ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
196
GRAND STRATEGY AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS IN THE TRUMP ERA.
Mashrabov Doston Dilmurodjon ugli
Master’s Student, Faculty of International Relations,
The University of World Economy and Diplomacy,
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17007682
Abstract:
Grand strategy has long been the framing blueprint for U.S.
foreign policy, enabling Washington to mobilize national power, maintain
alliances, and guide the international order. Though commonly regarded as
continuity from one government to the next, the Trump era placed both
durability and contestation for American grand strategy in relief. Trump’s
“America First” policy rebranded the engagement-restraint balance, transiting
America’s policy from institutionalized liberal internationalism to transactional
realism and selective retrenchment. This essay examines grand strategy as a
theoretical framework to understand the U.S. foreign policy under Trump’s
administration, drawing reference to competing schools of “deep engagement”
and “offshore balancing.” It argues that Trump’s regime was not doctrinal chaos
or complete rupture but rather a rebalanced reaction to the extended strategic
controversies. In his emphasis on sovereignty, military strength, and burden-
sharing, Trump contravened the post-World War II liberal order while,
simultaneously, reasserting traditional features of U.S. primacy such as deterring
competition and regional leadership. Positioning Trump’s policies within deeper
grand strategic legacies, this study illustrates that structural compulsion of
international politics constrains even populist and unorthodox leaders. Last but
not least, the Trump era underscores the strength of American grand strategy in
a dynamic multipolar world, but raises concerns about the longevity of U.S.
leadership of the liberal order.
Key words:
Grand Strategy, U.S. Foreign Policy, America Firs, Liberal
International Order, Deep Engagement, Offshore Balancing, Trump
Administration.
Grand strategy relies on long-term tools of national power that survive
temporary political systems. Central to this strategy is the cultivation of
enduring alliances and bilateral defense commitments, which are multipliers of
American power abroad. Central, too, is the maintenance of an effective nuclear
deterrent, which enables the United States to discourage enemies from
entertaining existential threats. A grand strategy also requires a well-diversified
ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
197
and adaptable military, one capable of projecting power across different
domains and sustaining operations in distant places while remaining capable of
winning in combat
1
. Systems for intelligence are also necessary because they
enable strategic foresight and give early notice of emerging threats
2
. These
security pillars are based on broader societal foundations: a strong economy, an
advanced technological base, a human resource base with expertise developed
to assist the country, and an industrial base that remains on alert at times of
crisis. Most critically, the continuity of American grand strategy is embedded in
its political order—founded upon liberal democratic principles—which allows it
to formulate long-lasting policies and allocate resources in ways that secure
long-term national interests.
The grand strategy of the United States can be described as a long-term
national resource’s mobilization framework with a focus on driving core
interests
3
. What constitutes U.S. grand strategy is therefore subject to shifting
national interest definitions. Among the available arguments among scholars,
two dominant approaches are apparent: “deep engagement” and “offshore
balancing.” Supporters of deep engagement, for instance, G. John Ikenberry,
contend that America functions best and most securely as a dominant power in
maintaining the liberal international order. Despite the expense and constraints
of multilateralism, they oppose that this policy grows disproportionate benefits
to Washington by keeping the world in an organized manner, which endorses
U.S. leadership
4
.
Offshore balancers like John Mearsheimer, however, propose a more usual
vision. They see deep engagement as a Cold War relic that is no longer relevant
to the challenges of our time. Offshore balancing prioritizes limiting American
military involvement in abroad by concentrating on reviving the nation at home
and rebuilding America’s status globally. Its two main goals are to reduce the
likelihood of getting involved in a great power war and to maximize the relative
power of the United States in a multipolar world
5
.
1
Brooks, S. G., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2016).
America abroad: The United States’ global role in the 21st century
. Oxford
University Press.
2
Jentleson, B. W. (2014).
American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century
(5th ed.). W. W. Norton
& Company.
3
Brands, H. (2014).
What good is grand strategy? Power and purpose in American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to
George W. Bush
. Cornell University Press.
4
Ikenberry, G. J. (2011).
Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order
.
Princeton University Press.
5
Mearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2016). The case for offshore balancing: A superior U.S. grand strategy.
Foreign
Affairs, 95
(4), 70–83.
ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
198
While each school of thought criticizes the other as dangerous to U.S.
primacy, these have been oversimplifications. Both schools may be reconciled by
balancing both aspects into a comprehensive grand strategy. Employing bits of
engagement—U.S. leadership in maintaining the liberal order—coupled with
selective restraint from offshore balancing can more closely fit policy to the
conditions of the current era. This would require consolidated alliances and
partnerships without intrusive encroachment in the internal politics of allies,
hence placing U.S. foreign policy on strategic cooperation rather than
overextension. For a grand strategy debate to be intellectually valid, four
conditions must be met: national interest agreement, identification of the
theoretical basis for alternative positions, critical evaluation of the theories, and
empirical analysis of their implications. The majority of discussions today rarely
approach these thresholds but having some format for arguing at least the first
two is the necessary point of departure for evaluating trade-offs among
alternative strategies. Lastly, even when U.S. policymakers are forced to engage
in reactive policymaking, their choices still remain rooted in overall strategic
assumptions about how the international system operates.
The foundations of U.S. grand strategy have remained relatively stable since
the end of World War II. Essentially, it exhibits a globally involved America
willing to tolerate excessively high expenses in exchange for shaping the
direction of the international system. The strategy focuses on safeguarding U.S.
interests through dominating the global security environment, enhancing
economic globalization, and upholding international cooperation
6
. By
positioning itself as the principal guarantor and payer of the international order,
Washington has been able to accumulate influence and sustain its primacy.
Every administration since President Truman has largely accepted the United
States’ position as both architect and defender of the postwar liberal order. The
beginning of the Cold War transformed this commitment into a geopolitical
contest with the Soviet Union, in the course of which the U.S. sought to arrange
and defend a coalition of similar-minded states from the expansion of
communism. Viewing communist growth as a direct threat to national security,
Washington intervened in strategically significant locations, like Korea in 1950,
Vietnam in the 1960s, and Chile in 1973.
Even after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the grand strategy of
engagement continued. Military involvements in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq in the
6
Brands, H. (2014).
What good is grand strategy? Power and purpose in American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to
George W. Bush
. Cornell University Press.
ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
199
First Gulf War were company in humanitarian terms, but ultimately guaranteed
broader U.S. interests—i.e., the preservation of an orderly international system
tolerant of American interests
7
. At the time of the Gulf War, for example,
President George H. W. Bush reflected the liberty of Kuwait not only as a
regional security measure, but as a defense of a “new world order” founded
upon U.S. leadership
8
. International action was not at balances with national
interests, then, but was Washington’s preferred means of sustaining the postwar
order it had constructed. The United States has always characterized its role in
international relations as both essential and challenged. The National Security
Strategy under Trump also dwelt on threats and opportunities, but in an even
more assertive tone that was consonant with its nationalist tilt
9
. Across these
texts, American power is consistently referred to as necessary to navigate the
international world but the precise form that role must take is consistently
debated in Washington and in broader foreign policy circles.
Neo-authoritarian players use multiple methods to undermine liberal
norms. Economic power is used to attack the openness of the global economic
order simultaneously with the development of selective relationships
reinforcing their political power
10
. Moreover, different political warfare—
ranging from disinformation campaigns to strategic cyber tools—has been
effective in undermining public trust in democratic government, opening up
space for substitute models of governance to be disseminated
11
. Here, the liberal
order maintenance can no longer be seen as a mere attempt to sustain the status
quo. Instead, the United States and fellow democratic friends are required to
redefine their grand strategy by remaking liberal leadership legitimacy and
reframing institutions to confront new challenges. As Ikenberry emphasizes,
liberal democracies must reclaim their ideals in a world in which authoritarian
powers are openly pushing them back. This requires a new multilateral work
and a willingness to work with the existing international institutions rather than
abandon them.
7
Ikenberry, G. J. (2011).
Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order
.
Princeton University Press.
8
Bush, G. H. W. (1991, March 6).
Address before a joint session of the Congress on the cessation of the Persian Gulf
conflict
. The American Presidency Project.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-
session-the-congress-the-cessation-the-persian-gulf-conflict
9
White House. (2017).
National security strategy of the United States of America
. The White House.
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/nss
10
Blackwill, R. D., & Harris, J. M. (2016).
War by other means: Geoeconomics and statecraft
. Harvard University Press.
11
Polyakova, A., & Meserole, C. (2019).
Exporting digital authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese models
. Brookings
Institution.
https://www.brookings.edu/research/exporting-digital-authoritarianism
ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
200
International politics predicting is always difficult, as things around the
globe often undermine some expectations. Nevertheless, Donald Trump's
presidency will ultimately be viewed as a turning point in American grand
strategy and the U.S.-led international order’s evolution. Although Trump’s
impulsive leadership, policy lack of coherence, and abrupt turns led many
experts to wonder if his foreign policy was incoherent, his government still had
significant grand strategic implications
12
. This is due to the reality that grand
strategic choices are inevitable, even for presidents who may not consciously
realize them. Any president, unpredictably matched or prepared, shapes the
United States’ geopolitical course, influences its external image, and decides
about the international order and the reasons of security and prosperity
Trump’s arrival in the White House was at the moment of a historic turn in
US foreign relations. For over seven decades, Washington had been embarking
on a grand experiment of building and sustaining a liberal world order, and for
the last quarter-century after the Cold War ended, it had done so with
unopposed global dominance. But by 2016, such order was facing mounting
stress: China’s rise challenged American military and economic supremacy;
authoritarian powers rose up more forcefully against liberal democratic
assumptions; and chronic Middle Eastern crises underlined the limits of
American power
13
. At the same time, domestic weakness with foreign policy
burdens began to lead citizens to question whether the United States would
continue to carry its weight of leadership abroad.
During campaigning on a nationalist platform, Trump promised to loosen
elements of America's long-standing struggle to preserve an open and stable
world order. In practice, however, his foreign policy was less revolutionary than
his campaign rhetoric suggested, with institutional forces drawing him toward
more pragmatic stances on some matters. Trump did, however, place a
distinctive and typically combative stamp on American policy. Rather than
employing his populism to affirm America’s interest in the international order,
he relentlessly assaulted the very foundations of U.S. leadership—alliances,
international institutions, and liberal economic practices—that had
underwritten Washington’s influence for decades. While Trump believed his
policies would increase America’s wealth, power, and autonomy, their collective
effect was to weaken America’s position in the world and add strains to the
international system it had established.
12
Brands, H. (2018).
American grand strategy in the age of Trump
. Brookings Institution Press.
13
Jervis, R., Gavin, F. J., Rovner, J., & Labrosse, D. N. (Eds.). (2018).
Chaos in the liberal order: The Trump presidency
and international politics in the twenty-first century
. Columbia University Press.
ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
201
Donald Trump's “America First” foreign policy was a fundamental
reorientation of U.S. strategy away from the cooperative norms of the liberal
international order. While conceding that American allies disproportionately
reaped the benefits of an open global system underwritten by U.S. power, Trump
rejected the traditional view that tolerating limited free-riding and accepting
institutional constraints were the cost of building trust, stability, and common
purpose. Instead, he viewed such dynamics as evidence that allies were
exploiting U.S. goodwill and that America had suffered from its own leadership
role. It represented an effort to divert U.S. grand strategy away from multilateral
cooperation and institutionalized liberal internationalism and toward unilateral
and transactional orientation. By framing world politics as a series of zero-sum
transactions, Trump privileged short-term national gains over collective
stability. This approach gave temporary leverage against partners and
competitors but at the expense of the long-term foundation of American
leadership based on trust, alliances, and institutional legitimacy. Trump's
policies—like trade wars with key economic partners and threats to undermine
NATO commitments—were directed at undermining the institutional
underpinnings of the liberal order, which he viewed as constraints on America’s
freedom to act unilaterally for its own gain. Equally significant was the
administration’s rhetorical and symbolic reorientation. Trump regularly
criticized traditional democratic allies while praising authoritarian leaders such
as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un. This reflected a
worldview in which national self-interest, rather than allegiance to shared
values, governed legitimate statecraft. His inaugural address made this
preference explicit, elevating sovereignty, non-interference, and “total
allegiance” to the United States above any broader moral or ideological venture.
Essentially, the Trump administration pursued four interconnected goals:
Containing China’s rise through tariffs, technology transfer bans, and
building coalitions in the Indo-Pacific.
Pursuing rapprochement with Russia to discourage the deepening
Moscow–Beijing alignment.
Exerting pressure on Europe, namely NATO and the EU, to persist in
military reliance on the U.S. and dissuade greater European strategic
autonomy.
Reasserting U.S. dominance in the Middle East, by maintaining
energy leverage, applying “maximum pressure” on Iran, and forging
transactional alliances such as the Abraham Accords.
ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
202
“America first” doctrine is an outright departure from the liberal
internationalist prism that governed previous presidencies. Rather, it redefines
American strategy on two broad fronts: accepting realism as opposed to liberal
principle, and elevating a nationalist, inward-looking vision over the
internationalist standard that had defined American involvement since the mid-
20th century. Donald Trump’s foreign policy worldview is best described as a
reduced form of realism. He perceives international politics in very much too
simplistic terms as inherently competitive, seeing states as being in a constant
state of competition rather than cooperation
14
.
Another pillar of his worldview is the conviction that military power is the
basic guardian of national prosperity and security. Trump repeatedly stressed
the need to raise defense spending in order to build what he called the greatest
military in history. This emphasis was generally justified by appealing to Ronald
Reagan’s proverb of “peace through strength,” which Trump invoked as an
overarching strategic principle. His adviser Peter Navarro went so far as to refer
to this emphasis as the defining “Trump Doctrine.”
15
Trump also viewed the
balance of power among great powers to be the main determinant of world
order. Trump assumed that Washington had to have stable relations with rival
great powers such as Russia and China only upon the basis of respect for U.S.
strength. He hence opted for hardline policies to vindicate American resolve,
arguing that only from a position of firmness could the United States negotiate
improved relations with Moscow or Beijing
16
.
Finally, unlike most of his predecessors, Trump was not keen to pursue
foreign policy by ideological or universalist commitments. Although he
occasionally acknowledged the necessity of protecting Western ideals, he
constantly resisted the idea that the United States attempted to disseminate its
values where they were unwanted. For him, American intervention abroad only
made sense when tangible national interests were directly threatened, and not
for more overall ideological purposes
17
.
The leadership principle of Donald Trump’s “America First” policy
emphasized a measured and limited use of American power, particularly in
terms of military deployment. Trump constantly denied mass deployments
overseas, requiring American troops to deploy only when absolutely necessary
14
Allison, G. (2020).
The new rivalry: U.S.–China relations in the Trump era
. Foreign Affairs, 99(3), 18–27.
15
Navarro, P. (2018).
The Trump doctrine of peace through strength
. The White House, Office of Trade and
Manufacturing Policy.
16
Waltz, K. N. (1979).
Theory of international politics
. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
17
Haass, R. N. (2017).
A world in disarray: American foreign policy and the crisis of the old order
. New York: Penguin
Press.
ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
203
and where there was a clear prospect of winning a decisive victory
18
Trump
constantly demanded more U.S. burden-sharing, condemning the uneven
burdens Washington bore to secure European and Asian security. According to
Trump, the United States had invested “trillions of dollars” defending allied
nations but received much less than its fair share in return. He went as far as
stating that Japan and South Korea should bear the defense burden themselves
and even develop nuclear weapons if they could no longer depend on
Washington’s defense guarantee
19
.
This view carried over into his criticism of NATO, which he painted as
taking advantage of American resources and “taking advantage” of U.S. money.
Still, Trump paired this hedgehog-like skepticism toward intervention with a
very Jacksonian desire, i.e., when vital American interests were directly under
attack, he argued in favor of overwhelming and solid responses
20
. This was
perhaps nowhere more evident than in his handling of terrorism. Since the
inception of his presidency, Trump recognized Islamist extremism as the main
threat to U.S. national security. He cast the struggle with jihadist forces as a
generational conflict akin to the Cold War, which must be waged both with
military force and a war of ideas in order to limit its spread
21
. In this spirit, the
so-called Islamic State (ISIS) was the only adversary Trump continued to
recognize as worthy of direct military confrontation.
The Trump presidency was a clear, if controversial, turning point in
American grand strategy development. Earlier administrations had attempted to
straddle expansive engagement and selective retrenchment, but Trump’s
“America First” policy indicated a reorientation of U.S. strategic assumptions
away from liberal internationalism towards a transactional realism based on
nationalism and hostility towards multilateralism. His emphasis on sovereignty,
military strength, and bilateral bargaining was reflective of a style that
disavowed conventional institutional obligations at the altar of short-run
national interest in the preservation of the liberal order. Nevertheless, far from
being reducible to pure improvisation despite incessant claims of doctrinal
confusion, Trump’s foreign policy was actually a reflection of a form of strategic
minimalism based on a recalibrated understanding of U.S. primacy within a
multipolar system. By trying to encircle China, re-shape relations with Russia,
18
Trump, D. J. (2017, January 20).
Inaugural address
. The White House.
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov
19
Sanger, D. E., & Haberman, M. (2016, March 26). Donald Trump sets conditions for defending NATO allies against
attack.
The New York Times
20
Mead, W. R. (2017). The Jacksonian revolt: American populism and the liberal order.
Foreign Affairs, 96
(2), 2–7.
21
Haass, R. N. (2017).
A world in disarray: American foreign policy and the crisis of the old order
. New York: Penguin
Press.
ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN MODERN SCIENCE
International scientific-online conference
204
nudge NATO allies towards burden-sharing, and leverage Middle Eastern
alliances, Trump redrew the United States as a selectively engaged but militarily
activist power. This redrawing, as much as it departed from post–1945 norms of
American leadership, still exposed the time-honored centrality of grand strategic
debates about engagement, restraint, and balance. Ultimately, Trump's
presidency proves that populist or personalized leadership is not exempt from
the structural necessities of grand strategy, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways
that will be felt long after his own presidency.
Bibliography:
1.
Brands, H. (2014). What good is grand strategy? Power and purpose in
American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Cornell University
Press.
2.
Dueck, C. (2015). The Obama doctrine: American grand strategy today.
Oxford University Press.
3.
Dueck, C. (2020). Age of Iron: On Conservative Nationalism. Oxford
University Press.
4.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). Liberal Leviathan: The origins, crisis, and
transformation of the American world order. Princeton University Press.
5.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order?
International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241
6.
Layne, C. (1997). From preponderance to offshore balancing: America’s
future
grand
strategy.
International
Security,
22(1),
86–124.
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.1.86
7.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of Great Power politics. W. W.
Norton.
8.
Mearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2016). The case for offshore balancing: A
superior U.S. grand strategy. Foreign Affairs, 95(4), 70–83.
9.
National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2017). The
White
House.
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
10.
Nau, H. R. (2017). Perspectives on international relations: Power,
institutions, and ideas (5th ed.). CQ Press.
11.
Walt, S. M. (2018). The hell of good intentions: America’s foreign policy
elite and the decline of U.S. primacy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
12.
Wright, T. (2017). All measures short of war: The contest for the 21st
century and the future of American power. Yale University Press.
