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FEATURES OF THE APPLICATION OF AMIR TEMUR'S ARMY
KHOLDAROV ABDULKHAMID YULDASHEVICH
Academy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Annotation:
The article explores the features of the application of Amir Temur's army, focusing
on the expedient organization and deployment of troops for conducting strategic and tactical
operations tailored to various enemy compositions.
Keywords:
division of troops, commanders of tens, commanders of hundreds, commanders of
thousands, commanders of regions, commander-in-chief’s tent, vanguard of the right wing, army
of the left.
In the field of military organization, Amir Temur significantly surpassed his contemporaries,
developing and implementing a system for creating and improving his army. He set high
standards for his command staff, closely monitoring their continuous improvement in combat,
moral, and psychological qualities. Amir Temur personally selected and trained his commanders.
The correct appointment of commanders of tens (un begi), hundreds (yuz begi), thousands (ming
begi), and ten thousands (tuman begi) largely determined the army’s success in battle.
Special attention was given to experienced warriors. Seasoned fighters, who had participated in
numerous major battles and considered military operations their primary occupation, were
selected together before a campaign and listed in registries, receiving state salaries. The troops
were divided into units of tens (un), hundreds (yuz), thousands (ming), and tens of thousands
(tuman). Amir Temur placed particular emphasis on selecting talented military leaders, requiring
commanders of various ranks to possess bravery, courage, sensitivity, resilience, and initiative.
Each commander had a deputy (naib) who would take their place in case of death. Amir Temur
widely used various forms of rewards for significant achievements. In his "Code" (Ulozhenie),
he stated: “I established three types of rewards for an emir who conquers a kingdom or defeats
an enemy army: I grant him the honorary title of ‘brave,’ admit him to my council, and finally
entrust him with the governance of a border province. An emir who defeats the army of any
prince receives the same reward.” Other commanders of lower ranks also received various
material and moral incentives.
Amir Temur placed great importance on the selection of commanders, stating, “A commander
whose authority is weaker than a whip and a stick is unworthy of the title.” Commanders of tens
were chosen by their units, while commanders of hundreds, thousands, and higher ranks were
appointed.
The core of Amir Temur’s army consisted of nomadic tribes that supplied cavalry and archers.
Sedentary populations provided infantry and soldiers for auxiliary and siege operations, such as
operating catapults, battering rams, firing incendiary arrows, and launching grenades with
flammable oil-based mixtures. Soldiers in Amir Temur’s army received fixed salaries,
determined by the quality of their service. A soldier received the equivalent of 2 to 4 horses,
a commander of ten received the salary of his unit (incentivizing higher pay for his soldiers),
a commander of a hundred received the salaries of six commanders of ten, and so on. One
disciplinary penalty was the deduction of one-tenth of a soldier’s salary.
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The army included light infantry, which traveled on horseback but dismounted for battle to
improve shooting accuracy. Each infantryman was equipped with a sword, a bow, and up to 30
arrows. Light infantry was used in rugged terrain and during sieges. Additionally, Amir Temur
organized specialized infantry units for mountain warfare.
The army had a well-organized structure and a specific formation order. Every soldier knew their
place within their ten, each ten within a hundred, and so on. Units maneuvered in formation and
were distinguished by the color of their equipment, clothing, and banners. Some units were
identified by the color of their horses. Strict adherence to pre-campaign inspections was enforced.
For battles, a large, flat field was chosen, with attention to nearby water sources and fodder,
ensuring the sun did not shine into the soldiers’ eyes. The battle formation was spread along the
front and, crucially, in depth. By weakening the center, the flanks were strengthened to encircle
the enemy. Amir Temur created strong reserves for decisive strikes.
During major battles, the commander-in-chief’s tent (bargoh, saroparda), adorned with colorful
battle banners and tufts, was set up on elevated ground for easy command. A military orchestra
typically played near the tent, boosting soldiers’ morale. Battles began with light cavalry or
outpost troops firing arrows and javelins, followed by the vanguard. If support was needed, the
vanguard of the right wing (shakavul) and then the left wing (chapavul) joined the fight. Further
reinforcements came from the left half of the right wing and the right half of the left wing. If
these were insufficient, the remaining parts of both wings engaged, and Amir Temur was
informed of the situation. If all efforts failed, the commander-in-chief (amiri lashkar) led the
main forces (kul), or reserves, into battle, confident that the ninth attack would secure victory.
Amir Temur famously said, “The ninth attack brings victory.”
When the enemy showed signs of retreat, a cavalry detachment pursued them to ensure complete
destruction. The army maintained a disciplined formation with multiple lines, gradually
introduced into battle. Once the enemy was weakened and fatigued, a fresh, elite reserve was
deployed to secure victory.
Enemies retreating to fortified structures were besieged. Wall-breaching (manjanik) and stone-
throwing (arroda) machines were used, along with cannons (ra’d). Tunnels were dug under walls
and towers, breaches were made, and warriors stormed through the gaps. During assaults,
protective shields (tura), ladders (shotu), loops (kamand), ropes, and other tools were employed.
Amir Temur’s army perfected the organization, strategy, and tactics of cavalry attacks. It
included proto-engineering units operating catapults, devices for launching incendiary mixtures,
and tools for undermining fortress walls. The army utilized contemporary technologies, such as
siege equipment and ballistae for hurling pots of burning oil. Specialists, including pontoon
builders for river crossings, were also employed, along with advancements from Chinese science
and technology.
Amir Temur refined his army’s organizational structure. His "Code" outlined battle formations
based on the enemy’s strength: “If the enemy army exceeds 12,000 but is less than 40,000,
command may be entrusted to one of my fortunate sons, with two commanders and several emirs
leading units of 100, 10,000, and hordes, totaling up to 40,000”.
According to Sahibkiran’s rules, a skilled commander, aware of the enemy’s numbers, had to
counter them effectively, observe their actions—whether their archers, spearmen, or swordsmen
attacked slowly or swiftly, together or in parts—and note their entry and exit points on the
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battlefield. Commanders needed to avoid ambushes, understand the battle’s dynamics, anticipate
the enemy’s intentions, and disrupt their plans.
The "Code" further states: “From 40,000 cavalry, the commander must form 14 units: the center
forms the main line, three units form the rearguard (or right-wing corps), with one as its
vanguard. Three units form the left wing, with one as its vanguard. Three units form the front of
the right-wing rearguard, with one as its vanguard, and the left wing follows the same structure.
A main vanguard, including archers, swordsmen, spearmen, and brave, experienced fighters, is
positioned before the center to disrupt the enemy’s vanguard with loud cries.” It adds, “No
movement of the enemy should escape the commander-in-chief, and any overconfident
commander advancing without orders must be punished.”
The battle began with the vanguard, followed by the vanguards of the right and left wings, then
the cavalry of both wings, followed by the second unit of the right wing and the first of the left.
If 13 attacks failed to resolve the battle, the commander-in-chief led the elite reserves into
combat, setting an example to inspire the troops. The main banner remained in sight.
When facing an enemy army exceeding 40,000, Amir Temur personally led the campaign. From
40 hordes of 100 and 10,000 soldiers, he selected 12, marked with a distinctive sign (tamga),
divided into 40 aimaks. Twelve elite aim MQTT
System: aimaks formed the first line, with the remaining 28 forming the second and third lines.
Troops led by his sons and grandsons stood at the front of the right flank, while relatives and
allies led the left. These units served as reserves, providing support where needed. Six aimaks
formed the second line of the right flank, with one as its vanguard, and the same for the left flank.
The first line of both flanks had a similar structure, with a large vanguard of experienced
commanders and brave warriors positioned ahead, preceded by a smaller vanguard. Light troops
and scouts protected the army from surprise attacks and monitored the enemy.
The battle began with light troops and the forward vanguard, supported by the main vanguard if
needed. If further reinforcement was required, the first and second lines of both flanks joined,
followed by the reserves—sons, grandsons, relatives, and allies—whose primary task was to
defeat the enemy commander and capture their banner. If these efforts were insufficient, the
remaining forces launched a decisive attack, weakening the enemy with successive strikes until
the reserves secured victory.
This leads to the following conclusions:
1. While Amir Temur’s army was structurally similar to Genghis Khan’s, it had distinct features.
2. Unlike Genghis Khan’s militia-style army, Amir Temur’s was not a universal conscription
system.
3. While Genghis Khan’s army relied on nomads, Amir Temur’s included both nomads (cavalry
and archers) and sedentary populations (infantry, farmers, artisans, etc.).
4. Unlike Genghis Khan, who lacked infantry, Amir Temur’s army heavily utilized infantry.
5. Amir Temur was among the first in the East to introduce artillery (ra’d), with thousands of
gunners used in sieges and battles.
6. He created specialized infantry units for mountain warfare.
7. Amir Temur skillfully maneuvered his forces, using flanking and rear cavalry attacks, dividing
his army into seven or nine parts (kul) based on the situation.
8. The army included units of women who fought alongside men, displaying courage and valor.
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The army consisted of warriors from Maverannahr, Dasht-i-Kipchak, Khorasan, Iran,
Badakhshan, Moghulistan, Khorezm, Mazandaran, and Jete.
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