Volume 4, issue 4, 2025
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REDEFINING REGIONAL STRATEGIES: INDIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE
TALIBAN
Saydaliyeva Jumagul
a second-year master’s student
International Relations and Foreign Policy.
Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Contact:
Abstract:
This article explores India’s evolving diplomatic engagement with the Taliban,
highlighting a shift from passive strategies to pragmatic policy execution. It examines India’s
balancing act among security concerns, humanitarian aid, and regional diplomacy in response to
the Taliban’s resurgence. The study contextualizes India’s soft power initiatives, trade
discussions, and developmental projects within the broader geopolitical framework. These
findings underscore India’s nuanced strategy to safeguard its presence in Afghanistan while
navigating regional stability and security challenges.
Key Words:
India-Taliban Engagement, Strategic Paradigm Shift , Soft Power, ‘‘strategic
activity’’, ‘‘strategic inactivity’’, Humanitarian Aid,
Belt and Road Initiative, ‘‘strategic
reactivity’’, ‘‘wait-and-watch’’ approach.
Annotatsiya:
Mazkur maqola Hindistonning Tolibon bilan rivojlanib borayotgan diplomatik
aloqalariga e’tibor qaratib, passiv strategiyalardan pragmatik siyosat yuritishga o‘tish jarayonini
yoritadi. Unda Tolibonning qayta kuchayishi bilan yuzaga kelgan vaziyatda Hindistonning
xavfsizlik, gumanitar yordam va mintaqaviy diplomatiya masalalaridagi muvozanat saqlash
jarayoni tahlil qilinadi. Tadqiqot Hindistonning yumshoq kuch tashabbuslari, savdo bo‘yicha
muzokaralari va rivojlanish loyihalarini kengroq geosiyosiy nuqtai nazarda ko‘rib chiqadi.
Ushbu natijalar Hindistonning Afg‘onistondagi ishtirokini mustahkamlash va mintaqaviy
barqarorlik hamda xavfsizlik bilan bog‘liq muammolarni hal qilishga qaratilgan murakkab
strategiyasini namoyish etadi.
Kalit so‘zlar:
Hindiston-Tolibon Hamkorligi, Strategik Paradigma O‘zgarishi, Yumshoq Kuch,
«strategik faoliyat», «strategik faoliyatsizlik», Gumanitar Yordam, «Bir Makon, Bir Yo‘l»
tashabbusi, «strategik reaktivlik», «kuzatish va kutish» yondashuvi.
Аннотация:
Эта статья исследует развитие дипломатических отношений Индии с
Талибаном, подчеркивая переход от пассивных стратегий к прагматичному выполнению
политики. В ней рассматривается баланс Индии между вопросами безопасности,
гуманитарной помощью и региональной дипломатией в ответ на возрождение Талибана.
Исследование анализирует инициативы Индии в области мягкой силы, торговые
обсуждения и проекты развития в более широком геополитическом контексте.
Полученные выводы подчеркивают продуманную стратегию Индии, направленную на
сохранение своего присутствия в Афганистане при одновременной ориентации на
обеспечение региональной стабильности и безопасности.
Ключевые слова:
Взаимодействие Индии с Талибаном, Изменение стратегической
парадигмы, Мягкая сила, «стратегическая активность», «стратегическая пассивность»,
Гуманитарная помощь, Инициатива «Один пояс, один путь», «стратегическая
реактивность», «подход наблюдения и ожидания».
Volume 4, issue 4, 2025
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INTRODUCTION
India and Afghanistan have long shared a profound bond rooted in their historical and cultural
ties. India’s strategic imperatives in Afghanistan encompass security, economic, and political
dimensions. The proliferation of terrorist organizations in the region represents a substantial risk
to regional stability, with direct implications for India’s national security. Furthermore,
Afghanistan serves as a pivotal site for India to mitigate Pakistan’s influence through strategic
economic engagements. It is also regarded as an access point to Central Asia, a region abundant
in natural resources and presenting substantial opportunities for trade. In 2005, India advocated
for Afghanistan’s membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), underscoring its commitment to Afghanistan’s integration into regional frameworks.
India’s significant contributions to Afghanistan’s reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts have
further reinforced this partnership. Notably, the Strategic Partnership Agreement has solidified
the multifaceted and dynamic relations between the two nations. While India does not officially
recognize the Taliban regime, it has maintained humanitarian aid and developmental assistance
as key components of its engagement. For instance, India has provided consignments of wheat
and medical supplies to address Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis. This highlights the significant
paradigm shift in India’s approach to its policy regarding Afghanistan. However, the Taliban’s
ascension to power has posed significant challenges to India’s foreign policy, necessitating a
recalibration of its approach while maintaining its core strategic objectives. India’s enduring
priorities have profoundly shaped its diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan over the years.
Methods:
This study uses both primary and secondary data collection methods. It consults
classical and contemporary sources to understand the existence, nature, and factors shaping
Indian strategic engagement with Taliban, ensuring a balanced perspective by including Indian
and non-Indian viewpoints. Additionally, it uses literature from think tanks in India and other
countries to gain insights into the ‘‘Indian perspective’’ and ‘‘Afghanistan perspective’’. The
research involves thematic analysis to identify key trends in India’s foreign policy approaches.
This includes examining case studies of India’s aid initiatives and their impact on Afghanistan’s
socio-economic landscape, as well as policy shifts in response to evolving geopolitical scenarios.
The analysis is grounded in concepts of soft power diplomacy and strategic culture, with a
particular focus on India’s strategies in humanitarian aid, cultural diplomacy, and developmental
projects.
Literature review:
Gilpin (1981) talks about how a state’s potential strength and wealth can
shape her strategic behavior. As states become stronger and wealthier they also tend to become
more and more ambitious in their foreign policy postures and objectives. By this logic India’s
growing economic and military strength after 1991 can explain the ‘‘strategic paradigm shift’’ in
her foreign policy in general and her Afghanistan policy in particular. India’s pro-active
Afghanistan policy over the past sixteen years is part of a broader attempt by New Delhi to
control her ‘‘strategic environment ’’.
The reluctant realist: A study of India's Afghanistan policy from 2001 to 2018 in the light of
India’s civilizational strategic culture by Hameed Shuja examines the factors influencing India’s
Afghanistan policy since 2001 and how Kabul has responded, within the debate of India’s
1
Gilpin, R. (1981). War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Volume 4, issue 4, 2025
19
strategic culture. The study focuses on the period from 2001 to 2017 to analyze the domestic
factors shaping Indian and Afghan foreign policy thinking, such as the rise of Hindu nationalist
politics in India and the transition of power in Afghanistan. It also considers external constraints
during this period.
Historically, India’s approach to Afghanistan was rooted in a realist
perspective
,
a realist perspective in international relations emphasizes that states operate in an
anarchic global system, where they compete for power and security due to the absence of a
centralized authority
.This framework views states as rational actors primarily concerned with
their national interests, security, and survival
. Realism contrasts with idealism or liberalism by
focusing on the competitive and conflictual nature of international politics, often prioritizing
self-interest over ethical considerations.
Building on the discourse surrounding India’s strategic culture, Kanti Bajpai (2013) offers a
contemporary perspective, asserting that India does, in fact, possess a grand strategy. Bajpai
suggests a departure from both Nehruvian ideals and hyper-realism, ideological extremes that
have historically defined India’s foreign policy. Instead, he posits that India is increasingly
embracing ‘‘neoliberalism’’ as the most suitable framework for its foreign policy choices.
In the context of India’s strategic approach to Afghanistan, Avinash Paliwal’s book ‘‘My
Enemy’s Enemy’’ offers a nuanced analysis that identifies two dominant schools of thought
within India’s foreign policy establishment regarding its strategic objectives in Afghanistan:
1.
The Conciliatory School: This group advocates for a more accommodating approach
towards Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, believing that engaging with Pakistan is necessary
for regional stability.
2.
The Partisan School: This faction favors a more assertive Indian role in Afghanistan,
even at the risk of antagonizing Pakistan.
Paliwal’s work provides a more in-depth examination of the internal debates and policy
contradictions within India’s strategic thinking on Afghanistan. This analysis contributes to the
broader discourse on India’s strategic culture and foreign policy decision-making, offering
valuable insights into the nuances and competing visions that influence India’s approach to
regional security and diplomacy in South Asia.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The one aspect of India-Afghanistan relations that transcends both geographical borders and the
nature of political ties between the two Governments are the deep historical and civilizational
ties between the two people. Over the centuries these relations have been both friendly and, at
2
Shuja, H. (2018).
The reluctant realist: A study of India’s Afghanistan policy from 2001 to 2018
.
[Doctoral dissertation, Lancaster University]. Department of Politics, Philosophy, and Religion.
3
Devetak, Richard, ed. (2012).
An introduction to international relations
(2nd ed.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. pp. 36–41.
4
.Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. (2023) ‘’
Political Realism in International Relations’’
. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of philosophy , edited by Edward N.Zalta and Uri Nodelman,
5
Bajpai, K. (2013). India Does Do Grand Strategy. Global Brief [published online on 5 March 2013].
Available from: http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2013/03/05/india-does-go-grand-strategy/ [Accessed on 2 April
2015]
6
Paliwal, A. (2017). My Enemy’s Enemy. India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US
Withdrawal. London: Hurst Publishers
Volume 4, issue 4, 2025
20
times, thorny. Historically, Afghans have flooded into India for all sorts of reasons. They have
come as conquerors of course, as traders, as Sufis and religious scholars spreading their faith and
as ordinary laborer looking for survival. In more recent years they have been coming as tourists,
medical patients and students. These historical interactions have resulted in an understanding of
each other’s history, culture and faith. Centuries of interaction between the two people has given
birth to new knowledge and ideas, a shared art, a similar literature and an appreciation of each
other’s place and significance in the region and the world .
India’s interaction with the Taliban
represents a pivotal evolution in its foreign policy, underscoring a shift from traditional realist
approaches to a more pragmatic stance within international relations. Historically, India adhered
to principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, shunning engagement with non-state
actors like the Taliban due to their ties with militant groups hostile to Indian interests. However,
the resurgence of the Taliban in 2021 necessitated a recalibration of India’s strategy, balancing
its security priorities with humanitarian imperatives and regional diplomacy. However, recent
shifts in India’s policy reflect a pragmatic adaptation to new realities, balancing security
concerns with humanitarian engagement and regional diplomacy.
India’s traditional stance regarding bilateral relations with Afghanistan has been to focus on
engaging with the Afghan Government directly. New Delhi has preferred to support and engage
with whoever was in power in Kabul, with the years of the Mujahedeen regime and later the
Taliban rule (1992 to 2001) being an exception.
India, from the very beginning of the world’s
renewed engagement with Afghanistan in 2001, was playing a prominent role. Policy elites in
New Delhi realized this was an opportunity to not only shape India’s future strategic vision for
the region but also to re-engage with a strategically important neighbor which India had pretty
lost to Pakistan for many years. It is apparent from this,
since 2001, India has pursued a non-
military, non-coercive and soft power policy towards Afghanistan. India’s soft power approach
of forging economic (aid), humanitarian, capacity building and institutional links vis-à-vis
Afghanistan tried to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan government and the ordinary
Afghans.
Scholars have already discussed the terms ‘‘strategic inactivity’’- ‘‘passive engagement’’ which
refers to a passive or ‘‘wait-and-watch’’ approach, where India refrains from taking proactive
measures in Afghanistan, and ‘‘strategic reactivity’’- ‘‘pragmatic response,’’ on the other hand,
involves responding pragmatically to emerging challenges without necessarily initiating bold
actions. However, the Taliban’s resurgence in 2021 required India to recalibrate its policy.
Despite India’s traditional reluctance to engage with the Taliban, recent developments reveal a
shift toward pragmatic engagement. It could be proposed to introduce a third phase characterized
by ‘‘strategic activity,’’ reflecting a deliberate and goal-oriented approach to policy execution.
India’s engagement with Afghanistan is aligned with the region’s changing landscape. India’s
approach to isolating the Taliban has faced limitations as global dynamics shift over the years.
Many countries, including China and Russia, have begun engaging with the Taliban to secure
7
Kousary, H. (2016). Interviewed by Hameed Shuja in April 2016.
8
Shuja, H. (2018).
The reluctant realist: A study of India’s Afghanistan policy from 2001 to 2018
.
[Doctoral dissertation, Lancaster University]. Department of Politics, Philosophy, and Religion.
9
Ahmad, P. T. (2022).
An Analysis of India’s Soft Power Policy in Afghanistan.
India Quarterly, 78(4),
634-653. https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284221127787 (Original work published 2022)
10
Shuja, H. (2018).
The reluctant realist: A study of India’s Afghanistan policy from 2001 to 2018
.
[Doctoral dissertation, Lancaster University]. Department of Politics, Philosophy, and Religion.
Volume 4, issue 4, 2025
21
regional stability and economic interests. For instance, China has integrated Afghanistan into its
Belt and Road Initiative, while Russia views the Taliban as a counterbalance to extremist groups
like ISIS. Meanwhile, China has increased its presence by appointing Ambassador Zhao Xing
and showing interest in Afghanistan’s vast natural resources, valued at approximately $1 trillion.
These resources are crucial for supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to
enhance regional connectivity and economic influence.
In response, India aims to counterbalance
China’s influence by strengthening its ties with Afghanistan and leveraging this growing
relationship to navigate its historically complex ties with Pakistan. Apart from that,
Furthermore,
India’s security concerns, particularly the Taliban’s ties with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and
Jaish-e-Mohammed, have made direct engagement increasingly vital. The Taliban’s strained
relationship with Pakistan, especially over issues like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), presents
India with opportunities to recalibrate its approach. By engaging directly, India seeks to address
cross-border terrorism and safeguard its interests.
India is Afghanistan’s biggest regional donor in terms of financial aid. Although India may not
rival the financial contributions of Afghanistan’s other donors, particularly the United States,
there are several compelling reasons why India is well-positioned to outperform even the US in
development and reconstruction efforts. First, public opinion in Afghanistan is strongly in India’s
favor. Many of its developmental projects have been concerned with improving the lives of
ordinary Afghans. Importantly, this public goodwill for India is spread around the country,
transcending tribal, ethnic or regional borders. This has helped India expand its activities in
Afghanistan. This is a unique status for India. Many other countries involved in the current
Afghan quagmire, including the US, have failed to rally ‘‘large scale public support’’ for their
engagement in Afghanistan.
Second, civilizational and historical ties between India and
Afghanistan mean Indian aid workers operating in Afghanistan have a better understanding of
the country’s culture, traditions and religious sensitivities. This is one area where western
countries and their militaries failed badly. Third, India is able to deliver far greater services with
a relatively smaller budget. India has used her financial aid in Afghanistan smartly
India’s
‘‘soft power’’ strategies in Afghanistan have been a cornerstone of its foreign policy,
emphasizing cultural diplomacy, developmental assistance, and humanitarian aid over military
intervention. The Taliban has shown openness to India’s involvement, encouraging the
reopening of its Kabul mission and resuming direct flights. In turn, India has also provided
substantial humanitarian aid, including food, medicine, and vaccines. Strengthening economic
ties, particularly in infrastructure, agriculture, and energy, can create mutual benefits and foster
stability.
From a development perspective, India emerged as a vital partner for Afghanistan in its process
of rebuilding and stabilization. Almost 500 projects were implemented by India in the priority
areas of power, water supply, road connectivity, healthcare, education, agriculture, and capacity
building. The landmark projects include the Afghan Parliament building, inaugurated in 2015,
which symbolized the commitment of India towards Afghan democracy. The Salma Dam, earlier
referred to as the India-Afghanistan Friendship Dam, built in Herat Province and completed in
2016, served 75,000 hectares of land and produced 42 MW of power, thereby significantly
11
Shuja, H. (2018).
The reluctant realist: A study of India’s Afghanistan policy from 2001 to 2018
.
[Doctoral dissertation, Lancaster University]. Department of Politics, Philosophy, and Religion. P-125.
12
Mullen, R, D. (2016). Interviewed by Hameed Shuja on 20 March 2016.
Volume 4, issue 4, 2025
22
contributing to the infrastructure and needs of Afghanistan.
However, after the Taliban
assumed power, India severed ties with them and closed its embassy in Kabul. In June 2022,
India reopened its embassy in Kabul, assigning a technical team to oversee humanitarian aid and
developmental initiatives. This represented a notable shift in India’s stance, as the embassy had
been closed following the Taliban’s takeover. The Taliban responded positively, guaranteeing
the embassy’s security and urging other countries to follow India’s example in resuming
diplomatic activities. This action highlighted India’s strategic intent to maintain a foothold in
Afghanistan despite the challenges of engaging with the Taliban administration.
Apart from that, India has sent a team from the Ministry of External Affairs to Kabul to oversee
its humanitarian aid operations and visit project sites. India has provided 20,000 metric tons of
wheat, 13 tons of medicine, 500,000 COVID vaccine doses, winter clothing, and plans to send
more aid. Notably, one million doses of COVAXIN were gifted to Iran for Afghan refugees, and
UNICEF received 60 million polio vaccine doses. India’s assistance, appreciated across Afghan
society, reflects its longstanding civilizational ties with Afghanistan. The team will also meet
Taliban leaders to discuss ongoing humanitarian efforts.
India proposed sending 50,000 tones
of wheat to Afghanistan via Pakistan in October 2021, and Pakistan approved the transit in
November 2021. The first shipment of 2,500 tones was dispatched on February 22, 2022, and
reached Jalalabad on February 26,
2022.
These considerations position India as a highly
suitable partner for Afghanistan. The Afghan Government acknowledges and values India's
unique status.
India’s main objective is to ensure its long-term presence in Afghanistan. India’s commitment to
maintaining a long-term presence in Afghanistan has been evident through various recent
developments.
Consular Services in Mumbai:
The Taliban appointed Ikramuddin Kamil as the acting consul
at the Afghan Consulate General in Mumbai on November 12, 2024. This appointment aims to
facilitate consular services for Afghan citizens in India. Kamil, who has been pursuing a Ph.D. in
Delhi, is expected to strengthen diplomatic ties and assist Afghan nationals visiting India.
Bilateral Trade Talks in Doha:
The talks between Indian diplomats and Taliban officials have
focused on trade relations, especially through the use of Iran’s Chabahar port, while New Delhi
has also sought to counter Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan
.
In November 2024, an Indian
delegation, led by Singh, held discussions with Muttaqi to advance bilateral trade relations.
Singh assured that India would address challenges faced by Afghan businessmen, streamline visa
processes, and actively resolve existing trade issues. He emphasized increasing exports and
imports through Iran’s Chabahar port. Afghan businessmen highlighted certain trade-related
concerns with Chabahar, prompting Singh to commit to making substantial efforts to address
them. Additionally, Singh engaged in talks with Taliban Foreign Minister Muttaqi, focusing on
Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan relations, India-Afghan bilateral ties, and the Taliban’s efforts against
the Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP). According to a Taliban statement, the Indian
delegation expressed New Delhi’s interest in deepening political and economic collaboration
with Afghanistan, particularly by enhancing trade through the Chabahar port. According to a
13
Hindustan Times. (2015, December 25). Modi in Kabul: PM meets Ghani, to inaugurate Afghan’s parl
building. Hindustan Times.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/modi-in-kabul-pm-meets-ghani-
to-inaugurate-afghan-s-parl-building/story-wua2CtN8gj4IQsRnmNknHM.html
14
India’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan
Ministry of External Affairs Government of India
15
Why India is reaching out to the Taliban now. The Economic Times. January 14, 2025.
[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/)
Volume 4, issue 4, 2025
23
statement on the Taliban’s official website, ‘‘the focus was on fortifying relations between the
two nations’’ and while Muttaqi stressed the importance of supporting the Afghan people to
foster trade relations, specifically by improving the process of issuing Indian visas to
businesspersons, the Indian special representative spoke about upcoming discussions between
technical delegations from the region, Afghanistan, and India regarding the Chabahar port. In a
move demonstrating pragmatism and strategic foresight, Senior representatives from India and
the Taliban met in Dubai on January 8, 2025. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and
Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi discussed expanding bilateral relations, enhancing
trade through Iran’s Chabahar Port, and potential collaborative development projects.
The
Taliban government expressed interest in strengthening political and economic ties with India, calling
it a ‘‘significant regional and economic power’’.
Discussions were centered on enhancing trade and
utilizing Iran's Chabahar port, a key infrastructure project developed by India to circumvent Pakistan's
Karachi and Gwadar ports. The Dubai meeting between Misri and Muttaqi took place amid escalating
tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, intensified by Pakistani airstrikes on Paktika province’s
Barmal district in December 2024. While Pakistan views Afghanistan as a key element of its strategic
depth, India regards strengthening ties with Afghanistan as vital for both its security and strategic
objectives.
Conclusion:
Key finding of that research is that India’s engagement with the Taliban represents
a significant departure from traditional foreign policy norms, reflecting the need for pragmatic
adaptation in a changing geopolitical landscape. By balancing humanitarian efforts, economic
ties, and strategic diplomacy, India aims to uphold its influence and security interests in the
region. This paradigm shift underscores India’s broader ambition to shape its strategic
environment while addressing domestic and regional challenges. As global powers increasingly
integrate Afghanistan into their regional strategies, India’s recalibrated approach demonstrates its
commitment to fostering stability and ensuring long-term partnerships. India’s engagement with
the Taliban signals a significant departure from its traditional foreign policy norms, embracing
pragmatism to navigate the evolving geopolitical terrain. This strategic recalibration not only
underscores India's resolve to secure its interests in Afghanistan but also positions it as a key
player in regional diplomacy. By intertwining humanitarian efforts with economic and strategic
objectives, India exemplifies a nuanced approach to global engagement. Looking forward, the
success of this engagement will hinge on its ability to balance domestic priorities with the
shifting dynamics of South Asia, paving the way for sustainable partnerships and stability in the
region.
References:
1.
Ahmad, P. T. (2022). An Analysis of India’s Soft Power Policy in Afghanistan. India
Quarterly,78(4),634–653.
2.
Bajpai, K. (2013). India Does Do Grand Strategy. Global Brief [published online on 5
March 2013].
16
Why India is reaching out to the Taliban now. The Economic Times. January 14, 2025.
[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/)
17
Indians diplomats seek bilateral trade relations with Afghan Taliban through Iran’s Chabahar port.
January
24,2025.Middle
East
Media
Research
Institute.
official
site:
https://www.memri.org/reports/indian-diplomats-seek-bilateral-trade-relations-afghan-taliban-through-
irans-chabahar-port#_edn2
Volume 4, issue 4, 2025
24
3.
Devetak, Richard, ed. (2012). An Introduction to International Relations (2nd ed.).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 36–41.
4.
Gilpin, R. (1981). War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
5.
Hindustan Times. (2015, December 25). Modi in Kabul: PM meets Ghani, to inaugurate
Afghan’s parliament building.
6.
India’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India.
7.
Indians diplomats seek bilateral trade relations with Afghan Taliban through Iran’s
Chabahar port. Middle East Media Research Institute. January 24, 2025.
8.
Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. (2023). Political Realism in International Relations. The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman.
9.
Kousary, H. (2016). Interviewed by Hameed Shuja in April 2016.
10.
Mullen, R. D. (2016). Interviewed by Hameed Shuja on 20 March 2016.
11.
Paliwal, A. (2017). My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion
to the US Withdrawal. London: Hurst Publishers.
12.
Shuja, H. (2018). The Reluctant Realist: A Study of India’s Afghanistan Policy from
2001 to 2018 [Doctoral dissertation, Lancaster University]. Department of Politics, Philosophy,
and Religion.
13.
Why India is reaching out to the Taliban now. The Economic Times. January 14, 2025.
