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LEGAL BARRIERS TO DEVELOPING NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
Sayidkomil Ibodullaev
Lecturer at “Private International Law”
Department of the Tashkent State University of Law
siresearchuz@gmail.com
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16949714
Introduction
The global energy landscape is undergoing a profound transformation,
driven by the dual imperatives of decarbonisation and energy security. As
countries seek to diversify their energy portfolios and reduce reliance on fossil
fuels, nuclear power has re-emerged as a viable low-carbon option. According to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as of 2024 there are 412
operational nuclear power reactors worldwide, with an additional 59 under
construction. Significantly, several of these new builds are located in emerging
economies, including Bangladesh, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Arab
Emirates—countries that have historically relied on imported hydrocarbons.
Yet the promise of nuclear energy for emerging economies is tempered by
an array of legal, regulatory, and institutional barriers. The establishment of
nuclear infrastructure is not merely an engineering challenge; it is
fundamentally a legal and governance endeavour. Unlike most other forms of
energy generation, nuclear power requires a complex interplay of national
legislation, international treaty obligations, regulatory competence, and
compliance with global safety, security, and non-proliferation norms. The failure
to adequately address these legal prerequisites can lead to project delays, cost
escalations, and even the cancellation of entire programmes.
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyse the principal legal
barriers that impede the development of nuclear infrastructure in emerging
economies, drawing on recent case studies and the evolving international legal
framework. The discussion integrates comparative perspectives, highlighting
lessons learned from both successful and stalled nuclear programmes.
1. The International Legal Framework: Obligations and Entry Barriers
Emerging economies aspiring to launch nuclear power programmes must
first navigate the web of binding international treaties and conventions that
constitute the backbone of the global nuclear governance system. Chief among
these is the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
,
which establishes the fundamental obligation for non-nuclear-weapon states to
refrain from developing nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards. For
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emerging economies, accession to and compliance with the NPT is a
precondition for securing nuclear technology transfers from supplier states, as
stipulated by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines
.
In parallel, the
Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994)
obliges contracting
parties to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to
govern the safety of nuclear installations. This includes setting up an
independent regulatory authority, enacting licensing procedures, and ensuring
transparency and public communication in the event of incidents. For many
emerging economies, meeting these obligations requires overhauling existing
legal systems, which may lack specialised nuclear legislation or trained judicial
and regulatory personnel.
The legal requirements are not confined to safety and non-proliferation.
The
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986)
and the
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency (1986)
impose obligations for international cooperation in
emergencies. Additionally, liability regimes under the
Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963, as amended 1997)
or the
Paris
Convention (1960, as amended 2004)
demand that states designate a single
operator to bear exclusive and strict liability for nuclear damage and provide
adequate financial security. For resource-constrained economies, meeting the
minimum financial security requirements—often set at several hundred million
SDRs—can be prohibitive without substantial state backing or international
guarantees.
These conventions and instruments, while essential for ensuring nuclear
safety and security, collectively establish a formidable entry barrier for
emerging economies. The legal obligations they impose are not merely
formalities; they necessitate structural reforms in governance, substantial
budgetary commitments, and enduring political consensus.
2. National Legislative and Regulatory Challenges
While adherence to the international legal framework is a necessary
condition for developing nuclear infrastructure, it is not, in itself, sufficient. The
effective translation of treaty obligations into coherent national legislation and a
robust regulatory framework remains one of the most significant hurdles for
emerging economies. This challenge is compounded by the fact that nuclear law
is highly specialised, intersecting with areas such as environmental law,
administrative law, maritime law, and even constitutional principles of
governance.
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A recurring barrier is the
absence of comprehensive nuclear legislation
at the national level. In many emerging economies, the initial stages of nuclear
planning occur under a fragmented set of laws—often a mixture of outdated
radiation protection statutes, environmental codes, and industrial safety
regulations. Without an integrated nuclear law, responsibilities between
ministries, regulators, and operators can become blurred, leading to procedural
delays and jurisdictional disputes. For example, prior to 2018, Egypt’s nuclear
activities were regulated primarily through general energy laws and radiation
safety provisions. It was only with the enactment of Law No. 7 of 2010,
subsequently amended, that Egypt established a dedicated Nuclear and
Radiological Regulatory Authority (ENRRA) with a clear mandate over licensing,
inspections, and enforcement. The delay in creating a fully empowered regulator
contributed to a slow progression from feasibility studies to actual construction
of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant.
The
independence of the regulatory authority
is another crucial factor.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety explicitly requires that the div regulating
nuclear safety be functionally separate from entities responsible for the
promotion or operation of nuclear power. Yet in several emerging economies,
regulatory bodies are placed under the same ministry that oversees energy
policy or nuclear project development. This institutional arrangement, while
often justified as a means of streamlining decision-making, can undermine
public trust and raise questions about compliance with international norms.
Turkey’s establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NDK) in 2018
marked a significant step towards institutional independence, but critics have
noted that some of its oversight functions remain intertwined with the Ministry
of Energy and Natural Resources, which also promotes the Akkuyu Nuclear
Power Plant project.
Licensing procedures
for nuclear installations pose additional legal and
administrative challenges. In established nuclear states, licensing is a multi-
stage process—typically covering site approval, construction permits, and
operating licences—each supported by detailed safety assessments,
environmental impact studies, and public consultations. Emerging economies
often lack both the procedural infrastructure and the technical expertise to carry
out such comprehensive reviews in a timely manner. Bangladesh’s experience
with the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant illustrates this point: while the
Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA) successfully issued
construction licences with Russian technical support, the process required
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significant external assistance from the IAEA and Rosatom specialists,
highlighting the dependency risks that can arise from limited domestic capacity.
Another barrier lies in the
integration of environmental and nuclear
legal regimes
. Large-scale infrastructure projects in emerging economies are
generally subject to environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements.
However, nuclear projects require additional layers of safety assessment, often
governed by separate legal frameworks. The failure to harmonise these
processes can lead to duplication, inconsistencies, and litigation. For instance, in
South Africa—an emerging economy with advanced nuclear ambitions—
conflicts between environmental approval procedures and nuclear licensing
timelines have previously delayed progress on new reactor proposals.
These domestic legal and institutional challenges are not insurmountable,
but they require political commitment, sustained investment in capacity-
building, and, often, targeted legislative reform. Countries that have advanced
more smoothly, such as the United Arab Emirates with its Barakah Nuclear
Power Plant, have done so by enacting comprehensive nuclear laws at an early
stage, establishing an independent regulator (the Federal Authority for Nuclear
Regulation, FANR), and embedding international best practices into domestic
procedures.
3. Financing, Liability, and Investment Protection: The Legal
Dimension
Even when emerging economies succeed in establishing a compliant
national legal and regulatory framework, the question of
how to finance
nuclear infrastructure
often becomes the most formidable barrier. Nuclear
power plants are capital-intensive projects with long lead times and payback
periods extending over decades. According to the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
(NEA), the overnight cost of a conventional large-scale nuclear reactor can range
from USD 5,000 to 8,000 per kilowatt of installed capacity, meaning that even a
relatively modest 1 GW plant may require an initial investment of USD 5–8
billion. For many emerging economies, such financial commitments are beyond
the capacity of domestic budgets and require foreign investment, export credit
arrangements, or build-own-operate (BOO) models with external vendors.
These financing arrangements inevitably intersect with the
international
and domestic legal regimes on nuclear liability
. Most advanced nuclear
vendor countries are parties to either the Vienna or Paris Conventions on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage, or to the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). These instruments impose strict and
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exclusive liability on the nuclear operator, require financial security (often in the
range of hundreds of millions of Special Drawing Rights), and channel all claims
to the jurisdiction where the incident occurs. While these rules aim to protect
the public and ensure swift compensation, they present complex challenges for
emerging economies hosting nuclear projects financed and operated, at least
initially, by foreign entities.
The BOO model, exemplified by Turkey’s Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant,
where the Russian state corporation Rosatom is both the investor and the
operator, illustrates these complexities. Under Turkish law, Akkuyu Nuclear A.Ş.
is designated as the liable operator, but the plant is majority-owned and
controlled by a foreign entity. This arrangement required careful drafting of
intergovernmental agreements to ensure compliance with the Paris Convention
and Turkish domestic liability laws, while also addressing cross-border
enforcement of potential compensation awards. For states without prior
experience in nuclear liability law, such arrangements necessitate
comprehensive legislative reform before contracts can be finalised.
Financing and liability considerations are further complicated by
investment protection and dispute settlement mechanisms
. Large nuclear
projects typically involve long-term contracts between the host state and foreign
investors, often supported by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or investment
chapters in free trade agreements. These instruments can give foreign investors
access to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, such as
arbitration under the ICSID Convention or UNCITRAL Rules. While this can
provide security for investors, it also creates potential exposure for host states
to substantial arbitral awards in the event of regulatory changes, project delays,
or disputes over liability following an incident.
Emerging economies must therefore reconcile two competing imperatives:
on the one hand, the need to offer investors legal certainty, strong contractual
protections, and dispute resolution avenues; on the other, the need to retain
sovereign control over nuclear safety, security, and environmental regulation.
Striking this balance is legally intricate. For example, Egypt’s intergovernmental
agreement with Russia for the El Dabaa plant reportedly includes provisions
that prioritise compliance with Egyptian nuclear safety laws, even in the event of
contractual disputes—an approach that aims to shield sovereign regulatory
authority while still attracting foreign investment.
A further challenge lies in ensuring that nuclear liability laws are
compatible with investment treaties. If compensation limits under domestic
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liability regimes are perceived as inadequate by affected investors or
contractors in the event of an incident, they may seek recourse through ISDS,
potentially circumventing the liability framework envisaged by international
nuclear conventions. This tension underscores the importance of integrating
liability, financing, and investment protection considerations into a unified legal
strategy at the earliest stages of project negotiation.
4. Human Capital, Institutional Capacity, and the Rule of Law
Beyond the formal architecture of treaties, legislation, and contractual
arrangements, the development of nuclear infrastructure in emerging
economies is profoundly dependent on the availability of
qualified human
capital
and the maturity of
institutional capacity
. The law, no matter how well-
crafted, is only as effective as the institutions and individuals responsible for its
interpretation, enforcement, and day-to-day application. In the nuclear sector,
where safety and compliance are paramount, deficits in expertise can become de
facto legal barriers, delaying or even derailing projects.
One of the principal challenges is the
shortage of specialised legal and
regulatory professionals
with a deep understanding of nuclear law, safety
standards, and international obligations. Many emerging economies entering the
nuclear field have robust general legal systems but lack practitioners familiar
with the intricacies of the Vienna or Paris Conventions, the IAEA Safety
Standards Series, or the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. This scarcity
extends to the judiciary, where judges may have no prior experience
adjudicating cases involving nuclear safety, liability, or environmental impacts.
Without targeted capacity-building, even the most sophisticated laws risk
inconsistent application or weak enforcement.
The
independence and authority of regulatory institutions
are equally
critical. A regulator may exist in law but lack the operational capacity to carry
out effective oversight—whether due to inadequate staffing, insufficient
technical resources, or lack of enforcement powers. The IAEA’s Integrated
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) missions frequently highlight such gaps
during peer reviews. For example, early IRRS assessments in newcomer
countries like Jordan and Kenya identified the need to expand technical
expertise, improve inspection protocols, and strengthen legal authority to
impose penalties for non-compliance. These recommendations illustrate that
institutional shortcomings can directly undermine legal compliance, creating
vulnerabilities in safety and public confidence.
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The
rule of law environment
in the host state also plays a decisive role.
Nuclear projects are inherently long-term endeavours, with operational
lifespans of 40–60 years or more. Investors and technology suppliers must be
assured that regulatory decisions will be consistent, transparent, and free from
arbitrary political interference. Weaknesses in judicial independence, corruption
risks, or opaque administrative procedures can erode confidence, making it
harder for emerging economies to secure financing or attract reputable
technology partners. The experience of some states with delayed or stalled
nuclear projects due to shifting political priorities—sometimes accompanied by
retrospective legislative changes—underscores how instability in the legal
environment can be as damaging as technical shortcomings.
Moreover, the integration of nuclear law with broader
governance
frameworks for safety culture
is an often-overlooked factor. IAEA guidance
emphasises that safety culture—defined as the assembly of characteristics and
attitudes in organisations and individuals that prioritise nuclear safety—must
be embedded not only in operating organisations but also in regulatory bodies.
Where institutional culture tolerates regulatory shortcuts or lacks robust
internal accountability, the formal legal framework may fail to function
effectively.
Addressing these human and institutional capacity barriers requires
sustained commitment to education, training, and professional exchange.
Initiatives such as the IAEA’s Nuclear Law Institute, bilateral capacity-building
agreements, and academic programmes in nuclear law and policy can help
create a new generation of legal and regulatory professionals in emerging
economies. However, such efforts must be complemented by governance
reforms that entrench judicial independence, transparency, and accountability,
ensuring that the legal framework for nuclear energy remains credible and
resilient over the long term.
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The development of nuclear infrastructure in emerging economies is as
much a legal challenge as it is an engineering and financial one. The complex
web of international obligations, domestic legislative requirements, liability
regimes, financing structures, and institutional capacity constraints collectively
shapes the feasibility and sustainability of nuclear projects. While the benefits of
nuclear power—low-carbon baseload energy, energy security, and potential
economic development—are well documented, the legal barriers outlined in this
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paper demonstrate that success depends on a carefully sequenced and
integrated approach to law and governance.
At the
international level
, compliance with core treaties such as the NPT,
the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the Vienna or Paris Conventions on
liability is non-negotiable. However, these frameworks, designed primarily for
established nuclear states, can present steep entry requirements for newcomers.
Emerging economies must adopt proactive legal and policy measures to
internalise these obligations early in the project lifecycle, ideally before
significant contractual commitments are made.
Domestically, the establishment of a
comprehensive, coherent, and
enforceable nuclear law
—coupled with an independent, well-resourced
regulator—is the cornerstone of a credible nuclear programme. Fragmented
legal regimes, overlapping jurisdictions, and weak enforcement powers are
liabilities that will surface during IAEA peer reviews and can delay or undermine
project implementation. Countries that have succeeded in advancing their
nuclear programmes, such as the UAE, demonstrate the importance of legislating
early, integrating best practices, and institutionalising regulatory independence.
Financing and liability frameworks must be
aligned and mutually
reinforcing
. Host states need to ensure that nuclear liability legislation meets
international standards while balancing the need to attract foreign investment
through robust contractual and treaty-based protections. This requires early
integration of liability rules into project agreements, careful drafting to avoid
conflicts between domestic laws and investor-state dispute settlement
provisions, and, where possible, securing sovereign guarantees or multilateral
support to meet financial security obligations.
Institutional capacity and human capital development are not ancillary
issues; they are central to the viability of nuclear infrastructure. Without skilled
legal professionals, independent regulators, and a judiciary capable of
interpreting and enforcing nuclear law, the formal legal framework risks
becoming a paper exercise. Capacity-building programmes, academic
partnerships, and long-term professional development must be embedded in
nuclear policy from the outset.
Policy Recommendations
arising from this analysis include:
1.
Early legal alignment
with international nuclear safety, security,
and liability regimes, supported by IAEA peer review services before major
contractual commitments.
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2.
Enactment of dedicated nuclear legislation
that consolidates
safety, security, safeguards, and liability provisions, coupled with a mandate for
regulatory independence.
3.
Integration of financing and liability arrangements
into a single
legal strategy to avoid conflicts between contractual obligations and public law
requirements.
4.
Capacity-building initiatives
targeting regulators, judiciary, and
legal practitioners, leveraging IAEA programmes and bilateral technical
assistance.
5.
Governance reforms
to strengthen rule of law, transparency, and
public trust in nuclear decision-making.
If these measures are implemented in a coordinated manner, emerging
economies can significantly reduce the legal risks and uncertainties associated
with nuclear infrastructure, thereby enhancing their prospects for safe, secure,
and sustainable nuclear power deployment
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