THE PHENOMENON OF SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN CORPORATE LAW
Keywords:
Abstract
This essay discusses the phenomenon of separation of ownership and control by arguing who is the real owner of company. By discussing the different interests of members this essay identifies that company is considered as real entity which has own interest from its members. This phenomenon is supported by different cases and current legislative norms. [1] The main concern of the modern company is to find whose interest should be issued as primary purpose of the company. Some scholars argued that company and its employees should serve to desires of shareholders who are owner of the company. [2] However, this argument influences the relationship between principal and agent hence agency problems have been concerned as the most unresolved issue of company.
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References
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Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company, Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch. 34
Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421
Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] B.C.C. 711
Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley [1971] 1 W.L.R. 443
Table of Cases (International)
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co [1919] 204 Mich. 459.
Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp [1931] 18 Del. Ch. 28
Auer v. Dressel [1954] 306 N.Y. 427
Table of Legislation/ Statutes
Kholmirzaev U. PROBLEMS OF LIABILITY OF CONTROLLERS OF CORPORATIONS TO CREDITORS IN UZBEK LAW //Review of law sciences. – 2020. – Т. 4. – №. 2.– С. 146-154
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The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act 2002
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