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ANTIMONOPOLY ASPECTS OF BIG DATA UTILIZATION IN E-COMMERCE:
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Khakimov Asadbek
Tashkent State University of Law
The student of Master’s degree Business Law
e-mail:
Abstract:
This article examines the pressing issues of antimonopoly regulation concerning the
use of Big Data in e-commerce. The author provides a detailed analysis of how the processing
and control of large data volumes can lead to market distortion, including the creation of entry
barriers for new market participants, personalized pricing, algorithmic collusion, and self-
preferencing by platforms in favor of their own products. The study offers a comparative
analysis of antitrust approaches in the European Union, the United States, and China based on
specific cases and precedents (Amazon, Google, Alibaba). Special attention is paid to the
legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan, particularly the new Law “On Competition” (№. LRU-
850), which, for the first time, includes specific provisions regarding digital platforms and the
use of Big Data. Based on international experience, recommendations are formulated for the
further improvement of national antimonopoly regulation in the context of the digital economy.
Keywords:
Big Data, antimonopoly regulation, e-commerce, digital economy, dominant
position, personalized pricing, algorithmic collusion, self-preferencing.
Introduction
In modern e-commerce, Big Data has become a strategic resource that significantly influences
the competitive environment. This term generally refers to large volumes of heterogeneous data
that companies collect and analyze at high speed to obtain commercially significant information.
In the field of e-commerce, such data may include consumer behavior, purchase history, search
queries, product ratings, and much more. The processing of such data enables online platforms to
improve the personalization of services and enhance efficiency; however, it simultaneously
creates new antimonopoly risks. Major technology companies with unique access to vast datasets
gain competitive advantages that may hinder market entry for new players and distort
competition conditions. As a result, antimonopoly authorities worldwide are closely monitoring
how the use of Big Data impacts competition in the digital economy [1].
The purpose of this article is to examine how the application of Big Data can affect competition
in the e-commerce sector and what measures regulators in different countries are taking to
prevent exclusionary practices. Special attention is given to international experience—the
practices of the European Union (EU), the United States, and China—as well as Uzbekistan’s
new national legislation. The article analyzes key legal provisions (such as Article 102 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Section 2 of the U.S. Sherman Act, and China’s
antimonopoly legislation) and provides precedent cases (cases against Amazon, Google, Alibaba,
and others) that illustrate current trends. Based on this comparison, conclusions will be drawn
about the most effective approaches and recommendations will be offered for areas that could be
considered in Uzbek competition regulation practice.
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Big Data and Competition in E-Commerce
The use of Big Data can affect competition in e-commerce in various ways. On the one hand, the
extensive use of data allows companies to better meet consumer demand—for example,
recommendation systems help customers find the products they need more quickly, while sellers
can optimize inventory. On the other hand, the concentration of large datasets in the hands of
certain major players may lead to the emergence of market power, which carries the risk of
restricting competition. Let us consider the main aspects:
•
Entry Barriers and Strengthening of Dominance.
Data is often referred to as the “new oil”
of the digital economy. The holder of an extensive database of user and transactional information
gains a competitive advantage that is difficult for new market entrants to replicate. For example,
global e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and Alibaba accumulate vast amounts of
information on the behavior of buyers and sellers, which allows them to continually improve
their services and strengthen their market positions. As a result, entry barriers for new firms
increase—it becomes difficult for them to compete without comparable data resources and
analytical capabilities. Antimonopoly regulators note that data is becoming an important factor
when assessing dominance in digital markets. For instance, in China, the 2021 Guidelines on
Platform Economy explicitly state that a company’s ability to collect and process large datasets
is one of the criteria for determining a dominant position [2].
•
Personalized Pricing and Discrimination.
The processing of large volumes of consumer data
enables dynamic and personalized pricing—setting different prices for different users based on
their profile, purchasing power, or previous behavior. From an economic perspective, this may
increase pricing efficiency, but there is a risk of price discrimination, where loyal or less price-
sensitive customers are systematically offered higher prices. Antimonopoly authorities are
concerned that “surveillance pricing” using Big Data can lead to the infringement of the interests
of certain consumer groups and weaken price competition. In 2024, the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission launched a special inquiry into such practices, requiring a number of companies to
disclose information on the use of algorithms and personal data for individualized pricing [3].
Such practices, if they result in the maintenance of inflated prices or the exclusion of competition,
may be qualified as unfair and subject to regulatory intervention.
•
Algorithmic Collusion and Price Coordination.
Another issue is the risk that dynamic
pricing algorithms based on Big Data may inadvertently lead to price coordination among
competitors. If competing sellers use similar automated pricing systems (for example, on a major
e-commerce platform), these algorithms, learning from the same market data, may develop
alarmingly similar pricing strategies. In theory, this can result in “tacit collusion”—situations
where prices remain consistently high without any explicit agreement between companies,
simply as a result of the parallel operation of self-learning algorithms [4]. Although such cases
are rarely identified in practice, there have been precedents. For example, in the United States in
2015, the Department of Justice charged a manager of a company selling goods on Amazon for
participating in price-fixing using an algorithm—sellers had agreed to maintain elevated prices
for certain products by programming their price bots accordingly [5]. This case demonstrated
that even algorithms can become instruments of antitrust violations if their coordinated behavior
is based on human agreements. In response, regulators and the academic community are now
exploring how to update competition law tools to account for such situations.
•
Self-Preferencing and the Use of Data to Exclude Competitors.
The possession of Big Data
in e-commerce gives platforms the ability to implement sophisticated pricing strategies and
control access to the market. The risk lies in the fact that a platform, effectively acting as a
“gatekeeper” to large groups of consumers, can promote its own goods or services at the expense
of independent partners. For example, having information about the best-selling products of
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third-party sellers, a platform can launch its own products in these niches and promote them
through search and recommendation algorithms, thereby squeezing out competitors. A platform
may also impose the use of its own services, technologies, or data on counterparties under threat
of worsening their position on the marketplace. All of these practices are under close scrutiny by
antimonopoly authorities, who seek to define the line between legitimate business strategy and
abuse of market power.
Thus, Big Data is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it increases efficiency and innovation
in e-commerce, while on the other; it requires fine-tuned antimonopoly regulation to prevent
digital giants from becoming unassailable monopolies. Let us consider how different
jurisdictions approach this challenge.
International Regulation: The Experience of the EU, USA, and China
European Union
For the European Union, countering monopolistic practices has traditionally been a priority of
competition policy. The main legal provision applicable to Big Data and digital platforms is
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This article directly
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by one or more undertakings within the internal
market of the EU. Specifically, the text of the article lists examples of abuses: imposing unfair
prices or trading conditions on counterparties, limiting production or technical development to
the detriment of consumers, discriminating between trading partners, and making the conclusion
of contracts subject to supplementary obligations unrelated to the subject of the contract [6]. In
other words, dominance itself is not prohibited—a company may hold a large market share if it is
achieved lawfully. However, a dominant undertaking bears a “special responsibility” not to
engage in conduct that distorts competition. This principle has been established in the case law of
the Court of Justice of the EU and serves as the basis for numerous cases against digital giants.
Big Data has become a focus in EU cases primarily through the lens of abuse of market power.
One of the most high-profile cases was the investigation against Amazon concerning the use of
data from third-party sellers. Amazon combines the functions of a platform (a marketplace for
independent sellers) and its own retail operations. The European Commission found that
Amazon, holding a dominant position in the largest EU markets (Germany, France) in online
retail, systematically collected and analyzed confidential data on the sales of independent sellers
on its platform and then used this information to make business decisions for its own retail
operations. Essentially, the company could see which products sold best among third-party
merchants and used this insider information to develop its own products and optimize pricing,
thereby gaining an unfair advantage. The European Commission regarded these actions as a
violation of Article 102 TFEU—an abuse of dominance—since fair competition on the platform
was distorted to the detriment of third-party sellers [7].
At the same time, the EU regulator examined whether Amazon was abusing its position in
managing key elements of the platform’s infrastructure—specifically, the Buy Box system (the
“Add to Cart” feature on product pages) and the Prime program. There were concerns that the
algorithms determining the winner of the Buy Box and the admission of sellers to Prime unfairly
favored either Amazon itself (when it sells products directly) or those sellers who use Amazon’s
logistics services (Fulfillment by Amazon). The European Commission’s preliminary findings
confirmed these concerns: Amazon could give preference to itself and its logistics partners,
thereby making it more difficult for other sellers to access attractive options and, consequently,
customers.
Facing the prospect of fines and prolonged litigation, Amazon, at the end of 2022, proposed a
settlement (commitments) that the European Commission approved and made legally binding.
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According to these commitments, Amazon undertook to cease using non-public data from
independent sellers for its own commercial purposes. In particular, the company agreed not to
use marketplace information (such as data on sales, prices, or inventory of sellers) to inform its
own retail offers, including private label products. Furthermore, Amazon committed to ensuring
equal access to the Buy Box and the Prime program: it must modify the algorithms so that all
sellers compete for the Buy Box on equal terms according to clear criteria (without hidden
favoritism), and the purchase box must simultaneously display two competing offers from
different sellers if the second is not inferior in terms of price and delivery. Regarding Prime,
Amazon agreed not to impose discriminatory requirements and to allow sellers to freely choose
any delivery services without the risk of losing the Prime badge [8]. These measures are intended
to restore competition on the platform and prevent possible future abuse of data.
Another landmark example is the Google Shopping case. Google was fined a record €2.42 billion
by the European Commission for abuse of its dominant position in the search engine market,
expressed in the unlawful self-preferencing of its own comparison shopping service (Google
Shopping) in search results. According to the Commission’s findings, Google, holding about
90% of the search market in the EU, artificially promoted its shopping service to the top of
search results while demoting competing price comparison aggregators. This led to decreased
traffic for competitors and strengthened Google’s position in the adjacent comparison shopping
market. The EU Court in 2021–2022 upheld the regulator’s decision, explicitly stating that the
practice of placing one’s own product in the best positions on the search results page is
discriminatory and violates Article 102 TFEU. The Google Shopping case set a precedent by
establishing the obligation of digital platforms with dominant positions not to create privileges
for their own services to the detriment of competitors.
Subsequently, the EU adopted the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which directly prohibits the
largest online gatekeeper platforms from engaging in self-preferencing, mandatory use of their
own services, and other behaviors observed in the Google, Amazon, and other cases [9]. While
the DMA is an experiment in preventive regulation that goes beyond classical antitrust law, its
adoption highlights a broader trend: the European Union seeks to actively control the impact of
Big Data and digital platforms on competition by combining the application of existing rules
(such as Article 102 TFEU) with new regulatory measures.
It is important to note that in the EU, precedents related to Big Data arise not only in the field of
e-commerce but also in adjacent areas—such as social networks and user data. Antimonopoly
authorities in some member states have attempted to interpret excessive data collection as a form
of abuse of dominance (for example, the Facebook case in Germany, where the
Bundeskartellamt found a violation of competition in the data collection policy without user
consent). Although that case was strongly oriented toward data protection, it demonstrates the
willingness of European regulators to interpret abuses broadly, including exploitative abuses, if
the collection or use of data violates the interests of consumers and competitors [10]. Overall, the
European model is characterized by its aim to ensure a level playing field in digital markets: a
dominant company should not use its informational advantage to suppress competition. If such
practices are identified, the EU has a wide array of measures (fines of up to 10% of global
turnover, orders to change conduct, and now new regulations) to stop abuses and restore a
competitive environment.
United States of America
U.S. antitrust policy is based on the Sherman Act of 1890, which became the world’s first
antitrust law. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that “monopolization, attempted
monopolization, or conspiracy to monopolize any part of trade or commerce” is illegal and
subject to criminal prosecution [11]. In simple terms, U.S. law prohibits both the unfair
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acquisition or maintenance of a monopoly and any attempt to do so. However, it is important to
understand that under American legal doctrine, the mere fact of possessing monopoly power
does not constitute a violation if that power was achieved through competitive merit (skill,
foresight, and industry). The violation arises when there is abuse of that power—meaning
deliberate actions aimed at suppressing competition (so-called “anticompetitive conduct”). Over
the twentieth century, U.S. courts developed a test: to bring a charge under Section 2, it must be
proven (1) that monopoly power exists in the market, and (2) that prohibited means were used to
acquire or maintain it—i.e., means that exclude competitors without objective justification. This
approach has long made U.S. law more tolerant of dominant firms, requiring authorities to
carefully demonstrate specific harm to competition or consumers.
Nevertheless, the growing role of Big Data and digital platforms in the economy has led to a
reassessment of American antitrust priorities. In recent years, the United States has launched a
series of high-profile cases against the largest technology corporations, effectively accusing them
of monopolizing digital markets. One of the central cases has been the lawsuit by the U.S.
Department of Justice (DoJ) against Google. In 2020, the DoJ and a coalition of states filed suit
against Google, alleging that the company had unlawfully monopolized the search engine and
search advertising markets, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The key argument of
the prosecution was that Google, holding a dominant position in search (>90% of queries), had
entered into exclusive agreements with Apple and other device and browser manufacturers,
paying them billions to set Google as the default search engine on all major platforms. These
actions were viewed as exclusionary conduct, leaving competitors (such as Bing or
DuckDuckGo) with no realistic chance to reach a significant audience, thus entrenching
Google’s monopoly in the search market.
The case went to trial, and in 2024, a federal judge issued a historic decision: Google was found
to be a monopolist that had unlawfully maintained its dominance through exclusive deals and
other practices that restricted competition. This was the first major victory for U.S. authorities in
the battle against Big Tech in recent decades and opened the way for discussions on possible
remedies for restructuring the company (including the possible divestiture of parts of Google’s
business) [12]. While final measures are still pending, the very fact of the technological giant
being found guilty of monopolization signals a turning point in the approach—the U.S. is now
prepared to actively enforce existing laws to curb digital monopolies.
At the same time, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is taking action against another
dominant e-commerce platform—Amazon. For a long time, Amazon avoided direct lawsuits in
the United States, although its business model, especially its control over the online marketplace
and use of data, raised questions. In September 2023, the FTC, together with 17 state attorneys
general, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Amazon, accusing the company of unlawfully
maintaining monopoly power in the online retail market. The complaint alleges that Amazon
employs “a set of interrelated anticompetitive and unfair strategies” that create barriers for
competitors and maintain its dominance. Specifically, Amazon is accused of punishing sellers for
attempting to offer lower prices on other platforms (thus “inflating prices” across the internet),
forcing them to use its paid services (logistics, advertising) under the threat of losing traffic, and
hindering the growth of potential competing platforms by entering into exclusive agreements
with them or simply acquiring them. According to regulators, such actions lead to higher prices,
lower quality of service, and suppression of innovation, to the detriment of both consumers and
sellers [13]. The FTC emphasizes that Amazon’s size alone is not illegal; what is unlawful is the
combination of exclusive measures aimed at preventing rivals from gaining a foothold or even
emerging. This court case is just beginning, but it is already regarded as a key test for the new
approach of American antitrust authorities: they will need to convince the court that the platform
is abusing its Big Data and market ecosystem, even if final consumer prices have not increased
significantly. A successful outcome in the case against Amazon could set an important precedent,
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confirming the applicability of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to modern digital platforms and
their data management practices.
In addition to direct enforcement, there is an active discussion in the U.S. about improving
legislation in light of the digital economy. On Capitol Hill, bills have been discussed aimed at
limiting the power of Big Tech (for example, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act,
which prohibits large platforms from favoring their own services). Although these initiatives
have not become law at the time of writing, they reflect a bipartisan consensus on the need to
update antitrust rules. Notably, the new wave of interest in Big Data is also manifesting itself in
related areas: issues of data privacy and competition are increasingly being linked. The FTC has
openly stated that surveillance of user behavior and the accumulation of detailed profiles can be
used not only to undermine privacy but also to undermine price competition (through
personalized pricing, for example) [14]. As a result, the American regulator is in fact expanding
its role, including “commercial surveillance” among the factors influencing the market.
In summary for the United States:
the legal framework remains the same (the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act, etc.), but interpretation is changing—Big Data and the associated effects
(network effects, economies of scale, information about competitors and consumers) are now
recognized as significant elements of analysis. U.S. antitrust agencies are showing a willingness
to aggressively pursue cases where the use of data and platform control leads to monopolization
of e-commerce markets. This is a significant shift compared to previous decades, and it is likely
that court practice in the coming years will clarify the boundaries of acceptable conduct for
dominant digital firms.
China
China’s antimonopoly legislation is relatively young—the basic PRC Anti-Monopoly Law
(AML) was adopted in 2007 and entered into force in 2008. Structurally, it largely resembles EU
regulations: it also prohibits anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and
anticompetitive economic concentrations. In particular, Article 17 of the AML (in its previous
version) states that companies holding a dominant market position are not entitled to abuse it for
the purpose of eliminating or restricting competition, and lists a number of prohibited practices
(imposing excessively high or low prices, restricting production or sales, refusal to deal without
objective grounds, exclusivity, discrimination, etc.) [15]. Thus, according to the letter of the law,
Chinese rules are very similar to those of Europe—dominance itself is not prohibited, but its
abuse is strictly suppressed.
For a long time, antimonopoly regulation in China was characterized by moderation, especially
regarding national internet giants. However, the situation has changed in recent years. Due to the
rapid growth of the platform economy, Chinese authorities have taken a course towards
tightening control over big tech. Big Data and digital platforms have come into sharp focus for
Chinese regulators around 2020–2021 [16]. This has manifested both in high-profile
investigations and updates to the regulatory framework.
The most well-known case is the Alibaba matter. Alibaba Group, the operator of the largest e-
commerce platforms in China (Taobao, Tmall), was fined a record 18.2 billion yuan (about $2.8
billion) by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) in April 2021 for abuse of
its dominant position. The regulator found that since 2015, Alibaba had pursued a policy known
as “er xuan yi” (“choose one out of two”): it forced sellers to work exclusively with its platforms,
prohibiting them from selling on competing marketplaces [17]. Violations were punishable by
sanctions (lower rankings, reduced traffic, etc.). This practice enabled Alibaba to maintain a
leading market share by artificially limiting sellers’ access to alternative sales channels and was
found to be illegal. The Alibaba fine—the largest in China’s history—became a demonstrative
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measure, showing Beijing’s serious intention to rein in the anticompetitive behavior of internet
giants.
In addition to Alibaba, in 2021–2022, other major platforms also faced penalties: for example,
the delivery service Meituan was fined for a similar exclusive practice, and several transactions
involving Tencent, Baidu, and others were reviewed over concerns that the consolidation of big
data was strengthening monopolies. Thus, Chinese authorities, almost simultaneously with
Western regulators, launched a large-scale campaign against monopolistic trends in the digital
sphere.
An important feature of China is the combination of retrospective penalties and preventive
regulation. In February 2021 (amid the Alibaba case), the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the
State Council of China issued the “Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy.” This
document became a sort of interpretation of antimonopoly legislation as applied to major
platforms. Among other things, it confirmed the role of data in the assessment of dominance:
regulators now officially consider whether a company has significant advantages in access to
data when determining its market power. It was also noted that the concentration of data (for
example, during company mergers) can strengthen market power, and that when considering
transactions, the authorities will analyze whether the merging of databases leads to the restriction
of competition [18]. The Guidelines directly stated that it is prohibited to use data and algorithms
to carry out monopolistic practices, whether it be collusion (such as data sharing to coordinate
prices) or abuse of dominance.
A logical continuation of this process was the revision of the law itself. In June 2022, China
adopted the first package of amendments to the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The amendments
came into force in August 2022 and were largely aimed at the digital economy. In particular, the
new provisions established that companies must not use data, algorithms, technology, capital, or
platform rules to engage in monopolistic behavior. This general provision (Article 9 of the new
version of the AML) reflects the principle that tools of the digital economy cannot serve as a
cover for old anticompetitive practices. Additionally, specifically in cases of dominance, it is
now stipulated that dominant companies are prohibited from abusing their position by using data,
algorithms, technologies, or platform rules. This provision directly targets situations where, for
example, a platform changes its recommendation algorithm to exclude competitors, or uses
collected Big Data about users to lock them into its own service and exclude alternatives. The
amendments significantly increased penalties for violations and introduced the concept of a
temporary suspension ("stop-the-clock") in the review of transactions, allowing for more
thorough scrutiny of mergers in the digital sector [19].
The practical application of the updated law has already begun. In 2023, it was reported that
regulators are closely monitoring new business models (such as short-term rentals, sharing
economy services) for signs of data monopolization, and are also requiring large platforms to
improve third-party access to their ecosystems. The Chinese approach may seem strict:
authorities essentially impose directive restrictions on the freedom of dominant firms, especially
when they see a threat of “big data monopolies.” However, it is important to consider that the
Chinese market is unique—due to the absence of traditional competition from foreign companies
(Google, Facebook, etc. are blocked in China), dominance by local giants can occur more rapidly.
Therefore, the regulator acts as an active arbiter, leveling the playing field for competition out of
considerations of national policy and consumer protection. Many experts note that international
trends—EU fines, investigations in the US—gave Chinese authorities both a signal and
justification for similar actions [20]. At the same time, China follows its own path, emphasizing
preventive regulation through updated legislation. Already, the Chinese AML contains
provisions not directly found in the EU or US (for example, a direct ban on the use of algorithms
and data for monopolistic practices). Thus, China seeks to embed the control of Big Data into the
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very foundations of antimonopoly law, striving to support the “healthy development of the
digital economy,” as proclaimed in their official documents.
National Experience: Uzbekistan
In recent years, the Republic of Uzbekistan has also modernized its competition legislation in
response to global trends in the digital economy. In July 2023, a new Law of the Republic of
Uzbekistan “On Competition” (№. LRU-850) was adopted and entered into force in autumn
2023. This law replaced the previous legislation and incorporated a number of innovations that
reflect, among other things, the challenges of digital markets. The explanatory materials noted
that new terminology has been introduced—concepts such as “digital platform,” “superior
bargaining power,” and others directly related to the modern realities of e-commerce.
From the perspective of antimonopoly regulations, the Uzbek law is harmonized with the
principles adopted in the EU and other jurisdictions. It prohibits anticompetitive agreements,
unfair competition, abuse of dominant position, and so forth. Abuse of dominance covers the
standard range of actions (setting monopoly high or low prices, creating artificial shortages,
discriminatory conditions, forcing unfavorable deals, etc.)—effectively mirroring the provisions
analogous to Article 102 of the TFEU and Article 17 of the Chinese AML. A significant
innovation is a special provision aimed at digital platforms. The law introduces an article
whereby an operator of a digital platform, recognized as holding a dominant position, is not
entitled to engage in actions that restrict competition by imposing mandatory requirements for
the use of certain information, technologies, or digital products. In other words, a dominant
platform is prohibited from abusing its position by requiring market participants to use its
informational resources or technical solutions if this leads to a restriction of competition. This
provision directly correlates with the issues discussed above in the context of Amazon, Alibaba,
and others: a platform should not force sellers or users to exclusively use its data or tools to
retain them and prevent them from accessing competitors. The emergence of such a provision
indicates that Uzbek lawmakers have carefully studied international experience and provided
safeguards against potential abuses in digital markets.
In addition, the new Uzbek law has changed the criteria for determining dominance, including,
apart from market share, other factors. In particular, it introduces the concept of “superior
bargaining power,” applicable in cases where a company’s market share may not be formally
monopolistic, but it possesses incomparably greater economic power in relation to its
counterparties (for example, a large platform vs. many small suppliers). This innovation is once
again inspired by modern practice: even if the market share of an electronic platform is less than
50%, it can still dictate terms to thousands of sellers, which requires oversight. Thus,
Uzbekistan’s competition legislation in its new version seeks to account for the specific
mechanisms of the digital economy, where the power of a platform is determined not only by
market percentage but also by the dependence of other players on it.
It is important to note that the Law “On Competition” (2023) establishes the priority of
international rules, if an international treaty establishes rules different from national ones [21].
This demonstrates a willingness to follow the best global practices. In the context of Big Data
and e-commerce, Uzbekistan, of course, does not yet have high-profile precedents comparable to
those in the EU, US, or China—largely due to the smaller scale of the digital market. However,
the prerequisites for attention to this topic already exist. National e-commerce is actively
developing, with local marketplaces and fintech platforms emerging. In addition, foreign digital
services (such as social networks, messengers, and marketplaces from neighboring countries) are
beginning to play a noticeable role. Under these circumstances, the Antimonopoly Committee of
the Republic of Uzbekistan is provided by the new law with modern tools to monitor and
suppress possible abuses. For example, if a major platform begins to restrict sellers from working
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with other marketplaces or uses collected data to squeeze out competitors, the law allows for
intervention and the issuance of an order to cease such practices. Uzbek legislation now also
provides for mandatory antimonopoly compliance requirements for dominant firms and
government agencies, which should improve the culture of compliance with competition rules in
the digital environment.
Overall, Uzbekistan’s national experience is still at the initial stage of implementing the updated
norms. It will be necessary to develop law enforcement practice, and perhaps to adopt bylaws or
guidelines for interpreting new concepts (such as “digital platform”). Here, international
experience will be especially valuable: cooperation with foreign antimonopoly authorities,
studying Big Tech cases, and adapting successful methods for detecting and proving violations in
the digital sphere. As Uzbekistan is integrated into the global economy and is attracting
investment into the IT sector, harmonizing approaches to Big Data regulation with global
standards will contribute both to the protection of competition and to the creation of clear
conditions for business.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Analysis of international and national practice shows that the use of Big Data in e-commerce is a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, Big Data enables companies to innovate, more accurately
meet demand, and increase trading efficiency. On the other hand, its concentration in the hands
of certain players can lead to a distortion of the competitive environment—from the creation of
nearly insurmountable barriers for new companies to the emergence of subtle forms of abuse that
are not immediately apparent to consumers (such as personalized pricing or algorithmic
coordination).
International experience (EU, USA, China) demonstrates a converging trend: regulators
worldwide do not intend to passively observe the rise of digital giants; instead, they seek to adapt
antimonopoly tools to the era of Big Data. In the European Union, there is a combination of strict
enforcement (fines and orders under Article 102 TFEU in cases against Google, Amazon, etc.)
with new ex ante measures (DMA) specifically targeting major data gatekeepers. In the United
States, which relies on the century-old Sherman Act, the focus of enforcement has shifted: from
a relatively liberal approach to monopolies (as long as they supposedly benefit consumers) to a
determined struggle against Big Tech—even if consumer prices do not rise, but competition and
innovation are harmed. This is illustrated by the landmark lawsuits against Google and Amazon,
intended to demonstrate that monopolization of digital markets is unacceptable. China, for its
part, has taken a path of strict state control, quickly updating its laws and signaling to business
that the use of data and algorithms is under oversight: monopolies will not be allowed to flourish,
even if this requires record fines to curb the ambitions of the largest companies. Despite
differences in political and legal systems, all three jurisdictions agree that Big Data can become a
factor in strengthening market power, and that to keep e-commerce competitive and open,
adequate regulatory responses are required.
For Uzbekistan, this experience is highly instructive. The updated national legislation has already
laid a good foundation by introducing the concepts of digital platforms and restrictions for them,
as well as expanding the tools for monitoring potential monopolists. Going forward, it is
important to ensure the effective implementation of these provisions. The following
recommendations are proposed:
Continue monitoring digital markets (e-commerce, online services) for the emergence of
companies with signs of dominance and analyze whether they are using Big Data to the
detriment of competition (for example, collecting data on competitors or entering into exclusive
agreements with key partners).
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Drawing on international practice, develop interpretative guidelines or methodological
recommendations for businesses: what data practices are considered unacceptable. For instance,
clarify that forcing counterparties into exclusivity or using others’ data for self-preferencing
should be under special scrutiny.
Strengthen cooperation with foreign antimonopoly authorities. Exchanging information
on global digital platforms will help to better understand their strategies. For example, if Amazon
or Alibaba decide to enter the Uzbek market, the regulator will already be equipped with
knowledge of their “typical” problematic behavior abroad.
Enhance the competencies of antimonopoly authorities in the fields of Big Data and
algorithms. As cases of algorithmic pricing show, regulators need to understand technical aspects.
It may be advisable to involve IT experts and develop data science analytics within agencies to
identify hidden anticompetitive practices.
Ensure a balance between supporting digital transformation and protecting competition.
The main task is not to turn Big Data control into a brake on innovation. The purpose of
antimonopoly regulation is to prevent abuses, but also to encourage fair competition based on
data—where companies compete in better analytics and service for consumers, not in building
closed ecosystems.
In conclusion, the use of Big Data in e-commerce opens enormous opportunities for market
growth and improving the consumer experience. But as global practice shows, without oversight,
this can also lead to the concentration of power in the hands of a few platforms, which can
dictate terms to others. The international community has already learned the first lessons and
begun to develop new rules of the game—from court decisions prohibiting self-preferencing to
entire laws regulating digital “gatekeepers.” Uzbekistan, taking its first steps in this direction, has
the opportunity to proactively implement the best approaches while its digital markets are still
forming. The competent application of antimonopoly principles to Big Data will ensure that e-
commerce develops on a competitive basis, innovation is not stifled by monopolism, and both
consumers and businesses receive the maximum benefit from the digital economy without abuses
by dominant players.
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_o_konkurencii_(prinyat_zakonodatelnoy_palatoy_14_02_2023_g_odobren_senatom_02_03_20
