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RELATIONS WITH ASEAN IN JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LATE 20TH
CENTUR
Scientific advisor:
S.Sh.Pirimkulova
teacher of the Department of World History, Faculty of History
Samarkand State University named after Sharof Rashidov
Student:
A.Ne’matov
student of the Faculty of History
Samarkand State University named after Sharof Rashidov
Student of the IV stage
Abstract:
This article highlights Japan's foreign policy relations with the ASEAN organization
in the late 20th century, including visits by Japanese leaders to Southeast Asian countries, as well
as treaties and cooperative efforts. It also discusses Japan's influence on the development of
ASEAN member states and provides information about ASEAN+3.
Keywords:
Fukuda Doctrine, ASEAN, the UN, JICA, “JENESYS”, ASEAN + 3, Zenko Suzuki,
JAIF.
After World War II, Japan was forced to radically reassess its foreign policy. By the second half
of the 20th century, Japan had achieved significant economic growth, but remained militarily
constrained. As a result, it sought to expand its political and economic influence through regional
cooperation. Strengthening relations with Southeast Asian countries became a strategic
priority.The main directions of this approach were outlined in the famous Fukuda Doctrine,
announced in 1977 by Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of
Malaysia.The Fukuda Doctrine: An Approach Based on Peace, Participation, and Respect.The
Fukuda Doctrine represented a new conceptual framework for Japan’s role in Southeast Asia. It
declared that Japan’s engagement in the region would not be based on military power or strategic
dominance, but rather on principles of economic cooperation, cultural closeness, and political
trust.The doctrine encompassed three core principles:
1.
Establishing sincere “heart-to-heart” relationships with the peoples of Southeast Asia –
this principle was aimed at strengthening cooperation on the basis of equality, using Japan’s
economic power. It reflected a rejection of the legacy of colonialism and the pursuit of new
political relations based on mutual respect.
2.
Japan’s non-military role in the region – Fukuda clearly stated that Japan did not aim to
reestablish itself as a military power and would not pose a threat to the region. This position
helped to alleviate concerns among the peoples of Southeast Asia that had arisen due to Japan’s
historical military activities. [1 B-89]
3.
Supporting ASEAN’s ZOPFAN initiative – that is, Japan’s political support for the
concept of the “Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality.” This initiative aimed to maintain the
region as a neutral area free from military blocs. By endorsing this idea, Japan contributed to
regional security policy not through military means, but through diplomatic engagement.
The Fukuda Doctrine was warmly welcomed by ASEAN member states. It demonstrated Japan’s
intention to support regional integration not through military power, but through economic and
cultural cooperation. The doctrine marked the beginning of a new era in ASEAN–Japan relations
and contributed to enhancing Japan’s international reputation through its “soft power” foreign
policy approach. [2 B-151] This political statement was reflected in practical programs. Japan
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began providing technical assistance, grants, and investments to ASEAN countries. Priority areas
included energy, infrastructure, agriculture, education, healthcare, and environmental
protection.Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Japan was recognized as one of the largest donor
countries to ASEAN. According to UN development programs, Japan provided over 10 billion
USD in aid to ASEAN during this period.
The Fukuda Doctrine brought positive outcomes for Japan not only economically, but also
diplomatically. It fully separated Japan’s foreign policy from military approaches and portrayed
the country as one that respects the independent development paths of Southeast Asian nations.
Moreover, the doctrine served as a favorable political foundation for Japan to gain the trust of
Global South countries in international forums, particularly within the United Nations.
Through the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan launched a new political course with ASEAN countries
based on mutual equality, pacifism, and cooperation. This doctrine, in turn, elevated ASEAN–
Japan relations to a qualitatively new level. A political approach not grounded in military power,
but in economic, social, and cultural diplomacy, enabled Japan to establish long-term influence
in the East Asian region.
Announced in 1977 by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, the Fukuda Doctrine marked a major
turning point in Japan’s foreign policy. In the following years, initiatives carried out in the spirit
of this doctrine further deepened Japan’s economic, political, and cultural influence in the
ASEAN region.The Fukuda Doctrine established the approach of engaging with ASEAN through
“soft power” means. This approach was implemented through economic aid, human capital
development, cultural exchanges, and the promotion of institutional trust mechanisms. Notably,
new initiatives proposed by Japanese prime ministers in the 1980s aimed to deliver the practical
outcomes of this doctrine.
During his 1981 visit to ASEAN, Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki proposed a series of
initiatives aimed at strengthening Japan’s active participation in the region’s socio-economic
development. Among the most important of these were technical assistance projects focused on
human capital development. In his speech, Suzuki announced Japan’s readiness to share its
experience and technology with ASEAN countries. Within this framework, Japan implemented
special training programs, technology transfer projects, and the dispatch of experts in agriculture,
healthcare, and industrial development through the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA).
According to JICA data, by the late 1980s, more than 10,000 specialists from ASEAN countries
had undergone training in courses organized by Japan. [3 B-64] This led to significant
improvements in technical infrastructure, public administration, energy policy,
telecommunications, and healthcare sectors within ASEAN nations.
In 1983, the youth exchange program initiated by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone marked a
new phase in Japan–ASEAN cultural relations. This initiative, in the spirit of the Fukuda
Doctrine’s “heart-to-heart” approach, aimed to strengthen cultural integration, overcome
stereotypes, and build mutual trust. The main goal of the Nakasone government was to establish
cultural, academic, and social bridges between the youth of Japan and Southeast Asia. As part of
this effort, memorandums of cooperation were signed between Japanese universities and
educational institutions in ASEAN countries. Through the JENESYS (Japan-East Asia Network
of Exchange for Students and Youths) program, thousands of students and young leaders
participated annually in study visits, seminars, and internships in Japan. [4 B-211] This program
helped Japan present itself not merely as an economic donor but as a country with a positive
image in the region through cultural diplomacy. The growing positive attitudes toward Japan
among ASEAN youth laid the foundation for strengthening political and economic ties in the
future. The initiatives of Suzuki and Nakasone became consistent continuations of the Fukuda
Doctrine. Despite changes in Japan’s ruling parties, the approach of steady and consistent
cooperation with Southeast Asian countries was maintained. Each new government sought to
deepen strategic partnership with ASEAN. This policy opened new opportunities for Japan,
especially in the 1990s, when the trend of “more ASEAN, less reliance on the US” gained
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strength. Japan emerged in the region as a friendly, trustworthy, and long-term partner through
its “soft power.” This, in turn, allowed Japan to gain diplomatic benefits without directly
interfering in the regional political climate.The Fukuda Doctrine and the subsequent initiatives
by Suzuki and Nakasone contributed to the formation of multifaceted, trust-based, and stable
relations between Japan and ASEAN. During this period, Japan’s foreign policy went beyond
economic aid and also made significant contributions in cultural exchange, human capital
development, and social assistance. As a result, today Japan is not only an economic partner for
ASEAN but also a close strategic partner politically and culturally.
After World War II, Japan reoriented its foreign policy based on economic diplomacy. In
particular, through cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, Japan not only strengthened its
influence but also became a key participant in advancing economic integration and infrastructure
development in the region. In its partnership with ASEAN, Japan placed great emphasis on
financing infrastructure projects as a major part of its Official Development Assistance (ODA).
Between the 1980s and 2000s, Japan provided approximately 100 billion US dollars in economic
aid to ASEAN in the form of loans, grants, and technical assistance. The majority of this aid was
directed toward infrastructure projects and was implemented through Japan’s financial
institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA), and others. For example, Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard Development Program
was carried out with Japanese financial support. Under this program, highways, ports (including
Laem Chabang Port), industrial zones, and railway networks were constructed, creating the
necessary logistics infrastructure to foster industrial development in the region. [5 B-147]
Similarly, modernization of the Surabaya and Jakarta ports in Indonesia was financed by
Japanese investments. These large-scale infrastructure projects facilitated the movement of
goods and services within ASEAN, reduced logistics costs, and accelerated regional integration.
Japan participated not only as a financial supporter but also took an active role in project
management, technological expertise, and construction.
Practically, Japan’s foreign direct investments helped improve efficiency in labor-intensive
industries in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.This process
intensified after the 1985 Plaza Accord, as the yen appreciated significantly against major
currencies.
Japan’s sustained economic boom also offered a large and lucrative market for Southeast Asian
exporters. Official development assistance, based on the principles of self-help and sensitivity to
host country contexts, was expanded to catalyze Southeast Asia’s growth. Over time, Southeast
Asia experienced rapid development. Japan facilitated this growth by transferring capital and
technologies to its neighbors. However, by the 1990s, Japan’s economic slowdown and the
strong performance of firms from other rapidly growing East Asian economies somewhat
weakened this perspective. Although Japan still maintained a trade surplus in technology-
intensive goods and services, its relations with Southeast Asia—which were once primarily
driven by economic concerns—evolved into more interpersonal and multifaceted cooperation.
This shift is clearly reflected in the sustained popularity of Japanese educational programs,
cultural events, and entertainment across Southeast Asia. These exchanges, emdiving the “soft”
elements of the Fukuda Doctrine, transformed diplomatic formalities into meaningful and
dynamic interactions. Another clear example of this change is the willingness of Japanese
companies to hire not only graduates of Japanese universities but also Southeast Asian talents to
manage their operations.
Despite recent challenges in great power relations, opportunities for cooperation between
ASEAN and Japan remain. It is easy to overlook Japan’s leadership in maintaining
internationally significant initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—which the United
States transformed into a comprehensive and progressive agreement after initially withdrawing
from the original deal. Although only four ASEAN member states have so far confirmed their
participation in this economic cooperation, the door remains open for others to join in the future.
This is largely due to ASEAN member countries’ skillful balancing of interests within the
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Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which unites ASEAN members with
their “Plus Five” partners: China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, cautious consultations and discreet diplomacy by Japan’s
economic elites helped lay the foundation for the creation of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic
Research Office (AMRO). Although its establishment occurred largely in response to the 1997
Asian financial crisis, which severely impacted nearly all East Asian countries, AMRO arguably
represents the closest East Asia has come to a “regional self-help institution.
Since its inception, the initiative has evolved into a knowledge center that contributes to the
region’s macroeconomic and financial stability and resilience through monitoring, regional
financing, and technical assistance. Practically, unlike the top-down and vocal approach adopted
by the International Monetary Fund during the Asian financial crisis, AMRO offers a more
cautious and alternative perspective to the ASEAN+3 financial institutions. Japan’s approach to
diplomacy and regional integration sharply contrasts with that of other major powers. It
emphasizes building consensus and “leading from behind.” While these practices can be time-
consuming and not always widely embraced, they are valued by the Southeast Asian countries.
One of Japan's strategic policies in ASEAN was the relocation and expansion of its
manufacturing bases within the region. Through this, Japan combined its advanced
manufacturing capabilities with the labor-intensive economies of ASEAN countries to create
manufacturing hubs for the entire Asian continent. Since the 1980s, major Japanese multinational
corporations such as Toyota, Mitsubishi, Sony, Panasonic, and Honda established manufacturing
centers in ASEAN countries in key sectors like electronics, automobile manufacturing,
semiconductors, and the chemical industry. For example, Toyota opened several large factories
in Thailand, turning the country into a regional hub for automobile exports. Similarly, clusters
producing electronic components were developed in the Philippines and Malaysia. [6 B-215]
These investments not only boosted industrial development but also created thousands of jobs,
facilitated technology transfer, and significantly enhanced the export capacities of ASEAN
countries. Moreover, through this approach, Japan was able to establish stable and resilient
manufacturing supply chains.
Japan’s economic strategy was not limited to state-level assistance but also involved
active participation from the private sector. Japanese banks, financial institutions, and investment
funds collaborated with numerous financial entities in ASEAN. In this process, Japanese
companies expanded their economic interests by forming joint ventures with local firms,
participating in stock markets, and supporting startups. Notably, through the Japan-ASEAN
Integration Fund (JAIF), dozens of projects related to technical assistance, business strategy, and
digital infrastructure were financed. This fund serves to enhance ASEAN’s potential in areas
such as the digital economy, e-commerce, and e-government. Japan-ASEAN economic relations
have become firmly established, particularly through strategic approaches in infrastructure and
manufacturing sectors. Japan has deeply engaged in the region not only as a donor and investor
but also by contributing knowledge, technology, and management expertise. This involvement
has brought many positive changes to the ASEAN economies and made Japan’s influence in the
region long-lasting and sustainable.
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Pants, K. Japan's soft power in east asia: cultural diplomacy and the youth
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