The American Journal of Political Science Law and Criminology
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TYPE
Original Research
PAGE NO.
44-49
10.37547/tajpslc/Volume07Issue04-08
OPEN ACCESS
SUBMITED
23 February 2025
ACCEPTED
19 March 2025
PUBLISHED
22 April 2025
VOLUME
Vol.07 Issue04 2025
CITATION
Jamolov Azizjon Nodir oʻgʻli. (2025). Legal regulation of activities of the
qualification boards of judges in foreign countries. The American Journal of
Political Science Law and Criminology, 7(04), 44
–
49.
https://doi.org/10.37547/tajpslc/Volume07Issue04-08
COPYRIGHT
© 2025 Original content from this work may be used under the terms
of the creative commons attributes 4.0 License.
Legal regulation of
activities of the
qualification boards of
judges in foreign countries
Jamolov Azizjon Nodir oʻgʻli
Head of Department of the Supreme Court in Uzbekistan
Abstract:
This article is devoted to the study of the
issues of legal regulation of the activities of qualification
boards of judges in foreign countries. In addition to the
article also studied the experience of advanced foreign
countries and the documents of international
organizations. Furthemore, recommendations have
been developed based on international standards and
experience of foreign countries to improve qualification
boards of judges in Uzbekistan.
Keywords:
Judicial power, qualification boards of
judges, member of qualification board, public
representative, court veteran, Commission on Judicial
Performance.
Introduction:
The independence of the judiciary is the
mainstay of a democratic society, and qualification
boards of judges have a significant role in ensuring this
independence. The study of the legal regulation of the
activities of the qualification boards of judges in
different countries is important in the process of
reforming the judicial system of Uzbekistan.
In Uzbekistan, comprehensive comparative-legal
studies on the legal regulation of the activities
qualification boards of judges have not been sufficiently
studied. In particular, improving the directions of
activities of qualification boards of judges have not been
identified based on international legal standards and
advanced foreign experience in Uzbekistan.
The study of the legal regulation of the activities of
qualification boards of judges in foreign countries and
the development of recommendations for Uzbekistan is
the main goal of the study. The scientific work carries
out the tasks of studying international legal standards,
analyzing the experience of foreign countries,
developing recommendations for Uzbekistan.
The results of the study can be used in the
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The American Journal of Political Science Law and Criminology
implementation of judicial reforms in Uzbekistan, in
particular in the improvement of legal acts which
regulating the qualification boards of judges.
Literature analysis
Many scholars studied about the activities of the
qualification boards of judges or the bodies exercising
some of its powers. In particular, S.Shetreet and
C.Forsyth’s scientific work which is titled “the Culture
of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and
Practical Challenges” argues that the qualification
boards of judges are one of the main institutions for
ensuring the independence of the judiciary [1]. The
authors analyzed in depth the issue of the proportion
of judges in the composition of the qualification boards
of judges, justifying the need for judges to make up at
least half of composition of qualification boards of
judges.
N.Garoupa and T.Ginsburg studied in his research,
“Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence”, comparing models of Judicial Councils
and qualification boards of judges in different states
[2]. They distinguish two main models that differ from
each other according to the composition and
competence of the qualification boards of judges: the
Southern European model (Italy, France, and Spain)
and the Northern European model (Sweden,
Denmark). While the first model refers power with
broad powers and whose composition is primarily
composed with judges while the second model refers
with limited powers and relatively little proportion of
judges in their composition.
M.Bobek and D.Kosar published “Global Solutions,
Local Damages: a Critical Study in Judicial Councils in
Central and Eastern Europe”, a critical analysis of the
activities of Judicial Councils and qualification boards
of judges in Central and Eastern European states [3].
The authors argue that in post-soviet states Judicial
Councils and qualification boards of judges which
organized by European standards do not always give
the expected result, the effectiveness of the activities
of these institutions largely depends on national legal
cultures and traditions.
From Russian scientists Y.Trofimov [4], A.Kashina [5],
Y.Burdina [6], N.Smirnova [7], Y.Pereplesninas [8]
studied some issues of the activities of the bodies of
the judicial community, their constitutional legal
framework, the role of these bodies in the
independence of the judicial system and the
competence of the judges.
From Uzbek scholars D.Aripov scientifically studied
issues of the formation of the composition of the
qualification boards of judges, the re-election of
members and the inclusion of public representatives in
its composition and the determination of criteria for
candidates for membership in his dissertation [9].
J.Abdurakhmankhojayev analyzed the legal foundations
of the activities of the qualification boards of judges and
covered its concept, essence, status and system in
scientific and practical terms. At the same time, while he
proposed to improve the requirements for candidates
for membership in the qualification boards, the
organizational and legal framework for their selection,
formation, election, suspension of authority and early
release [10], M.Mamasiddikov, A.Otajonov [11],
E.Sabirovs [12] are revealed analysis and prospects of
public control over the activities of the judiciary, the
procedural
features
of
the
participation
of
representatives of civil society institutions in the
consideration of cases in court.
A number of studies have also been conducted by
international organizations on the activities of the
qualification boards judges. In particular, in the opinion
set “On Judicial Councils” No. 10 prepared by the
Advisory Council of Judges (CCJE) of the Council of
Europe, the role of Judicial Councils and qualification
boards of judges in ensuring the independence of the
judiciary is analyzed in depth, which states that
members should reflect as much diversity in society as
possible [13].
Another of the most important documents on judicial
independence within the Council of Europe is the
“European Charter on the Status of Judges”, adopted on
8 July 1998. Paragraph 1.3 of this charter establishes
that judges must make up at least half of the
composition of the qualification boards (or similar
bodies) of judges [14]. This requirement aimed at the
implementation of the principle of
self-government of judges.
The Council of Europe’s
report “On the Independence of
the Judicial System” which is prepared by the European
Commission for Democracy through Law also explored
various aspects of the activities of the judicial
competence boards [15].
METHODOLOGY
This scientific article uses methods of comparative-legal,
logical, systematic, historical-legal, functional approach,
statistical analysis. Documents of national and foreign
countries and international organizations were studied,
scientific literature and information on internet
resources were analyzed, and relevant proposals and
recommendations were made.
RESULTS
According to the results of the analysis, the composition
of the qualification boards of judges is formed various
way in different states. However, international
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standards recommend that judges make up at least
50% of the mambers. Among the countries that fully
follow this recommendation are France, Russia, and
Ukraine. In France, for example, the Supreme
magisterial Council is the div that adjudicates
questions of judicial selection, appointment, and
disciplinary liability, and contains two contents - one of
them competent with respect to judges and another
one competent with respect to prosecutors. The
competent composition includes five judges and one
prosecutor, in addition to the President of the Republic
and the minister of justice, one member appointed by
the State Council and three persons who do not belong
to either Parliament or the judicial system are
appointed by the President of the Republic, the
Speaker of National Assembly and Chairperson of
Senate.
The composition of the Supreme magisterial Council,
authorized in relation to judges, makes proposals for
the appointment of judges of the court of Cassation,
first Presidents of the courts of Appeal and Presidents
of the courts of High instance. The remaining judges
appointed with a positive opinion of the Council. It
makes decisions as a disciplinary board of judges. The
composition of the Supreme magisterial Council, which
is competent in relation to judges, makes decisions as
the Disciplinary Council of judges.
It is possible to appeal to the Council of state (Conseil
D'état) Within 2 months of the decisions of the
Supreme magisterial Council as a disciplinary panel.
The mechanism of this appeal is administrative-legal
control. There is no direct appellate mechanism for
judges’ recommendations for appointment, because
the final decision made by the President or the minister
of Justice [16].
According to Article 11 of the law “On the bodies of the
judicial community”of
the Russian Federation, the
Supreme qualification boards of judges is formed in a
composition of 29 members. In this case, from the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 4 judges,
from district arbitration courts 2 judges, from
arbitration appellate courts 2 judges, from the
Supreme Courts of the Republics, territories, regional
courts, courts of cities of federal significance,
autonomous regional court and autonomous district
courts 4 judges, from the arbitration courts of the
subjects of the Russian Federation 3 judges, from the
district military courts 3 judges, totally 18 members of
the Supreme qualification board of judges elect by the
Congress of judges. Also, representatives of the public
(10 person) appointed by the Federation Council of the
Federal Assembly and the representative of the
president (1 member) appointed by the President [17].
It can be seen that judges make up 62% of the
composition of the Supreme qualification board of
judges in Russia (18 out of 29 members are judges).
The main tasks of the qualification boards of judges are
select candidates for the position of a judge,
recommend them to the relevant authorities, give
qualification degrees to judges, and solve the issues of
disciplinary prosecution of judges.
Judges can appeal the decisions of the qualification
boards of judges to the Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation within 10
days, and on the decisions of the Supreme Court
Disciplinary Board can be appealed to the Presidium of
the Supreme Court in appellate order.
In Ukraine, according to Article 94 of the law of the
Republic of Ukraine “On the structure of the court and
the status of judges” sixteen members can electe to the
Supreme qualification Commission of judges. They
should be citizens of Ukraine; the candidate must have
higher legal education and experience of professional
activity in the field of law for at least fifteen years. In the
Supreme qualification Commission of judges, the
following elect (appointed):
1) at the Congress of judges of Ukraine eight
commissioners from among judges who have at least
ten years of seniority in the position of judge or who
have resigned;
2) At the Congress of representatives of legal higher
educational institutions and scientific institutions - two
members of the commission;
3) At the Congress of lawyers of Ukraine - two members
of the commission;
4) Two members of the commission - from non-judges
by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’s Human Rights
representative;
5) Two members appoint by the chairperson of the state
judicial administration of Ukraine from among non-
judicial persons.
There are two chambers within Supreme qualification
Commission of judges. Each chamber includes eight
commissioners. The term of member of the Supreme
qualification Commission of judges is four years from
the date of election (appointment). The same person
cannot exercise his authority for two consecutive terms.
A member of the Supreme qualification Commission of
judges, who is a judge or civil servant, retains the
position, status and place of work during the exercise of
powers. Members of the Supreme qualification
Commission of judges cannot carry out Justice.
According to Article 95 of the law, the Supreme
qualification Commission of judges is competent if at
least eight members elected to its composition.
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The Commission performs tasks such as selecting
candidates for the position of Judge, assessing their
qualifications,
conducting
qualification
exams,
recommending candidates for judge. In addition, the
Commission will review the complaints received over
the judges and may bring them to disciplinary
responsibility. Judges can appeal to the Court above
the decision of the Supreme qualification Commission
of judges [18].
However, in some countries, the proportion of judges
in the qualification boards of judges less than 50
percent. For example, in some states of the United
States, judges make up 30-40 percent of the
composition of the qualification boards. In particular,
the state of California qualification boards of judges
–
The Commission on Judicial Performance, established
in 1960, is the independent state agency responsible
for investigating complaints of judicial misconduct and
judicial incapacity and for disciplining judges, pursuant
to article VI, section 18 of the California Constitution.
The commission’s jurisdiction includes all judges of
California’s superior courts and the justices of the
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. The commission
also has jurisdiction over former judges for conduct
prior to retirement or resignation. Additionally, the
commission shares authority with the superior courts
for the oversight of court commissioners and referees.
The Director-Chief Counsel of the commission
designate as the Supreme Court’s investigator for
complaints involving the judges of the State Bar Court.
The commission does not have authority over federal
judges, judges pro tem or private judges. In addition to
its disciplinary function, the commission is responsible
for handling judges’ applications for disability
retirement.
The commission’s authority is limited to investigating
allegations of judicial misconduct and, if warranted,
imposing discipline. Judicial misconduct usually
involves conduct in conflict with the standards set
forth in the Code of Judicial Ethics. The commission
cannot change a decision made by any judicial officer;
this is a function of the state’s appellate courts. After
investigation and in some cases a public hearing, the
commission may impose sanctions ranging from
confidential discipline to removal from office.
The CJP has its own balanced composition that intend
fully cover the judicial system, the law Corps and the
interests of the public. The CJP consists of
11 members. Particularly, the Supreme Court of
California appoints three judges. They must operate in
California’s courts of varying degrees –
the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or the district courts. The
California Bar Association appoints two lawyers who
are required to have a license in the state of California
and have at least 10 years of practical experience.
Various branches of government appoint the six public
representatives that make up a large part of the
Comission. In particular, two by the Governor, another
two by the Senate committee, and the other two by the
speaker of the Assembly appoints. Representatives of
the public should be citizens of California who do not
have a legal education.
CJP members serve four-year terms, and one person
may serve as a jury member for a maximum of two
terms. An important aspect is that all members operate
for free (voluntary basis) with only the official expenses
covered.
The main duties of the board include handling
complaints arising from the activities of the judges,
verifying the conduct of the judges and, if necessary,
taking disciplinary action. The disciplinary actions the
CJP sees can vary depending on the level
–
from warning
and reprimand to public condemnation, to a certain
period of demotion, and even to the recommendation
to be removed from office altogether. Such powers
allow the CJP to play an important role in maintaining
the validity and prestige of the judicial system.
CJP conducts its activities based on a clearly defined
procedure. This process begins with the adoption of
complaints and includes the stages of preliminary
examination, if necessary, formal examination,
conducting appropriate hearings and decision-making.
The basic principles of the CJP’s activities are review of
complaints, giving the judge the opportunity to defend
himself, impartiality, and the acceptance of decisions by
a majority vote [19].
The California CJP had handled more than 1,424
complaints in 2023, of which 111 had a preliminary
investigation, with disciplinary action in 34 cases. In
2024, it had heard more than 1,715 complaints, of which
115 had a preliminary investigation, with disciplinary
action in 29 cases [20].
The CJP disciplinary decisions may be appealed for
review to the California Supreme Court within 30 days.
In cases of the judge is alerted or fined, he or she has
the right to request a review. However, cases
automatically heard by the California Supreme Court
when CJP made decisions about removing or forcing
resignation. In this case, the California Supreme Court
may amend, overturn, or leave decisions in force.
In general, CJP is an important element of the self-
control mechanism of the judicial system, which serves
to build confidence in justice by ensuring that the CJP
complies with high moral and professional standards.
DISCUSSION
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By international standards, it is recommendation that
judges make up
50 percent at least the composition of the qualification
boards. This recommendation developed in order to
ensure the principle of self-government of the
judiciary. However, according to the results of the
study, it is obvious that several states have not fully
implemented this recommendation.
In terms of ensuring the independence of the judiciary,
the high proportion of judges in the board is positive
case. However, according to some scholars, the
excessive proportion of judges in the board can lead to
the closure of the judicial system and the protection of
the “corporate interests” of judges [21].
For this reason, it is advisable that the board consists
of law professors, lawyers and representatives of civil
society, as well as judges. This makes it possible to
achieve balance in the activities of the board and take
into account various points of view.
The scope of competence of boards is vary in different
countries. In some states, the courts are concerned
only with matters of judicial selection and
appointment, while in other states they have broad
powers (judicial selection, appointment, qualification
assessment, qualification level awarding, disciplinary
prosecution, etc).
It is important to ensure balance in determining the
scope of the powers of the board. On the one hand, the
granting of broad powers to the board makes it
possible to ensure the independence of the judiciary.
On the other hand, too broad a board’s powers can
lead to a violation of the principle of separation of
powers and the expulsion of the board from control
[22].
Therefore, legislatives should take into account the
features of the national legal system, the traditions of
the judiciary and the peculiarities in the public
administration system when determining the scope of
the powers of the boards.
Mechanisms for revising board decisions play an
important role in ensuring the independence of the
judiciary. According to the results of the study, these
mechanisms organized differently in different states.
The most effective mechanism is the presence of an
opportunity to appeal the decisions of the board to the
court. This mechanism allows independent control
over the activities of the board [23].
However, caution is necessary in introducing the
mechanism of judicial review, because this situation
should not become a means of interfering with the
activities of the board and limiting its independence
[24].
Based on the study of international standards and
advanced foreign experience, the following proposals
developed to improve the activities of qualification
boards of judges in Uzbekistan:
To introduce the procedure for the election by the
Congress of judges of the Supreme qualification boards
of judges for a term of five years in a composition
consisting of the chairman, deputy chairman and
twenty-three members of the jury, including judges of
the courts of each branch, as well as representatives of
the public and veterans of the judicial system;
Set up requirements like age, legal, judicial and general
experience for candidates for membership of
qualification boards of judges;
To introduce separate quotas for the membership of
female judges in order to ensure the gender balance of
the qualification boards of judges;
Development of the legal framework for the inclusion of
foreign experts in the membership of the qualification
boards of judges;
To create the legal framework for the exemption from
the performance of justice and the maintenance of the
position and salary, when a member of the board
performs duties on the qualification board;
It is advisable to establish rules that the qualification
boards of judges can be elected by secret ballot, the
member of the lower board cannot be a member of the
Supreme qualification boards of judges, and the judge
cannot be elected for the position of Chairman and
deputy chairman of the board for more than two
consecutive terms.
The implementation of these proposals will serve to
ensure the independence of the judicial system in
Uzbekistan, improve the qualifications of judges and
strengthen confidence in the judicial system.
The results of the study can be used in the
implementation of reforms of the judicial system in
Uzbekistan, in particular in the process of improving the
activities of the qualification boards of judges. The
developed recommendations serve as the basis for the
development of the law of Uzbekistan “Judicial
Community Bodies”, which is expected to be adopted,
and for the improvement of the regulation “On the
qualification boards of judges”.
In the future, it is advisable to conduct a deeper study
of the main areas of legal status and activity of the
qualification boards of judges, the scope of powers, the
procedure for making decisions (conclusions), the issues
of ensuring transparency and the introduction of
modern information technologies and the prospects for
improving legislation and practice in the field.
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