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THE IMPACT OF THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR ON POLITICAL PROCESSES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
Raimkulov Sheroz,
a graduate
student of the Department of World
History, Sharaf Rashidov
Samarkand State University, II stage
Abstract:
This article analyzes the causes and consequences of the fourth major military conflict
between the Arab states and Israel. The reason for the start of hostilities was the recovery of the
territories lost by the Arab states in the "Six-Day War". As a result of the war, both sides
suffered heavy losses. This war clearly demonstrated the need for a policy of compromise
between the Arab states and Israel.
Keywords:
Egypt, Israel, Sinai Peninsula, Arab states, Syria, USSR, USA, Suez Canal, Golan
Heights.
Annotatsiya:
Ushbu maqolada Arab davlatlari va Isroil o’rtasidai to’rtinchi katta harbiy
to’qnashuvning boshlanish sabablari va oqibatlari tahlil qilib o’tilgan. Bunda Arab davlatlarining
“Olti kunlik urush” da yoqotgan hududlarini qaytarib olish harbiy harakatlarning boshlanishiga
sabab bo’lgan. Urush natijasida ikki tomon ham ko’p talofat ko’rgan. Ushbu urush Arab
davlatlari va Isroil o’rtasida kelishuv siyosatining olib borilishi zarurligini yaqqol namoyon qildi.
Kalit so’zlar:
Misr, Isroil, Sinay yarim oroli, Arab davlatlari, Suriya, SSSR, AQSH, Suvaysh
kanali, Golan tepaligi.
Аннотации:
В статье анализируются причины и последствия четвертого крупного
военного конфликта между арабскими государствами и Израилем. Поводом к началу
военных действий стало возвращение арабскими государствами территорий, утраченных в
Шестидневной войне. В результате войны обе стороны понесли тяжелые потери. Эта
война ясно продемонстрировала необходимость политики компромисса между арабскими
государствами и Израилем.
Ключевые слова:
Египет, Израиль, Синайский полуостров, арабские государства, Сирия,
СССР, США, Суэцкий канал, Голанские высоты.
Introduction.
The tragedy of October 6, 1973 - the day when the long-standing conflict between
the two countries of the Middle East turned into an open military confrontation. In 1973, on the
Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egyptian troops, together with the Syrian military, suddenly
attacked Israel, which had been at war. This conflict lasted eighteen days and was the fourth
major Arab-Israeli conflict, known as the "Yom Kippur War".
The military attack on Israeli territory was initiated by two Middle Eastern states: Egypt and
Syria. Diplomats of these countries repeatedly tried to negotiate with the Israeli government on
the return of the lands captured in 1967. However, Israel categorically rejected the proposals of
its neighbors, forcing the Arabs to take extremely drastic measures and sign the "three nos". This
was the beginning of a slow political conflict, which went down in history as the "war of
confrontation". The return of once-conquered lands became a matter of principle for the Arabs,
linked to the desire to wash away the shame of the previous “Six-Day War”.
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Main part.
The desire to return the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, which Egypt had
occupied since 1967, and to restore its territorial integrity, gained importance in the fall of 1970
after President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, came to power in Egypt.[1] The
Arabs, thirsting for revenge, began preparations for the upcoming uprising in 1971 when they
built special training centers near Alexandria and Cairo, which were called “Bar-Lev Lines”,
where the mobilized Egyptian armed forces practiced practical skills in conducting combat
operations in conditions of forcing the canal and overcoming terrain.[2] The number of sapper
units in the Egyptian armed forces increased. Particular attention was paid to the delivery of
equipment to the bridge. In addition, the Egyptians decided to use a very unusual approach to
solve the problem of moving heavy equipment through the sand pits encountered on the road. In
the summer of 1973, they purchased one hundred and sixty water cannons in Germany and
England. The idea was simple and ingenious: instead of overcoming an obstacle from above, it
was decided to use water cannons to wash the road on loose sandy banks.
The next step was to involve Syria in the attack on Israel. In order to divert the attention and
forces of the Israelis, military operations were to begin from the Golan Heights, and the fact that
Israel was waging war on two fronts at once would significantly increase the Egyptians' chances
of victory. According to some sources, the attack by Israeli aircraft on Syrian MIGs on
September 13, 1973 was an additional impetus for this Arab state to enter the war. [1] The air
clash, in which the Israelis shot down twelve Syrian aircraft, took place on the Lebanese-Syrian
border. One of the lessons learned from the Six-Day War was the massive rearmament of the
Syrian and Egyptian armies. The USSR made a significant contribution to equipping them with
more modern military equipment, supplying Egypt not only with tanks of various modifications,
but also with experienced instructors who taught soldiers how to properly conduct combat
operations using armored vehicles. The Arabs equipped their troops with a large number of
Malyutka ATGMs, which were capable of quickly and effectively destroying enemy equipment.
The periodic exercises, which initially alarmed Israeli intelligence and border patrols, eventually
began to be perceived as a routine by their neighbors.
The Arabs were not careful in choosing the day of the attack, which was one of the main Jewish
holidays, Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement). They knew that the Israelis would spend the Day of
Atonement in prayer, and the cities would seem to have disappeared: institutions and public
transport would not work, radio and television would stop broadcasting. However, the cunning
enemy did not take into account that it was precisely the lack of traffic on transport routes that
allowed the Israelis to quickly mobilize and receive reinforcements shortly after the start of the
attack.
It would not be entirely correct to call the Egyptian and Syrian attacks sudden, since it is well
known that mobilization in Israel was announced early in the morning, long before the start of
the invasion. Some members of the Israeli government had long been demanding urgent
measures, and the regular receipt of intelligence about the impending attack alarmed all the
ruling circles of this country. However, the uncertainty and indecision of Prime Minister Golda
Meir, who was under pressure from the US Secretary of State, as well as the suspicion of the
then Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, ultimately proved decisive.
The Israeli military was stunned by the force with which the enemy attacked the territory it had
captured in Sinai on October 6. Describing the tank battles of the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, many
historians compare them to such great historical events as the Battle of Kursk in World War II.
Witnesses of the battle recall the countless armada of Egyptian tanks stretching towards the
horizon towards the Israelis. The ground shook constantly from the explosions of artillery shells.
It was one of the largest tank battles in world history. At 14:00, an air attack was launched on
Israeli positions, and five minutes later Egyptian artillery launched a powerful strike involving
more than two thousand guns and mortars[2]. The readiness of the attack is evidenced by the fact
that in just twenty minutes the Egyptians had put out of action all the Israeli defensive firing
points, and ten minutes later they were on top of the fortress and directed their shells deeper into
the defenses. Their troops crossed the Suez Canal along its entire length, simultaneously
preparing crossings for equipment at seventy pre-determined locations. After lunch, an overjoyed
Anwar Sadat called the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, Vladimir Vinogradov, and shouted into the
receiver: “We have crossed the canal, we are on the east bank.”
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Although the surprise, speed, and scale of the enemy’s attack took the Israelis by surprise, their
reaction was not long in coming. As soon as the first Egyptian soldiers set foot on Israeli soil,
they were immediately attacked by tank units. Having no time to prepare, they acted blindly,
without intelligence, which turned out to be a very rash decision. As a result, by the end of the
day, Egyptian ATGM crews, with the help of infantry, managed to disable more than two
hundred Israeli tanks. The glorious Israeli air force also suffered defeat after defeat, losing more
than eighty aircraft in just three days.
On the evening of October 7, two tank, one mechanized and five Egyptian infantry divisions
already controlled the Sinai Peninsula. The number of infantrymen exceeded one hundred
thousand people, and the number of tanks exceeded eight hundred. At the same time, the
Egyptian Second Army went on the offensive towards the Mediterranean coast, and the Third
Army in the Suez area. The fighting continued at night, and in this regard the Egyptians and
Syrians had one significant advantage. The fact is that the main part of the Arab tank fleet was
made up of Soviet T-55s with night vision devices that could be controlled by the crew
commander and the gunner himself[3]. This made it possible to successfully fire on enemy
armored vehicles. In addition, the high maneuverability due to the small size and relatively low
weight of the T-55 made them less vulnerable to heavier and larger Israeli tanks. However, the
Israeli army tanks, despite their large size and weight, provided more comfortable conditions for
their crews, the elevation of the gun and the angle of depression, had two to three times more
ammunition and fuel tanks and more powerful engines. These factors later played an important
role in the outcome of that war.
The successes of the Arabs in the Sinai direction were offset by the failures of the Syrians in the
Golan Heights. Two days after the first attack, the Israelis came to their senses and on October 8
they launched a decisive military operation and dealt a very good blow to the Syrians. By
October 14, the Israeli army had made significant progress in the Damascus direction and was
firmly entrenched in the positions it had taken in order not to stretch communications.[5]
On October 10, after four days of fierce fighting, the situation on the battlefield stabilized
somewhat and a short respite began. From time to time, the Israelis launched small
counterattacks on Egyptian artillery positions. The lull was explained very simply: both sides of
the military conflict were waiting for reinforcements from their sponsors, the United States for
the Israelis, and the USSR for Egypt and Syria. The Israelis preferred not to take risks; their
position was already too dangerous, and any enemy attack could open the way for the Arabs to
the north and end in a breakthrough of the defense.
Activity on the Sinai front was resumed at 6:30 a.m. on October 14, when four Egyptian infantry
and two tank divisions launched a sharp attack on the enemy, advancing ten kilometers in
movement.[4] However, then the Arabs attacked two hundred dug-in Israeli tanks. With the
support of eighteen helicopters equipped with TOW ATGMs, the Israelis managed to destroy
almost half of the Egyptian tank brigade advancing near the Mitla Pass. Then, in the night battle,
they destroyed another two hundred and sixty Egyptian tanks and two hundred armored
personnel carriers. The losses of the Israeli army amounted to a little more than forty tanks. On
this day, General Mendler, who commanded the Israeli armored units in Sinai, was killed. The
losses on both sides were so great that the Israeli army was weakened. If it had not been for US
assistance, it is unlikely that the outcome of the October War would have been so favorable for
Israel. In those days, European countries had completely refused to provide military assistance to
the country. Golda Meir called Washington day and night, asking to meet with the American
president and arrange an airlift. His phrases sounded like this: “Help us today. “Tomorrow will
be too late.” At the same time, the Prime Minister constantly reminded the Americans that “a
huge supply of Russian weapons” was being delivered to Syria and Egypt. Golda Meir, by her
own admission, cried with joy - twenty-seven thousand tons of military cargo were delivered to
distant allies - tanks, shells and rockets, cluster bombs.
On October 14, a group of Israeli saboteurs disabled the Egyptian radio interception center in the
Jebel Ataka area. This loss greatly complicated its ability to control troops and conduct
reconnaissance. On October 15, the Israelis launched their first frontal counterattacks with nine
tank brigades. Although fierce fighting continued throughout the day, neither side achieved
success.
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October 15-16, 1973 On the night of 18 October, a small Israeli detachment of seven tanks and
eight armored personnel carriers crossed the Great Bitter Lake, capturing a small bridge on the
Egyptian side. The enemy army allowed the Israelis to advance without allocating additional
resources to the defense of the West Bank. Thanks to the presence of a bridge dug on the enemy
side, the Sharon units were able to build a pontoon bridge and transport tanks to the opposite
bank. On 18 October, the 252nd and 162nd Israeli divisions crossed the canal and began to
penetrate the rear of the main group of Egyptian troops, representing the Third Army.[3] One of
the first and most significant losses for the Egyptians was the complete destruction of the air
defense forces located west of the canal. And this, in turn, opened the sky for Israeli aviation. On
19 October, the Third The position of the army went from superior to threatened. The Israeli
army was preparing to deliver a decisive blow to its hated neighbor, but at that moment the UN
decided to intervene in the relations of the Middle Eastern states, demanding an immediate
cessation of hostilities. Both sides took advantage of the short lull to gather their forces to catch
their breath and prepare for new battles. The Israeli army was in no hurry to follow the advice of
the “big brothers” and stopped only after the capture of Suez on October 25, which was the final
chord of the battle in Sinai. Three days of psychological pressure on the ruling circles of Tel
Aviv, bringing the US nuclear forces and the Soviet airborne forces to full combat readiness, had
their effect[4]. The war was stopped.
All participants in the war suffered heavy losses: in nineteen days of fighting, the Arab states lost
three hundred and sixty-eight helicopters and airplanes (sixty-nine of which were shot down by
“their” air defense forces due to errors and misunderstandings) and one thousand seven hundred
armored vehicles. More than eighteen thousand people were killed, about fifty thousand were
injured. Israel lost one hundred and fourteen helicopters and airplanes, more than eight hundred
armored vehicles and tanks. About two and a half thousand Israelis were killed, seven and a half
thousand were injured. The Fourth Arab-Israeli War, according to most historians, ended in a
draw, with the exception of one positive moment: the Israeli elite finally began to work seriously
on improving relations with the countries of the Middle East. After the end of hostilities in Israel,
a commission was created headed by Shimon Agranat, the chairman of the Supreme Court of
Israel. It was she who was tasked with understanding the causes of the “misunderstanding” that
almost turned into a national disaster. The initial conclusions of the commission, published on
April 1, 1974, shocked the public. According to its conclusion, under the guise of training
exercises for Israeli intelligence services, the Egyptian military was prevented from revealing its
true intentions and the premature mobilization of forces was delayed in order not to provoke the
Arabs into conflict. Four months after the end of the conflict, Golda Meir openly stated that the
highest levels of the Israeli leadership had made serious mistakes that almost led to defeat. In
response, the majority of the country's population recognized her as the main culprit of the “Yom
Kippur War”. Some time later, more precisely, on April 11, 1974, at the height of a wave of
mass street protests, the prime minister was forced to resign and handed over his post to Yitzhak
Rabin, the former Israeli ambassador to the United States, who had commanded the General
Staff of the Israeli Army during the Six-Day War. "
Sharon, the war hero who almost single-handedly saved the nation from defeat, also received his
share, as he led the Southern District until the end of the summer of 1973. The implementation of
the current policy of national reconciliation was up to Menachem Begin, the successor to
Yitzhak Rabin, who was appointed Prime Minister of Israel in 1977. The result of this policy was
the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, which effectively ended the Arab struggle
against the Jewish state. The irony of history is that Begin reconciled with Sadat in 1971 on
terms that Golda Meir had rejected. The severe slap in the face of the "October War" proved
once again to Israel and the world that pride is a very bad adviser in politics.[3]
Conclusion.
The October War is becoming increasingly important as it recedes into the past. In
particular, it was a new era of military conflicts, in which various missiles of the “surface-to-air”,
“surface-to-surface”, “sea-to-surface” and “air-to-surface” classes began to be widely used. In
view of the findings, military strategists had to reconsider all military technology and science. In
addition, the Arab-Israeli war was the official cause of the first global oil crisis. On October 17,
1973, the main Arab oil exporters decided to reduce oil production and impose an embargo on
supplies to the United States. These measures had a significant impact on the world economy.
Among the subjective factors, it is worth noting the foreign policy of Anwar Sadat, who began to
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transform Egypt from an ally of the USSR into a state openly hostile to cooperation with the
United States. Soviet diplomats, under the auspices of Washington, gradually began to be
excluded from participation in the Middle East peace process, which took the form of bilateral
agreements between Israel and Egypt. In 1976, the first C-130 military transport aircraft from the
United States arrived in Egypt. At the same time (more precisely, on March 14, 1976), A. Sadat
announced the termination of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. Within a
month, all Soviet military services left the country.
List of used literature
1.
Лоскутов Р. М., Латушко О. И. Боевые действия египетской и израильской армий в
зоне Суэцкого канала в войне 1973 года.
2.
Кожухаров А. Ближний Восток: Октябрьская война 1973 года (Боевые действия
легких ракетно-артиллерийских сил на море в ходе арабо-израильской войны). // Морской
сборник. — 1998. — № 10. - С.60.
3.
Avigdor Kahalani. The heights of courage: a tank leader's war on the Golan. —
Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992. — 236 p. — ISBN 0275942694, 9780275942694.
4.
Abraham Rabinovich. The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the
Middle East. — Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2007. — P. 592.
5.
https://topwar.ru/35491-oktyabrskaya-voyna-1973-go-goda.html
