiative can be viewed as part
of the comprehensive U.S. C5+1 project, and Uzbekistan’s participation
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in it reflects an attempt to align its priorities with the interests of global centers
of influence within its multi-vector foreign policy concept. Furthermore, it is
important to consider the arrangements of these conferences as a means for
Tashkent to reclaim its position as a regional initiator and mediator in the
negotiation process concerning Afghanistan, particularly given the current
circumstances in the country.
In comparison to Turkmenistan or Iran, Uzbekistan has maintained a
more reserved approach in its interactions with the Taliban government since
their rise to power in Kabul in August 2021. Unlike other countries in the region,
the official stance of Tashkent refrains from accrediting Taliban diplomats, even
in the role of charge d'affaires. Uzbekistan’s position towards the Taliban
government is characterized by a general attitude, with minimal criticism of their
actions in the media or public discourse within Uzbekistan.This approach bears
similarities to that of the United States, as highlighted by Secretary of State A.
Blinken during his visit to Tashkent in March 2023
(Blinken, 2023).
In an
interview with VOA, Donald Lu, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South
and Central Asia, emphasized that it is premature to consider recognizing the
Taliban. Furthermore, there exists a global agreement involving Moscow,
Beijing, and Iran to refrain from taking such a step
(VOA, 2022).
Uzbekistan’s enhanced focus on Afghanistan aligns seamlessly with its
transition to becoming an export-oriented economy since 2016. President
Mirziyoyev, in his address at the SCO-CSTO summit 2021, emphasized that
Uzbekistan’s primary objective is to create a conducive environment in
Afghanistan that facilitates the implementation of infrastructure, transportation,
and energy projects targeting South Asia and the Middle East
(Mirziyoyev,
2021).
Uzbekista
n’s transportation priorities encompass not only Afghan
projects but also Iranian initiatives. However, the Iranian route presents
challenges due to potential U.S. sanctions. In pursuit of its strategy
to engage Central Asian nations in Afghanistan and est
ablish the “Greater
Central Asia” region, the United States endorses the Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-
Peshawar initiative. This endorsement aligns with Uzbekistan’s transit and
transportation ventures, which aim to counter Russia’s influence in the region.
Moreover, the United States holds a vested interest in maintaining its
influence in the region, particularly concerning its long-term relationships with
China, as outlined in the NSS 2022. China’s primary concern regarding
Afghanistan revolves around ensuring stability and security in Central Asia and
its western provinces. Prominent Chinese leaders, including President Xi
Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, have consistently emphasized the
importance of peace, security, and stability in Afghanistan
(PRC MFA, 2022).
China views the growing instability in northern Afghanistan as an
opportunity for terrorist organizations like the Uyghur East Turkistan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) to expand their influence. China accuses the ETIM of
promoting separatism and carrying out acts of terrorism within its borders.
China’s approach to the Taliban seems to be guided by four main objectives:
ensuring the establishment of a functional government in Afghanistan, securing
its border, eradicating Uyghur militant groups, and safeguarding its investments
and citizens in the region
(Schoff & Xi, 2022).
During the 4th Meeting of
Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan in April 2023, China’s Former Foreign
Minister Qin emphasized the need to enhance regional cooperation on counter-
terrorism, drug control, and refugee management. He stressed the importance
of strengthening border control and collaborating to assist Afghanistan in
developing its counter-terrorism capabilities, with the aim of effectively
combating cross-border terrorist activities and promoting stability
(ANKASAM,
2023).
China, being one of Uzbekistan’s key trade and economic partners, is
utilizing various platforms such as the One Belt One Road initiative and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to advance its interests in
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Afghanistan. The Chinese policy in Central Asia has raised concerns in the
United States, which considers China as the “most significant challenge” to its
national security
(The White House, 2022).
However, Uzbekistan, acting as a
mediator state, highlights the importance of China’s support as a regional power
in promoting stability not only in Afghanistan but also in the wider region. As a
result, during the recent meeting of leaders from SCO member countries in July
2023, it was proposed to resume cooperative efforts and discussions through
the framework of the SCO-Afghanistan contact group
(Kun.uz, 2023).
Given the threats posed by extremist groups such as the Islamic State,
alongside China’s increasing influence and Russia’s desire to maintain its
historical role in the region, close cooperation among the six nations of Central
Asia is imperative. As China and Russia vie for influence in the area, the five
former Soviet republics cannot afford to exclude Afghanistan from their efforts
to establish a regional bloc that would bolster their economic and political
strength, ultimately benefiting their citizens. The extent to which the United
States pursued a long-term perspective with a specific strategy for Afghanistan
is a subject of debate and interpretation. Nevertheless, it is evident that the
situation in Afghanistan remains intricate and uncertain, and the consequences
of the U.S. withdrawal are likely to have significant ramifications for the region
and beyond.
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